A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia

Edited by Andrew T.H. Tan

A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia

Edited by
Andrew T.H. Tan

Associate Professor of International Studies,
University of New South Wales

Edward Elgar
Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© Andrew T.H. Tan 2007

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.

Published by
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
Glensanda House
Montpellier Parade
Cheltenham
Glos GL50 1UA
UK

Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
William Pratt House
9 Dewey Court
Northampton
Massachusetts 01060
USA

A catalogue record for this book
is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data

A handbook of terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia / edited by Andrew T.H. Tan.
p. cm. — (Elgar original reference)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Terrorism—Southeast Asia. 2. Terrorism—Religious aspects—Islam. I. Tan, Andrew T. H. (Andrew Tian Huat)
HV6433.A785T36 2007
363.3250959—dc22

2006035020

ISBN 978 1 84542 543 2 (cased)

Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall

Contents

List of tables vii
List of contributors viii
List of abbreviations xv
Preface and acknowledgements Andrew T.H. Tan xxiv

PART I TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1 Terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia 3
Andrew T.H. Tan
2 Setting the post 9/11 context: the emergence of postmodern terrorism 26
Andrew T.H. Tan
3 Old terrorism in Southeast Asia: a survey 45
Andrew T.H. Tan

PART II THE CHALLENGE OF RADICAL ISLAM

4 Militant Java-based Islamist movements 63
Greg Fealy
5 Jemaah Islamiah according to *PUPJI* 76
Elena Pavlova
6 Suicide terrorism and Southeast Asia 104
Adam Dolnik
7 Human tragedy in Sulawesi Indonesia: 1998–2002 122
James Veitch
8 Jihad in Maluku 146
Badrus Sholeh
9 Al-Ma'unah and KMM in Malaysia 167
Elina Noor
10 'Radical Muslim terrorism' in the Philippines 194
Rommel C. Banlaoi

PART III ARMED SEPARATIST INSURGENCIES

11 Separatist insurgency in the southern Philippines 225
Paul A. Rodell

12 The Aceh conflict: phases of conflict and hopes for peace 248
Kamarulzaman Askandar
13 The Malay-Muslim insurgency in Southern Thailand 266
Thitinan Pongsudhirak
14 Separatism in Papua 279
Philips J. Vermonte
15 Ethnic conflicts in Burma: from separatism to federalism 293
Martin Smith

PART IV STATE TERRORISM

16 State terrorism in Arakan 325
Syed Serajul Islam
17 The Hmong rebellion in Laos: victims or terrorists? 352
Gary Yia Lee
18 East Timor under Indonesian occupation, 1975–99 374
Peter Carey

PART V COMMUNIST INSURGENCY

19 The communist insurgency in the Philippines 405
Miriam Coronel Ferrer

PART VI COUNTER-TERRORISM

20 Terrorism in Southeast Asia: threat and response 437
Rohan Gunaratna
21 The triad of twenty-first century counter-terrorism 451
Renato Cruz De Castro

Index 467

Tables

1.1	Major armed rebellions in the ASEAN states since 1945	10
10.1	Basilan-based faction of the ASG	209
10.2	Sulu-based faction of the ASG	210
15.1	Armed ethnic groups in Burma, 2006	294
17.1	Lao military bases with Vietnamese troops	365
19.1	Revolutionary member-organizations of the NDF (2003)	413
19.2	Estimates of CPP-NPA forces based on CPP and AFP figures, Martial Law and post-Martial Law periods	418
19.3	Other Marxist-Leninist armed groups (from the 1990s splits in the CPP)	424

Contributors

Kamarulzaman Askandar
Kamarulzaman Askandar is the Coordinator of the Research and Education for Peace at Universiti Sains Malaysia, where he is also an Associate Professor. He has been the Regional Coordinator of the Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (www.seacsn.net) since 2001. He received his PhD from the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. He has written on issues of peace and conflict in the region including *Our Culture of Peace* (Penang: REPUSM & SEACSN, 2006), and 'A regional perspective of UN peacekeeping operations in Southeast Asia', published in the *Journal of International Peacekeeping* (Spring 2005). He has also edited or co-edited a number of books including *Understanding and Managing Militant Movements in Southeast Asia* (Penang: SEACSN, 2005), *The Mindanao Conflict* (with Ayesah Abubakar; Penang: SEACSN, 2005), and *Peacebuilding in Aceh: Lessons Learnt from Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland* (with Ang Ming Chee; Bangkok: Forum Asia, 2005). He has been involved as an invited speaker or workshop facilitator in many peace- and conflict resolution-related programmes in the region. He is also interested in peace-building activities in the region, especially in Aceh, the southern Philippines and Southern Thailand.

Rommel C. Banlaoi
Rommel C. Banlaoi is the Executive Director of the Strategic and Integrative Studies Center (SISC). He was previously Professor of Political Science at the National Defense College of the Philippines where he served as Vice-President for Administrative Affairs and Assistant Vice-President for Research and Special Studies. He is the author and co-author of seven books to date, which include *War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia (*Manila: Rex Book Store International, 2004). His articles and book reviews have appeared in various book chapters and internationally refereed journals such as *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *Parameters*, *Naval War College Review*, *Asian Affairs*, *Southeast Asian Affairs*, *Indian Ocean Survey*, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* and *Intelligence and National Security*.

Peter Carey
Peter Carey is Laithwaite Fellow and Tutor in Modern History at Trinity College, University of Oxford, specializing in the modern history and politics of contemporary Southeast Asia, in particular Indonesia and East Timor. He is currently writing a biography of the Javanese prince, Pangéran

Diponegoro (1785–1855), who led the last great revolt against the Dutch in Java known as the Java War (1825–30).This will be published by the Royal Institute for Anthropology and Linguistics in Leiden in 2007 under the title: *Born Leader in Changed Times: Prince Dipanagara and the End of an Old Order in Java, 1785–1855*. Since 1999, he has been researching an oral history of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor (1975–99) entitled 'Survivors: East Timorese experiences of the Indonesian occupation', which focuses on the Geração Foun ('New Generation'), Timorese now in their late twenties and thirties who came of age in the 1975–99 period and for whom Bahasa Indonesia rather than Portuguese is their principal non-Timorese language. Peter is the author of *East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation* (London: Cassell, 1995).

Renato Cruz De Castro
Renato Cruz De Castro is a faculty of the International Studies Department, De La Salle University and the holder of the Dr Aurelio Calderon Professorial Chair of Philippine–American Relations. He earned his PhD from the Government and International Studies Department of the University of South Carolina as a Fulbright Scholar in 2001. He obtained his BA and two Masters degrees from the University of the Philippines. He has also worked as a Research Fellow in the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore (1991 and 1995) and in the European Institute of Public Administration in the Netherlands (1989). Since 1994, he has written several articles on international relations and security that have been published in a number of scholarly journals and edited works in the Philippines, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. He is a columnist in the *Manila Bulletin*, contributing his insights on US foreign and defence policies as well as general strategic issues that affect the Philippines. He also conducts courses and delivers lectures in the Foreign Service Institute of the Philippines and in the National Defense College of the Philippines.

Adam Dolnik
Adam Dolnik is Senior Fellow and Director of Research Programs at the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention at the University of Wollongong, Australia. Previously, he worked as a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore, and as a researcher at the WMD Terrorism Project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California and at the United Nations Terrorism Prevention Branch in Vienna. Dolnik regularly lectures for various governmental and non-governmental organizations and agencies around the world, and has also conducted field research on terrorist networks in conflict zones such as Afghanistan and the North Caucasus. His work has been published in a number of books and a variety of international journals, including

Terrorism and Political Violence, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, *International Negotiation: Journal of Theory and Practice*, *Perspectives: Central European Review of International Affairs*, *Yaderny Kontrol*.

Greg Fealy
Greg Fealy holds a joint appointment as Fellow and Senior Lecturer in Southeast Asian politics at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, and the Faculty of Asian Studies, the Australian National University, Canberra. He gained his PhD from Monash University in 1998 with a study of the history of Indonesia's largest Islamic party, recently published in Indonesian under the title *Ijtihad Politik Ulama: Sejarah NU, 1952–67*. He is the co-author of *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia* (2005), and *Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia* (2005). He is also co-editor of *Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook* (2006), *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation* (2003) and *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditionalism and Modernity in Indonesia* (1995). He was the C.V. Starr Visiting Professor in Indonesian Politics at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, in 2003.

Miriam Coronel Ferrer
Miriam Coronel Ferrer is currently Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP), and Convener of the Program on Peace, Democratization and Human Rights of the UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies. She has written various articles on the Philippine armed conflicts (Moro and communist insurgencies), peace processes and peace-building. She is also involved in various peace, disarmament and humanitarian law campaigns nationally and internationally.

Rohan Gunaratna
Rohan Gunaratna is Head, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore; Senior Fellow Alumnus, Combating Terrorism Centre at the United States Military Academy at West Point; and Honorary Fellow, International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, Israel. He designed the UN Database on the Mobility, Weapons and Finances of Al Qaeda, Taliban and its Associates. He is author of ten books including *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (Columbia University Press, New York). A Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, UK, he is a former Chair of the NATO-PfP (Partnership for peace) Working Group on Counter Terrorism.

Syed Serajul Islam
Syed Serajul Islam is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Lakehead University, Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada. He

received his PhD from McGill University and taught at McGill University, International University in Malaysia, and the University of Dhaka. He was a visiting Fulbright Scholar in 1988 at the University of Iowa. He has published eight books and nearly 70 articles in internationally refereed journals. His recent book, *The Politics of Islamic Identity in Southeast Asia* published in 2004, has drawn worldwide attention.

Gary Yia Lee
Gary is a Hmong born in Laos, but has lived in Australia since 1976. He obtained his PhD in social anthropology from Sydney University in 1981, following undergraduate and graduate studies in social work from the University of New South Wales. He has worked for Indochinese refugees since their resettlement in Australia in 1976 and taught for a number of years in various Australian tertiary institutions. He was most recently a Visiting Fellow in Anthropology at the Australian National University, Canberra. In 2006, he was a Visiting Professor to the Center for Hmong Studies, Corcordia University, St Paul, Minnesota. He currently works as a multilingual welfare coordinator with the Cabramatta Community Center in Sydney. Gary has researched the Hmong for the past 25 years and has published books and papers on various aspects of the global Hmong community, including their involvement in the civil war in Laos and their ongoing resistance against the government there.

Elina Noor
Elina Noor graduated in law from Oxford University and obtained an LLM in Public International Law from the London School of Economics and Political Science with distinction, winning the Georg Swarzenberger Prize as well as the Higgins Prize in Public International Law. She also holds an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University. She has volunteered at Interights, a legal human rights NGO based in London, and worked on WMD terrorism at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Washington, DC. After a stint as a Research Assistant for the Brookings Institution's Project on US Relations with the Islamic World within the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, she is back as an Analyst with the Bureau of Foreign Policy and Security at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia where she started out. Elina's work includes published chapters in the Asia-Pacific Security Outlook series (2002–2005) and in *Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific: Threat and Response*, edited by Rohan Gunaratna.

Elena Pavlova
Elena Pavlova is a graduate of Harvard University. She worked as a terrorism research analyst at the Investigative Project, Washington, DC, where

she focused on analysing the emerging traits among Middle East terrorist groups. She joined the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, where she worked as Research Manager for the Asia-Pacific terrorism database programme and the Ideological Response to Terrorism project at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. She is now Associate Research Fellow on the Political Islam programme. She is a specialist in radical ideology and has written numerous articles, including a chapter contribution in *The Changing Face of Terrorism*, edited by Rohan Gunaratna.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak

Thitinan Pongsudhirak is Assistant Professor of International Political Economy at the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. Currently Director of its Institute of Security and International Studies and a former Deputy Dean of the Political Science Faculty at Chulalongkorn, he has authored a number of articles and book chapters on Thailand's politics, political economy, foreign policy, and the role of the media in democratization, as well as ASEAN security and economic cooperation. He was educated at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. His PhD thesis at the London School of Economics, which focused on the political economy of Thailand's economic crisis in 1997, was awarded the United Kingdom's Best Dissertation Prize in Comparative and International Politics and Thailand's National Research Council Dissertation Prize in Political Science.

Paul A. Rodell

Paul A. Rodell is Associate Professor of Southeast and East Asian History at Georgia Southern University. He served in the Philippines with the US Peace Corps and did MA work at the Asian Center, University of the Philippines. He has published relevant articles and chapters in *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2002 and 2004), *Terrorism and Transnational Violence in Southeast Asia* (2005), *Bulletin of the American Historical Collection* (January 2004), *Revolutionary Movements in World History* (2006) and *The Encyclopedia of Modern Revolutions* (forthcoming). In 2002, he authored *Culture and Customs of the Philippines* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press) and in 2000, he edited a special issue on Southeast Asia for the *Journal of Commonwealth and Postcolonial Studies*. From 1996 to 2002, he served as Executive Director of the Association of Third World Studies, Inc.

Badrus Sholeh

Badrus Sholeh is Head of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, and Deputy Director of the Study Program of International Relations, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University of Jakarta, Indonesia. He graduated from the Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University

(ANU) Canberra and wrote his thesis entitled *Ethno-Religious Conflict and Reconciliation: Muslim and Christian Relationship in Ambon* (March, 2003). He has published research papers on conflict, peace-building and political Islam in academic journals and national newspapers, and participates actively in international conferences.

Martin Smith
Martin Smith is a political analyst specializing in Burmese and ethnic minority affairs. He is author of *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity* (Zed Books, 1991 and 1999), *Ethnic Groups in Burma: Development, Democracy and Human Rights* (ASI, 1994) and *Burma (Myanmar): The Time for Change* (Minority Rights Group International, 2002). Other recent publications include 'Army politics as a historical legacy: the experience of Burma', in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds), *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy* (Zed Books, 2002), and 'Burma: the Karen conflict', in J. Rudolph (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts* (Greenwood Press, 2003).

Andrew T.H. Tan
Andrew T.H. Tan is Associate Professor at the University of New South Wales – Asia. He was formerly Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies, King's College London, based at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Watchfield, UK, and was Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore. He was educated in Singapore, Cambridge and Sydney. His advice on regional security issues is much sought after by governments, corporations, universities, research institutes and the media. His many monographs, book chapters, journal articles and book reviews have appeared in leading refereed academic journals such as *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *Contemporary Security Policy*, *Panorama*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *International Affairs*, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, *International Relations of the Asia Pacific*, *Harvard Asia Quarterly* and *Asia-Pacific Review*. He has also written, edited or co-edited nine books. His recent sole-authored book, *Security Perspectives of the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War on Terrorism*, published by Edward Elgar publishing, has been described by Professor Stephen Walt, Dean of Harvard's JFK School, as 'a major contribution to our understanding of regional security', and by Shigekatsu Kondo, Executive Director, National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, as 'a superb navigator for us to cope with this turbulent region'. Another of his sole-authored books, *A Political and Economic Dictionary of South-East Asia*, published by Europa – Taylor & Francis, UK, is a definitive guide to the region. He is also editor of *The Politics of Terrorism* (London: Europa

/ Routledge, 2006), which contains contributions by some of the world's leading terrorism experts, as well as his own substantive study (which occupies half the volume) of major terrorism incidences and groups. His sole-authored book, *Southeast Asia: Threats in the Security Environment*, published by Marshall Cavendish, contains his collected papers and articles on this subject. His edited volume, *The Politics of Maritime Power* (Routledge), which contains contributions by some of the world's leading maritime experts, is forthcoming in 2007.

James Veitch
James Veitch is Associate Professor in the Strategic Studies Program in the School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand where he coordinates the teaching of courses in counter-terrorism, intelligence studies and transnational crime, and teaches a course on diplomacy and religion. Concurrently he is establishing a specialist research programme in security and intelligence studies. Prior to taking up this appointment in the School of Government he taught for many years in the Religious Studies Program at the same university. He has also lived and taught in both Indonesia and Singapore. He specializes in the study of religious conflict, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and is involved in studies of religion and terrorism. He has taught courses on the interface between human violence (including terrorism and revolution) and religion, and on Islam and Christianity in contemporary culture. He keeps up his long-time interest in the origins and early history of Christianity and is a fellow of the California-based Jesus Seminar. He is also the New Zealand Co-Chair of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and is the New Zealand Co-Chair on the Steering Committee of CSCAP International for 2006–2008.

Philips J. Vermonte
Philips J. Vermonte is a Researcher at the Department of International Relations, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta since 2001. He is also a Visiting Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Paramadina University, Jakarta, and teaches international relations theory and military issues in developing countries. He received his Masters degree in international studies from the University of Adelaide, Australia in 2001. The title of his thesis is *Democratisation and Foreign Policy: The Case of Indonesia*. He has written numerous articles in various newspapers and academic journals, and presented papers in many conferences. He is also actively involved in Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group on Transnational Crime. He is also currently a member of Working Group on Papua.

Abbreviations

9/11	11 September 2001
AA	Arakanese Army
ABB	Alex Boncayao Brigade
ABSDF	All Burma Student Democratic Front
ADTK	Aceh Damai Tanpa Korupsi / Peace for Aceh Without Corruption
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFPFL	Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League
AHAI	Al-Harakatul al-Islamiya
AID	All Inclusive Dialogue
AIO	Arakan Independence Organization
ALP	Arakan Liberation Party
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
AMNM	Amar Makruf Nahi Mungkar / Enjoining Right Forbidding Evil
ANU	Australian National University
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
AQ	al-Qaeda
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ARIF	Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front
ARMAS	Artista at Manunulat ng Sambayanan / Artists and Writers of the People
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ARNO	Arakan Rohingya Nationalist Organization
AS	Abu Sofia
ASDT	Associacão Social Democrática Timorense / Timorese Social Democratic Association
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
ASNLF	Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front
ATTF	Anti-Terrorism Task Force
BAKIN	Indonesian State Intelligence Agency
BIA	Burma Independence Army
BIAF	Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces
BIC	Benevolence International Corporation

BIMM	Badan Imarat Muslim Maluku
BIPP	Barisan Islam Pembebasan Pattani
BMLO	Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization
BNPP	Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani
BRC	Barrio Revolutionary Committee
BRN	Barisan Revolusi Nasional
BSPP	Burma Socialist Programme Party
CARHRIHL	Comprehensive Agreement on respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law
CBA	Cordillera Bodong Association, *later* Cordillera Bodong Administration
CBRE Defence Group	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Explosives Defence Group
CC	Central Committee
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CHDF	Civilian Home Defense Forces
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
CNF	Chin National Front
CNI	Commission on National Integration
CNL	Christians for National Liberation
CNN	Cable News Network
CNRM	National Council of Maubere Resistance
CNRT	National Council of Timorese Resistance
CoHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
CPA	Communist Party of Arakan
CPB	Communist Party of Burma
CPDF	Cordillera People's Democratic Front
CPLA	Cordillera People's Liberation Army
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
CSIC	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
CTM	Communist Terrorist Movement
DAB	Democratic Alliance of Burma
DDII	Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia / Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia
DI	Darul Islam

DOM	Daerah Operasi Militer / Military Operation Region
EC	European Community
EC	Executive Committee
EP	enlisted personnel
EU	European Union
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia / Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia
FFCL	Fact Finding Commission on Laos
FIDH	International Federation of Human Rights League
FKAWJ	Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah / Sunni Communication Forum
FKM	Front Kedaulatan Maluku / Maluku Sovereign Front
FPDRA	Front Perlawanan Demokratik Rakyat Aceh / Acehnese Fight for Democratic Front
FPI	Front Pembela Islam
FPIM	Front Pembela Islam Maluku
FTO	foreign terrorist organization
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka / Free Aceh Movement
GHQ	general headquarters
GIA	Armed Islamic Group
GKST	Protestant Church of Central Sulawesi
GMIP	Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani / Pattani Mujahideen Movement
GoI	Government of Indonesia
GPK/L	Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan/Liar
GPM	Malukan Protestant Church
GPNG	Gerakan Persatuan Nieuw Guinea / New Guinea Unity Movement
GPST	Gerakan Pemuda Sulawesi Tengah / Central Sulawesi Youth Movement
GRP	Government of the Republic of the Philippines
HDC	Henri Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue
HLT	High Level Team
HUDA	Himpunan Ulama Dayah Aceh / Aceh Dayah Ulama Group
ICG	International Crisis Group

ICMI	Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia / Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals
ICPVTR	International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research
IDPs	internally displaced persons
IIC	International Information Center
IIRO	International Islamic Relief Organisation
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMPD	Immigration and Manpower Department
IPD	Immigration and Population Department
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRIC	International Relations and Information Center
ISA	Internal Security Act
ISAFP	Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
ISIS	Institute of Strategic and International Studies
IWW	Islamic Wisdom Worldwide
JASIG	Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees
JI	Jemaah Islamiah
JMC	Joint Monitoring Committee
JS	Jemaah Salafiah
JSC	Joint Security Committee
KAGUMA	Katipunan ng mga Gurong Makabayan / Association of Patriotic Teachers
KIO	Kachin Independence Organization
KISDI	Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian committee for Solidarity with World Islam)
KKY	Ka Kwe Ye
KM	Kabataang Makabayan / Nationalist Youth
KMM	Kampulan Mujahideen Malaysia *later* Kampulan Militan Malaysia
KMT	Kuomintang
KNL	Karen National League
KNLP	Kayan New Land Party
KNPP	Karenni National Progressive Party
KNU	Karen National Union
KNUP	Karen National United Party
KPPSI	Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam / Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Law

KPSI	Komite Penegakan Syari'at Islam
KTA	Khalid Trinidad Army
LAB	Liga ng Agham para sa Bayan / League of Scientists for the People
Lao PDR	Lao People's Democratic Republic
LMHR	Lao Movement for Human Rights
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
LUMABAN	Lupon ng mga Mananganggol para sa Bayan / Council of Lawyers for the People
MAKIBAKA	Makabayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan / Patriotic Movement of New Women
MAPT	Myanmar Agricultural Products Trade
MBG	Misuari Breakaway Group
MCFF	Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters
MI	Military Intelligence
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MIM	Mindanao Independence Movement
MIPT	National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
MISPI	Mitra Sejati Perempuan Indonesia (True Partner of Indonesian Women)
MLF	Moro Liberation Front
MLSA	Military Logistics Support Agreement
MMI	Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia / Indonesian Holy Warriors Council
MNDAA	Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MORO	Moro Revolutionary Organization
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPU	Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama / Ulama Council
MRP	Majelis Rakyat Papua / Papuan People's Council
MSU	Mindanao State University
MTA	Mong Tai Army
NBC	nuclear, biological, chemical
NCGUB	National Coalition Government Union of Burma
NCUB	National Council Union of Burma
NDAA	National Democratic Alliance Army
NDF	National Democratic Front
NDFP	National Democratic Front of the Philippines

NDPHR	National Democratic Party for Human Rights
NDUF	National Democratic United Front
NEST	Nuclear Emergency Search Teams
NGO	non-governmental organization
NII	Negara Islam Indonesia / Indonesian Islamic State
NLD	National League for Democracy
NMSP	New Mon State Party
NPA	New People's Army
NRC	National Reconciliation Commission
NSCN	National Socialist Council of Nagaland
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama
NUFC	National United Front Commission
NULF	National United Liberated Front
NUPA	National Unity Party of Arakan
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OMA	Office of Muslim Affairs
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPM	Organisasi Papua Merdeka / Independent Papuan Organization
OPMRC	OPM Revolutionary Council
OPMT	Organização Popular de Mulher de Timor / Popular Organization of Timorese Women
PADAM	Advocacy Services for Justice and Peace in Indonesia
PAMDAE	Philippine Association of Muslimah Darul Eeman
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional / National Mandate Party
PAS	Parti Islam Se-Malaysia
PATH	Peace Advocates for Truth, Justice and Healing
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang / Crescent-Moon and Star Party
PCC	People's Crisis Center
PCN	Protestant Church in the Netherlands
PDI-P	Parti Demokratik Indonesia-Perjuangan
PDP	Parliamentary Democracy Party
PDP	Papuan Presidium Council
PEPERA	'Act of Free Choice'
PGK	Partai Golongan Karya
PIJ	Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PK	Partai Keadilan
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa / National Awakening Party
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia / Communist Party of Indonesia

PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party
PKP	Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera / Prosperity and Justice Party
PL	Pathet Lao
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PMP	Partido ng Manggagawa Pilipino
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PNP	Philippine National Police
PNP-IG	Philippine National Police Intelligence Group
PNU	Partai Nahdlatul Ummat
POC	People's Organizing Committee
POG	People's Organizing Group
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan / United Development Party
PPW	protracted people's war
PRRI	Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia
PRS	Pusat Rujuk Social / Social Reconciliation Centre
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
PULO	Pattani United Liberation Organization
PUPJI	*Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah* / General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah
PVO	People's Volunteer Organisation
RAs	reaffirmists
RAID	Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
REDI Centre	Regional Emerging Disease Intervention Centre
RJs	rejectionists
RLG	Royal Lao Government
RMS	Republik Maluku Selatan / Republic of South Maluku
RNA	Rohingya National Alliance
RPA-ABB	Revolutionary Proletarian Army – Alex Boncayao Brigade
RPF	Rohingya Patriotic Front
RPM-M	Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Mindanao / Revolutionary Proletarian Party of Mindanao
RPM-P	Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Pilipinas / Revolutionary Proletarian Party of the Philippines
RSM	Rajah Solaiman Movement
RSRM	Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement

RSO	Rohingya Solidarity Organization
RWCs	Reciprocal Working Committees
SAMAK	Solidaritas Masyarakat Anti Korupsi (Anti Corruption Solidarity Group)
SBPAC	Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre
SEC	Securities Exchange Commission
SEFA	Save Emergency For Aceh
SIRA	Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh / Aceh Referendum Information Center
SLORC	State Law and Order Restoration Council
SMUR	Solidaritas Mahasiswa untuk Rakyat / Student Solidarity Movement for the People
SNLD	Shan Nationalities League for Democracy
SPCPD	Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development
SPDC	State Peace and Development Council
SSA	Shan State Army
SSA-S	Shan State Army – South
SSNA	Shan State National Army
SSNLO	Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organization
SUA	Shan United Army
SURA	Shan United Revolutionary Army
TIRUS	Tim Relawan Untuk Kemanusiaan / Volunteers for Victims of Social Unrest
TPN	Tentara Pembebasan Nasional / National Liberation Army
TNI	Indonesian Armed Forces
TRC	Temporary Registration Card
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UDT	União Democrática Timorense / Timorese Democratic Union
UIFO	Union of Islamic Forces and Organization
ULNLF	United Lao National Liberation Front
UN	United Nations
UNCRC	United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTEA	United Nations Temporary Executive Authority
UP	University of the Philippines
USA	United States of America
UWSA	United Wa State Army
VCD	video compact disc
VOC	Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie / Dutch East India Company
VPDC	Village Peace and Development Council
VX	VX (nerve agent)
WMD	weapon of mass destruction

Preface and acknowledgements

The editor wishes to thank Edward Elgar (UK), in particular, the commissioning editor, Catherine Elgar, for having the courage to support this ambitious undertaking. A word of heartfelt thanks is also due to Felicity Plester, Kate Emmins and the staff of Edward Elgar for polishing up the draft so well. Many thanks indeed to the many authors who have contributed to this book; collectively, they constitute a repository of experts on rebellion in Southeast Asia. These authors have spent many months collecting information and doing fieldwork; their dedication and the quality of their scholarship is reflected in the many excellent chapters in this volume.

The contributors, to whom this book owes its existence, are: Dr Greg Fealy, Ms Elena Pavlova, Dr Adam Dolnik, Professor James Veitch, Badrus Sholeh, Ms Elina Noor, Professor Rommel Banlaoi, Professor Paul Rodell, Professor Kamarulzaman Askandar, Professor Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Philips J. Vermonte, Martin Smith, Professor Syed Serajul Islam, Dr Gary Yia Lee, Dr Peter Carey, Professor Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Professor Rohan Gunaratna and Professor Renato Cruz de Castro.

The editor would like to record a word of thanks and appreciation to Professor Terry Walter and Professor Bruce Milthorpe, University of New South Wales – Asia, who have been very supportive during the latter phases of this project. The editor would also like to thank Professor Matt Uttley, Professor Wyn Bowen, Professor Geoff Till and Dr Stuart Griffin of King's College London, who have been extremely supportive of the early phase of this project whilst the editor was Senior Lecturer in the faculty of the Defence Services Department, KCL, in the Joint Services Command and Staff College, UK. The editor also wishes to thank the Asian Research Institute, particularly its Director, Professor Anthony Reid, for hosting the author during his field research trip. The assistance extended by the ARI was certainly invaluable and much appreciated.

It is the collective hope of all the contributors that this book will help deepen understanding, in a holistic and historically empirical way, the nature of rebellion in Southeast Asia. As such, this volume takes a broad and holistic definition of terrorism as its basis. Indeed, the topic of 'terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia' cannot be viewed in narrow definitional terms, nor is it amenable to a set of generalizations, and hence narrow prescriptive countermeasures. Each and every rebellion within the region has deep historical, political, social and economic roots which do not easily lend themselves to generalizations except in the broadest of

conceptual terms, such as 'lack of state legitimacy' or the 'need for comprehensive measures'. It follows therefore that a narrowly bounded definition and view of rebellion in the region, such as that inherent in the concept of the region as 'the second front in the war on global terrorism' will result in misdiagnosis, the wrong counter-terrorism strategies, the failure of political strategy, the gross misdirection of scarce resources, and the guarantee that violence and conflict in this region will continue unabated for a very long time.

It is the hope of the contributors that as a reference and education text, this volume will help to provide an empirical, area studies-oriented guide to understanding the complex problem of rebellion in Southeast Asia; a deeply informed understanding that could provide the basis for thinking about not merely 'counter-terrorism' but the appropriate comprehensive strategies to what have been deep-rooted and long-standing conflicts within the region, now made more urgent with the advent of the 'new' and deadly global terrorism.

Andrew T.H. Tan
Associate Professor of International Studies
University of New South Wales

CHINA
TAIWAN
BURMA
LAOS
THAILAND
VIETNAM
CAMBODIA
PHILIPPINES
PACIFIC OCEAN
BRUNEI
MALAYSIA
SINGAPORE
INDONESIA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
SOLOMON ISLANDS
AUSTRALIA

PART I

TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1 Terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia

Andrew T.H. Tan

Terrorism in Southeast Asia

After the seminal terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, Southeast Asia was designated the 'second front' in the 'global war on terrorism'. Yet, from a perspective that initially emphasized a narrow counter-terrorism approach, there has been a gradual appreciation that underlying terrorism within the region are fundamental grievances of a political, economic and social nature that pre-dated al-Qaeda and the events of 9/11. Indeed, Southeast Asia has experienced numerous internal conflicts since de-colonization after 1945, with the legitimacy of the state being questioned through armed insurgencies from those disaffected elements on the geographical periphery, those who belong to different ethnic or religious groups, or those who espouse a different political ideology. The experience of communist and separatist insurgencies that affected many states in Southeast Asia after 1945 has deeply imbibed the region with the notion of comprehensive security approaches in countering such rebellions, given the recognition that the fundamental grievances that underlie these insurgencies need to be addressed if there is to be progress in counter-insurgency efforts.

The comparative recent emergence of 'non-traditional security issues' in the academic literature after the end of the Cold War was therefore not a surprise to a region that had already experienced insurgencies and terrorism on a major scale and which had a history of searching for 'comprehensive security' solutions to such armed challenges to the state, solutions that encompass political, economic, social, ideological and military measures.[1] 'Non-traditional security issues' such as poverty (and resulting socio-economic disparities and crime), resource scarcity, environmental degradation, population growth and ethnic conflict have been held to have contributed to the alienation and consequent receptiveness to armed challenges to the central government in every state in the region.[2] The presence of a Maoist communist insurgency that could still count as many as 10 000 guerillas in central Luzon province in the Philippines at the turn of the twenty-first century, long after the end of the Cold War, indeed, long after Maoism itself is no longer fashionable in China, is indicative of the

continued salience of 'non-traditional security issues' within the region as key factors that have led to the persistence of armed terrorisms.

This chapter (indeed, this handbook) argues that while the new terrorism as represented by 9/11 and al-Qaeda has undoubtedly emerged in Southeast Asia, an older, more traditional form of terrorism continues to pose a major security challenge for governments in the region. An examination of the salient terrorisms in the region also reveals that both old and new terrorisms are closely related to fundamental grievances that have caused the alienation which have made some in the region susceptible to appeals to religion, ethnicity or class. All separatist and rebel groups in Southeast Asia, including radical Islamist groups described by the region's authorities as terrorist, such as the Kampulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM) and the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) – the latter blamed for several major terrorist attacks in the region since 9/11 – are local in origin.[3] Indeed, the JI, which is able to trace its roots back to the Darul Islam rebellion in the 1950s, in fact pre-dated al-Qaeda.[4] Further, whilst 9/11 has reaffirmed the agency of the state in dealing with terrorism, it has at the same time brought to the fore human security concerns that have fuelled rebellions and terrorism. There has thus been greater attention to human security or non-traditional security dimensions in discussing terrorism in Southeast Asia.[5] In the context of the global war on terrorism, the salient non-traditional security issues can be divided into two broad categories: those that constitute underlying factors that cause terrorism (such as poverty, lack of development, socio-economic disparities, resource-sharing issues, environmental degradation and population pressures), and those that are a consequence of terrorism (such as international crime and transitional terrorist networks). Finally, recognition of the salience of human security means that the answers or solutions to the problem of terrorism in Southeast Asia must lie with a multilateral and multidimensional approach, in contrast to the unilateral and military-oriented, unidimensional approach that the United States under the Bush administration has thus far pursued in its global war on terrorism.

The definition of terrorism

Rebellion in Southeast Asia has expressed itself in two forms: terrorism, which is the use of violence, usually against selected urban or human targets, to press for ethno-nationalist or religious objectives; and insurgency (a term used interchangeably with 'guerilla warfare'), which is violence aimed at establishing bases that are secure from the control of the central government and which would enable the establishment of what amounts to a counter-government. In many cases, however, the line is blurred as insurgent groups have also used, sometimes through splinter or associated groups, terrorist tactics to further their aims.

Although Southeast Asia has been designated by the United States after the seminal terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 as the 'second front' in the 'global war on terrorism', there is little consensus within the region on the definition of terrorism, as the wide array of chapters in this volume attests. Some of the contributing authors have also made clear that many of the roots of rebellion lie with the failure of the state, including not merely failure of nation-building and territorial governance, but the state's practice of terror as a political instrument on ethnic and/or religious minorities. Some authors have therefore also posed the fundamental question of 'Who is the terrorist?' This is not a sop to fashionable neo-Marxist left-wing thinking but a sober analysis of the fundamental roots of rebellion in Southeast Asia. A reading of Peter Carey's contribution on East Timor, and Syed Serajul Islam's contribution on Arakan, for instance, reveals that the main contributory factor to the salience of armed resistance has stemmed in the first place from the excessive use of terror as a political instrument by the state itself. Thus, while terrorism has always been associated with rebellion, most scholars understand terror as a means not an end, given that states use it as well.[6] The term 'terrorist' should therefore be seen as a neutral term to denote the use of terror by groups prepared to use such means. It should not carry with it the normative and pejorative connotation that assumes the privileging of the state, since terrorism is a tool of the weak as well as used by states against armed rebellions mounted by ethnic or religious minorities.

A more complete understanding of the terrorism phenomenon therefore requires us to examine terrorism from a more holistic and even historical perspective, in order to arrive at a more in-depth understanding of the complexities of this historical phenomenon, particularly the fundamental motivations or grievances that underlie the use of terrorism.

In sum, the topic of 'terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia' cannot be viewed in narrow definitional terms nor is it amenable to a set of generalizations, and hence narrow prescriptive countermeasures. Indeed, the complexities and diversities are such, and the variables are so many, that no such generalizations may be possible. Each and every rebellion within the region has deep historical, political, social and economic roots which cannot easily lend themselves to generalizations except in the broadest of conceptual terms, such as 'lack of state legitimacy' or the 'need for comprehensive measures'. It follows therefore that a narrowly bounded definition and view of rebellion in the region, such as that inherent in the concept of the region as 'the second front' in the 'global war on terrorism', will result in misdiagnosis, the wrong counter-terrorism strategies, the failure of political strategy, the gross misdirection of scarce resources, and the

guarantee that violence and conflict in this region will continue unabated for a very long time.

New and old terrorisms

The seminal terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the United States have had significant political, economic, social and psychological impacts. The attacks, the first major attack on US soil since Pearl Harbor, shocked the American public for its very audacity in targeting a major US financial symbol, New York's World Trade Center, and the Pentagon in Washington, a symbol of American military might. The first true mass casualty terrorist act in modern times, it breached an unseen threshold, galvanizing other militants to carry out similar or even deadlier attacks given its evident impacts. 9/11 was also the first time a non-state actor has carried out a successful, major strike in the US; subsequent deadly attacks worldwide by radical Islamists have demonstrated the 'new' characteristics of this emerging form of terrorism.

They include: motivation by apocalyptic, millenarian religion that espouses violence; mass casualty terrorist attacks which could potentially involve the use of weapons of mass destruction; a transnational mode of operation that disregards national borders; a global presence, made possible by decentralized, networked organizational structures and local strategic alliances; the multinational character and composition of its members; decreasing dependence on state sponsors as the ability to operate across borders has increased; and the exploitation and use of modern technology and communications to reach out to potentially millions of supporters as compared to the much smaller clandestine support base in the pre-Internet age. It has thus been argued that this 'new' terrorism is in fact a product of the global interlinked economy that has emerged from globalization, and which has provided the conditions for its emergence.[7] Following 9/11, the USA was therefore galvanized to act, convinced it had to take the war on terrorism to its sources, be it in Iraq against rogue dictators such as Saddam Hussein; Afghanistan, which had hosted Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda; or the Muslim Moro rebels operating in the jungles of Mindanao in Southeast Asia, the region today designated as the 'second front' in the 'global war on terrorism'.

Southeast Asia, for its part, has had its fair share of terrorism, emanating from separatist movements carried out by Christian and Muslim ethnic minorities, armed anti-government opposition groups, and radical Islamist groups. Given the links between some local radical Islamist groups (such as the JI) and international terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, the new terrorism can be said to have penetrated Southeast Asia. However, as Chapter 3, which surveys some of the 'old' terrorism, demonstrates, it exists in tandem

with the old, more traditional forms of terrorism representing longstanding ethnic, religious, political, economic and social grievances that predated 9/11 and al-Qaeda. Indeed, the local dynamic is perhaps the more dominant, when one takes into account the fact that all local Islamist groups, such as the JI, in fact pre-dated al-Qaeda and emerged in response to local grievances and conditions. Indeed, despite claims of al-Qaeda penetration and co-option, the exact nature of the links between al-Qaeda on the one hand, and local groups on the other, such as JI and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, is in fact disputed on these very grounds.[8]

This raises interesting questions relating to the 'old versus new' debate in terrorism studies.[9] How new is terrorism in Southeast Asia? In what way, if any, has the new terrorism penetrated and transformed local terrorisms?

This is not to say that the 'new' global terrorism has not made inroads into the region. Indeed, as various contributors have pointed out, they pose a serious danger to the security of the region, and have introduced a new transnational, and potentially much more lethal, dimension to an existing problem. In examining the 'new', however, we also need to be reminded of the 'old' terrorism and insurgencies that have plagued the region or which remain extant, and ask useful questions concerning what is new, what is old and in what ways the two might be interacting to raise the level of lethality.

No definitive answer to the difficult questions can, however, be made, given the fluid and dynamic nature of terrorism and insurgencies in the region; after all, they are the symptoms of underlying local grievances and issues, although clearly, given the context of 9/11, the impact of new forms of terrorism from outside the region, particularly the new modes of operation pioneered by al-Qaeda, needs to be considered as a factor. Nonetheless, a closer examination of the regional landscape appears to reveal a number of continuities amidst change. These continuities stem from the nexus between the lack of legitimacy of the states in the region and the armed rebellions in the form of terrorism and insurgencies that have beset the region since the end of the Second World War in 1945.

Legitimacy and rebellions[10]

The states in Southeast Asia have had a history of internal conflicts since 1945. Even in 1975, at the conclusion of the Vietnam War, they remained fragile political entities, with every state facing internal political and economic problems of varying degrees. Malaysia was still facing a stubborn communist insurgency and the aftermath of racial tensions which had exploded in the deadly 13 May riots in 1969. In Thailand, the Communist Party of Thailand was gaining strength from disaffected students and intellectuals driven underground by the violent military coup and crackdown in 1976, which ended the brief era of democratic government. There

was also a stubborn Muslim secessionist movement in the south. The Philippines, labouring under the 'crony capitalism' of Ferdinand Marcos, faced a growing communist insurgency as well as a major Muslim separatist rebellion in the south. In Indonesia, separatist tendencies in various parts of the Indonesian archipelago, such as Aceh and Irian Jaya, constituted serious internal security threats. Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in 1976 led to years of unrelenting counter-insurgency warfare against Fretilin guerillas as well as the deaths of a very substantial proportion of the population of East Timor. Myanmar continued to be beset by armed rebellions since independence in 1948, by ethnic minorities along its periphery that contested the authority of the central government in Yangon.

The fact that the states in the region, except for Thailand, have been artificially cobbled together by departing colonial powers has meant that many have lacked national cohesion. Coupled with relatively underdeveloped institutions, their governments have faced the problem of legitimacy, which is accentuated in situations where that legitimacy is regarded as suspect due to authoritarian political domination by an elite, such as the military in Thailand and Indonesia, or a political strongman, such as Marcos in the Philippines. The states in the region have exhibited the classic feature of many decolonized developing countries; that is, the lack of a close fit between nation and state. They are in fact multinational or multi-ethnic states, where the dominant ethnic group invariably holds the reins of power over significant ethnic minorities that are often located at the periphery. There are further complications due to differences in religion, geography and historical experiences. The nation-building efforts of the dominant group, however, often require the subordination of ethnic minorities (who often also belong to a different religion), creating grievances that tend to find expression in separatism or irredentism.

As Muthiah Alagappa has noted:

> If the idea of the state lacks broad societal consensus, then the physical base of the state and its organising ideology and the legitimacy of the incumbent regime are frequently contested, and internal security becomes a primary concern.[11]

The importance of political legitimacy is explained by Azar and Moon:

> The effective leadership strength, the people's perceived relevance of national strategy, and social and cultural integration derive from the level of legitimacy which a government or regime in power enjoys legitimacy relates to whether citizens are loyal and willingly support state policies – whether they accept the authority of the state and believe existing institutions are functionally competent, legally right and morally proper.[12]

The lack of political legitimacy, which includes the lack of a common belief in a given political and social order, has been a major cause of the armed rebellions that have taken place or are still in progress in some of the states in the region.[13] In addition, Paribatra and Samudavanija have rightly observed that:

> In post-colonial SE Asia, it has been conveniently forgotten by central governments that the constructing of what is more accurately a state-nation merely means that external or western imperialism had been replaced by an internalized one, which is potentially more brutal and enduring.[14]

Table 1.1 shows the major armed rebellions in Southeast Asia since the end of the Second World War. These rebellions reflect the absence of a basic consensus in domestic politics, and also point to the fact that many of the post-independence ruling regimes have been narrowly based. Suharto, for instance, seized power in the midst of a bloodbath in 1965. In Thailand, successive military coups demonstrated the military's power and influence over politics. In the Philippines, Marcos subverted the democratic process when he declared Martial Law in 1972 and ruled to benefit a band of elite cronies. In Myanmar, a military regime siezed power in 1962, and military regimes have since maintained strong, authoritarian rule. Myanmar also annulled the results of the free elections in 1990 and persecuted the victors. Not surprisingly, some of the most virulent and extensive rebellions have been communist revolts. These revolts have sought to replace the central government with an alternative regime which the rebels felt would better reflect the aspirations of the majority of the people. Much of the impetus towards communist rebellion has petered out over time, given the general economic development of the region and the subsequent success of counter-insurgency operations by the national governments.

Indeed, within the region, the anxieties following the events of 1975 in Indochina had given way by the 1980s to a growing confidence that economic development promised to enhance regime legitimacy. The process of regime legitimation has thus focused more on economic development. Regimes claim the right to rule in the name of economic development, which, it is claimed, will bring resilience and security to the state and its population.

Moreover, the global strategic changes occasioned by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the end of the Cold War between communist and capitalist blocs, have been reflected in the region. Not only did Vietnam lose the backing of its chief supporter, the Soviet Union; it also lost any ideological reason to support communist movements. China, too, has embarked on economic modernization with Maoist communist ideology

Table 1.1 Major armed rebellions in the ASEAN states since 1945

Country	Rebel Groups
Brunei	Partai Rakyat Brunei (1962)
Cambodia	Khmer Rouge (1970–75) Khmer Rouge / Khmer People's National Liberation Front/ Moulinaka (1979–92)
Indonesia	Madiun communist rebellion (1948) Darul Islam (1948–62) PRRI Permesta (1958–61) Organisasi Papua Merdeka (1963–) Partai Komunis Indonesia (1965) Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (1976–) Fretilin (1976–99)
Malaysia	Communist Party of Malaya (1948–89)
Philippines	Huk communist rebellion (1946–54) New People's Army (1969–) Moro National Liberation Front (1972–96) Moro Islamic Liberation Front (1982–) Abu Sayyaf (1993–)
Singapore	Communist Party of Malaya (1948–89)*
Thailand	Barisan Revolusi Nasional (1960–) Communist Party of Thailand (1965–) Pattani United Liberation Organization (1968–) Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani (1971–)
South Vietnam	National Liberation Front (1958–75) Le Front Unifie de Liberation des Races Opprimees (FULRO) (1964–75) Le Mouvement pour l'Autonomie des Hauts-Plateaux (1961–75)
Laos	Pathet Lao (1951–75) Le Ligue de Resistance Meo (1946–75)
Myanmar	Communist Party of Burma (1948–) Some 24 ethnically related armed rebellions (1948–)

Note:
* The CPM, which had Singaporean members, considered Singapore to be a part of Malaya and therefore constituted a security problem for Singapore as well, although its operations there were clearly constrained by the island-state's small size and urban nature, as well as the vigilance of its internal security apparatus.

Source: An update of the table provided in Mohammed Ayoob (ed.) (1986), *Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies from Southeast Asia and the Middle East*, London: Croom Helm, p. 61.

taking a back seat. The demise of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) in 1989 exemplified the trend. These developments were generally credited with improving the internal security outlook for the states in the region.

Yet, some governments in the region continue to grapple with the problem of legitimacy, despite decades of nation-building. In particular, some found it hard to win the allegiance of the periphery. Most of the internal rebellions listed in Table 1.1 which are still extant are ethnically based separatist movements.

These separatist movements are not merely based on territorial grounds; underlying their virulence has been a sense of community, which provides a network of communications and a basis for leadership. Some of the most persistent separatist movements have depended greatly on a consciousness of past importance as a state. The Muslim sultanates of Aceh, Sulu and Pattani were, until recent times, historical power centres, providing self-confidence and a network of leaders who retained their prestige. Indeed, it is the sense of being historically and culturally coherent communities that underlies their sense of nationality, of having a right to exist as separate nation-states.[15] Their armed rebellion has been expressed in Islamic terms; not surprisingly given the central role of Islam in their communities. This has also lent a certain 'rightness' to their crusade, as well as allowing appeal to the broader national and international Islamic community for their support. The cases of Irian Jaya and East Timor are also interesting as neither were originally part of the Republic of Indonesia, having being forcibly incorporated in 1962 and 1976 respectively.

The complexities of terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia

A useful way of categorizing contemporary terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia is to adopt a four-class division.[16] Such a division is necessary due to the need to identify better the diverse nature of terrorism and insurgency within the region.

The first class are separatist insurgencies, given that the most significant form of terrorism stems from separatist movements, which include: armed ethnic separatist groups in Burma/Myanmar fighting for autonomy or independence (for example the Karen National Union, Kachin Independence Organization, Chin National Front, Shan State Army, Rohingya Solidarity Organization); Christian East Timorese and Irian Jaya peoples in their agitation against Indonesia (for example Fretilin, now the government of newly independent Timor Leste, and the Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM); the Hmong armed opposition to the government in Laos; and armed Muslim separatist rebellions in various places, such as in Pattani province in southern Thailand (for example Pattani United Liberation Organization or PULO and its splinter groups, such as the

Barisan Revolusi Nasional or BRN), Aceh province in Indonesia (principally by the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM), and Mindanao province in southern Philippines (by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front or MILF, the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Rajah Solaiman Movement).

These groups have demonstrated all the characteristics of long-running civil conflicts, such as severity, persistence and resistance to negotiated settlement, such is the depth of grievances and the sense of separateness that have caused such rebellions in the first place. The fact that all of them are ethnic and/or religious minorities located at the periphery of large states indicates the enduring and continuing challenge to the legitimacy of these states.

The second category, that of armed anti-government political opposition groups, includes: the Communist Party of the Philippines, its armed wing, the New People's Army, and urban terrorist unit, the Alex Boncayao Brigade; the Communist Party of Thailand, believed to have become defunct sometime in the 1990s; and the Burmese armed opposition (for example All Burma Student Democratic Front or ABSDF, and the National Council Union of Burma or NCUB).

This second category demonstrates the salience and depth of local political, economic and social grievances; after all, the Maoist nature of the Communist Party of the Philippines is strangely at odds with the demise of Maoism elsewhere, particularly China, where it originated. The ostensibly peasant revolution here, however, contains echoes of landless exploitation, deep poverty, a relative sense of deprivation and arguably the presence of a greedy and corrupt elite that has been the cause of these grievances – all the classic symptoms of a peasant-based revolt. The case of the armed Burmese political opposition is different in that it was not a peasant revolt but was led by students and the intelligentsia. The political grievances and antipathy to the military regime, however, were so deep that armed political opposition was perceived to be the only answer. The armed movement is now virtually dormant because of the eviction from its frontier bases of the Karen National Union, which harboured and supported those who had fled from the military terror of the central Yangon regime. Nonetheless, political opposition to the Yangon regime remains strong.

The third category consists of radical Islamist groups which aim to overthrow the central government through the use of violent, terrorist tactics, and to impose a Muslim state run strictly according to the sharia or Muslim laws. These groups aim to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate that would unite the *umma* or Muslim community under the banner of Islam. As such, these groups are clearly influenced by radical ideology. In terms of methods and tactics, they have also, to varying degrees, learnt from al-Qaeda through the Afghan mujahideen network, where they have obtained

funding, indoctrination and training which have raised their operational effectiveness.

It must be clarified here though that the term 'Islamist' does not refer to Islam in general but to those who subscribe to radical ideology. Violent Islamist groups include: al-Ma'unah; the Kampulan Mujahideen Malaysia or KMM; and the Jemaah Islamiah or JI. There is a fair bit of diversity within this category. For instance, whilst the KMM and JI have close links with al-Qaeda, al-Ma'unah, described as a deviant Muslim sect by the Malaysian government, does not. There is also a fair degree of overlap between some of the Muslim separatist groups and this third category, with some separatist groups having established close ties with the global jihadist movement and with al-Qaeda. They include the shadowy Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) in southern Thailand, sections of the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization in Burma/Myanmar. The caveat that must be remembered here is that al-Qaeda's actual operational links with each of these groups is a matter of dispute.

In recent years, governments and intelligence agencies in the region and elsewhere have also become concerned with an amorphous fourth category of mostly overt and currently legitimate radical organizations that have known sympathies for radical Islamist ideology. These groups are believed to possess the potential for violence, although most Indonesians defend their right to participate in the democratic political process. Principally, they can be found in Indonesia, many of which are part of the umbrella radical organization, the Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI) headed by the alleged spiritual leader of the JI, Abu Bakar Bashir. These organizations include: Laskar Jundullah, Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam and KISDI (Komite Solidaritas Islam), amongst others. Some, such as Laskar Jundullah, have documented links with al-Qaeda but have otherwise not participated actively in the global jihadist movement despite being influenced by radical ideology. Whilst the various groups under the MMI have not been directly linked to jihadist radical terrorism, individual members have. It is important to bear in mind that the MMI remains an overt and legal religious and social organization in Indonesia, although the concern has been the way it has facilitated the spread of radical ideology. Indeed, some of the constituent groups have already been implicated in violence, for instance, KISDI activists were allegedly prominent in the anti-Chinese riots in 1998 when the Suharto regime came to an end, while Laskar Jihad had been involved in sectarian Muslim–Christian violence in the Maluku Islands.[17]

The categorization above is reflected in the chapters in this handbook. The sheer variety of rebellions in the region, including communist insurgencies,

Burmese separatist rebellions, Christian-dominated rebel movements in the case of the Karen, East Timorese and West Papuans, armed Muslim separatisms, and radical Islamist groups with links to international terrorism, demonstrates the complexities of terrorism and insurgency in this diverse and complex region. They raise questions regarding the accuracy of conceptualizing the region as the 'second front' in the 'global war on terrorism', and clarify the oft-held misconception by those outside the region that terrorism in Southeast Asia is somehow a phenomenon that consists predominantly of pan-Islamist radicalism.

Fundamental causes

The chapters in this handbook will demonstrate the salience of fundamental causes of political repression, poverty, economic disparities and environmental degradation that underlie most of these rebellions. Furthermore, despite the emergence of 'new' forms of terrorism, most of these are old terrorisms that have pre-dated the likes of global terrorist movements such as al-Qaeda, although that does not rule out the old terrorism adopting the technology, organization and tactics pioneered by the new terrorists or which could potentially transform them into deadlier terrorist/insurgent groups capable of challenging the state and inflicting much greater civilian casualties.

Moreover, underlying the various rebellions is a sense of alienation which has translated into a problem of legitimacy for the states in the region, some of which still demonstrate a certain degree of fragility as nation-states decades after independence from the colonial powers. The chapters in this handbook, which cover rebellions in the region that are as diverse as Burmese separatisms, the Hmong rebellion, Philippine communist insurgency and Muslim separatist rebellions, tell us not just about the diversity of these rebellions, in that they are not exclusively dominated by Islamists or Muslim separatists, but also the fact that they display a number of interesting common characteristics.

Indeed, all the rebellions here display some of the following characteristics: past importance as a separate state, Islam as a focal rallying point and the presence of migrant communities much resented by the locals (in the case of all the Muslim separatisms in Aceh, Pattani and Mindanao); strong local identity and the fear of losing their identity in the face of a dominant group (in all cases except for the case of Philippine communist insurgency); and local political, economic and social grievances, a sense of relative deprivation, deep socio-economic disparities, the presence of discrimination and prejudice, mismanagement and corruption by authorities, and ignorance and insensitivity by central governments of local regional concerns (in all cases).

Implications for counter-terrorism

The complexities and presence of fundamental causes have some important implications for counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia. They raise some interesting questions: how accurate is the 'new' terrorism paradigm in describing the nature of terrorism in the region? Is the concept and strategy of the US-led 'global war on terrorism' adequate or even relevant to the Southeast Asian context?

The answers to these questions invariably involve an examination of radical Islamism. An emerging concern in Southeast Asia in recent years has been the appearance of religion-inspired militant terrorism, particularly radical pan-Islamist groups. Increased globalization and the growing ease of communication have made it possible to establish cross-border linkages and networks. These factors have facilitated the spread of pan-Islamic militant ideology throughout Southeast Asia. Al-Qaeda has provided the ideological indoctrination, training and funding to both nurture radical groups such as the JI as well as penetrate separatist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).[18] Al-Qaeda adopted this twin-track strategy in order to improve its prospects of penetrating Southeast Asia. This region is especially important to al-Qaeda, as success in the Malay Archipelago, which contains the world's largest Muslim population, would ensure continuous recruitment and boost Osama bin Laden's strategic revolutionary objective of a worldwide pan-Islamic community. The post-Suharto crisis of governance in Indonesia and the presence of fundamental grievances in places such as Mindanao in the Philippines seem to suggest that the region is ripe for the pan-Islamic revolution.

Yet, it is worth pointing out once more that the chapters in this handbook demonstrate that while the new terrorism as represented by al-Qaeda and its local supporters has emerged in Southeast Asia, an older, more traditional form of terrorism has posed, and continues to pose, a major security challenge for governments in the region.

They indicate the presence of deep fundamental grievances that have caused the alienation which have made some in the region susceptible to appeals to religion, ethnicity or class. While al-Qaeda has attempted to penetrate local separatist and radical groups, it has met with mixed results. The JI was founded by Southeast Asians and later established contact with, and was penetrated and co-opted by al-Qaeda.[19] On the other hand, separatist groups with a nationalist agenda have responded with ambivalence. GAM rejected it from the outset, while the MILF saw tactical advantages in establishing linkages with the global jihadists. Yet, its leadership, though not all its factions, has beat a hasty retreat from al-Qaeda in the wake of 9/11, choosing to emphasize the MILF's nationalist agenda.

Thus, in joining up the dots to uncover the al-Qaeda network in the region, it is important to bear in mind that given the complex nature of Muslim rebellion in Southeast Asia and the presence of fundamental grievances, not every Muslim rebel in the region is a dedicated al-Qaeda operative striving to achieve pan-Islamist religious objectives. Local Muslims in places such as Aceh and Mindanao have home-grown political, economic and social concerns that long pre-dated 11 September 2001 and al-Qaeda. While they may derive satisfaction and be galvanized by al-Qaeda's actions, fundamental grievances of a political, economic and social nature underlie armed Muslim rebellion in Southeast Asia. Armed rebellion, including separatist rebellion, has at its root socio-economic issues and grievances, which cannot be redressed solely through the use of force. Indeed, understanding the complexity of armed rebellions in Southeast Asia is important if an appropriate and effective counter-strategy is to be devised.

Further, whilst 9/11 has reaffirmed the agency of the state in dealing with terrorism, it has at the same time brought to the fore non-traditional human security issues and concerns that have fuelled rebellions and terrorism. There has thus been greater attention to human security or non-traditional security issues that constitute the root causes of alienation in Southeast Asia. Poverty, socio-economic disparities, environmental degradation and resource scarcities have been translated into political demands and a retreat into ethnic community and religion. They have exacerbated historical animosities and grievances, particularly between those who have been dispossessed or marginalized, whether they are ethnic or religious minorities along the periphery, such as the Muslim Moros in the Philippines, or the suffering landless peasants in the heartland of a Catholic Philippines. The resulting alienation has provided the fodder for various separatist and rebel causes, whatever the ideological dressing or justification, be it communism or radical Islam.

A recent study by RAND of three countries, Israel, the Philippines and the United Kingdom, which have enacted social and development policies to inhibit a resurgence of terrorism within their jurisdictions, made the following findings: social and economic development policies can indeed weaken local support for terrorist activities; they can discourage terrorist recruits; inadequately funded social and economic policies however are likely to inflate expectations and renew support for terrorism; the ability of development policies to inhibit terrorism depends on their implementation; they can be used as a 'stick' to discourage terrorism; and, most crucially, they inhibit but do not by themselves eliminate terrorism. The RAND study thus concluded that development is most effective when it is incorporated into a 'multi-pronged approach' (or comprehensive approach) that includes wider political, military and community-relations dimensions.[20]

The key is the ability to implement development policies effectively to alleviate poverty, redress socio-economic disparities, resolve resource allocation issues and result in meaningful land reform. The problem, however, is the lack of an indigenous ability to implement the necessary comprehensive measures that will address the issues that have fuelled terrorisms within the region, given low levels of governance, ineffective institutions and a high level of corruption, all starkly revealed in the devastating political, economic and social impacts of the Asian financial crisis that hit the region in 1997. Despite the recognition of the fundamental issues that underlie armed rebellion in the region, the countries in Southeast Asia have mostly failed to resolve these issues satisfactorily. Ultimately, it is the failure of governments in the region that have fuelled terrorism.

The recognition of the salience of human security concerns means that the answers or solution to the problem of terrorism in Southeast Asia must necessarily be multidimensional and comprehensive in approach. The transnational dimension also means that a multilateral approach is required. This is in contrast to the unilateral and military-oriented, unidimensional approach that the United States under the Bush administration has so far pursued in its global war on terrorism. The way ahead for Southeast Asia must therefore be a concerted application of a comprehensive security approach, which must include both tactical military measures as well as non-military measures. Tactical military measures, in an age of transnational terrorism and crime, must necessarily involve effective transnational regional security cooperation. They must also, however, be strongly complemented by non-military measures, such as political negotiations with disaffected ethnic separatist elements, since their grievances are political in nature. In addition, they must also include the effective implementation of social and economic development policies that can weaken local support for terrorist activities and discourage terrorist recruits.

Even then, however, the most realistic outcome will be the containment of terrorism, not its resolution, given the presence of deep-seated fundamental grievances, as the rest of this volume shows, that have persisted within the region for a very long time.

Themes and structure of the handbook

This handbook is designed to illustrate the themes discussed in this chapter. The first is the broad definition of terrorism. As an instrument of the weak, and one used by states against their ethnic minority foes, 'terrorism' as a social phenomenon can only be understood if studied in an objective and holistic manner. In this respect, the three chapters on the Burmese use of state terrorism in Arakan, the case of the Hmongs in Laos, and East Timor under Indonesia occupation, provide a refreshing

illustration of how terrorism as an instrument is used by both the weak and the strong alike.

The second key theme is the old versus new terrorism debate. The challenge of radical Islam is well covered in the chapters on radicalism in Indonesia, the phenomenon of suicide terrorism in Southeast Asia, the case of Sulawesi, Jihad in Maluku, radicalism in Malaysia and radical Islamism in the Philippines. This is balanced by the chapters on armed separatist insurgencies, illustrating the old or traditional terrorism that has been ongoing for many years. These chapters cover the Muslim separatist insurgency in the Philippines, the Aceh conflict, southern Thai separatism, separatism in West Papua, and ethnic conflicts in Burma.

The third key theme is the legitimacy of the state, which has been contested by all the rebellions covered in the chapters of this handbook. Radical Islamists aim to replace the secular state with one (preferably a pan-Islamic entity covering all Muslim regions) run strictly according to the sharia or Muslim laws. Separatists want to secede and form their own separate state. Political terrorism, in the form of the Philippine communist rebellion, aims to overthrow the present state and establish a more equitable communist state and society.

Another key theme is the complexities of rebellion in the region, which raises questions over the simplistic assumptions underlying the concept of Southeast Asia being the 'second front' in the 'global war on terrorism'. The diversity of rebellions covered by the various chapters illustrate this diversity and complexity well enough to raise questions over the nature, aims and conduct of counter-terrorism strategies.

Another key theme is the question of fundamental causes. The chapters in this handbook illustrate the presence of fundamental causes of rebellion, and tell us why there are significant numbers of people in the region who rebel. All rebellions in the region have underlying political, economic and social grievances: a sense of relative deprivation due to evidently deep socio-economic disparities; the pervasive presence of discrimination and prejudice; and gross mismanagement and corruption by the authorities.

The handbook is divided into six sections. Part I consists of three chapters written by the editor of the volume, comprising this introductory chapter which sets out the key issues and themes, followed by Chapter 2 which sets the post-9/11 context and examines the rise of the 'new' postmodern terrorism; Chapter 3 tries to balance this by examining, through a brief survey of some of the rebellions in the region, the continued salience of the old, traditional ethno-nationalist and political ideological terrorism and insurgency that have been going on for a long time and indeed predated the emergence of the new postmodern terrorism.

Part II, on 'The Challenge of Radical Islam', has a total of seven chapters. It begins with Chapter 4 by Greg Fealy of the Australian National University. Fealy examines the five main militant Islamic groups on Java, giving special attention to their origins, leadership and membership, ideology, interaction with other militant groups and prospects for the future. He concludes that despite the fact that conditions in Indonesia are becoming more difficult for militant groups, Indonesia is unlikely to rid itself of terrorism and other forms of violent jihadism in the near future. This is due to the porosity of its borders, the widespread corruption within its customs and immigration services, the ready availability of arms and explosives, and the continuing presence of deeply aggrieved Muslim groups, thus creating an environment which is conducive to continuing militant action.

This is followed by the excellent analysis of a key radical Islamist document, the *PUPJI*, by the Harvard-trained Elena Pavlova. Pavlova's Chapter 5 is an invaluable examination of the manifesto of the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) which outlines its fundamental principles and practices. Known as the General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah (*Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah*), or *PUPJI*, the document provides religious, strategic and tactical instructions on how the JI should conduct itself as a mobilizing agent for collective action.

The next chapter in this section, Chapter 6, is written by Adam Dolnik, who works with the Center for Transnational Crime Prevention at Wollongong, Australia, on the very recent emergence of suicide terrorism in Southeast Asia, as illustrated by the Bali suicide bombings in October 2002. Although Dolnik locates his piece in the context of suicide terrorism as a general phenomenon, he examines its impact in Southeast Asia, and notes that the modern practice of suicide bombing as we know it today had reached Southeast Asia as a direct consequence of al-Qaeda's attempts to infiltrate the local struggles in the region. Dolnik concludes that we can expect the suicide bombings in Indonesia to continue, and that the likelihood of possible proliferation of the tactic into Southern Thailand and the Philippines in the near future is relatively high.

This is followed by Chapter 7 by Jim Veitch, who is a professor of religion in New Zealand and who lived for some years in Sulawesi. Veitch provides an important analytical narrative of the conflict. According to him, the causes of the Sulawesi conflict between Muslims and Christians are complex, and he concludes that the issues that caused the crisis and sustained it have not been resolved.

Chapter 8, by Badrus Sholeh, is an extremely useful empirical study on the emergence of the jihadist movement in Maluku as a result of the involvement of the Java-based militant organization, the Laskar Jihad, which exacerbated the local conflict and eventually left a legacy of local

radical groups that will continue to cause insecurity. A result of a great deal of fieldwork, it sheds light on the lesser-known but very intense Muslim–Christian civil conflict in Maluku that claimed more than 10 000 lives after it began in 1999. This chapter more than any other illustrates the deep empirical knowledge that local scholars bring to understanding this pivotal region.

This is followed by Chapter 9 by Elina Noor, who examines the phenomenon of militant Islam in Malaysia. Given that al-Ma'unah and KMM sought to overthrow the government using violence as a tool and religion as its cloak, due to their disaffection with local politics and at the electoral system's shortcomings to establish an administration compatible with their vision of Islam, Elina therefore observed that 'the the goal of all militant and terrorist groups is inevitably political'. Elina concludes that an enduring commitment to good governance, equitable political and socio-economic opportunities as well as a sound and balanced education system will decrease the pool of disaffected Muslims.

The last chapter in this section, Chapter 10, is an insightful one written by Rommel Banlaoi of the National Defense College of the Philippines. Banlaoi questions the whole notion of 'radical Muslim terrorism' in the Philippines. He points out that there are deep historical, economic, social and political roots to rebellion; while there is no doubt that the violent activities of so-called radical Muslim groups have wreaked havoc, the absence of a commonly acceptable definition of terrorism and the pejorative meanings attached to radical Muslims make the term 'radical Muslim terrorism' a continuing subject of tremendous contestation.

Part III of this handbook is on 'Armed Separatist Insurgencies'. There are five chapters in this section. It begins with an excellent chapter by Paul Rodell which examines the Moro insurgency in the southern Philippines. Rodell argues in Chapter 11 that the fundamental nature and causes of the Philippine Muslim insurgency should not be equated with the radicalism of either al-Qaeda or the Jemaah Islamiah. Rather, the main Philippine insurgency is a domestic phenomenon with deep historical roots and is the result of the unsuccessful integration of the Muslim population of the south into the Christian dominated nation-state and society that is the Philippines. He correctly points out that the main challenge today is whether the country's Islamic people will truly be integrated into the national whole so the events of the past 30 years will not be continued.

This is followed by the important and insightful Chapter 12 on Aceh by Kamarulzaman Askandar, who is coordinator of the Southeast Asian Studies Network in Penang, in Malaysia. Kamarulzaman examines the history and causes of the Aceh conflict and concludes that it is on its way to a resolution as a result of both the Helsinki process and the peace

agreement between the Indonesian government and GAM after the deadly tsunami of December 2004. He highlights the crucial role of civil society in the peace-building process and sets out the key challenges, which include post-tsunami reconstruction, creating structures that promote long-term sustainable growth and social stability, and the need for a comprehensive development programme.

Chapter 13 is an excellent one on the Muslim insurgency in Southern Thailand written by Thitinan Pongsudhirak of Thailand's Chulalongkorn University. A prolific commentator and analyst on political and security issues, particularly on Thailand, he provides a well-written historical and contemporary context that explains the protracted violence in Southern Thailand. He attributes the ability of the insurgents to regain their footing in recent years to the ascendancy of Prime Minister Thaksin and his top-down management style and nationalist inclinations. He concludes that the fact that violence has been confined to the three southernmost provinces to date suggests that no germination with regional extremism has taken place. However, he warns that the likelihood of external and regional jihadist involvement will increase as the insurgency progresses, especially given the insensitive responses from Bangkok.

Chapter 14 is written by Philips Vermonte, who works at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIC) in Jakarta, in Indonesia, and is also a member of the Working Group on Papua. His informative and useful chapter traces the causes of the West Papuan separatist conflict and examines the responses of the international community and the Indonesian government to the problem. The chapter observes that despite the granting of autonomy and the provision for greater representation, the Indonesian government has also continued to sanction the use of very tough security measures. The question of past as well as continuing human rights abuses committed by the military also needs to be addressed if the people of Papua are to be placated. The conclusion is that the challenges remain serious, as the aspiration for independence remains strong in the province.

The last chapter in this section on 'Armed Separatist Insurgencies' is a well-written one on ethnic conflicts in Burma, written by a foremost authority on the country, Martin Smith. Since the outbreak of ethnic rebellions along its periphery in 1948, there has been a stalemate, with the Burmese government unable fully to dominate the restless minorities and none of the minorities succeeding in their political goal of secession. According to Smith in Chapter 15, the insurgencies in Burma were sustained over subsequent decades by a number of regenerating factors, including political, economic and international ones, which resulted in prolonged armed conflict in Burma. He concludes that, despite the growing efforts by the UN and other international bodies to support conflict

resolution and the undoubted war-weariness, historical precedent suggests caution in expecting any long-lasting resolution.

Part IV of this volume consists of three excellent chapters on 'State Terrorism'. Chapter 16 is on state terrorism in Arakan, written by Syed Serajul Islam, who is Chair of Political Science at Lakehead University, in Canada. He documents how the Burmese state has carried out deliberate policies designed to terrorize the Rohingya population. These include denial of citizenship, restrictions on mobility, forced unpaid labour, land confiscations and evictions, arbitrary taxation and restrictions on marriages. He concludes that given the degree of religious and political persecution, the plight of the Rohingyas deserves international attention.

The second chapter in this section is on the little-known Hmong rebellion. Entitled, 'The Hmong rebellion in Laos: victims or terrrorists?' Chapter 17 is written by Gary Yia Lee, a Hmong who earned his PhD in social anthropology from Sydney University and now lives in Australia. Lee explains the Hmong problem and how armed resistance developed and was sustained. He cites political differences, perceived racial discrimination, poverty and high inflation, corruption, and lack of economic and employment opportunities as the underlying causes of the rebellion. He concludes that these underlying causes of the resistance need to be resolved, and that the problem cannot simply be stemmed out by force.

The final chapter in this section, Chapter 18, is a contemporary historical study of East Timor under Indonesian occupation, from the time of Indonesia's invasion in 1975 to its independence in 1999, written by Peter Carey of Oxford University. Carey documents the course of events in the East Timor conflict, and highlights the various abuses committed by the Indonesian military in the territory, such as the use of torture and rape. He concludes that East Timor was a victim of the Cold War, as Indonesia, a key Western ally during that time, was always going to be favoured over the tiny territory, however bad Jakarta's human rights record was. He celebrates the independence of the territory in 1999 and pays tribute to the bravery and skill of the Timorese people which was crucial to the eventual outcome. However, he cautions that East Timor's fate was, and remains, inextricably bound up with international politics.

Part V of this volume, on 'Communist Insurgency', has but one chapter as the only ongoing communist rebellion in the region is in the Philippines. Armed communist insurgency existed in most Southeast Asian states at the end of the Second World War. In Thailand, however, the long-running insurgency fell victim to the splits between China and the Soviet Union in the 1970s. A more sophisticated and comprehensive approach adopted by the government of Thailand, one that emphasized addressing fundamental causes, was also instrumental in degrading support for the communists.

By the 1990s, it had faded away. In Malaysia, the Malayan Communist Party ended its armed struggle in 1989 after signing a Tripartite Peace Accord with the governments of Thailand and Malaysia. In Burma, the pro-China orientation of the Communist Party of Burma alienated the ethnic minority cadres, culminating in a series of mutinies and finally the seizure of the party headquarters in Panghsang by Wa militia units in 1989. The ageing, pro-China leadership fled to China and the movement fractured into small, ineffective factions.[21]

The sole chapter in this section, Chapter 19, is therefore on the Philippine communist insurgency. It is excellently written by Miriam Coronel Ferrer, who is Convenor of the Program on Peace, Democracy and Human Rights at the University of the Philippines. Ferrer observes that after the restoration of formal democracy following the end of the Marcos regime, a number of factors, such as the dominance of traditional politics, factionalism among the political elites, and a weak bureaucracy, impeded national reforms that were needed to address deep-seated problems of poverty and injustice. At the same time, incoherent or contradictory policies of the different administrations and conflictive issues on the process and substance of the talks between the communists and the government have undermined political negotiations. The Maoist CPP (Communist Party of the Philippines) has thus continued to seek seizure of political power through armed revolution. Ferrer calls for the institutionalization of political and economic reforms that will provide the lasting foundation for addressing the roots of the conflict, equalize opportunities and avenues for political and economic participation of disgruntled citizens, and enhance conditions for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. According to Ferrer, such reforms need to span the whole gamut of societal concerns – from electoral and security sector reforms to land security of poor farmers and indigenous peoples, and a fair and efficient justice system. Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the continued salience of a Maoist communist insurgency in the twenty-first century only serves to highlight the fundamental political, economic and social causes of rebellion that are still extant in the region.

Part VI, the final section of this volume, addresses counter-terrorism strategies. There are two excellent chapters here. Chapter 20 is written by Rohan Gunaratna, the celebrated author of the seminal work, *Inside Al-Qaeda*, which appeared just after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the USA. An exponent of the 'new' terrorism school and indeed a disciple of Bruce Hoffman, Gunaratna has contributed much to our understanding of the new global terrorism. Here, his study, entitled 'Terrorism in Southeast Asia: threat and response', marries global terrorism analyses with its local manifestation. This chapter is extremely important, as it helps

to highlight the old versus new terrorism debate described earlier and also raises the question of the implications our understanding of the old–new mix would have on counter-terrorism.

The second chapter in this section, and the final chapter in the handbook, is Chapter 21, written by Renato Cruz De Castro, who is Chair of International Studies at De La Salle University in the Philippines. Whilst he discusses the kinetic, security measures that are required by states to deal with terrorism, he also makes the point that states should also cooperate in formulating and implementing social and economic development polices that would discourage the resort to terrorism. He points out that the key component in the fight against terrorism is to gain political advantage over the terrorists in terms of time, space, legitimacy and political support. Ultimately, it means defusing the terrorists' most powerful weapon – the political message. There is therefore a need to address underlying grievances, such as alleviating poverty, social ills and other problems associated with globalization that provide a fertile ground for political discontent as well as foster recruitment and support for the terrorist organization. He concludes on the pessimistic note that the powerful forces of globalization and modernization in this new century will continue to generate problems and tensions that will result in both winners and losers, with the losers sometimes resorting to terrorism. The stark reality is that terrorism as a phenomenon is here to stay.

Notes

1. See Tan, Andrew T.H. (2004), *Security Perspectives of the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the 'Second Front' in the War on Terrorism*, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
2. See Tan, Andrew T.H. and Ken Boutin (eds) (2001), *Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia*, Singapore: Select Books. The volume was the result of a Ford Foundation-funded project.
3. 'Islamist' is a term that is used to refer only to those who subscribe to radical, violent interpretations of Islam, not to Muslims or to Islam in general.
4. See entries on 'Darul Islam' and 'Jemaah Islamiah' in Tan, Andrew T.H. (2004), *Political and Economic Dictionary of South-East Asia*, London: Europa / Routledge.
5. See, for instance, Cragin, Kim and Peter Chalk (2003), *Terrorism and Development: Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
6. See Rapoport, David C. (2006), 'Modern terror: history and special features', in Andrew T.H. Tan (ed.), *The Politics of Terrorism*, London: Routledge, p. 4.
7. See Hoffman, Bruce (1997), 'The confluence of international and domestic trends in terrorism', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, **9** (2).
8. See for instance, Barton, Greg (2005), *Jemaah Islamiyah Radical Islamism in Indonesia*, Singapore: Singapore University Press, and Wright-Neville, David (2004), 'Dangerous dynamics: activists, militants and terrorists in Southeast Asia', *Pacific Review*, **17** (1), March.
9. For an example of this debate, see Duyvesteyn, Isabelle (2004), 'How new is the New Terrorism?', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, **27**, 439–54.

10. Some of the material in this section on 'Legitimacy and rebellions', as well as parts of the sections on the Karen, Hmong and Communist Party of the Philippines rebellions, are drawn from the author's book, Tan, Andrew T.H. (2000), *Armed Rebellion in the ASEAN States: Persistence and Implications*, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Center, Australian National University.
11. Alagappa, Muthiah (1987), *The National Security of Developing States: Lessons From Thailand*, Dover, MA: Auburn House, p. 5.
12. Azar, Edward E. and Chung-in Moon (1988), 'Legitimacy, integration and policy capacity: the "software" side of Third World national security', in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon (eds), *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats*, Aldershot, UK and Brookfield, US: Edward Elgar, p. 81.
13. See Bassman, Joseph (1979), 'Max Weber's concept of legitimacy: an evaluation', in Arthur J. Vidich and Ronald Glassman M. (eds), *Conflict and Control: Challenge to Legitimacy of Modern Governments*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, pp. 17–48.
14. Paribatra, Sukhumbhand and Chai-Anan Samudavanija (1984), in Lim Joo-Jock and S. Vani (eds), *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p. 32.
15. Lim Joo-Jock and S. Vani (eds) (1984), *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p. 12.
16. This four-class categorization was first suggested in the author's paper, 'Armed Muslim rebellion and postmodern terrorism in Southeast Asia: persistence and implications after 9-11', delivered at the International Studies Association Conference, 1 March 2003, Portland, OR.
17. See relevant entries in Tan, Andrew T.H. (2004), *A Political and Economic Dictionary of South-East Asia*.
18. Gunaratna, Rohan (2002), *Inside Al-Qaeda*, London: Hurst, pp. 167–220.
19. Abuza, Zachary (2003), *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 125–87.
20. See Cragin, Kim and Peter Chalk (2003), *Terrorism and Development: Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
21. Tan, Andrew (2000), *Armed Rebellion in the ASEAN States: Persistence and Implications*, pp. 81–6.

2 Setting the post 9/11 context: the emergence of postmodern terrorism

Andrew T.H. Tan

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, and the Pentagon in Washington, on 11 September 2001 are clearly a watershed, marking the emergence of the new postmodern terrorism.

The attacks shocked not just the United States but the entire world; 9/11 had far-reaching implications for future security. The targets, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, guaranteed the widest possible publicity for the perpetuators, as both represented American prestige as well as economic and military power. The attacks also sent shock waves through the US and world economies, as New York is the financial capital of the world's largest economy. The World Trade Center was also the headquarters of many major American financial powerhouses.

More significantly, with casualties running into many thousands, it is the first true mass casualty terrorist act in modern times.[1] Prior to this attack, the worst terrorist attack was the one on an Abadan cinema in 1979 that killed more than 400 people. The Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 killed 168 people, the sixth most lethal terrorist attack.[2] What security analysts had been predicting for years, that is, the perpetration of a terrorist act causing massive casualties running into thousands or tens of thousands, has finally come true.[3] A brave new world of postmodern (or 'new') terrorism has dawned.

9/11 also breached an unseen threshold. It has demonstrated that such massive acts of terror can be successfully carried out even in the most powerful state in the world. This opens a Pandora's box, as it encourages other militant groups to carry out similar attacks. While moral considerations might in the past have conceivably stopped terrorists from such major attacks on innocent civilians, given the risks for the terrorists and uncertain outcomes, the tremendous political, economic and psychological impacts sustained by the United States and the rest of the world due to 9/11 has lowered the moral threshold for similar or worse attacks. In turn, it has also increased the probability of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) sometime in the not-too-distant future. The use of WMDs would be even more effective than slamming hijacked commercial aircraft into high-value targets, given the much greater horror as well as social,

economic and political disruption they would cause. To make it even more difficult to defend against such sneak terrorist attacks, terrorists who are prepared to die for their cause appear to be growing in number.[4] As many subsequent terrorist attacks after 9/11 demonstrated, those who had carried out the New York and Washington attacks have become role models for other fanatics. Suicide terrorism, while not new, came of age after 9/11.

Postmodern (or 'new') terrorism

According to Walter Laqueur, 'terrorism is the use or threat of violence, a method of combat or a strategy to achieve certain goals . . . its aim is to induce a state of fear in the victim . . . it is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian norms, and publicity is an essential factor in terrorist strategy.'[5] The US Department of Defense defines terrorism as 'the unlawful use of, or threatened use of, force or violence against individuals and property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives'.[6]

The problem with these definitions, however, is the oft-mentioned but nonetheless accurate cliché that one person's terrorist may well be another person's freedom fighter. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) were terrorist organizations but they ultimately achieved legitimacy by being accorded a place at the negotiating table. What distinguishes terrorist movements from national liberation groups is sometimes the outcome: the group that succeeds becomes a national liberation movement.[7] Nonetheless, there is a difference between national liberation movements, whose objective is freedom, and terrorism, which is a means of achieving freedom or whatever objective is at stake. National liberation movements can choose to use peaceful means to achieve their objectives, or they may choose a combination of terrorism and political measures.

Terrorism is a tactic often used by the powerless against the powerful; ethnic or religious minorities often employ it on behalf of their political causes. However, it is important to remember that terrorism as a means of violence is not only employed by liberation movements or religious extremists. Governments also use terrorism against their own people or against another sovereign state. The US has alleged that Cuba, Syria, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Libya have trained and supported anti-US terrorist groups. Others accuse the US of supporting terrorist activities in Chile, El Salvador and Nicaragua.[8]

However, the prevailing image of terrorism has been that formed during the Cold War – of radical left-wing groups such as the Japanese Red Army, as well as other nationalist-type groups such as the IRA and the PLO.

These groups were mostly characterized by their tight organization and hierarchical structure, training in the techniques and tactics of terrorism, and consisted of individuals engaged in conspiracy as a full-time occupation, living underground and plotting terrorist attacks, who at times operated under the behest of a foreign government. These groups also usually had a clear set of political objectives and often issued communiqués taking credit for and explaining their actions.[9]

In recent years, however, globalization and other factors have changed the nature of terrorist groups. According to Bruce Hoffman, there have emerged new terrorist groups which have joined these more traditional types. These groups have less comprehensible nationalistic or ideological motivations, embracing much more amorphous religious and millenarian aims. In addition, they are also less cohesive in their organization, with a more diffuse structure and membership.

More significantly, these groups are potentially far more lethal than traditional terrorist groups given their attempts at mass casualty terrorist acts, that is, acts calculated to kill very large numbers of people, using conventional explosives or weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), as the sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum Supreme Truth attempted in 1995. Increasingly, such groups do not bother to explain or justify their attacks, as the 1995 Oklahoma bombing demonstrated. The implication of this is that such groups see violence as an end in itself, not just a means to an end.[10] The use of WMDs in an age of technological and WMD proliferation has also made it logical for such groups to attempt WMD terrorist acts, as the Aum demonstrated.

The dramatic development in telecommunications and information that has been the hallmark of increasing globalization has provided new channels for transnational terrorism. The internationalization of terrorism has become more pronounced as terrorist groups today operate in various countries, taking advantage of porous borders in a rapidly globalizing world economy. These transnational terrorists are thus much more difficult to track. In addition, they have also been able to exploit the new information economy and the Internet to reach out to a much wider base of support than was possible in the past.

They are also much less dependent on the support of states in their terrorist causes since they have become much more mobile and flexible, and do not need fixed base areas to operate from.[11] The ethnic conflicts and disintegration of states in the post-Cold War era in various places such as Afghanistan, Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union have afforded terrorists sanctuary in weak or failed states. This is not to say that state-sponsored terrorism does not exist; on the contrary, terrorist acts using WMDs targeted at civilian infrastructure, or asymmetrical warfare, may be

the only means to counter states with much more superior conventional military capabilities.

The improved prospects for terrorism has made possible new transnational actors with new weapons, with the capacity to cause widespread panic in society through their capacity for mass casualty terrorist acts, thereby weakening states, possibly leading to significant political change. The focus in the post-Cold War era has thus been on the emerging threat of postmodern (or the 'new') terrorism. This new form of terrorism is potentially perpetuated by international (transnational) terrorist groups, which may or may not be supported by a state, and which may have the capacity to inflict mass casualties in terrorist acts. The effects of such attacks are unlikely to be confined to one country.

Reasons for the emergence of postmodern terrorism

Globalization has resulted in an interlinked global economy, characterized by improved communications as well as the movement of people and goods. This in turn has facilitated the movement and activities of transnational terrorists, whose activities are now much harder to track.

Indeed, globalization has resulted in the imposition of modern, secular values, often originating from the West, upon traditional cultures and communities, leading to fragmentation and much stress. Much has been said about the conflict between 'McWorld' and jihad,[12] but the point here is that the disaffected and those who have been left out have struck back at the perceived injustices by joining radical movements and extreme causes. Hence, while the worldwide Islamic resurgence is an understandable response to the challenge of global, Western values and systems, there has been an extreme fringe which espouses violence as a means of redress.

The increasing reliance on computer and telecommunication systems that has accompanied globalization has also introduced new forms of terrorism, such as the threat of cyber-warfare and cyber-terrorism. The modern terrorist could now hack into modern systems and potentially wreak havoc with power supplies, air traffic or the banking system.

The Internet has also shaped the new form of terrorism. It has helped to spread the message of the terrorist groups, helping to legitimize them and providing new avenues for raising funds. Through chat groups on the Internet, terrorist groups have evolved into more amorphous, indistinct organizations, consisting of independent cells that operate autonomously. This type of organizational structure will increase the chances of survival because the loss of individual units will not compromise the organization as a whole. Al-Qaeda, for instance, is not organized as a tight, hierarchical organization with Osama bin Laden as commander-in-chief. Instead, he

has functioned more as a coordinator and facilitator, as well as paymaster and spiritual leader.[13]

There has also been the 'CNN effect' (Cable News Network); the internationalization of news has resulted in much greater competition for publicity among terrorist organizations. Spectacular acts, such as a mass casualty act, would guarantee maximum publicity, as well as political and psychological impact. Attacks have become steadily more spectacular, for instance, Oklahoma City in 1995, the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001.

Despite the fact that some groups have, in this age of globalization, become much more autonomous in their operations and much less dependent on state support, some states continue to see utility in supporting terrorism. Sneak attacks against soft targets, particularly using weapons of mass destruction, is increasingly seen as the only way to defeat a militarily superior state such as the US. Postmodern terrorism is a substitute for warfare, as it makes even the most advanced countries vulnerable. Smaller and weaker states could potentially use this as a means of waging asymmetric warfare, in order to nullify the technological and numerical superiority of the armed forces of much larger states. Indeed, states continue to support terrorist groups against their more powerful adversaries.[14]

Bruce Hoffman has also identified a trend for terrorism to rely on migrant communities for support, which is partly attributable to globalization. This has resulted in the internationalization of violence, a growing network of organizations all over the world, and the use of diaspora and migrant communities for support in terms of funding, sanctuary and personnel. Indeed, terrorists are now able to get even second- and third-generation migrants to join their organizations.[15] A second reason for the increased emphasis on migrant communities is the decrease in sanctuaries, with previously radical states such as Libya becoming more wary of supporting such new terrorist groups, given the US threat of massive retaliation against any state supporting terrorist groups engaged in mass casualty terrorist acts.[16]

More seriously, some of the new transnational terrorist groups, especially those which are motivated by religious militancy, are alleged to be on the verge of obtaining or developing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), which is becoming more plausible due to the spread of, and public access to, hitherto sensitive know-how, as well as the availability of expertise from the former Soviet Union. They are adept at using the latest technology and have established links with transnational organized crime in order to obtain or smuggle weapons. Moreover, lax security at various chemical, biological and nuclear installations, particularly in the former Soviet Union, means that WMD devices or material could conceivably be

stolen. Indeed, there are reported incidences of the theft of fissile material, low morale among those guarding nuclear sites, increasing interest in such materials by Russian criminal organizations, and problems of rampant corruption and lax border controls.[17]

There already exist extremist groups which appear ready to use weapons of mass destruction, should they succeed in obtaining them. According to James Campbell, the terrorist WMD threat will emanate from non-state groups operating under a veneer of religion and ethnic-racist hate. These groups are the most likely candidates to threaten the use of weapons of mass destruction in a mass casualty 'super-terrorist act'.[18] Indeed, according to *Jane's Intelligence Review* (June 1999), Osama bin Laden has been attempting since 1993 to acquire WMDs, such as a nuclear device or chemical weapons, to be used against the US, the objective being to drive it out of the Middle East. He is quoted as saying: 'If I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty.'[19]

What motivates these groups? As Colonel Gaddafi warned in July 1993:

> Whatever takes place in America – and you will see a lot more terrorism there – is a function of perceived injustices in other parts of the world. Acts of terrorism in America will be the answer, and they will be more and more violent and spectacular for television purposes around the world.[20]

The radicalization of Islam has been traced to various sources, including the Iranian Revolution and the First Gulf War. But 'Talibanization', that is, the destabilizing export of Afghan-style radical Islam, has been a major factor in the rise of millenarian militant Islam. According to Ahmed Rashid, the chaos of Afghanistan during the 1980s and 1990s seeped through its porous borders. A new generation of violent fundamentalists, nurtured and inspired by the Taliban's unique Islamist model, took power in much of Afghanistan in the 1990s. The many thousands of foreign volunteers who fought in the Afghan war against the Soviet occupation, as well as those who trained there in al-Qaeda camps in the 1990s after the departure of Soviet forces following the end of the Cold War, have formed an international alumni based on their shared experience and a much greater awareness of the worldwide Muslim *umma* or community. Many of these ex-Afghan veterans also returned home determined to someday overthrow their regimes and carry out Taliban-style radical revolutions in their own homelands.[21] More seriously, they carried home superb training, field experience, knowledge of sophisticated bomb-making technology, propaganda and organizational skills, and cutting-edge operational tactics and strategies – all developed and imparted by al-Qaeda. These have raised the operational efficacy and lethality of regional terrorist groups, who have used the ex-Afghan alumni network to establish formal and informal ties

cutting across nations and continents in the common pursuit of what they see as the defence of an *umma* under attack, and their ultimate objective of a worldwide caliphate ruled strictly according to the sharia or Muslim laws.

Thus, whilst terrorist and insurgent groups in Southeast Asia, for instance, long pre-dated al-Qaeda and have long-standing local grievances of a political, historical, economic and social nature, the rise of postmodern radical religious terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda has had a significant impact. They have galvanized local insurgent groups and led to a rise of urban terrorist cells dedicated to deadly mass casualty bombing campaigns. This has resulted in the increasing lethality of terrorist attacks. Thus, the events of 9/11 were followed by the discovery of an al-Qaeda-linked group in Southeast Asia known as the Jemaah Islamiah (or JI), elements of which were implicated in an audacious plot to attack a swathe of Western and local targets in Singapore. The targets included American military personnel at a local subway station, US naval vessels at Singapore's Changi Naval Base, US commercial interests, Western (specifically, US, British and Australian) and Israeli embassies, and Singaporean military facilities. They involved an unprecedented seven truck bombs and 21 tonnes of ammonium nitrate, to be carried out by an al-Qaeda suicide team flown in from abroad. The planned attacks were to be coordinated by two senior al-Qaeda operatives, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi and Jabarah Mohammed Mansour, both of whom were subsequently arrested.[22]

Had the ultimately abortive attack taken place, it would have caused an unprecedented casualty list of many hundreds of Westerners and locals, resulting in a massive political, economic and social shock that would have reverberated around the region and beyond. The unprecedented nature of the threat demonstrated the fact that the new postmodern terrorism has well and truly penetrated Southeast Asia.[23] That radical Islam was involved should not have been surprising, given the trends in the Middle East and globally, and the fact that Southeast Asia has the world's largest Muslim population – a strategic battleground for the hearts and minds of the Muslim *umma* as far as Osama bin Laden and his fellow radical ideologues are concerned.

As revealed in the Singapore Government's White Paper entitled *The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism* issued in January 2003, the JI is an extensive regional terrorist network with well-trained operatives in Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and Australia. As spelt out in its key training manual, the *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jema'ah Al-Islamiyah* (*PUPJI*), its objective is the creation of a Daulah Islamiah or Islamic state in the region through the use of violence. Despite the arrests of some 400 alleged operatives throughout the region, the JI remains dangerous, given its estimated number of several thousand,

including several hundred that have been trained in Afghanistan as well as in regional camps. A number of these have become very adept bomb-makers, and have been responsible for a number of terrorist attacks in the region since 9/11.[24] Not surprisingly, a number of members of the JI network were ex-mujahideen who had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets in the 1980s.

Since then, there has been much sharper awareness of the spread of transnational terrorist linkages in the region, and their broader links further afield with the likes of al-Qaeda. Indeed, there are a number of radical groups in Indonesia today, apart from the JI, which has links with al-Qaeda. In addition, there also exist well-documented links between al-Qaeda and the two Muslim separatist groups in the southern Philippines, namely, the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Although the latter has consistently distanced itself from al-Qaeda since 9/11, there remain persistent allegations that JI operatives have sought sanctuary with it.[25]

Finally, a major cause of contemporary terrorism has been the outbreak of ethnic conflict. In particular, radical pan-Islamic groups have been able to exploit existing local ethno-nationalist grievances on the part of Muslim minorities in various parts of the world. Indeed, ethnic conflict as a whole seems to be increasing in the post-Cold War era, for instance, in the former Soviet Union, where one can think of the Chechnya–Dagestan conflict and the Moscow bombing campaign carried out by Chechen terrorists in 1999, Yugoslavia (both Serbs and Muslims), Albania (the Kosovo Liberation Army and Serb militias) and various parts of Africa. These and other similar conflicts will continue to fuel terrorism. Significantly, the success achieved by the PLO in publicizing the Palestinians' plight through the internationalization of the struggle with Israel now serves as a model for similarly aggrieved ethnic and nationalist minority groups everywhere. Similarly, the IRA has now achieved legitimacy as a partner at the negotiating table. Clearly, terrorism eventually pays.

In Southeast Asia, ethno-nationalist conflict remains a serious problem. In Burma (or Myanmar), since 1948 there have been armed separatist rebellions by a swathe of ethnic minority groups living along the periphery of the centralized Burmese state. These groups contest the artificially drawn boundaries enacted by the British colonial authorities that have resulted in the denial of what they see as their legitimate right to exist as separate societies; if not in separate nation-states, then at least in federal states with maximum autonomy. In the same manner, the Montagnards in Vietnam and the Hmong in Laos have the same aspirations to separateness, which has caused civil conflict with central government. In Thailand, the Malay-Muslim armed separatist movement, consisting of a variety of small,

armed groups, have battled for decades for separation due to their strong sense of historical nationhood and the much greater empathy with ethnic and religious kin in neighbouring Malaysia. Of late, the situation has taken a turn for the worse due to the poor, clumsy handling of the conflict by the Thaksin government in Thailand. In Indonesia, armed separatist groups have included the East Timorese independence movement, the Irian Jaya Christian separatists, and the Acehnese independence movement centred around the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM). In the Philippines, the Muslim Moro separatist rebellion in the southern provinces has been extant for decades, with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) now being eclipsed by the more overtly religious MILF and the extremist, al-Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf Group.[26]

The threat of mass casualty terrorism

Prior to the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, much of the security literature had already identified the emergence of postmodern terrorism and concluded that mass casualty terrorist acts involving death tolls in the thousands or tens of thousands would occur. The question was not if but when and how. Since the question of when could not be answered definitively, analysts had speculated on the question of how. It seemed logical that the only way to carry out a spectacular mass casualty terrorist act successfully would be to use weapons of mass destruction.

Yet, despite the sometimes quite alarmist security literature on post-modern terrorism, there has not yet been a single successful attack using WMDs, although the Aum came close with sarin nerve gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995. Instead, the means used to carry out the devastating attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 were decidedly low-tech; some suicide bombers willing to undergo rudimentary flight training, a few hijacked commercial aircraft and meticulous planning were all it took.

Indeed, some experts doubt if any terrorist organization would have the expertise to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), for instance, nuclear devices.[27] Even chemical and biological weapons are not easy to manufacture and deploy, given the difficulties faced by the Aum Supreme Truth. Other experts, however, believe that the threat is very real, especially if covertly supported by rogue states, and given the easy availability of information pertaining to WMDs.[28]

Nuclear terrorism is most unlikely to happen via theft or the construction of nuclear devices. This is because they are not easy to steal or assemble. However, nuclear reactor sabotage, or a radiological device (which consists of conventional explosives with radioactive material), could be

quite easily made. Such devices could cause massive casualties.[29] Even if the casualties could somehow be limited, the fear and unease they would cause if used would have a huge political, economic and social impact. The raw materials are easy to find; indeed, radioactive waste and material could be stolen or bought from the former Soviet Union.

Chemical terrorism is not as potentially lethal as the use of biological weapons, but kills faster. Equipment and technology to make chemical weapons are easily available, and are similar to those for making insecticides. VX nerve agent, sarin and poison gas can be easily made utilizing commonly available knowledge. Indeed, any competent graduate in chemistry can easily construct some kind of chemical weapon. However, the problem is more in terms of deployment. Very large quantities, in the order of tonnes, have to be dispersed, without affecting the attacker, in order to be effective as a weapon of mass destruction.

It is biological terrorism which is considered the most viable and likely weapon of mass destruction. Firstly, it is much more lethal than the use of chemical weapons; a small quantity will suffice compared to many tonnes of chemical agents. Indeed, a small culture is all it takes to produce a large quantity of agent. Biological weapons are easy to deploy because they are small and undetectable using traditional anti-terrorist sensor systems. By the time the authorities are able to determine that it is a biological attack and not a natural outbreak, the perpetuators would have long escaped. They are relatively easy to produce, and do not need sophisticated facilities. The technology is also easily available, especially through the growing biotechnology industry and the availability of dual-use technology.

Alternatively, the material could be stolen. Unlike chemical warfare facilities and nuclear devices, civilian and biological research labs are not well guarded. If all else fails, there is plenty of ex-Soviet expertise for hire, especially those who have worked at the Biopreparat facilities of the former Soviet Union.[30] Indeed, in recent years, there has been increasing concern over the growing proliferation of biological warfare technology to states known to support terrorism, for instance, to North Korea.

As a weapon of mass destruction, biological weapons could cause massive casualties that are hard to achieve with other means. Biological weapons can produce terror and social disruption worse than a nuclear attack. With the right agent, they could be the ultimate doomsday weapon, with the potential of getting out of control and wiping out the human race.

Yet, despite attempts such as those by the Aum, and various warnings by analysts, WMD terrorist attack has not yet occurred on a large scale. The fear of retaliation by governments resulting in the terrorist group's own annihilation is one such deterrent. Also, states supporting terrorist groups would be deterred from helping them in such attacks as they would then

face massive (nuclear) retaliation from the US, which has made clear that it would severely punish states supporting any act of WMD terrorism. There is also the question of danger and risk to the terrorists themselves.

The first successful mass casualty terrorist attack, using hijacked commercial aircraft, on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington in the seminal 9/11 attacks, has demonstrated that spectacular mass casualty terrorist acts, which security analysts have been predicting for years, do not require weapons of mass destruction. It all came down to a basic question of poor intelligence and aviation safety. It is also clear that whatever barriers that existed are not insurmountable, especially to the fanatical suicide terrorist seeking martyrdom for his actions, particularly one who is prepared to disregard all moral considerations involved. Indeed, there are also innovative means of effecting mass casualties, such as attacking nuclear power plants with hijacked aircraft for instance.

This adaptability, as well as willingness to innovate, and the clear motivation and determination to acquire the means of mass destruction, has meant increasing fear that one day postmodern terrorists will succeed in surmounting the odds and carry out successful and devastating WMD attacks. Anticipating this, the United States has in recent years begun to put into place a counter-terrorist infrastructure involving training of civil defence personnel, the establishment of RAID (Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection) teams in major cities to diagnose chemical and biological attack, NEST (Nuclear Emergency Search Teams) to locate and disarm nuclear devices, and the stocking of antidotes. Many federal and state programmes have been initiated to defend the US against such attacks.

In Southeast Asia, the threat is now taken seriously by some governments. Singapore, in particular, has taken the lead, having been shocked by the audacity of the abortive al-Qaeda-linked mass casualty terrorist plots in late 2001. Vigorous and comprehensive measures since 9/11, under the rubric of its evolving homeland security doctrine and structure, have been enacted. In November 2002, for instance, Singapore passed the Strategic Goods (Control) Bill, which mandated the control of 600 items including chemicals, viruses and computer software that could be used to make nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.[31] It also established a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Explosives (CBRE) Defence Group to reinforce existing resources within the already well-established civil defence force. Even new subway stations had underground chemical decontamination chambers built to contain the impact of any chemical attack. To further improve bio-terror defences, a Regional Emerging Disease Intervention (REDI) Centre, a joint US–Singapore initiative, was established in 2003.[32] Singapore also joined the US-led Proliferation Security

Initiative (PSI) designed to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials by interdicting the illegal trafficking of such materials. This includes intercepting and searching suspect vessels on the high seas.[33]

The new versus old terrorism

It should noted that it is a fallacy to assume that most religious-inspired terrorism comes from Islamic radicalism. In the US, a number of recent terrorist attacks have come from fundamentalist Christian cults or militia groups which espouse right-wing, White supremacist, anti-government and anti-Jewish views. The most widely publicized atrocity has been the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma, in which Tim McVeigh and Terry Nichols used C4 plastic explosives, killing 168 people and injuring over 500. In India, Sikh extremists want a separate Sikh state (Kalistan), while Hindu extremists want a nationalist Hindu state, and have been responsible for a number of attacks on Muslims. In Israel, Jewish extremists have attacked Arabs and assassinated a prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin. The most deadly cult uncovered so far, the Aum Supreme Truth, is Japanese. Had the Aum's sarin nerve gas attack on a Tokyo subway in 1995 been successful, thousands of innocent people would have been killed.

It is clear that militant religion-inspired terrorism, of whatever faith, has become both a serious challenge and a defining feature of the new post-modern terrorism. On the part of radical Islamic groups, they blame the West, especially the United States, for its challenge to Islamic values and ideals. They also blame the West for the injustices and inequalities they see in a number of countries, especially in the Middle East. They reject the peace process in the Middle East which recognizes Israel's right to exist. Militant Islamic groups, like those inspired by other religions, have been responsible for a long list of terrorist atrocities.[34]

The al-Qaeda network led by Osama bin Laden, however, is considered especially dangerous. Galvanized by the events in Afghanistan, which was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1979, Bin Laden rushed there to volunteer as a mujahideen fighter. Towards the end of the war, he set up al-Qaeda (the Islamic Salvation Front) to extend his reach around the world. This organization is a formidable one, consisting of mujahideen of many nationalities who had fought with him in the Afghan conflict. He returned to Saudi Arabia after the Afghan war was over, where he inherited a fortune estimated at US$300 million. However, he was expelled in 1991 and had his citizenship revoked for his political activities. He then moved to Sudan, where he established training camps for his followers. Incensed by the presence of American troops on Saudi soil during the First Gulf War, he declared war on the USA in 1996, describing it as the enemy of Islam. Under pressure

from the US, Sudan expelled him. He then headed back to shelter under the new Taliban government in Afghanistan.[35]

Bin Laden has been able to rally thousands of radical Muslims around his pan-Islamic ideology, which seems compelling given the continued presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, sanctions against Iraq and a stalled Middle East peace process in which the US is seen as furthering Israel's interests at the expense of the Palestinians. He has been able to cooperate with other radical Islamic groups to kill Americans and attempt to topple what he regards as corrupt regimes in the Middle East. Bin Laden's edict or fatwa against America issued in February 1998 stated: 'the US has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbours, and turning its bases in the peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighbouring Muslim peoples'. The edict goes on to state that Muslims everywhere should kill American civilians and soldiers wherever they are.[36] Indeed, Bin Laden's organization, al-Qaeda, has demonstrated its effectiveness not just in carrying out the seminal attacks on 11 September 2001 but also in acting as a form of revolutionary vanguard. Notably, it established a global network of like-minded jihadists, effectively disseminated its radical ideology, and trained thousands of radical local operatives in carrying out clandestine mass casualty terrorist acts.

Even more seriously, post-9/11 terrorist attacks have rapidly shifted to local regional groups linked ideologically but not operationally with al-Qaeda, who have developed, through al-Qaeda's training and careful nurturing, a global jihadist mindset. The JI, for instance, has been responsible for a number of recent and deadly terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia, including the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002 that killed 202 people, mostly Western tourists, the Marriott Hotel attack on 5 August 2003 that killed 12 people, the attack on the Australian High Commission on 9 September 2004 that killed 11 people and injured over 140, and the second Bali attack on 1 October 2005 that killed 23 people. If the JI represented the cutting edge of the new terrorism in Southeast Asia, the inescapable conclusion is that al-Qaeda has succeeded in raising the effectiveness and lethality of local radical groups, as well as penetrating and co-opting them to its global jihadist cause.

But the presence of the old ethno-nationalist terrorism also remains a key feature of conflict worldwide. Secessionists or armed political groups which seek to establish a separate state or to overthrow a government can be found in every region in the world. the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and the Kurdish PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) have been fighting for a separate homeland. In Peru, Maoist Shining Path guerillas have

been fighting the government for years, seeking to replace it with one which can ensure social justice.

In Southeast Asia, Muslim separatist revolts in southern Thailand, Aceh and Mindano long pre-dated al-Qaeda. Even the al-Qaeda-linked JI pre-dated the emergence of the new postmodern terrorism, as it can trace its ideological links as well as personal ties to the failed Darul Islam uprising from 1948 to 1962, which attempted to establish a Muslim state in Indonesia. It is undeniable that the new postmodern terrorism has made inroads into the region. However, the old traditional terrorism also continues to exist, and as the preceding chapter, and chapters elsewhere in this volume demonstrate, the record of al-Qaeda in penetrating existing Muslim rebel groups is in fact mixed.

Countering postmodern terrorism

The events of 9/11 demonstrate that the face of global terrorism has changed, and that Southeast Asia is not immune, as demonstrated by the threat posed by the violent and shadowy JI, and the more insidious threat posed by groups operating legitimately and openly throughout the region in spreading radical ideology.

Countering this threat necessarily requires a comprehensive, long-term approach. As the leading expert on al-Qaeda has observed: 'Compared to all other terrorist categories, Islamists (ie the small violent minority who adhere to radical ideology) have the greatest capacity to attract new recruits and resources because their recruitment and fund-raising infrastructure is enmeshed with the welfare, socio-economic and political fabric of Muslim communities.'[37]

This counter-terrorism strategy needs to function at three levels: domestic, regional and international. At the heart of Muslim alienation and rebellion within Southeast Asia are strongly held grievances that are local and domestic in nature. Indeed, those most at risk from radical terrorism are countries with large Muslim populations, which the radical groups have targeted to destabilize in order to create the necessary conditions for a revolution that would result in a region-wide caliphate ruled strictly by the sharia or Muslim laws. Given local conditions in parts of Indonesia, Southern Thailand and the Southern Philippines, the alienated and disaffected have become easy prey to radical ideology. Thus, Gunaratna has observed that 'wider support from Muslim societies is imperative if the fight against Al Qaeda and its brand of Islamist terrorism is to be won'.[38] This war on hearts and minds within the Muslim *umma* or community can only be won by Muslims themselves. Governments in the region do not need any reminding of this, having experienced, and in most cases defeated, communist insurgency in the past. In the case of Malaysia, for instance, it

was not the purely kinetic military-oriented counter-terrorism approach that resulted in the victory over the communist insurgents, but a comprehensive political, economic and social strategy designed to win the hearts and minds of those who might have otherwise supported the communists. The same comprehensive approach also informed the Thai approach to counter-insurgency that helped, among other factors, to eliminate the communist threat. Development, together with political negotiations, military actions and community relations, is part and parcel of such a comprehensive multifaceted approach. Although it cannot by itself inhibit terrorism, development could stem the tide of potential recruits and facilitate the emergence of a new middle class.[39] In today's context, other aspects of domestic-level responses include homeland security measures, improved coordination amongst security agencies and more legal powers to deal with the threat.

The transnational nature of the new global terrorism, demonstrated links between various regional insurgent and terrorist groups, and the transnational mode of operation practiced by the JI, have given impetus to a regional approach to the problem. The infrastructure in Southeast Asia for transnational regional cooperation in countering terrorism was, prior to 11 September 2001, rather weak, consisting in the main of measures to counter piracy.[40] However, the series of terrorist attacks and abortive plots since 9/11 have demonstrated that local militants have been galvanized into stepping up urban terrorist campaigns in the Philippines, Malaysia and other parts of the region, targeting Western and US commercial and military interests, as well local governments. Since 9/11 therefore, enhancing regional cooperation has become an urgent imperative, with a number of initiatives being taken to improve multilateral security and intelligence cooperation.

The ASEAN states condemned the 9/11 attacks at the United Nations, supporting the 'global war against terrorism', as expressed through UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373. On 5 November 2001, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) also issued a joint declaration condemning terrorism and agreed to cooperate to combat it following the events of September 11.[41] It also agreed on common measures in an action plan against terrorism, such as strengthening national mechanisms, enhancing intelligence exchange and supporting the UN in playing a bigger role in combating it.[42] ASEAN intelligence chiefs also met in January 2002 and discussed the threat to the region posed by militant groups.[43] Previously sympathetic to the Moros, the Malaysian government deported renagade Moro leader Nur Misuari back to the Philippines in January 2002 to face charges of armed rebellion.[44] Malaysia and Indonesia also agreed to exchange intelligence information to combat terrorism.[45]

Multilateral cooperation in intelligence sharing, establishing uniform laws and counter-terrorism was stepped up under an Action Plan adopted by the ASEAN states in May 2002.[46] The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in July 2002 also produced a ground-breaking statement on a set of financial measures to cut off terrorist funding.[47] After the Bali terrorist attack in 2002, Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders in October 2002 also agreed to a number of measures to counter terrorism, such as enhancing security in trade, expanding the Container Security Initiative (involving pre-screening of cargo containers), choking off terrorist financing and promoting cyber-security.[48] The ASEAN Summit of October 2002 also endorsed measures against money laundering and terrorism financing, as well as the establishment of a Regional Counter-Terrorism Center in November 2002 in Kuala Lumpur.[49]

The global nature of the new terrorism also requires an international effort. In July 2002, the US and ASEAN signed a joint declaration to provide for 'greater cooperation in intelligence exchange and other joint action to deal with international terrorism'. However, whilst ASEAN made this commitment to fight terrorism, it also made clear that it was doing so for its own security, not on behalf of the US, and that terrorism cannot be defeated without addressing the root causes.[50]

Other countermeasures at the broad international level must clearly include coordinated international intelligence gathering, including the penetration of terrorist groups. Collaborative efforts and active surveillance of known terrorist groups should always be the first line of defence, the objective being to prevent terrorist attacks in the first place.

Notwithstanding the low-tech nature of the 9/11 attacks, it has been increasingly recognized that the danger of mass casualty acts involving the use of WMDs has increased, not decreased, as a result of this attack. Vigorous countermeasures (such as anti-hijacking measures) may conversely make the use of weapons of mass destruction an attractive option in carrying out mass casualty terrorist acts. Given the deep psychological impact achieved in the 9/11 attacks, WMD terrorism will become even more attractive due to the much greater publicity and impact they would engender. There is thus a need to increase passive and other security measures. States at risk must collaborate to develop new sensor systems that can detect a chemical or biological attack from a distance, giving some valuable warning time. There must be training for police, customs and hospital staff to recognize and respond to a variety of terrorist attacks and attempts to smuggle or steal nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) material. States or cities at risk must stockpile the necessary vaccines, antibiotics and equipment to deal with an attack. At-risk facilities and buildings should be installed with filter systems and NBC protection, and greater chlorine

filtration of public water is required to prevent the water supply from being targeted. The US has already instituted quite vigorous countermeasures, such as the setting up of Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST) and Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams that can detect and diagnose chemical and biological attack. In Southeast Asia, Singapore is setting the pace with its own comprehensive homeland security infrastructure embodied in its National Security Strategy in 2004.

There is also a need to ensure much greater control over sensitive information (for example on the Internet and also that emanating from the scientific community) and to step up surveillance of potential terrorists. This may, however, invariably result in the loss of some freedom. There must be adequate security for military NBC facilities and stockpiles. There must also be a better system of worldwide monitoring of sensitive equipment or raw materials that could be used to make WMDs.

Improved domestic, regional and international measures, such as transnational collaboration in intelligence, the active pursuit and infiltration of terrorist cells, and the institution of passive civil defence measures, might help in preventing and deterring terrorist attacks. But the long-term solution to the problem of radical militant violence is to deal with the fundamental causes of such militancy. Such militancy has, at its roots, political and socio-economic issues and grievances which cannot be redressed through the use of force. There is a need to address fundamental socio-economic issues through equitable growth and development. In particular, there is a need to rein in the corruption and socio-economic disparities in a number of countries in the region. Attention to root causes would isolate the militants. However, countermeasures cannot be carried out by any one state alone. To be effective, active counter-terrorist strategies need to be coordinated with other affected states, given the transnational nature of such groups. The caveat that must be reiterated here is that the new terrorism has not replaced the old terrorism. The old ethno-nationalist terrorism and insurgency is also not confined to Muslim separatist rebellion, as Burmese separatism and the Maoist rebellion in the Philippines demonstrate.

But one thing is certain. The New York and Washington attacks on 11 September 2001 have reverberated around the world, including in Southeast Asia, ushering in a brave new world. In Southeast Asia, the new terrorism has met with the old terrorism, but the combustion is something we will all have to live with from now.

Notes

1. *Straits Times*, 12 September 2001, p. 1.
2. Hoffman, Bruce (1997), 'The confluence of international and domestic trends in terrorism', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, **9** (2), p. 2.

3. See, for instance, Foxell, Joseph W., Jr. (1999), 'The debate on the potential for mass-casualty terrorism: the challenge to US security', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, **11** (1), pp. 94–109.
4. See Gunaratna, Rohan (2000), 'Suicide terrorism: a global threat', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, **12** (4).
5. See Laqueur, Walter (1986), 'Reflections on terrorism', *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 86–100.
6. See United States Department of the Army and the Air Force (1990), *Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*, Field Manual 100-20, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.
7. For a discussion of the problem of defining terrorism, see Wardlaw, Grant (1989), *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-Measures*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8. See Schlagheck, Donna M. (1990), 'Superpowers, foreign policy and terrorism', in Charles W. Kegley, Jr (ed), *International Terrorism*, New York: St Martin's Press, pp. 170–97.
9. Hoffman, Bruce (1997), 'The confluence of international and domestic trends in terrorism', p. 2.
10. Hoffman, Bruce (1997), 'The confluence of international and domestic trends in terrorism', pp. 8–9.
11. 'Terrorists relying less on state sponsors', *Straits Times*, 3 May 2000, p. 7.
12. See Barber, Benjamin R. (1995), *Jihad vs McWorld*, New York: Random House.
13. Hoffman, Bruce (1999), 'New dimensions of international security', talk delivered at the Summer Camp for Senior Military Officers of the Asia-Pacific, Singapore, 3 August.
14. *Straits Times*, 2 May 2001.
15. Hoffman, Bruce (1999), 'New dimensions of international security'.
16. 'Libya makes pledge against terrorism', *Straits Times*, 4 December 1999, p. 22.
17. Schmid, Alex P. (1999), 'Terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction: from where the risk?', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, **11** (4), pp. 116–17.
18. See Campbell, James K. (1997), 'Excerpts from research study: weapons of mass destruction and terrorism: proliferation by non-state actors', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, **9** (2), pp. 24–50.
19. See Leader, Stefan (1999), 'Osama bin Laden and the terrorist search for WMD', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, **11** (6).
20. Cited in Kegley, Charles W., Jr and Eugene R. Wittkopf (1999), *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, New York: Worth, p. 379.
21. Rashid, Ahmed (1999), 'The Taliban: exporting extremism', *Foreign Affairs*, (November/December), pp. 22–3.
22. Ministry of Home Affairs (2003), *The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism*, Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs. pp. 9–14, and 'Malaysia finds explosive cache', *BBC News*, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2867635.stm, 20 March 2003.
23. Tan, Andrew T.H. (2004), *Security Perspectives of the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War on Terrorism*, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, pp. 60–65.
24. 'Bali, Marriott attackers still a threat', Associated Press, 10 August 2003.
25. See Tan, Andrew T.H. (2004), *Security Perspectives of the Malay Archipelago*, pp. 237–47.
26. For a fuller exposition, see Tan, Andrew (2000), *Armed Rebellion in the ASEAN States: Persistence and Implications*, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Center, Australian National University.
27. See, for instance, Jacobs, Stanley S. (1998), 'The nuclear threat as a terrorist option', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, **10** (4), pp. 149–63.
28. See, for instance, Falkenrath, Richard A. (1998), 'Confronting nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism', *Survival*, **40** (3), pp. 43–65.
29. Jacobs, Stanley S. (1998), 'The nuclear threat as a terrorist option', pp. 149–63.
30. The old Soviet Union maintained very extensive biological warfare capabilities. See Alibek, Ken (1999), *Biohazard*, New York: Random House.

31. 'Strategic Goods (Control) Bill', www.parliament.gov.sg/Legislation/Htdocs/Bills/020044.pdf.
32. 'Singapore builds up capability against biological and chemical attacks', *Straits Times*, 17 January 2003. See also 'Chemical attack? Clean up at N-E Line', *Straits Times*, 14 February 2003, and 'Fact sheet on US–Singapore Regional Emerging Disease (REDI) Center', www.globalhealth.gov/Singapore_REDI_MOU.shtml.
33. 'Singapore participates in US-led security exercise in Arabian Sea', *Channel News Asia*, 11 January 2004 and 'Proliferation Security Initiative', www.state.gov/t/np/c10390.htm.
34. See Chalk, Peter (1999), 'The evolving dynamic of terrorism', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, **53** (2), p. 155.
35. *Straits Times*, 30 August 1998.
36. *Straits Times*, 30 August 1998. See also Osama bin Laden's interview with the press, in *Frontline* www.pbs.org/wgbh, 25 February 2000.
37. Gunaratna, Rohan (2002), *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, London: Hurst, pp. 241–2.
38. Gunaratna, Rohan (2002), *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, p. 242.
39. Cragin, Kim and Peter Chalk (2003), *Terrorism and Development: Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, p. 36.
40. See Chalk, Peter (1998), 'Low intensity conflict in Southeast Asia: piracy, drug trafficking and political terrorism', *Conflict Studies* (January/February).
41. *Straits Times Interactive*, straitstimes.asia1.com.sg, 4 November 2001.
42. *Straits Times Interactive*, straitstimes.asia1.com.sg, 6 November 2001.
43. *Straits Times*, 30 January 2002.
44. *Straits Times*, 8 January 2002.
45. *Straits Times*, 29 January 2002, p. A4.
46. *Straits Times*, 18 May 2002.
47. 'War against terrorism breathes new life into ASEAN Forum', *Straits Times*, 2 August 2002.
48. 'APEC Leaders' Statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth, Los Cabos, Mexico, 26 October 2002', at www.apec.org.sg.
49. 'Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th ASEAN Summit', at www.aseansec.org.
50. *Straits Times*, 30 July 2002.

3 Old terrorism in Southeast Asia: a survey

Andrew T.H. Tan

The four-class division in categorizing contemporary terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia was discussed in the first chapter. Such a division is necessary due to the need to identify better the diverse nature of terrorism and insurgency within the region. The first class are separatist insurgencies. The second consists of armed anti-government political opposition groups. The third comprises radical Islamist groups which aim to overthrow the central government by force and impose a Muslim state run strictly according to the sharia or Muslim laws. The final group is an amorphous mix of mostly overt and currently legitimate radical organizations that have known sympathies for radical Islamist ideology, but which are seen by governments and some analysts to possess the potential for violence.

This chapter complements Chapter 2 (which discusses the rise of the new terrorism in Southeast Asia), by examining the continued salience of the old ethno-nationalist and political terrorism that pre-dates the new post-modern terrorism. A brief survey of selected examples, from the long list of such terrorist and insurgent movements in the region will demonstrate the salience of fundamental causes of political repression, poverty, economic disparities and environmental degradation that underlie each of these rebellions.

It will also be obvious that terrorism and insurgency within the region is not confined exclusively to Muslim separatism or Islamist terrorist groups. Indeed, the following brief survey will include non-Muslim examples such as the Christian Karen in Myanmar, the Hmong in Laos and the Communist Party of the Philippines. Further examples will be drawn from within the Malay archipelago, from Muslim separatist movements in the Philippines, Southern Thailand and Indonesia.

Karen rebellion in Myanmar

Myanmar (formerly Burma) has had to contend with a succession of major armed separatist rebellions since gaining independence from Britain in 1948. The roots of these rebellions lie in the artificial construct of Burma, which was a legacy of the colonial British. Many ethnic groups along the periphery, such as the Karen, Shan, Mon, Arakanese, Chin and Nga, did not want to be dominated by the Burmans and, indeed, desire their own statehood. The Burmese nationalists under Aung San had promised local autonomy

after independence, and constitutional protection so that they could leave the Union of Burma after ten years should they desire to. The Karen, many of whom are Christian, especially felt that their support for the British against the Japanese during the Second World War had fostered assurances of later independence. Aung San's assassination in 1947, however, removed the one Burmese national leader the ethnic minorities could trust. The Karen National Defence Organization (later Karen National Union or KNU) thus launched a separatist rebellion in late 1948, and was joined by defecting units from the state's army, many of whom were Karen.[1]

By January 1949, the Karens had penetrated into Rangoon itself, but they were then driven back. Subsequently, the Karens continued to defy the central government, fighting the Burmese army to a stalemate. In 1956, the second congress of the Karen National Union (KNU) called for 'the establishment of a genuine federal union with all the states having equal rights and the right to self-determination', a political objective which still applies today.[2]

In 1990, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San's daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi, won the general elections but it subsequently suffered violent repression at the hands of the military regime. Students and other supporters of the NLD fled into safe areas controlled by the Karens, who took the momentous decision to help arm and shelter the student rebels, who established the armed All Burma Student Democratic Front. The Karens joined with other opposition and ethnic groups to form the umbrella Democratic Alliance of Burma, which established an opposition National Coalition government at the Karen stronghold of Manerplaw, close to the Thai border.[3]

The Karens however, may have miscalculated in joining with the student rebels, because this galvanized the central government into taking steps to crush the Karens once and for all. By the 1990s, it was much better prepared than ever before, following a large-scale expansion of the armed forces and the infusion of conventional weaponry from China and other sources. Tragically, however, it was internal divisions between Buddhist and Christian Karens that led to the downfall of the KNU. The Buddhist faction was unhappy over Christian domination of the Karen struggle and was susceptible to the overtures of their Burman co-religionists. Indeed, the tensions within the ranks of the Karen National Union afforded the opportunity for Rangoon to play off one faction, the Buddhists, against the Christians. In the end, Buddhist members of the KNU rallied to the central government's cause. There was also war fatigue in the face of an increasingly capable Burmese military, as well as inept leadership within the KNU. Led by Buddhist Karen defectors, the Burmese were able to fight their way into Manerplaw in January 1995.[4]

The armed forces were able to break the back of the Karen insurgency by 1997, driving the remaining Karen rebels out of their bases in the eastern mountain ranges. Over 100 000 Karen refugees fled across the border into Thailand, with an estimated 500 000 displaced by the fighting.[5] The Karens have clearly suffered a very serious setback but they have not been crushed. Recognizing the need for more political support from overseas, the Karens established the Karen National League (KNL) at the Second International Karen Youth Conference held in December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. The KNL's objective is clear: 'In this time of difficulties for the Karen people, KNL will seek to expand and deepen the cooperation with all the democratic organizations critical to our national liberation.'[6] Significantly, the KNU emphasized a political as opposed to a purely military approach to the Karen struggle.

After the loss of Manerplaw and control of the lucrative trade checkpoints along the Thai border in 1995, the KNU switched to guerrilla tactics, regrouping in some 300 small military bases throughout the frontier area where 4 million Karen villagers live in poverty. The KNU has continued to inflict casualties on government forces, although it is clear that its previous strength has ebbed.[7] The KNU today can field only 4000–5000 ill-equipped guerrillas.[8] Aware of the need for fresh leadership, General Bo Mya was ousted as President of the KNU and replaced by Saw Ba Thin in March 2000. Saw is a more flexible leader compared to Bo Mya, and has the support of younger Karens. Saw's policy is that of 'politics before military', which essentially means that the Karen struggle should be seen as a political and not purely military struggle. He promised to stress Karen solidarity (it was this lack of solidarity that led to the downfall of the KNU in 1995) and did not rule out entering into negotiations with the central Myanmar government.[9] Reflecting this new and more sophisticated approach, the KNU and KNL work closely together to try to gain more international recognition and support for the Karen cause.

International attention to this cause came from a most unlikely source. In January 2000, a small splinter group called God's Army took over a Thai hospital in Ratchaburi. The ten guerrillas involved were killed by Thai army commandos but the fact that God's Army was led by a pair of 12-year-old twins believed to possess supernatural powers lent a certain poignancy to the whole affair.[10]

Meanwhile, the plight of the Karens has been pitiful, with continuing reports of severe human rights violations by Myanmar troops, such as summary executions, rape, forced labour and the wholesale destruction of villages. Given the plight of the Karens, it was perhaps not surprising that the KNU finally opened negotiations with the government in 2003, with Bo Mya personally leading a team to Yangon in 2004, the first time he had

visited the capital in 50 years. Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, who had announced a seven-point road-map to democracy and national reconciliation upon becoming premier in 2003, treated him with deference and hosted a birthday party to celebrate his 77th birthday.[11] However, Khin Nyunt's own removal from power in October 2004 has led to uncertainty over the process of reconciliation with the Karens.

Hmong rebellion in Laos

Laos is a small, poverty-stricken and landlocked state surrounded by larger and more powerful countries. It is also a multi-ethnic state, with more than 60 different ethnic groups belonging to several linguistic families. The major ethnic group living in the mountains are the Hmong, who differ from the majority lowlanders linguistically and culturally. During the anti-colonial struggle against the French in the First Indochina War (1946–54), the communist Pathet Lao drew its support mainly from the lowland Laotians. The majority of Hmong sided with the French, although a substantial minority under Faydang Lobliayao supported Prince Souphanouvong's Pathet Lao. The Pathet Lao worked closely with the Vietminh in its struggle first against the French, then against the Americans. The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recruited the Hmongs into a clandestine army to fight the communists during the Vietnam War. Special Forces advisers and arms were parachuted to help the Hmongs. When the Paris peace agreement was signed in 1973, however, the Hmongs were abandoned; 18 000 Hmong troops were disbanded and American advisers left.[12]

The Pathet Lao which came into power after 1975 has had to contend with the small-scale insurgent movement dominated by these disaffected Hmongs. The insurgency has been fuelled by mutual suspicion between the highland Hmong, who had fought with the US in the Vietnam War, and the lowland Lao, who dominated the ultimately victorious Pathet Lao. Counter-insurgency operations from 1976 to 1979 involved both Lao government forces and Vietnamese troops stationed in the country, supported by air strikes and artillery. They are alleged to have used chemical weapons on the Hmong, such as napalm and defoliants, resulting in vast environmental damage, affecting the livelihood of the native Hmongs. Three hundred thousand Hmongs and Laotians eventually fled the country, resettling in the United States, Australia, France and other countries.[13]

Hmong insurgents, supported by the anti-communist Lao community abroad, operated out of Hmong refugee camps in Thailand with the tacit assistance of anti-communist Thai military officers reluctant to abandon their former allies. They conducted hit-and-run guerrilla warfare against the Lao and Vietnamese forces in Laos. Hmongs who

escaped to China also obtained assistance with military training and weapons, as China found them a useful ally in its conflict with Vietnam. The Sino-Vietnamese conflict had erupted in 1979 over the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, which was opposed by China. A Lao government-in-exile has been formed in France, where a number have settled. Within Laos itself, the remaining 150000 Hmong are living in dire poverty, forced to abandon their semi-nomadic lifestyle (as their slash-and-burn practices threatened valuable timber resources) and forced to work in collective farms in the lowlands.[14] This dissatisfaction bred a revival of the Hmong armed resistance, which by 1985 was able to claim as many as 7000–8000 members.

The Hmong insurgents, however, were no match for Lao and Vietnamese troops and could only engage in nuisance sabotage attacks. With the improvement in relations with Thailand in the 1990s and Laos's admission into the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997, Thai support for insurgent activity has declined.[15] From 1992, Thailand took steps to close Hmong refugee camps along the border and repatriated the remaining Hmong refugees, cutting off sanctuaries as well as sources of recruitment for the resistance. By 1994, armed Hmong resistance was reduced to isolated incidents.

Yet, the resistance is by no means crushed. The Hmong-dominated Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos continues to exist and has an estimated 2000 members.[16] In 2000, there were also a number of bombings in the capital city of Vientaine as well as other urban centres, amidst an economic crisis and rampant inflation. Hmong insurgents attacked the town of Muong Khoun in January, while skirmishes have occurred in the Saysombourn area as well as in the mountains near the Vietnam border. A royalist movement led by Prince Soulivong Savang, grandson of King Vatthana, who was deposed by the communists after 1975 and died in a prison camp, has also gathered momentum. In July 2000, royalist insurgents carried out an attack in southern Laos and hoisted the pre-1975 flag before being driven back by government forces.[17]

Communist rebellion in the Philippines

The Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was established in 1969 in the province of Tarlac, and is a successor to the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) of the 1950s and the 1960s (the so-called 'Huks'). Its military arm, the New People's Army (NPA), has been able to operate in an area much wider than the PKP, which had been confined to Luzon. It attracted many poor plantation workers and farmers exploited and mistreated by wealthy landowners and their security forces. Marcos's Martial Law administration had some success in combating the CPP, with almost

the entire political and military leadership of the CPP-NPA captured or killed by the time its Chairman, Jose Sison, was himself captured in 1978, although he was subsequently exiled to Netherlands.[18]

However, such was the depth of dissatisfaction at the social and economic inequalities of Marcos's government that wave after wave of leaders rose to replace those who had been either killed or captured. By 1985, the NPA was described as the 'fastest growing, most threatening and arguably most brutal communist insurgency in the world today', as its strength increased to more than 20 000 guerrillas operating in the countryside.[19] This increase in support for the CPP was due to a combination of factors, such as the continued exploitation of agricultural labourers and tenants, the harsh economic difficulties of the post-1970 economic decline, the displacement of smallholders during the Marcos years to make way for large-scale public and private development projects, abuses of power by corrupt bureaucrats and soldiers, and popular opposition to Marcos's repression.

The success of the People's Revolution in 1986 and the ascension to power of Corazon Aquino, however, marginalized the NPA to a certain extent. Aquino was herself representative of the victory of the people over the oppression, corruption and rapacity of the Marcos elite. In addition, the NPA was riven by infighting.[20] Within the Philippines, the structural reforms and economic development under Aquino's successor, Fidel Ramos, undermined CPP morale, with many CPP members ceasing to be active. Moreover, the CPP has had no significant external support from China or any other communist state. By December 1993, the government claimed that the NPA had been reduced to 8000 in strength.[21] The NPA however continued its insurgency, including urban terrorism through its breakaway group, the Alex Boncayao Brigade.[22]

Although a Maoist insurgency appears to be an anachronism in the post-Cold War era, there are clearly domestic factors driving the insurgency. Richard Kessler has observed that the socio-political conditions that have given rise to severe inequalities have become so entrenched that there is now a cyclical pattern of rebellion, and that even if the NPA were defeated, the situation would be no different than after the defeat of the Huks a generation earlier.[23]

Echoing Kessler, W. Scott Thompson observed that the failure under the Aquino administration to carry out land reform (due to obstruction in the Philippine Congress dominated by landlords and their allies) means that fundamental problems remain unaddressed.[24] Alan Robson has also highlighted the continued existence of the 'boss' system, whereby a handful of powerful families have dominated provincial politics in their areas. Acting very much like warlords, these families have maintained their grip through

the dispensation of patronage. The problem with this system, which Aquino and Ramos both failed to tackle, is that it:

> Endlessly diverts development capital into futile pork-barrel projects and traps the central government into a paralysing bargaining web. Election outcomes are determined by personality factors while national political debate bypasses crucial development issues and diffuses into nationalist rhetoric.[25]

The problems of landless peasants have been exacerbated by the population explosion in the Philippines, a country that has frowned on population control on religious Catholic grounds. The population has grown to 80 million, having doubled in the past 50 years, and will total 130 million by 2025. Already 40 per cent of the population lives on US$1 or less a day, which is below the poverty line, and jobs and farmland are scarce.[26] This has forced large numbers of Filipinos to work overseas in a variety of mostly menial jobs. Given these socio-economic conditions, the CPP-NPA has continued to attract recruits and to pose a serious threat to security. In September 1999, for instance, a major urban bombing campaign was uncovered including plans to assassinate top government officials such as President Estrada. To date, CPP guerrillas remain active, attacking police stations and committing other acts of violence. The NPA continues to field an estimated 10000 guerillas in 2004. It has been designated by the US as a terrorist organization, while strangely, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), with its alleged al-Qaeda links, is not.

The Moro rebellion in the Philippines

The roots of the Moro rebellion in the Philippines go well back into colonial history when the Islamization of the Philippine islands was halted by the Spaniards, who arrived in 1565. After the Americans took over the Philippines following the Spanish-American War in 1898, the situation was aggravated by a massive influx of Catholic settlers from the north.[27]

By the 1960s, the Moros had become a minority in many parts of their traditional homeland, with many losing their land to the immigrant settlers through dubious legal transactions or outright confiscation, since the Moros did not have legal documents to prove their traditional ownership of the land. Added to landlessness and discrimination, much poverty and unemployment also exists among Muslim Moros, contributing to a very deep sense of alienation. The Jabidah massacre in 1968 of 28 Muslim Philippine Army recruits, following a mutiny over a pay issue, shocked the Muslim Moro community as it seemed to represent the oppression that the Moro Muslims were suffering as a result of central Christian rule.[28]

The impetus from this seminal event led to the establishment of the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) in 1969. The MIM vowed to

establish an independent state in the Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan islands.[29] Specifically, the MIM cited the following reasons for agitating for secession: the establishment of provincial and municipal governments that undermined the status of traditional leaders; the imposition of a new legal system that negated the judicial functions of the village elders, causing a breakdown of social order; the public school system that caused dislocation and alienation by forcing children to learn a new set of values which negated their traditional cultural values; and the influx of settlers and 'landgrabbers' into Muslim provinces that undermined the economic base of the Moros.[30]

In 1972, the MIM was succeeded by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) led by Nur Misuari, who was also able to capitalize on popular Moro resentment over the influx of Catholic settlers and the general economic poverty in the south. The MNLF's military arm, the Bangsa Moro Army, conducted a bitter guerrilla campaign against the Philippine armed forces. Over 100 000 deaths occurred in a huge but under-reported civil war, with over 500 000 fleeing as refugees.[31] A subsequent split within the MNLF saw the setting up of the Islamic-oriented Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) led by Hashim Selamat. The MILF was critical of the leftist orientation of the MNLF, and sought to emphasize its Islamic credentials and identity. It grew tremendously, with many from the MNLF defecting to join it. Ex-Afghan mujahideen who had fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s against the Soviet invasion also joined upon returning.[32] The MILF by the mid-1990s had an estimated strength of 18 000, a formidable force.[33] It has been able to obtain funds from sympathetic Muslim organizations and supporters abroad. Domestically, it controls large swathes of several provinces and is able to draw popular support from Muslims throughout Mindanao.

The MNLF signed the Davao peace agreement in August 1996 that established a Muslim autonomous region as well as a regional development council. This was, however, denounced by the MILF as a sell-out.[34] The majority Christians, backed by their own armed vigilante and militia groups, also refused to accept the agreement and vowed to resist violently any attempt by the Philippine government to disarm the Christian community in Mindanao.[35]

In recent times, the MILF's links with international terrorism have come to the fore in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the USA. Osama bin Laden had provided funding and training to the MILF, with funds channelled through his brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, who lived in Manila in the 1990s, where he ran a Muslim charity.[36] There is also evidence that MILF chairman Hashim Selamat was in regular contact with the top al-Qaeda leadership. At the military level,

al-Qaeda also imparted specialized training to MILF and other Southeast Asian Islamists at the MILF-run Camp Abubakar in Mindanao.[37]

But the events of 11 September 2001, rather than galvanizing the MILF into revolutionary fervour, actually provided a boost to the peace process as the MILF leadership beat a hasty public retreat from its links with al-Qaeda.[38] In March 2002, the MILF described as 'unfair, inaccurate, unfounded' reports linking the MILF with terrorism, and insisted that it is in fact a 'legitimate liberation organization', stressing its participation in negotiations 'for a peaceful settlement of the Bangsamoro problem'. Significantly, the MILF stated that it 'counts on committed popular memberships who are not fanatical about their religion', and declared that it would be contrary to the MILF's declared goal and objectives to link up with 'terrorism or any extremist groups using religious faith as a tool for terroristic activities'.[39] In April 2002, the MILF agreed to the joint training with the Philippine government of local ceasefire monitoring teams.[40] In June 2002, the MILF offered to fight 'hand in hand' with the Philippine military to 'end the Abu Sayaff problem'.[41]

This apparent new-found realism on the part of the MILF did not go unnoticed. Indeed, the government's chief negotiator for peace talks with the MILF, Jesus Dureza, paid the group the ultimate compliment when he stated in October 2002 that he found the MILF 'friendlier than the government' in building a climate of peace and development in Mindanao, citing as an example military officials who seemed intent on continuing with the use of force to resolve the Moro problem.[42] In August 2003, the death from natural causes of Selamat Hashim and his replacement as MILF leader by Murad Ebrahim, considered a more nationalist-oriented leader, raised hopes that the MILF would be more amenable to a negotiated political settlement.[43]

Despite these developments, however, there is some evidence that some MILF factions have continued to maintain links with the al-Qaeda-linked JI, even to the extent of carrying out operations for it as well as providing refuge and training for JI operatives on the run from authorities in the region.[44] This indicates the tension within the MILF between nationalism and pan-Islamic radical ideology, with members pulled in both directions.

On the government's side, there has been recognition that extreme poverty and unemployment has fuelled the rebellion in the south. In 2000, President Estrada launched a major 24 billion pesos programme funded by the World Bank and the European Union to tackle Mindanao's severe socio-economic problems. A separate United States Agency for an International Development programme was also launched, aimed at improving the efficiency of agriculture.[45] Yet, these efforts appeared too little as well as too late, as the conditions for the development projects to

proceed were simply not present given the fighting which ensued in the months after these initiatives were launched. The Philippine government under President Arroyo has promulgated a Fourteen Point Plan to combat terrorism. However, this plan, in the main, emphasizes military measures. Fundamental grievances, such as Moro landlessness, poverty, unemployment, widespread discrimination and Catholic militia abuse, remain unaddressed. Essentially, this guarantees that the rebellion will continue for the foreseeable future.

The Aceh rebellion in Indonesia

Aceh has historically been an independent kingdom and there exist strong local pride and traditions, with Islam as a significant unifying factor and a focal point for nationalist sentiments. Since Indonesia's independence in 1949, there has developed much resentment over what the local Acehnese see as Javanese domination, corruption and rapaciousness. The poverty, unemployment and backwardness of the province contrast with the presence of huge gas deposits, which has benefited mostly non-Acehnese, with the bulk of the revenue siphoned off by Jakarta.[46] In addition, the transmigration programme has resulted in Javanese settlers establishing themselves in Aceh, much to the resentment of the local Acehnese. This has fuelled ethnic conflict in Aceh.

The strong local Islamic identity and the resentment against Jakarta contributed to the founding of the Aceh independence movement, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM or Free Aceh Movement) in 1976. Led by Hasan di Tiro, GAM has been able effectively to use economic and religious discontent to increase support for the independence cause. GAM initially obtained the support of Libya, which provided military training for some 600 Acehnese. The GAM political leadership has been based in Sweden, where GAM has been able to publicize the plight of the Acehnese and the independence agenda for Aceh. At the same time, it has been able to raise funds from the Acehnese diaspora and other sympathizers abroad.

The end of the Suharto regime in May 1998, following massive street protests, opened the way for more democratic expressions of dissent and emboldened the advocates of secession in various parts of Indonesia, especially in East Timor and Aceh. Demonstrating the enhanced influence and power of the Free Aceh movement in the midst of heightened expectations of independence, local government in Aceh was shut down in October 1999 when the separatists ordered local employees to stay away.[47] This was followed by the burning of the state parliament on 2 November 1999.[48] On 4 November, a mass rally for independence was attended by some 100 000 people.[49] On 8 November, some 500 000 people rallied for independence.[50] After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the USA, various

allegations have been made regarding links between GAM and al-Qaeda.[51] However, so far, it is the external links with Malaysian-based sympathizers and with Libya that have been much better documented and proven.

Indeed, when senior al-Qaeda leaders, Ayman Al Zwahiri (Osama bin Laden's deputy) and Mohammad Atef visited Aceh in June 2000, GAM leaders rebuffed their efforts to embrace GAM.[52] After the 11 September 2001 attacks, GAM leaders in fact expressed sympathy to the United States; Abdullah Syafiah, the then GAM military commander, is said to have been among the first to send a message of condolence to the USA.[53] When the Indonesian radical group, Laskar Jihad, later attempted to rally support for a radical religious agenda in Aceh, GAM called on the Acehnese to stay away, a call heeded by most the Acehnese.[54] GAM has thus reaffirmed its nationalist and territorial objectives, and has emphasized its desire not to get involved in a wider religious war. Despite al-Qaeda's attempt to penetrate Aceh, the nationalist impulse appears to have been more durable.

Through Swiss mediation, GAM signed a Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement on 9 December 2002, which was expected to involve maximum autonomy following a referendum. Full-scale conflict was, however, renewed following President Megawati's declaration of martial law soon in May 2003, with some 50 000 troops stationed in Aceh.[55] The situation stabilized sufficiently for martial law to be replaced by a state of civil emergency in May 2004. Tragedy struck in December 2004 when a major earthquake and tsunami devastated the province. International relief efforts helped to open up a province hitherto restricted to foreigners. The devastation of the province and the evident need for major reconstruction provided the backdrop for a peace agreement in August 2005, in which GAM agreed to end the insurgency and participate in the political process. In turn, the government agreed to withdraw its 50 000 troops from Aceh. However, given the presence of fundamental political, economic and social grievances in the province, which have never been satisfactorily rectified or addressed, fears have already been expressed over whether the peace agreement will last.

Muslim separatism in Thailand

Seat of the ancient Malay kingdom of Patani, the Southern Thai provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun have been ruled indirectly by Siam since 1785. In 1909, the Anglo-Siamese Treaty demarcated the border between Siam and British Malaya, thus achieving for Siam a measure of international recognition for its rule over the area. The Malays, however, viewed this British recognition of Thai authority and sovereignty over them as arbitrary and unjust, and have since viewed Bangkok as an occupying colonial power.[56]

The fears of the Malay community were heightened by the policies of the Thai government, which sought to centralize the bureaucracy of the southern provinces, taking away power from the traditional Malay royal and religious elite. Secular Thai education was introduced, and the Thai language actively promoted. Thai local officials aggravated community relations by their corruption and anti-Malay prejudices, often viewing the Malay population as inferior. More significantly, the Thai government's policy of assimilation raised fears of an erosion of Malay culture and values. The Thai government in fact did not appoint Malay-Muslims to the bureaucracy, a policy that was reversed only in 1977. The Muslim problem was also accentuated by the low economic status of the Malay populace, who occupied the bottom rung of society as they made their livelihood from fishing, agriculture and plantation work.

The geographical contiguity of Malaysia provides an important explanation to the impetus to armed irredentism among the Thai Malay-Muslims. The visible economic development in neighbouring Malaysia, where kindred Malays are dominant politically and are reaping the economic benefits of the pro-*bumiputra* New Economic Policy, provided an unwelcome comparison. Moreover, the free flow of people and information across the Thai–Malaysian border have enabled Thai Malay-Muslims to reinforce their cultural, ethnic and religious identity in the face of concerted attempts, prior to 1977, at assimilation.

The Muslim separatists in Southern Thailand are currently fragmented into many small groups. The Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), founded in 1960, is leftist in orientation, and has enjoyed the support of Muslim organizations such as the Arab League. One splinter group, the Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani (BNPP) was formed in 1971. BRN itself is said to have splintered into at least four factions, with current total strength estimated at less than 100. The Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) was formed in 1968 and is led by intellectuals educated in the Middle East and Pakistan. PULO achieved some international recognition, attending the World Muslim League Conference since 1977 as an observer. It has been involved in a string of violent attacks, including an attempt in 1977 to assassinate King Bhumibol Adulyadej during his visit to Yala Province. In 1993, PULO launched a high-profile terrorist campaign targeting Buddhist temples, schools, railway trains and army patrols. The Thai Fourth Army commander responsible for security in the south admitted that the attacks were launched by a younger generation of radicals who 'are motivated by hatred and bitterness against the injustice that prevails in the south, and have thus resorted to terrorism'.[57]

However, in comparison to the Moro rebellion in the southern Philippines, the scale of the fighting has been much less severe, even taking

into account the expanded violence since 2001. The efforts on the part of the Thai government to win over the Malay-Muslim population, generous funding for development projects in the south and cooperation by the Malaysian government, which has not supported the separatists, have helped to ameliorate the severity of the conflict. Strategic cooperation against the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) had made the Malaysian government wary of assisting the guerrillas. As a result, the situation in Southern Thailand has, until recently, been under better control. Thus, from a peak of 1000 fighters in the 1970s, PULO declined to under 100 by the late 1990s. PULO also split in 1995, with the formation of New PULO. Another group, the Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (Pattani Mujahideen Movement or GMIP) was founded by ex-Afghan mujahideen in 1995. Little else is known of this covert group, except that it is believed to share the pan-Islamic radical ideology of al-Qaeda, had links with the Kampulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM) and was also involved in the abortive regional umbrella radical organization, the Rabitatul Mujahideen, allegedly led by Abu Bakar Bashir.

However, a new wave of coordinated violence began in December 2001, persisting to-date. It is believed that an umbrella organization, Bersatu, has been formed to reconcile PULO and New PULO. Yet, the modus operandi does not bear the hallmarks of al-Qaeda–JI type attacks, as the many foreigners in beach resorts in Southern Thailand have not been targeted, and neither have there been mass casualty attacks involving the use of ammonium nitrate and car bombs, as happened in Bali and the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in 2002 and 2003. Indeed, key radical figure Hambali, now in US custody, has told his interrogators that while al-Qaeda and the JI had approached Southern Thai separatists for assistance in attacking Westerners, they were rebuffed.[58]

Nonetheless, there continue to be allegations of links with international terrorism. The Thai Defence Minister alleged in early 2004 that the spate of violence since 2001 was more than just the work of common criminals, and that the attackers were in fact trying to draw attention from international terrorist groups for possible support.[59] Indeed, the attacks in 2004 raised serious concerns, given that despite the local nature of Muslim alienation, some groups such as the GMIP do have links with global jihadist groups. The scale of the coordinated nature of attacks also pointed to a new level of training, leadership and sophistication hitherto unseen amongst the Thai separatists. Members of the Jemaah Islamiah (JI), including its key operations leader, Hambali, had also sheltered in Thailand. In 2003, three prominent southern Muslim community leaders were also arrested by the authorities on suspicion of planning major bomb attacks against foreign embassies and tourist spots.[60] While tantalizingly suggesting future

possibilities, however, there remains at this point overall little hard evidence to indicate that longstanding grievances in Southern Thailand have become subordinate to terrorist groups with global, pan-Islamic agendas.

Yet, the transformational impact of two significant recent major incidents should not be underestimated. On 28 April 2004, Thai security forces killed 108 Muslim rebels in a single day, including a number who sheltered in a historic mosque.[61] In October 2004, 78 Muslim demonstrators were also shot or suffocated by security forces.[62] The extraordinarily harsh, and poor, handling of these fateful incidents has shocked and angered the Muslim community in Thailand, undermining the other positive aspects of Thailand's broad counter-terrorism strategy that emphasizes development, education reform and generous amnesties. The iconic incidents in 2004 could potentially galvanize and transform the various Muslim separatist movements in Southern Thailand, possibly leading to their linking up with the global pan-Islamic jihadist cause. For their part, al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups are also looking to exploit local grievances, in order to meld those disparate local groups into a powerful global ideological force.

Should the rebellion be transformed into a global and more overtly transnational pan-Islamic struggle, the geographical scope of the conflict would widen to include the rest of Thailand, and spill over to neighbouring Malaysia and the rest of the Malay Archipelago. Southern Thailand could then become Southeast Asia's Chechnya. Indeed, the separatists warned as much, issuing public statements after October 2004 warning tourists to stay away from transportation hubs and tourist spots. Despite some short-term government success, it seems likely that the violence will escalate and that the overall threat of violence will grow. It is also likely that the current separatist violence will not remain local for much longer.

Conclusions

The sheer variety of rebellions in the region, reflected in the above brief survey, demonstrates the complexities of terrorism and insurgency in this diverse and complex region. They not only clarify the oft-held misconception by those outside the region that terrorism in Southeast Asia is somehow a phenomenon that consists predominantly of pan-Islamist radicalism, but also raise a number of interesting questions. For instance, is terrorism in Southeast Asia 'old' or 'new'? How accurate is the new terrorism paradigm in describing the nature of terrorism in Southeast Asia? Is the conceptualization of the region as the 'second front' in the 'global war on terror' accurate? Is the post-9/11 strategy of the US-led 'global war on terrorism' relevant to the context of the region? How does an understanding of the old versus new debate in this region help inform us as to our approach in dealing with the problem of terrorism in the region? How can

outside powers, such as the USA and more generally the West, try to understand better the complexities of the region? The answers to some of these questions could be crucial in furthering our collective understanding as well as capacity in dealing with a social phenomenon, namely, armed rebellion against the state, that has persisted for a very long time and which has caused a great deal of suffering and instability in the region.

Notes

1. Tan, Andrew T.H. (2004), *A Political and Economic Dictionary of South-East Asia*, London: Europa, p. 141.
2. Karen National Union, www.karen.org/knl/home.html (August 2000).
3. Tan, Andrew T.H. (2004), *A Political and Economic Dictionary of South-East Asia*, pp. 141–2.
4. Than, Tin Maung Maung (1999), 'Myanmar: preoccupation with regime survival, national unity, and stability', in Alagappa, Muthiah (ed.), *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 401–2.
5. *Straits Times Interactive*, 19 December 1998.
6. Karen National League, www.karen.org/knl/home.html (accessed August 2000).
7. 'Myanmar's armed forces and their ongoing campaigns', *Asian Defence Journal*, March 1999, p. 13.
8. *Korea Herald*, 11 August 2000.
9. 'New KNU leader: politics before military', *Bangkok Post*, 12 March 2000.
10. *Japan Times*, 17 May 2000.
11. Tan, Andrew T.H. (2004), *A Political and Economic Dictionary of South-East Asia*, p. 144.
12. Chan Sucheng (1994), *Hmong Means Free: Life in Laos and America*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 21–2.
13. Chan Sucheng (1994), *Hmong Means Free: Life in Laos and America*, pp. 22–3.
14. Chan Sucheng (1994), *Hmong Means Free: Life in Laos and America*, p. 23.
15. 'Laos: internal threats and resistance movements', *Armed Forces of the World*, cfcac.dnd.ca/links/milorg/laos.html, accessed 2000.
16. 'Laos: the ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos', *Armed Forces of the World*, cfcac.dnd.ca/links/milorg/laos.html, accessed 2000.
17. 'Unrest in Laos spells uncertain future', *Straits Times*, 23 September 2000, pp. 88–9.
18. Muego, Benjamin N. (1984), 'Philippines', in Diane K. Mauzy (ed.), *Politics in the ASEAN States*, Kuala Lumpur: Maricans, pp. 90–91.
19. *Straits Times*, 27 December 1985.
20. Radio Filipinas (Quezon City, in English), 0230 GMT 1 November 1993, in BBC/SWB FE/1841 B/3 (6), 9 November 1993.
21. GMA-7 TV (Quezon City, in Tagalog), 0930 GMT 23 December 1993 in BBC/SWB FE/1881 B/3 (10), 29 December 1993.
22. People's TV 4 (Quezon City, in Tagalog), 0500 GMT 1 February 1994, in BBC/SWB FE/1911 B/3 (6), 2 February 1994.
23. Kessler, Richard J. (1989), *Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 21.
24. Thompson, W. Scott (1992), *The Philippines in Crisis: Development and Security in the Aquino Era 1986–1992*, New York: St Martin's Press, pp. 57–8.
25. Robson, Alan (1992), 'The boss system is alive and well in the Philippines', *ISEAS Trends*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, in *Business Times* (Weekend Edition), 26–27 June 1992, p. 1.
26. www.peopleandplanet.net/doc.php?id=1912, 26 April 2004.
27. Mercado, Eliseo R. (1984), 'Culture, economics and revolt in Mindanao: the origins of the MNLF and the politics of Moro separatism', in Lim Joo-Jock and S. Vani (eds),

Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 168–75.
28. Tan, Andrew T.H. (2004), *A Political and Economic Dictionary of Southeast Asia*, p. 135.
29. Mercado, Eliseo R. (1984), 'Culture, economics and revolt in Mindanao', pp. 156–7.
30. Kamlian, Jamail A. (1999), *Bangsamoro Society and Culture*, Marawi: Illigan Center for Peace Education and Research, MSU-Illigan Institute of Technology, pp. 21–2.
31. Rivera, Temario C. (1994), 'Armed challenges to the Philippines government: protracted war or political settlement?' *Southeast Asian Affairs 1994*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p. 260.
32. 'Professional style', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 February 1995, p. 26.
33. 'Under the gun', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 August 1995, p. 26. See also Lopez, Antonio, 'Wild Wild South', *Asiaweek*, www.cnn.com/Asianow/asiaweek/foc/2000/03/03.
34. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 31 August 1996, p. 20.
35. Chalk, Peter (1997), 'The Davao Consensus: a panacea for the Muslim insurgency in Mindanao?' *Terrorism and Political Violence*, **9** (2), pp. 92–3.
36. Reeve, Simon (1999), *The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism*, London: Andre Deutsch, pp. 72–3.
37. Gunaratna, Rohan (2002), *Inside Al Qaeda*, London: Hurst, pp. 183–4.
38. Gunaratna, Rohan (2002), *Inside Al Qaeda*, p. 185. See also *Straits Times*, 4 November 2002, p. A6, which reported the very strong denials of the MILF spokesperson of alleged links with al-Qaeda.
39. *Mindanao Times Interactive News*, mindanaotimes.com.p/news, 2 March 2002.
40. *Mindanao Times Interactive News*, 18 April 2002.
41. *Mindanao Times Interactive News*, 13 June 2002.
42. *Mindanao Times Interactive News*, 22 October 2002.
43. 'Filipino Muslim rebels in crossroads after chieftain's death', AFP, 5 August 2003.
44. 'Her other problem: a confession by a Filipino terrorist could deal a blow to Arroyo's negotiations with Islamic rebels', *Time*, 4 August 2003, pp. 39–40. See also 'MILF camps still training militants', AFP, 9 October 2003.
45. Bernama New Agency, www.bernama.com, 28 February 2000.
46. Tan, Andrew T.H, *A Political and Economic Dictionary of South-East Asia* (2004), p. 104.
47. *Straits Times*, 21 October 1999, p. 39.
48. *Straits Times*, 4 November 1999, p. 29.
49. *Straits Times*, 5 November 1999, p. 45.
50. *Straits Times*, 11 November 1999.
51. See *Straits Times*, 4 December 2001, p. 12.
52. *Straits Times*, 12 July 2002.
53. As revealed to the author by a prominent Acehnese scholar and Muhammadiyah leader. According to him, the message of condolence was sent to the US Ambassador in Jakarta.
54. *Straits Times*, 19 February 2002, p. A5.
55. 'Southeast Asia tries Shock and Awe', *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 May 2003.
56. Alagappa, Muthiah (1987), *The National Security of Developing States: Lessons from Thailand*, Dover, Massachusetts: Auburn House, p. 200.
57. Radio Thailand (Bangkok, in Thai), 1200 GMT 4 September 1993, in BBC/SWB FE/1792 B/1 (1), 13 September 1993.
58. 'Targeting Thailand', *Time*, 19 January 2003.
59. Quoted in Smith, Anthony L. (2004), 'Trouble in Thailand's Muslim south: Separatism, not global terrorism', *Asia Pacific Security Studies*, **3** (10), p. 2.
60. Smith, Anthony L. (2004), Trouble in Thailand's Muslim south, p. 3.
61. 'Scores killed in Thai gun battles', *BBC News*, 28 April 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3665293.stm.
62. 'Thai protesters die in custody', *BBC News*, 26 October 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3954587.stm.

PART II

THE CHALLENGE OF RADICAL ISLAM

4 Militant Java-based Islamist movements

Greg Fealy

Islam in Java has commonly been seen as peaceful, tolerant and benign. Numerous scholars have commented approvingly of its tradition of blending of Islamic elements with pre-existing Hindu, Buddhist and autochthonous beliefs and practices. Many have also written that the main cultures on the island emphasize smooth personal interactions and the avoidance of conflict, leading to the conclusion that Java's Islamic community is not disposed to violent jihad.

While this favourable characterization is true for a large majority of Java's Muslims, it does not capture the breadth of Islamic ideologies and behaviour on the island, either historically or contemporaneously. Indeed, this benign view has masked two important aspects of Java's Islam community: first, that syncretistic and heterodox Islam can also be militant; and second, that there is a long history of fundamentalist, exclusivist and intolerant behaviour among a small minority of the island's Muslims. These elements have been manifest in various insurgent and terrorist campaigns undertaken by militant Islamic groups on Java. Thus, as with so many aspects of Java, its Islamic culture is far more complex than the generalizations suggest.

A number of examples will serve to illustrate this point. The Darul Islam (DI) movement has been active on Java for more than half a century. It is religiously heterodox, combining Islamic elements with local folk beliefs, and also has a strong mystical inclination. During the 1950s and early 1960s, DI members rebelled against the central Indonesian government and fought with great commitment and sacrifice in seeking to implement their interpretation of Islam. By contrast, in recent times, more doctrinally orthodox groups have arisen, many of which are inspired by puritanical Middle Eastern revival movements such as Salafism (explained below). Two such groups are Laskar Jihad and Jemaah Islamiah (JI), though each are quite different in their methods and aspirations. Laskar Jihad was a Salafist paramilitary group whose primary purpose was to defend Muslims under physical threat from non-Muslims. It denounced terrorism, particularly attacks on non-combatants, and criticized al-Qaeda's ideology and actions. Jemaah Islamiah's version of Salafism is more extreme and the organization regards mass casualty terrorism as permissible. Many (though not all) JI members were inspired by the example of bin Laden and

al-Qaeda. So, it is apparent from the foregoing that militancy is not exclusively the domain of self-ascribed orthodox Muslims and that even among fundamentalist groups there is a considerable diversity of opinion and praxis.

This chapter will survey the main militant Islamic groups on Java, giving special attention to their origins, leadership and membership, ideology, interaction with other militant groups and prospects for the future. There are four main groups that warrant attention: Darul Islam, Jemaah Islamiah, the Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI) and Front Pembela Islam (FPI).

For the purposes of this chapter, 'Islamist' is defined as those Islamic groups or individuals who seek to apply Islamic teachings in a comprehensive and literal way within their society. Unlike other forms of Islamic activism, which may have multiple references, Islamists are inclined to have a largely Islamic framework for viewing the world. Usually the term has a strongly political connotation but it is also possible for Islamist groups to have specific economic, cultural and educational agendas as well. 'Militant' is taken to mean those of bellicose disposition, who are inclined to use aggression, physical intimidation or confrontation in order to achieve their ends. It should be noted that many Islamist groups in Indonesia are not particularly militant. The three main Islamist parties – United Development Party (PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), Crecent-Moon and Star Party (PBB, Partai Bulan Bintang) and the Prosperity and Justice Party (PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) – for example, do not espouse violence and pursue their cause through constitutional and democratic means. So 'militant Islamism' should be regarded as a minority sub-group within the broader category of Islamism.

It also needs to be stressed that Islam on Java is not necessarily the same as Javanese Islam. Java is home to about 130 million (60 per cent) of Indonesia's 216 million inhabitants. According to the most recent census data (that is, 2000), 94.1 per cent of Java's population is Muslim – about 122 million. The great majority of these – probably in the order of 80 million people – are ethnically Javanese, mostly living in Central and East Java. There are two other significant and predominantly Muslim ethnic groups on the island: the Sundanese of West Java and Banten, and the Madurese of East Java, respectively about 30 million and 10 million people. Some Java-based militant groups have a strong ethnic basis; others appear to pay little heed to the ethnic background of members.[1]

General characteristics of militant groups

The militancy of the Islamist groups under examination in this chapter is derived from two interlinked issues: (1) their perception of Islam's place in the world, and particularly the treatment of Muslims by non-Muslims; and

(2) their interpretation of scripture and Prophetic example regarding the use of violence. Most militant Muslims have a deep sense of grievance about what they see as the weak and vulnerable position of Islam in the contemporary world. Not only has Islam lost the technological and scientific innovation which was a feature of Muslim civilization several centuries before, but also much of the Muslim world is now economically deprived and militarily vastly inferior to non-Muslim nations. Moreover, most militant Muslims believe that Muslims are in this humiliating position because of ruthless manipulation and exploitation by the Christian and Jewish-controlled West, which is inherently hostile to Islam. This perception of Muslims as victims of a massive anti-Islamic campaign is widespread among militant groups. It is often conceptualized in starkly dichotomous terms, as part of an eternal Muslim–'infidel' conflict. JI's former *amir* (commander), Abu Bakar Bashir portrayed it thus:

> God has divided humanity into two segments, namely the followers of Allah and those who follow Satan. The party of God [Hizbullah] and the party of Satan. And God's group are those who follow Islam, those who are prepared to follow his laws and struggle for the implementation of Sharia, that is [Hizbullah]. Meanwhile what is meant by Satan's group is humanity which opposes God's law . . .
>
> We reject all of your [i.e., infidel] beliefs. We reject all of your ideologies. We reject all of your teachings that are associated with social issues, economics or beliefs. Between you and us there will forever be a ravine of hate and we will be enemies until you follow God's law.[2]

Similarly, the former commander of Laskar Jihad, Ja'far Umar Thalib, said that: 'All Muslims know that the United States is their enemy. They can never trust it [the US] because they know how it hates Islam and wants to destroy the Islamic community. We see the evidence for this everyday in Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia and, yes, here in Indonesia. This is so obvious that we [Muslims] don't even debate it any longer. It's just a fact.'[3]

This perception of the world as hostile and anti-Islamic has a powerful influence on how militant Muslims interpret the Quran and Hadith (reports of the Prophet Muhammad's deeds), particularly regarding jihad and conditions pertaining to the use of violence. For most militant groups, the plight of Muslim communities and the dire threat to Islam obliges Muslims to defend the faith and its adherents through the use of force. The Quran, as with the sacred texts of many other religions, has both irenic and belligerent passages. Whereas mainstream Muslims are more inclined to refer to verses which enjoin forbearance or moderation, militants are drawn to sections such as the so-called 'Verses of the Sword' in the Quran, which stress the need for armed jihad against Islam's enemies.[4]

Attitudes towards jihad are, indeed, a distinguishing factor between not only mainstream and militant Muslims but between different types of militant Muslims. *Jihad* (literally, 'effort', 'struggle') has a wide variety of meanings, ranging from controlling one's baser personal desires, to carrying out deeds for the good of the community such as conducting charitable or religious works, to fighting wars to defend or advance Islam. Mainstream Muslims usually emphasize the non-violent aspects of jihad and uphold strict limits on the resort to arms. Conventional Islamic scholarship holds that jihad is normally only justifiable when an Islamic community is under direct attack and that non-combatants, particularly women, children, the sick and the elderly, should not be targeted. Thus, when Muslim–Christian violence broke out in Maluku in early 1999, many Muslims saw the raising of paramilitary forces to defend their co-religionists by groups such as Laskar Jihad and Laskar Mujahideen as acceptable use of arms. By contrast, few Muslims regard Jemaah Islamiah's use of massive bomb attacks against foreigners as a legitimate use of violence, because Indonesian Muslims are not under direct assault and most of the bomb victims are non-combatants.

For those Java-based groups which engage in terrorism, a blend of religious factors and a sense of reciprocity are common drivers. Within the most militant sections of JI and DI, for example, there is a belief that Indonesia is just one theatre in a global war between Islam and its enemies and that by striking in a shocking manner at foreign non-combatants they will force anti-Islamic nations to desist from attacking Muslims. For example, Imam Samudra, a Sundanese who is now on death row for his role in Bali bombing, has written repeatedly about terrorism as just and religiously sanctioned retaliation to the attacks of non-Muslims on Islam:

> What has happened is that the colonizing nations have continued, are continuing and will continue to massacre the civilians of Muslim nations. However, America and its allies have exceeded the bounds. God is the most Holy, God is the most Righteous! God does not permit His servants to remain in a state of anxiety and degradation. God does not permit His servants to be played foul by the infidels. War will be met with war, blood with blood, lives with lives, and transgressions with the same.[5]

Mukhlas, a Javanese and another of the Bali bombers to be sentenced to death, has written at length about the virtue and efficacy of terrorism:

> The pious were commanded by Almighty God to become *irhaabii* or terrorists, namely those who can make the enemies of Almighty God and their enemies . . . tremble, be afraid and be overwhelmed by fear . . . To us, and our view is based on the axioms of the Qur'an and Sunnah and the facts on the ground, the enemies of Islam, from past times to the present day, including the Jews, America and their lackeys, will not understand the language of diplomacy. They

> only understand the language of force; they will not understand except by the language of force.[6]

The purpose of jihad is not only to retaliate against one's enemies but also to enable the comprehensive implementation of sharia law. Militant groups believe that non-Muslims are bent upon preventing Muslims from living according to God's law and thus promote secularism as a superior system to an Islamic one. The longer-term objective for many militant groups is the creation of an Islamic state, because only in such a polity can sharia be fully enforced. Some groups insist that the Islamic state be transnational in nature and headed by a caliph; others only seek an Indonesian Islamic state.

The ideological typology of militant groups in Java is also variegated. Some terrorist scholars place all militant groups in the Salafist category, but in reality, this generalization is misleading. In fact, only two of the militant groups discussed in this chapter are Salafist, and both of those are more accurately described as Salafi jihadist. The distinction between the two classifications is significant. The term 'Salafist' is derived from the Arabic *as-salaf as-salih* or 'pious predecessors' and refers to the desire to follow the example of the Prophet Muhammad and the early generations of Muslims, who are seen as providing an unimpeachable model of behaviour and thinking for subsequent generations. Various Islamic movements over the past 100 or so years have described themselves as Salafist, though there have been major differences in their outlook and agendas. In contemporary times, the term is most often used by those groups which see themselves as the most puritanical and doctrinally strict in emulating the founding generations of Muslims. Most Salafists seek to achieve their aims through educational, preaching and intellectual activity, and reject the use of violence and insurrection in all but the most extreme of circumstances.

Within the Salafist community there is a small minority who believe that Islam can only be protected and advanced by the use of violence. This group is often referred to as 'jihadi Salafism', though that is not a term used by members of this category. Jihadi Salafists believe such is the magnitude of the threat facing the Islamic community that only extreme violence will be effective in warding off Islam's foes. Indeed, the military and economic might of non-Muslim nations obliges Muslims to use terror as no other means are available.[7]

Militant groups

Darul Islam

Darul Islam (Abode of Islam) is the oldest violent jihadist organization in Southeast Asia and it has played a key role in spawning new generations of

militant Muslims. DI first began to take form as a movement in West Java in 1947 under the leadership of S.M. Kartosoewirjo, a failed medical student and charismatic Muslim politician. From the very beginning, DI objected to the perceived 'secular' nature of the Indonesian Republic, which had been established in August 1945,[8] and sought a stronger Islamic identity for the new state. In late 1948, it launched an armed rebellion against Republican forces and in August the following year, it declared the creation of an Indonesian Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII) based on sharia law, with Kartosoewirjo as imam (religious leader) and Commander-in-Chief. Over the next four years, the DI rebellion spread to four other provinces: Central Java, Aceh, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan. At its peak during the 1950s, DI posed a severe challenge to the Republican government. In West Java alone, it had an estimated 15 000 men under arms (though probably less than a third of these had firearms) and was able to control large areas of the province, particularly the mountainous jungle regions outside major cities. DI was feared for its attacks on villages and public facilities and it caused immense loss of life (more than 15 000 are estimated to have died by the early 1960s) and economic disruption.[9] Intensive army operations against DI from the late 1950s, combined with the defection of key field commanders, robbed the movement of much of its potency. Kartosoewirjo was eventually captured and executed for treason in 1962, after which the movement largely collapsed.[10]

DI activists in West Java began reviving the organization in the late 1960s, though many of the details of this process remain murky. Almost from the outset, tensions arose between those DI leaders who had surrendered and pledged loyalty to the Republic and those who had gone underground and refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Indonesian state. These divisions were deepened in the early 1970s when one of the Suharto regime's intelligence units, Opsus (Special Operations) under Major-General Ali Murtopo, began cultivating remnants of DI with the professed aim of strengthening the fight against communism. In reality, both sides had their own agendas: the DI activists hoped to use state sponsorship to help them consolidate their Islamic state networks; the regime seems to have wanted to monitor Islamist groups more closely and possibly manipulate them for its political purposes. In the run-up to the 1977 election the regime announced that it had uncovered a plot by Muslim extremists linked to DI-based Komando Jihad (Jihad Command) to overthrow the government. The timing of the announcement helped the regime to portray itself as protecting Indonesia from dangerous Muslim groups. Over the next few years, dozens of former DI activists were detained and tried for sedition, creating a new source of bitterness and mistrust of government agencies among DI circles.

From the 1980s, DI was beset with debilitating internal fragmentation. There were several causes of this. A key factor was the absence of an authoritative leader capable of uniting and directing the disparate elements within DI. The Acehnese Islamic scholar, Daud Beureueh, who had led DI's campaign in Aceh during the 1950s, was appointed imam in 1974 but poor health and irregular contact with other important DI figures in the West Java heartland meant that he had little control over the organization's affairs. Since Beureueh's death in 1984, the imam-ship of DI has, more often than not, been disputed, with several figures claiming the leadership. Another divisive issue was that of strategy, particularly regarding relations towards the Suharto regime. Some sections of DI readily accepted financial support and political protection from the regime in return for adopting a more accommodating stance; other sections forswore any contact and maintained their own underground parallel state structure. The most intriguing example of an accommodating attitude is that adopted by DI's Ninth Regional Command (known as KW9) covering West Java and Jakarta, which is now led by Panji Gumilang. Under Gumilang, the Ninth Command has become the largest and wealthiest of DI factions. Its best known asset is the al-Zaytun Islamic boarding school in Indramayu, which is probably the most extensive and handsomely equipped such school in Indonesia. Al-Zaytun claims to support the Indonesian state in its present 'secular' form and it enjoys the patronage of powerful political and intelligence officials, but various studies into its affairs suggest that it maintains tight control over and derived considerable income from local DI networks and that it has a concealed, longer-term Islamic state agenda. Several other factions in DI have openly hostile relations with the Ninth Command.[11]

Lack of reliable information makes it difficult to map DI's factional divisions with any certainty. But in recent years, the main groups have been those led by: Panji Gumilang; Kartosoewirjo's son Tahmid Rahmat Basuki, which is based in central West Java; Gaos Taufik, a Medan-based former DI military commander from the early 1960s; Ajengan Masduki, whose support also comes from West Java; and Kang Jaja, whose group is based in Banten, west of Jakarta. With the exception of Gumilang's Ninth Command, which is said to contain more than 20 000 members, most of the other factions would appear small in size – probably less than 1000 members each.

DI's current membership falls into two main categories: those who are from long-standing DI families and communities; and those with no DI background who are recruited to the organization from school, campus and mosque networks. The first of these two categories would appear the largest and in traditional DI areas of West Java, it is not uncommon to find

third- and fourth-generation DI members. Within these communities there remains a strong sense of pride in DI's historical struggle and a fervent commitment to the formal application of sharia law within Indonesia. Since the 1980s, however, DI has been increasingly active at recruiting new members from outside traditional support bases. A major site of 'outreach' is state university campuses in Java, where DI operates a network of covert cells. New members are often recruited through the compulsory religious education programmes for first-year students. A smaller system of recruitment and cell activity also exists in high schools, particularly in West Java, Banten and Jakarta. Outside educational institutions, DI uses mosque-based discussion and social groups to gain new members. Whereas its secondary and tertiary student recruitment is drawn from better-off sections of the community, those entering DI via local mosque groups tend to be from poorer, less educated strata of society.

Doctrinally, DI has always been heterodox. Many of its members combine elements of traditional Sundanese and Javanese village religious practice with the more orthodox aspects of Islamic devotions. There are also strong mystical and millenarian tendencies, which are a source of disapproval from the Salafist groups with which DI sometimes collaborates.

In security terms, Darul Islam warrants close study for several reasons. First, it has been a major recruiting ground for terrorist operatives, particularly those from JI and its more recent offshoots. Kang Jaja's Ring Banten, for example, has provided a number of suicide bombers and other foot soldiers in large bomb attacks. There is also some evidence to suggest that the three suicide bombers in the second Bali attack (1 October 2005) may also have been enlisted through DI networks. From one standpoint, the 'crossover' of DI members into JI operations against Western targets is surprising given that DI's focus tends to be Indonesia-centric rather than global jihad. Historically, DI's preoccupation has been 'secular Indonesians' rather than foreign infidels – DI rarely targeted Westerners or non-Muslims during the 1950s and 1960s. From another standpoint, however, the move from DI to JI may seem a small step to many DI members who have shared training and battlefield experiences with JI counterparts. Since the mid-1990s, DI has often 'piggy-backed' on JI training programmes in the Philippines and in various remote parts of Indonesia, and JI continues to provide teachers for DI camps in Java. Also, in both Maluku and Central Sulawesi, DI and JI members fought in close proximity against the 'Christian enemy', often forming lasting relationships that have been used by JI leaders for recruitment purposes.

Second, despite DI's lack of internal ideological and organizational cohesion, it continues to embody the aspiration for an Islamic state and thereby attract recruits who are drawn to the ideal of a creating a 'total

Islamic society' in Indonesia. Kartosoewirjo is still regarded as an inspirational figure for many younger militant Muslims, and the DI struggle of the 1950s and 1960s is seen as a noble example for the present-day Islamic community. In this regard, DI can act as a funnel to other, more militant, organizations.[12]

Jemaah Islamiah

As JI is covered elsewhere in this handbook, only its Java-related origins and operations need be discussed here. Despite being founded in Malaysia and having a genuinely transnational scope of membership and operations, JI's origins and organizational activities are inextricably linked to Java. All four JI heads have been born and raised in Java; two of them – Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir – are of mixed Arab–Javanese descent, and Toriquddin and Abu Dujana are ethnic Javanese. A majority of the JI central leadership would also appear to be either Javanese or Sundanese. Since 1999, Central Java has also been the headquarters of JI operations and is probably the region with the most active grass-roots organizational basis.

Java has been central to shaping JI's identity, particularly through the role of the organization's two historically dominant figures, Sungkar and Bashir. Two key events in their pre-JI careers were the establishing of an Islamic boarding school, al-Mukmin, near the Central Java city of Solo in 1971, and their involvement in the covert Darul Islam (DI) movement in the early 1980s. The founding of al-Mukmin reflected their belief that greater emphasis had to be given to education. In part this was due to the regime's tight restrictions on Islamic political activity – education was subject to less intrusive control; and in part it showed Sungkar and Bashir's view that the failure to Islamize Indonesia reflected the lack of 'true' Islamic understanding by the Muslim community. Al-Mukmin became a major training institution for future JI members. In the early 1980s, Sungkar and Bashir became active in Darul Islam, taking leadership roles in the organization's Central Java branch. DI thinking would have a powerful effect on their ideological outlook. One of the reasons that Sungkar and Bashir joined DI appears to have been a belief that conventional forms of Islamic struggle in Indonesia had failed and that more militant measures were called for.

From the mid-1980s, Sungkar began recruiting DI members to go to Afghanistan to join the war against the occupying Soviet forces – a great many of these came from Java. At least several hundred Indonesians joined the mujahideen struggle via these DI channels. This internationalization of what had previously been an Indonesia-based DI struggle resulted from several factors. First, many Indonesian Islamists were becoming more 'global' in their concerns, seeing not only that anti-Islamic repression in

their country was part of a worldwide phenomenon, but also that events elsewhere, such as the Iranian Revolution, could provide a source of inspiration for home-grown Muslim movements. Second, financial and logistical assistance from various Middle Eastern, South Asian and Western sources had made it relatively easy to send Indonesians on jihadist campaigns abroad, particularly to Northern Pakistan and Afghanistan. Sungkar and Bashir had also become increasingly attracted to some of the extreme Salafi jihadist thinking emanating from the Arab world such as Gama'a Islamiyah's Sheikh Omar Abdurrahman as well as Abdullah Azzam and Abdelsalam Faraj.[13]

Sungkar and Bashir left Darul Islam after falling out with key leaders in the organization. The precise reasons for the split remain a matter of dispute. It is highly likely Sungkar and Bashir became increasingly intolerant of what they saw as heterodox religious practices within DI as well as the organization's lack of a concrete programme of militant activity within Indonesia. Both men appear to have felt that DI was doing too little in pressuring the Indonesian state on Islamic issues or bringing about attitudinal change within the Islamic community. [14]

Shortly after leaving DI, Sungkar and Bashir founded JI. From its inception, JI was intended to be more puritanical, militaristic and tightly disciplined than Darul Islam. Sungkar had used the term *jemaah Islamiah* for some years to describe the community of followers gathered about him and Bashir but from January 1993 this became formalized into an organization with a strict selection and induction processes and a hierarchical internal structure which invested extensive powers in the emir. The core of the founding JI group was drawn largely from the community of exiled Indonesians and a number of Malaysians and Singaporeans living in Malaysia, but Sungkar and Bashir began recruiting from DI members and other mujahideen in Afghanistan as well as Indonesia.

In early 1999, following the downfall of Suharto the previous year, JI's headquarters was moved from Malaysia to Solo in Indonesia. Sungkar and Bashir believed that the new mood of *reformasi* would provide favourable conditions for JI operations and recruitment. When Sungkar died of natural causes in late 1999, he was replaced as emir by Bashir. The period from 1999 to 2002 marked the organization's 'high point' in terms of membership and operations. It was able to recruit and train extensively and expand its organization rapidly. The nature of its operations was also increasingly ambitious, ranging from the Christmas Eve 2000 attacks on more than 30 churches to the Bali and Marriott Hotel bombings of 2002 and 2003 respectively.

There is growing evidence to indicate that from 2004, the orientation of JI's leadership began to shift away from terrorism to predication, educational

and military activities. Partly, this was a response to the damage done to the organization by state crackdown on its operations. More than half of the central leadership was either arrested or made fugitives in the two years following the 2002 Bali bombing and close security service monitoring of internal communications and recruitment caused great disruption to JI's functioning. But the change in direction also reflected a belief among many JI leaders that large bombings were counterproductive for the organization's longer-term aims of Islamizing both society and state. As a result, those JI members most committed to continuing terrorism began either to be marginalized or, of their own volition, to pursue their operations outside the organization's formal command structures. JI's reorientation has seen the organization become more Indonesia-centric and move closer towards the Java-dominated DI movement. It has also meant that JI offshoots, such as those led by Noordin Mohammed Top, have emerged as, arguably, a more serious security threat than JI.[15]

Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI)

MMI (Indonesian Holy Warriors Council) has close links both to Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiah. It has strong ideological ties to and some overlapping membership with both organizations. Since its founding on 7 August 2000, the anniversary of DI's declaration of an Indonesian Islamic state in 1949, MMI has portrayed itself as an umbrella organization for all pro-sharia groups, but more specifically, it sees itself as a legatee of DI and self-consciously has sought to bridge the differences between and bring together the many rival DI factions. It has had some success in this and most DI groupings have joined MMI, though relatively few influential DI leaders figure prominently in its internal discourses. Abu Bakar Bashir was the organization's founding *emir*.

MMI's formation and Bashir's prominent role in the new organization sparked heated debate within JI. The more militant JI leaders felt that MMI's existence legitimated the secular and democratic Indonesian state and that JI members would be distracted from more important covert operations by the council's activities. Nonetheless, there were considerable similarities between the two organizations. MMI's central objective is the 'complete' (*kaffah*) implementation of sharia in Indonesia. It seeks to achieve this through public advocacy and involves itself in a range of activities such as seminars, rallies, publishing and public education campaigns in order to strengthen support for sharia. Like JI, it is also committed to the creation of a Daulah Islamiah (Islamic state) and caliphate, both domestically and transnationally.

Aside from these 'political' activities, MMI also has a paramilitary group called Laskar Mujahideen, whose primary role is physical jihad. [16] One

aspect of this is providing security for MMI rallies and events, but its fighters have also been deployed in Muslim–Christian conflict areas in eastern Indonesia, where at least some of their number have gained a reputation for provocative attacks and human rights abuses. A number of Laskar Mujahideen members have also been recruited into terrorist networks and become involved in bomb attacks. Several MMI members have been arrested on suspicion of involvement in Noordin Mohammed Top's terrorist cells.

Prospects for militant groups

Conditions in Indonesia, and particularly on Java, are becoming more difficult for militant groups. The security services, especially the police, have a good track record of monitoring, intercepting and prosecuting terrorists, and they have managed to thwart a number of planned bombings. Since the Bali bombing of 2002, Indonesia has tried more terrorists than any other country, several of whom are awaiting the death penalty. There has also been a change in community attitudes towards terrorism in recent times. Political and religious leaders who once expressed scepticism about the possibility of home-grown terrorists now support strong counter-terrorism efforts.

Despite this, Indonesia is unlikely to rid itself of terrorism and other forms of violent jihadism in the near future. The porosity of its borders, the widespread corruption within its customs and immigration services, the ready availability of arms and explosives, and the continuing presence of deeply aggrieved Muslim groups create an environment which is conducive to continuing militant action.

Notes

1. Suryadinata, Leo, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta (eds) (2003), *Indonesia's Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
2. Abu Bakar Bashir, 'Abu Bakar Bas'yir [*sic*] Sermon' (n.d.), 'edited translation' from *Four Corners* television current affairs programme website, Australian Broadcasting Commission, www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/s 711753.htm, posted 28 October 2002, accessed 12 January 2005.
3. Interview with Ja'far Umar Thalib, Degolan, Yogyakarta, September 2002.
4. For a more detailed discussion of jihad, see Bostom, Andrew D. (ed.) (2005), *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims*, New York: Prometheus Books.
5. Imam Samudra (2004), *Aku Melawan Teroris* [I Fight Terrorists], Solo: Jazera, p. 116.
6. Aly Ghufron bin Nurhasyim (Mukhlas) (2003), 'Jihad Bom Bali: Sebuah Pembelaan. Operasi Peledakan Bom Legian dan Renon. 12 Oktober 2002' [The Bali bomb jihad: a defence. Operation Legian and Renon bomb explosions, 12 October 2002], Bali District Police Jail, Denpasar, 25 March, pp. 35, 95.
7. For an excellent discussion of contemporary salafism, see International Crisis Group (2004), 'Islamism in North Africa I: the legacies of history', Middle East and North Africa Briefing, Cairo/Brussels, 20 April; and International Crisis Group (2004),

'Indonesia backgrounder: why Salafism and terrorism mostly don't mix', Asia Report 83, 13 September.

8. It is debatable whether Indonesia was in fact a 'secular' state, rather than a religiously neutral one. The first principle of the national ideology, Pancasila, is 'Belief in one Almighty God' and since 1946, the Republic has had a Department of Religious Affairs which has extensive authority in monitoring and sponsoring Islamic affairs.
9. Fealy, Greg (2005), 'Half a century of violent jihad in Indonesia: an historical and ideological comparison of Darul Islam and Jema'ah Islamiyah', in Marika Vicziany and David Wright-Neville (eds), *Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia: Myths and Realities*, Annual Indonesia Lecture Series, number 26, Clayton, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, pp. 15–31.
10. Dengel, Holk (1985), *Darul Islam dan Kartosuwirjo: 'Angan-Angan yang Gagal'* (Darul Islam and Kartosuwirjo: 'The Illusion that Failed'), Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan; and Dijk, C. van (1981), 'Rebellion under the banner of Islam: the Darul Islam in Indonesia', The Hague: *VKI*, **94**.
11. International Crisis Group (2005), 'Recycling militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian embassy bombing', Asia Report No. 92, 22 February; and Greg Fealy (2005), 'Radical Islam in Indonesia: history and prospects', in Fealy, Greg and Aldo Borgu, *Local Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia*, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September, pp. 11–46.
12. Jones, Sidney (June, 2005) 'The changing nature of Jemaah Islamiyah', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, **59** (2); and ICG (2005), 'Recycling militants in Indonesia'.
13. Bubalo, Anthony and Greg Fealy (2005), *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia*, Lowy Institute Paper no. 5, Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy (Longueville Press).
14. International Crisis Group (2002), 'Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: the case of the "Ngruki Network" in Indonesia', Asia Briefing, 8 August; and Neighbour, Sally (2004), *In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia*, Sydney: HarperCollins.
15. For a detailed account of recent developments within JI and related groups, see Sidney Jones, (2005), 'New developments within Jemaah Islamiyah' at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 5 July, a webcast of which is available at the ISEAS website.
16. Irfan Suryahardi Awwas (ed.) (2001), *Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syari'ah Islam* [Proceedings of the First Mujahidin Congress and Upholding Shariah Law], Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, pp. 149–60; and Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM) (2003), *Islam Kontemporer Indonesia: Munculnya Gerakan Radikal Islam* [Indonesian Contemporary Islam: The Emergence of Radical Islamic Movements], Universitas Islam Negeri Jakarta, Jakarta: PPIM.

5 Jemaah Islamiah according to *PUPJI*

Elena Pavlova

The General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah (*Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah*) – commonly known under its acronym *PUPJI*[1] – is an essential document for understanding Southeast Asia's most deadly terror network. Issued by Jemaah Islamiah's Central Executive Council (Qiyadah Markaziyah), it outlines the group's administrative structure and guiding religious principles, in addition to providing insights into its organizational development, membership recruitment and operational strategy. From the time Jemaah Islamiah (JI) was established on 1 January 1993 as the result of an internal split within the Darul Islam (DI) movement, until the time it first engaged in terrorist activities with the Medan church bombings on 28 May 2000,[2] the outfit was structured and managed in accordance with this handbook. To understand Jemaah Islamiah, therefore, we must understand *PUPJI*.

PUPJI is important for a number of reasons. For one, it is the most significant document produced by JI as an organization.[3] It functions as the de facto manifesto of the group, throwing light on its fundamental principles and practices. It also lays out the normative precepts and the operational methods of the group, as well as mapping out its rules of engagement, procedural norms and targeted outcomes. As such, *PUPJI* is the normative template from which the institutional entity of Jemaah Islamiah emerges and subsequently develops.

From a strategic point of view, *PUPJI* is also important because it outlines the group's religious vision and core mission. As an outfit that views itself primarily as a mobilizing agent for collective action, JI and its handbook provide key directions as to how this is to be achieved. From the organizational stages that Jemaah Islamiah has to undergo in order to reach its full institutional potential, to the operational learning curve that the members of the group have to accomplish in order to adapt successfully to their environment, *PUPJI* is essential to all these endeavours. It provides the strategic, tactical and operational guidelines on how Jemaah Islamiah should conduct itself as a strategic actor.

In terms of the religious underpinnings of the group, *PUPJI* is even more central to JI's endeavours because it portrays the organization as belonging to the spectrum of Salafi jihadist extremist outfits. Rather than a random collection of militants who perpetrate haphazard acts of violence,

the manual designates the group and its members as key stakeholders in a broad socio-political undertaking. Their principal rationale for action is that of creating the nucleus of an Islamic society that can subsequently form the core of the Islamic state of their imagination. While terrorist attacks and armed combat are important components of their overall plan, it would be a disfavour to JI to strip their operational calculus to the bare minimum of random violence.

In fact, the much-publicized split among the ranks of JI can be partly attributed to *PUPJI*-outlined norms and procedures. This split first took place when one of JI's armed factions – the faction successively led by Hambali, Azahari and Noordin Top – made a unilateral decision to engage in terrorism. The leaders of this group believed that the time had come for Jemaah Islamiah to wage armed jihad and to take on the international system.[4] Other members of JI, on the other hand, were either disinterested or directly opposed to such initiatives. While they were not averse to waging local jihad in conflict zones like Maluku and Poso, they were much more lukewarm to the imperatives of global jihad as espoused by Hambali, Azahari and Noordin Top.[5]

For one, these JI members believed that a premature descent into violence would jeopardize the goals of the organization as posited in *PUPJI*. Such activities would effectively thwart the group's efforts to build a broad constituency of like-minded individuals and to establish a secure base as their territorial headquarters. In their view, only after these primary objectives had been achieved, JI would be ready to engage in armed combat. It is in this context that we should interpret JI Executive Council member Achmad Roihan's statement that the decision to stage the 2002 Bali blasts was not taken by Jemaah Islamiah as an organization. Instead, it was the product of 'initiatives' undertaken by a few 'individuals'.[6]

A second explanation is that in the aftermath of President Suharto's fall from power and the democratic transition in Indonesia, a portion of JI's members had become convinced that a change of plans was also at hand. Whereas Jemaah Islamiah had been formed during a regime of active persecution against Islamist activists,[7] the new political system allowed such activists to champion their cause openly and through public debate. The formation of the Majlis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI) and the ascendance of Abu Bakar Bashir to the top position in MMI were perceived as evidence of the alternative routes available to the group. Why fight when one can proselytize and lobby?

Many of these internal debates quietly surfaced at the time of Bashir's resignation as JI's emir in 2000. He was quickly replaced by Abu Rusdan and, subsequently, by Abu Dujana.[8] Both of these top leaders had very different plans in mind for JI. Whereas Bashir was willing to shift methods

to match the new climate of political openness, Abu Rusdan and Abu Dujana stuck to the previous confrontational stance of JI. In fact, according to some reports, there were even plans in 1999–2000 to assassinate top Indonesian politicians, including then presidential candidate Megawati Sukarnoputri, on account that a woman was not suited to lead a Muslim country.[9] Similar plans were also formulated against four members of Megawati's PDI-P (Parti Demokratik Indonesia-Perjuangan) ruling party in 2003.[10]

Another point of contention among the ranks of JI was the increasing number of Muslim civilians killed. As the terrorist campaign of the Hambali–Azahari–Noordin Top splinter outfit unfolded, more and more JI members became uncomfortable with this faction's chosen methods and their unintended consequences. From key JI operatives who had helped out with various terrorist attacks[11] to JI members unaffiliated with violence,[12] the organizational sentiment inside JI was starting to change. What could previously be written off as relatively unimportant internal debates over organizational and operational matters became important faultlines, according to which the group was divided into the pro-violence and the non-violence factions. As much as Abu Bakar Bashir was publicly seen as their religious model and source of inspiration, even he felt compelled, upon his recent release, to condemn Noordin Mohammed, Top's splinter group as 'misguided fighters'.[13]

In summary, *PUPJI* is an important resource through which we can trace the gradual evolution of Jemaah Islamiah. From the day-to-day activities of the group to its key strategic premises and decision-making processes, *PUPJI* provides us with an 'insider's perspective' into the motivations, structures and capabilities of JI. As such, studying it and uncovering its key themes and objectives will bring us closer to understanding Jemaah Islamiah itself.

PUPJI's composition

PUPJI comprises a booklet of approximately 44 pages. Its content consists of a broad range of topics, divided into various sections and sub-sections. Written in a combination of Bahasa Indonesia and Arabic, the text is steeped in religious terminology and afloat with doctrinal precepts. The Quran and the Hadith are frequently quoted, either to illustrate the meaning of certain passages or to situate the workings of the group from a religious perspective. In this respect, JI resembles other radical Islamist militant groups. To them, the religious underpinnings of their endeavours are just as important as their ultimate strategic goals. Religious injunctions are usually incorporated in their manuals to ensure that all their actions are in strict accordance with Islamic principles.

It is important to note that *PUPJI* was intended as a reference manual for senior JI cadres.[14] Rather than as a booklet with specific instructions to all rank-and-file members, its content is geared towards providing religious, strategic and tactical directions to the top leaders. The handbook's primary objective is to map out the organizational structure and the operational trajectory of the group, while also ensuring that these components are synchronized with JI's religious values and core mission. As such, *PUPJI* functions on three distinct levels: it is simultaneously an organizational charter, an operational handbook and a religious-strategic programme. As the main guide for the group's activities, it embodies both the spiritual essence and the day-to-day practicalities of JI.

According to most experts, *PUPJI* was drafted by a committee of religious scholars, rather than a single individual.[15] This is obvious from the text's irregular cadence, the differences in writing style among the various sections, and the insertion of extraneous material at the end of the pamphlet.[16] The document allegedly underwent a number of editions, with new information being included on a periodical basis. For the most part, however, JI's guidebook is organized around four main themes. These are:

- the Principles for the Methodology to Establish the Religion (*Ushulul Manhaj Al-Harakiy Li Iqomatid Dien*);
- the Methodology to Establish the Religion (*Manhaj Al-Harakiy Li Iqomatid Dien*);
- the Methodology for Operations (*Manhaj Al-Amaliy*);
- JI's Constitution (*Nidhomul Asasiy*).

PUPJI starts by listing the ten religious principles that comprise Jemaah Islamiyah's Islamist worldview (*Ushulul Manhaj Al-Harakiy Li Iqomatid Dien*). These principles are subsequently expanded into a religious vision and an ideological programme on how to achieve them (*Manhaj Al-Harakiy Li Iqomatid Dien*). An operational methodology follows, delineating the group's structural apparatus and core activities (*Manhaj Al-Amaliy*). A constitutional charter is also included, with the goal of clarifying the group's norms and procedures, chains of command, and decision-making processes (*An Nidhomul Asasiy*). In its entirety, *PUPJI* thus offers a comprehensive strategic outline and coherent organizational framework with regard to JI. It is the conceptual template from which the institutional entity of Jemaah Islamiah emerges and subsequently evolves.

To understand JI, therefore, we must understand *PUPJI*. Three things stand out in this perspective. First, JI's founding document was drafted in a conscious effort to differentiate Jemaah Islamiah from Darul Islam (DI). Due to the internal split between the two – which was over ideology

as well as methodology – JI's leaders needed a new paradigm of collective action through which to refashion the group.

Second, *PUPJI* resembles closely the founding charters and operational handbooks of other radical Islamist militant groups. Due to the cross-fertilization of ideas and practices that resulted from JI's participation in the Soviet-Afghan war – especially the joint training with members of other terrorist outfits in the camps of Afghan commander Abdul Rasul Sayyaf – JI acquired knowledge and expertise previously unavailable to other Southeast Asian militant groups.

Finally, *PUPJI* envisions Jemaah Islamiah to emerge and develop as a counter-society instead of a counter-state movement. Inherent to this process is the emphasis on amassing resources, consolidating them over time, and transforming them into organizational and operational strengths. Only after these strengths have reached their territorial and institutional embodiment would JI be ready actively to engage in violence and effectively to traverse the threshold into a counter-state outfit.

In this regard, JI's descent into terrorism – in the aftermath of Bin Laden's Declaration of War in 1998 – is an aberration of *PUPJI* norms and procedures. How Jemaah Islamiah travelled the road from a counter-society – as envisioned by *PUPJI* – to an untimely counter-state movement – in direct contradiction to *PUPJI*'s principles – is the subject matter of this chapter.

Background information on *PUPJI*

PUPJI was first discovered two months after the 2002 Bali bombing. A police raid in Solo, Central Java on the house of Achmad Roihan – a member of JI's Central Executive Council (Qiyadah Markaziyah) – rendered the pamphlet in the hands of the police.[17] After a preliminary analysis of its content, the authorities were quick to recognize its value for throwing light on the workings of the group. Additional copies were subsequently recovered at the homes of other high-ranking JI leaders throughout Indonesia.

Files extracted from the computer of Imam Samudra – a top JI field commander responsible for orchestrating the first Bali bombing – also contain information on *PUPJI*.[18] In his book on Jemaah Islamiah, Nasir Abbas – yet another key JI operative and former head of the organization's territorial sub-division Mantiqi III – describes in detail both the pamphlet and its significance for the group.[19] Documents retrieved during a July 2003 counter-terrorism dragnet operation against the terrorist network of JI commander and Laskar Khos (Special Operations Group) leader Mustopa in Semarang, Central Java also corroborate and supplement the content of JI's guidebook.[20]

In court, *PUPJI* was applied as evidence in the trials of the Lampung group – the key suspects behind the first Bali bombing – and, even more prominently, that of Abu Bakar Bashir, the alleged emir and spiritual leader of JI.[21] However, due to the uncertain nature of the legal process during terrorism trials in Indonesia and the repeated withdrawal of promised testimonies by key JI suspects, *PUPJI* seems to have had little impact on the overall proceedings. One of the reasons is that although some JI members profess to have seen and read the handbook, others claim to have never even heard of its existence.[22] Even more troubling is the persistent denial by top JI commanders – such as Imam Samudra, Ali Ghufron and Abu Rusdan – that the document is authentic.[23]

Part of the mystery is explained by the fact that *PUPJI* was meant as a reference manual for senior JI cadres. Not every member recruited into the organization was presented with a copy or was expected to know *PUPJI*'s content.[24] In terms of key JI operatives who deny the existence of the handbook, their reluctance to acknowledge it stems from their insistence that even the organization that issued it – namely, Jemaah Islamiah – is not real. As they have widely proclaimed in the media, both *PUPJI* and JI are a convenient fabrication of the Indonesian authorities, part of a murky conspiracy to undermine Islam and Muslims at the behest of the United States. Even Abu Bakar Bashir – who prosecutors claim formed part of the religious committee that originally authored the booklet – has repeatedly stated that *PUPJI* was planted as evidence by the Indonesian police to prove that an organization by the name of Jemaah Islamiah exists.[25]

Notwithstanding such contradictions, investigation proceedings, court documents, witness statements and journalist reports all support the authenticity of JI's guidebook. For one, the procedural norms outlined in *PUPJI* have been followed throughout the organization's existence. From the rise of JI cadres through the ranks[26] and the nomination of regional and sub-regional chiefs[27] to the oath-taking ceremony marking the inclusion of new members into the group[28] and the regular meetings scheduled at the *Markaziyah*, *Mantiqi* and *Wakalah* levels,[29] *PUPJI*'s institutional influence and formative impact are prominent in a number of ways.

Even with regard to violence, most terrorist attacks conducted by the group bear the hallmarks of JI's manual. The Bali bombings, the Marriott hotel bombing, and the Christmas Eve bombings all share in the commonality of their being operations in which the *PUPJI*-stipulated modus operandi of division of labour and cell compartmentalization, pre-operations team surveillance and post-operations team review have been dutifully implemented.[30] Under these circumstances, any attempts to discredit JI's guidebook need to provide an alternative rationale for the high

levels of standardization and operationalization of norms and procedures that are clearly manifested in the day-to-day workings of the group.

Jemaah Islamiah according to *PUPJI*

PUPJI portrays JI as a highly centralized and well-structured organization with a top-down chain of command and meticulously defined objectives and activities. It also outlines a broad framework of organizational and operational procedures, based on Salafi jihadist religious principles and a rigorous methodology of self-discipline, inter-body consultation and internal control mechanisms. Furthermore, JI's constitutional charter in *PUPJI* unequivocally sanctions acceptable and non-acceptable behaviour for members. Three things stand out in this perspective:

- The emphasis on Daulah Islamiah (Islamic state) as a stepping stone towards the restoration of the global Islamic Caliphate (global Islamic governance).[31]
- The process of preparing for the Daulah Islamiah (Islamic state) through a persistent and patient 'moulding' of the individual, the family, and the *jama'ah* (group) as Islamic entities.[32]
- The prominence of military training and *jihad musallah* (armed struggle) as the final outcome and the ultimate test of success for JI's long preparations.[33]

It is imperative to consider all three principles together in order to understand JI. While other Islamist movements might share some of JI's objectives, *PUPJI*'s pre-eminent focus on armed struggle as its preferred modus operandi for establishing Daulah Islamiah and restoring the global Islamic Caliphate places JI into a completely different category of groups. The organization's efforts to cultivate the individual, the family and the environment can only be understood in the context of JI's unwavering resolution to become a military outfit. It is this difference that accounts for JI's descent into violence and its subsequent transformation into a clandestine terrorist network.

Within *PUPJI*, al-Qaeda's influence on JI is evident in terms of both JI's ideology and JI's modus operandi. The ways in which the parameters of the struggle are conceptualized, the organizational phases through which JI is expected to pass, and the clear distinction between JI's administrative apparatus and its operational branch all point to an organization whose reason for being and approach to the world are solidly rooted in seeking out opportunities for violence. As *PUPJI* phrases it:

> The effort to develop strength is a long process that includes building potential until (the organization) reaches the stage where this potential has become

real, effective, and ready to be used in a show of strength and combat operations.'[34]

The organizational patterns of JI according to *PUPJI*

JI as a jama'ah (group)

According to *PUPJI*, the main objective of JI as a *jama'ah* (group) is to develop the resources and capabilities of its members and the organization as a whole. In a 1997 interview, the founding father and first emir (leader) of JI, Abdullah Sungkar, observed that such an outcome is to be achieved in three consecutive phases:

- *Quwwatul Aqidah* (Faith's Strength);
- *Quwwatul Ukhuwwah* (Brotherhood's Strength);
- *Quwwatul Musallaha* (Military Strength).[35]

According to the interview, the need to establish JI as a separate *jama'ah* (group) is brought forth by the fact that other organizations have forsaken their religion and have become ineffective at dealing with oppressive governments. The strategic and tactical differences between JI and the rest of the Islamic community, therefore, require a separate organizational model, developmental trajectory and institutional entity to embody and sustain JI's unique vision and mission.

Similarly, *PUPJI* outlines two paths through which JI's strengths are to be nurtured:

- *Al-Manhaj al-Harakiy Li Iqomatid Dien* (the Methodology to Establish the Religion);
- *Al-Manhaj Al-Amaliy Li Iqomatid Dien* (the Methodology of Work/Operational Guide).

These two paths are to be implemented by training and developing enlisted JI members and by cultivating and expanding the organization geographically.[36] The structural model of a *jama'ah* (group) is particularly well suited for such endeavours. As a functionally distinct entity that differentiates between members and non-members, it allows JI to recruit, indoctrinate and instruct its followers into obedience. The concept and practice of a *jama'ah* thus lie at the foundation of JI's efforts to carve out a separate public space for its particular type of collective action.

On the one hand, JI's goal is 'to establish the religion collectively through the *jama'ah*'.[37] On the other hand, JI hopes to develop a particular type of community – with a strong sense of religious, social and political identity – that will act as a launching pad for its mission of armed jihad.[38] The

two paths are thereby inherently linked. Only by possessing the correct perspective, emotional conditioning and material preparation will JI's members be successful in achieving Daulah Islamiah (Islamic state) and the global Islamic Caliphate through jihad *musallah* (armed struggle). In this regard, JI as a *jama'ah* is only the first step on the long road of the group's transformation into an armed jihad movement.

JI as a Qiy'adah Rosyidah (Core Group of Those who Follow the Righteous Path)

According to *PUPJI*, before JI transforms itself into a full-blown jihad movement, some core mechanisms and principles need to be instituted within its structures to ensure that the organization will not deviate from the 'right' path or forget its 'true' mission. The essential component, in this respect, is the cultivation of a 'righteous' leadership and a 'wholesome' strategic vision. JI thereby conceptualizes itself as starting out with a *Qiy'adah Rosyidah*. In *PUPJI*, *Qiy'adah Rosyidah* refers to a 'core group' of leaders, who possess the 'true' faith, knowledge, leadership skills and adaptation mechanisms. Their role is to guide the organization and its members along the righteous path.[39]

Qiy'adah Rosyidah is expected both to set the agenda and to pave the way for other JI members to follow. In this sense, the processes of leadership selection, training, and evaluation become crucial to the overall success of the movement. The group will achieve its vision of Daulah Islamiah (Islamic state) and restore the global Islamic Caliphate through its strategy of *jihad musallah* (armed jihad) only if it manages to develop and preserve *Qiy'adah Rosyidah* as its guiding element. In the course of JI's existence, the moulding influence and institutional impact of *Qiy'adah Rosyidah* will prove crucial for retaining the group's original identity, while also adapting its structures and members for the opportunities and obstacles that the future holds.

JI as a Qoi'dah Sholabah (Solid Base)

Once the core leadership is developed and its long-term strategy outlined, JI can proceed to the next stage of its evolution. During this phase, the knowledge, the characteristics, and the experiences of the 'core group' of leaders will be passed on to other members of the *jama'ah* (group). The goal is to build *Qoi'dah Sholabah*, or a 'solid base' of followers, who are steadfast in their obedience and dedication to the group and its objectives.

According to *PUPJI*, JI as *Qoi'dah Sholabah* will be characterized by material strength and emotional solidarity. Its members will act as the vanguard and the 'core executor, propagator, and guardian of the *jama'ah*'s mission'.[40] They will assist one another in their efforts and keep the fire of the struggle alive.

It is important to compare this phase of JI's development with al-Qaeda's rationale as a 'Solid Base' (*Al-Qa'idah Al-Sulbah*). As conceptualized by Abdullah Azzam and put into practice by Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the 'Solid Base' is a conglomerate of training camps which provide military instruction and religious indoctrination to their recruits. Together, they also embody the symbolic effects and practical manifestations of armed jihad as a way of life:

> Therefore, I came with the idea of an essential base (*Al-Qa'idah Al-Sulbah*) for the construction of the Islamic society, which is as follows . . . The Islamic society cannot be established without an Islamic movement that goes through the fire of tests. Its members need to mature in the fires of trials. This movement will represent the spark that ignites the potential of the nation. It will carry out a long *jihad*, in which (the movement) will provide the leadership and the spiritual guidance. The long *jihad* will bring people's qualities to the fore and highlight their potentials. It will define their positions and have their leaders assume their roles to direct the march and to channel it. After all the tribulations, *Allah* will install them in the land and make them the outer manifestation of his might and the means to the victory of his religion.[41]

According to *PUPJI*, JI as a *Qoi'dah Sholabah* (Solid Base) will have a similar impact. It not only will pave the way for Muslims in Southeast Asia to acquire deadly jihad skills, but also will exert a gravitational pull on them. In this regard, *Qoi'dah Sholabah* is a much broader and deeper concept than *Qiy'adah Rosyidah* (Core Group of Those who Follow the Righteous Path). It encompasses both the 'core group' – as leaders – and other members of the *jama'ah* (group) – as followers.

JI as a Tandzim Sirri (Secret Organization)

The imperative to develop JI as a *Tandzim Sirri* (Secret Organization) is generated by the unwavering resolution of the group to become a military outfit. Similar overtones of concealment can be recognized in training manuals authored by al-Qaeda and other extremist militant groups. The need for secrecy is usually prompted by the practical consideration of insulating the open organization, with its mass membership and public interactions, from the illegal activities of a small contingent of its cadres – in general deliberately and independently trained for the purpose of violence.

Tandzim Sirri was first introduced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in 1942–43, in response to the increased hostility of the Egyptian government and its British allies towards the movement.[42] The secret apparatus fulfilled two key purposes: it maintained the security of the organization *vis-à-vis* its external enemies, and upheld internal law and order within the group. Its existence as a separate entity from the Brotherhood's administrative apparatus was instituted due to its explicitly military role. Apart

from the security benefits that mandatory secrecy imparted, the cycles of independent decision-making, covert operational planning and clandestine execution were deemed essential to the success of any paramilitary activity.[43] The Muslim Brotherhood could thus continue unimpeded with its social programmes of grass-roots education, community development and political mobilization, while also protecting and advancing its interests by force, if and when the need arose.

Within *PUPJI*, these same aspects are emphasized because JI is developing military capabilities in direct opposition to the state's monopoly on power. Concealment is considered paramount so as not to alert the 'enemy' – equated here with the state – to the gradual advancement of the organization in military terms.[44] The subdivision of JI into an open organization and a 'secret apparatus' is believed to facilitate this dissimulation and thereby contribute to the long-term survival of the movement.

Secondly, the purpose of JI as *Tandzim Sirri* – according to *PUPJI* – is to provide periodic military instruction and operational reminders to the group's members. Even if the organization has not yet reached the phase of a full-blown jihad movement, it is important for it to cultivate its members as fighters. Small-scale training sessions are recommended, in which paramilitary instruction is imparted in a gradual and measured fashion.[45] The ultimate goal of the 'secret organization' is to lay the groundwork for JI's eventual transformation into an effective counter-state outfit.

As such, JI as *Tandzim Sirri* (Secret Organization) has a dual role. It both contributes to the security and survival of the organization, while also preparing JI's cadres to adopt 'armed struggle' as their modus operandi in the long run.

JI as a Qoi'dah Aminah (Secure Base)

The final stage of JI's evolution – as outlined in *PUPJI* – is its transformation into a 'secure base' and a full-blown militant outfit. For this to occur, JI must exert complete and effective control over its territory, authority and membership. Only when JI has acquired certain critical capabilities and resources, and developed them into organizational and operational strengths, will it also be able actively to engage in violence. In this context, JI can become a counter-state movement only after it has reached its embodiment as a counter-society.

Within *PUPJI*, *Qoi'dah Aminah* refers to a 'Secure Base'. JI as *Qoi'dah Aminah* is the geographical, demographical, political and military manifestation of this concept. What this means in practice is that JI has secured control over a certain territory, where both preachers and mujahideen (fighters) have been deployed; the population has accepted JI's teachings and methods and is ready to sacrifice; and the community or collectivity is

secure from the advances of the enemy because it has developed certain defence mechanisms, in both political and military terms.[46]

As defined by JI's guidebook, the central leadership of the territory in question is under the control of the Islamic movement and there are enough resources and capabilities to neutralize 'the pressures of the enemy's politics'.[47] In terms of geography, the location of such territory is advantageous for both defensive and offensive actions. On the demographic front, the 'secure base' represents a community which is intrinsically averse to being subjugated and placed under the control of the central authorities. In the realm of politics, such an area renders itself conveniently to outside recognition and can be legitimized through international cooperation and diplomatic efforts.[48]

All these requirements contribute to the gradual advancement of the movement through their long-term conditioning impact. In this sense, the 'secure base' is the territorial, political and military embodiment of Jemaah Islamiah as a counter-society. It stands for the tangible manifestations of JI having fulfilled its institutional purpose as a mobilizing agent for collective action. Concurrently, the group has also reached the phase when it can actively traverse the threshold into an effective counter-state movement. The time has finally come for it to adopt armed jihad as its main goal and strategic focus. JI as *Qoi'dah Aminah* – according to *PUPJI* – is hence the ideal platform from which *jihad musallah* (armed jihad) can be launched.[49]

Not surprisingly, the emphasis within this stage of JI's evolution is on military training and combat preparations. Since the group considers *jihad musallah* (armed jihad) to mean a showpiece of organizational and operational strength, it is imperative for it 'to develop military-type personnel, who possess combat energy, tactical thinking and/or strategic thinking, and/or leadership qualities'.[50] All other endeavours of the outfit – from funding and collaboration with other *jama'ah* to security and intelligence gathering – are expected to revolve around its military efforts.[51] During this phase, militancy and martyrdom are elevated to the status of central virtues in the group's ethos. The goal is to inculcate destructive jihad skills and self-sacrificial ideals in JI's members and to prepare them to fight to the death in the name of the group's religious vision and strategic mission.

As such, JI as a 'secure base' is the climax of Jemaah Islamiah as an organization. It embodies both the spiritual essence and the institutional effects of the Daulah Islamiah (Islamic state) and the Islamic Caliphate (global Islamic governance) to come. Rather than focus solely on self-development or self-improvement, the group will attempt to shift the prevailing balance of power. Such efforts will be carried out either against a particular nation-state (such as Indonesia) or the international system as a

whole. The logical steps on this path of JI's development are *I'dad* (preparation), *Ribath* (standby), and *Qital* (fight).[52]

The operational dimensions of JI according to *PUPJI*

Details concerning the administration of the group and its daily proceedings are contained in the sections of *PUPJI* that deal with the Methodology for Operations (*Manhaj Al-Amaliy*) and JI's Constitution (*Nidhomul Asasiy*). These are the two most extensive and elaborate segments of the entire manual. Their importance is also underscored by the fact that they deal in a comprehensive and in-depth fashion with the group's religious nature, strategic culture and operational routines.

Al-Manhaj Al-Amaliy stands for 'general operational guide'. It provides information on the group's functional dynamics and composite structural layers. According to the manual, JI's command apparatus is divided into an administrative branch and operational branch.[53] While the administrative subdivision is responsible for managing the organization as a whole, the operational subdivision exhibits much more specialized functions. It is the equivalent of a field apparatus placed directly in charge of JI's paramilitary activities. As *PUPJI* defines it, its areas of expertise include:

> a) To observe, analyze, and assess all aspects of the enemy and the environment; b) To carefully and objectively monitor all potential and real strengths that we possess; c) To determine targets on the enemy and the environment to serve our purposes; d) To devise a general and an operational plan.[54]

Even though the language of this section is deliberately vague and can be applied to a range of other activities as well, there is no doubt that JI's operational branch is the ultimate stakeholder with regard to JI's military evolution. For one, the elements of strength that the group considers necessary for its advancement as an effective organization are articulated using explicitly military terminology. They include qualitative developments, such as 'mobility, firepower, and endurance', as well as quantitative developments – both physical and non-physical – such as 'mobility, arms weaponry, physical endurance' and 'confidence, mental endurance, knowledge, management'.[55] Furthermore, the sequence of proceedings – for what the manual terms 'activities' and 'events' – follows the spectrum of 'planning, execution, report, and evaluation of team efforts'.[56] As such, they are very much in concurrence with standard military procedures and any army's concept of operations.

With regard to the stages of preparation for each operation and their classification according to *PUPJI*, these revolve around 'intelligence, strength development, use of strength, and combat operations'.[57] The intrinsic components that must be put into place before an actual attack is

launched are: (1) the command and control function; (2) the coordination/communication function; (3) the objective assessment of resources and capabilities; and (4) the selection of the most opportune time/moment for attack.[58] What this tells us about the operational cycle of Jemaah Islamiah is that it envisions itself as a continuum of preparatory 'activities', punctuated on both sides by paramilitary 'events'. In this way, each operation becomes a stepping stone for the next one. To achieve its full military potential, JI must amass resources, capabilities and expertise, and subsequently feed them back into the planning and execution cycles for each new 'event'. From this perspective, Jemaah Islamiah's operational routine also follows standard military rules and combat procedures.

Finally, with regard to the organizational aspects of each operation, *PUPJI* specifies three types of working relationships for JI's operational teams. These include 'one core of the network (centralization); many cores of the network (organized decentralization); and even more cores of the network (unorganized decentralization)'.[59] As basic and rudimentary as this delineation sounds, it is important to remember the heavy compartmentalization of team efforts during terrorist attacks conducted by JI, such as the first Bali bombing or the Marriott Hotel attack. Even though the launching team for each operation was initially insulated and tightly coordinated (centralization), there were at least two levels of peripheral accomplices, who either provided attack logistics – such as transportation and funding (organized decentralization) – or post-attack team support, mainly in the form of safe-houses and general protection from the authorities (unorganized decentralization).[60] In this regard, JI's operational guide exhibits clearly military overtones also at the level of planning and launching terrorist attacks.

In summary, despite the deliberate obfuscation throughout JI's guidebook on the issue of the group's military ambitions, it is obvious that the activities of JI's operational branch belong firmly in the military domain. This is the entity which is de facto in charge of determining, defining and laying the groundwork for JI's engagement in violence. Although the group's administrative apparatus still holds ultimate decision-making authority over its operational branch, the goal is to provide broad and general directions, rather than to stymie personal initiative.[61] JI's operational subdivision thus retains high levels of organizational autonomy and operational flexibility, as long as it manages to calibrate its activities to match the overall capabilities and resources of JI. In *PUPJI*, this is reflected in the emphasis on maintaining a 'close mutual and reciprocal relationship' between the two units.[62] Rather than being in competition with one another, they are expected to work in tandem and synchronize their activities.

What this indicates is that Jemaah Islamiah is a multilayered and multidimensional organization. Its functional differentiation into an administrative branch and an operational branch ensures that the burden of the task at hand is equally subdivided. Such partition is especially important when it comes to military strategy and tactics. In the sphere of combat preparations, the existence of an autonomous technical apparatus, placed directly in charge of the organization's military endeavours, is crucial for the overall transformation of JI into an effective fighting force. Since military operations are defined as 'all efforts, activities, and measures that use the elements of strength based on a guided plan and in relation to certain criteria of space and time', persistent and constructive efforts are needed to achieve them.[63] This can only be accomplished if JI's operational subdivision takes the time and effort to develop its military resources and manpower capabilities independently from the rest of JI.

According to *PUPJI*, there are three areas of capacity-building initiatives that deserve special attention. They include a Military Training and Development programme; a Personnel Development programme; and a Territorial Development programme.[64] The Military Training and Development programme is responsible for the process of selecting, recruiting, training and creating a 'competent, loyal, effective, and efficient personnel'.[65] What this means in practice – to use real-life examples – is that it is in charge of planning the curriculum and monitoring the activities of JI's training camps in the Philippines and Sulawesi.[66] It is essentially responsible for establishing and maintaining JI's training facilities, recruiting and training promising JI cadres, and transforming them into battle-hardened JI veterans.

The Personnel Development programme, on the other hand, tackles the issue of the ongoing preparation and cultivation of JI's members, especially once these recruits have graduated from the group's training facilities.[67] To achieve this purpose, the internal assessment of their capabilities and their suitable post-graduation placement within JI's ranks become paramount. Whether such recruits will remain as trainers in the group's camps or be directed to take over critical positions in JI's administration will be determined on the basis of their skills and demonstrated potential. One example of successful placement is Nasir Abbas, who was consecutively ordered to assume the responsibilities of a military instructor in Camp Hudaybiyah, a *Wakalah* leader in Sabah, Malaysia and, ultimately, the head of JI's Mantiqi III.[68]

Finally, the Territorial Development programme is responsible for preparing the terrain and laying the groundwork for the group's combat activities. Among its most important tasks are the inspection of border, field and soil conditions; the study of weather and road conditions; and the

critical assessment of the local population, its customs and habits, and material and human resources. In its entirety, this programme thus oversees the overall 'preparation of the (selected) area so as to support the show of force and combat operations'.[69] A real-life example of it is JI's *Uhud* project undertaken in 2000 and headed by Mustopa, the former head of JI's Mantiqi III. This intiative consisted of a territorial building programme in Poso, Sulawesi, where JI members were expected to be sent for training, residence and combat.[70]

The purpose of the three programmes, therefore, is to create the infrastructure, the personnel and the expertise necessary to transform JI into an effective fighting force. By building assets and developing capabilities in these areas, the group envisions itself as becoming a full-blown military outfit, capable of withstanding the enemy's advances and of launching its own offensive initiatives. To quote *PUPJI* again:

> The effort to develop strength is a long process that includes building potential until (the organization) reaches the stage where this potential has become real, effective, and ready to be used in a show of strength and combat operations.[71]

In summary, the Methodology for Operations (*Manhaj Al-Amaliy*) lays out the military procedures and combat rules for the group. It is an essential component of JI's operational evolution since it focuses on the real and effective cultivation of JI's military strength. As stipulated in the pamphlet, JI's operational branch is responsible for managing the group's military camps and training facilities, its field preparations and field testing efforts, its territorial development and personnel development programmes, and so on. Given JI's paramilitary aspirations and its subsequent involvement in terrorism, it is not far-fetched to presume that JI's operational branch is also the de facto entity in charge of the group's terrorist activities as well. Within *PUPJI*, this is reflected in the *Manhaj Al-Amaliy* incorporating provisions that allow JI's operational teams to work both in a centralized and a decentralized fashion, and its emphasis on operational cycles and combat routines that consist of long preparatory 'activities', punctuated by a few destructive 'events'.

By contrast, JI's Constitution (*Nidhomul Asasiy*) deals exclusively with administrative matters and organizational norms and procedures. Comprising 15 chapters and a total of 43 articles, *Nidhomul Asasiy* establishes the building blocks, the ground rules and the membership criteria for JI. It also maps out the hierarchical structures, command-and-control mechanisms and decision-making processes of the group. Its primary goal is to ensure the smooth functioning of the organization by stipulating the ways in which Jemaah Islamiah should be run.

The need to regulate the way in which JI is governed stems from the religious nature of the group. Since the key reason behind its members' coming together and forming a community of like-minded individuals is so that they can practice their religion collectively and through the institutional vehicle of a *jama'ah*,[72] it is imperative for the organization that ensues from these efforts to be managed in accordance with Islamic laws and principles. As *PUPJI* phrases it:

> The objective is to ensure that the administration of *Jama'ah Islamiah* is organized in order to establish the Caliphate in accordance with the way of the Prophet, which guarantees the implementation of the *Syariah* (Islamic law) in a comprehensive way.[73]

This is also reflected by the inclusion in *Nidhomul Asasiy* of a section with general explanations, incorporating quotes from the Quran and Sunna (Prophetic tradition).[74] The purpose of these additions is to contextualize the constitutional provisions featured in *PUPJI* and to interpret them from the perspective of the traditional sources of Islam. Only when JI's members are assured that the directives of their organization are in harmony with Islamic values and principles can they also be confident that they are truly following the path of God and their rightly guided predecessors, in preparation for the Islamic state and Islamic Caliphate of the future.

With regard to JI's administrative apparatus, the Constitution stipulates both a technical and a territorial component. The technical component is represented by the *Qiyadah* (Executive) Council the *Syuro* (Consultative) Council, the *Fatwa* (Religious) Council, and the *Hisbah* (Internal Discipline) Council.[75] As entities with specialized competencies, these councils are expected to preside over the policy planning and policy implementation functions of JI. In an equal and uniform manner, they will articulate, disseminate and implement the organization's directives throughout its ranks. From key organizational decisions and general issues of management to more specific matters of religion and disciplinary action, the purpose of the technical councils is to manage and align the organization horizontally.

The territorial component, on the other hand, is manifested in the heavily layered and highly hierarchical relationships enacted among the three area commands of JI. The latter comprise the *Qiyadah Markaziyah* (Central Executive) Council, the *Qiyadah Manthiqiyah* (Regional Executive) Council and the *Qiyadah Wakalah* (Local Representative) Council.[76] The driving principle behind them is to facilitate the structural alignment and vertical coordination of the organization, given JI's geographically rather spread-out administrative apparatus. By initiating and

monitoring the activities of the group at the local and regional levels, and by making sure that these are also in concurrence with the requirements of the Central Executive Council, the territorial councils thus ensure the smooth and synchronized functioning of JI as field units on the ground.

The conclusion to be drawn from the parallel existence of a technical and territorial component in JI's administrative apparatus is that Jemaah Islamiah as an organization possesses multiple loci of authority and hierarchies of command. Differences in functional roles and operational manifestations are calibrated through structural layerings in the existing configurations of power. As an outfit with versatile ambitions, capacities, strategies and trajectories, Jemaah Islamiah can only succeed by leveraging on its manifold and sometimes overlapping channels of communication, coordination, command and control. To this end, JI has created both an overarching superstructure, reflected in the horizontal activities of its four technical councils, and an underlying infrastructure, rendered in the vertical relationship among its three area commands. Any ensuing tensions are thus dissipated through the interconnected links and networked dynamics of an organization in intentional structural flux. Core and periphery relationships, top-down and bottom-up approaches, and horizontal and vertical alignments are all utilized to serve the group's multifaceted needs and purposes.

At the heart of this structural fluctuation is the religious, social and strategic stratification of the group into: (1) a *jama'ah* (a group of Muslims); (2) a *Tanzim* (organizational structure); and (3) an *Imarah* (Leadership).[77] Even though such differentiation may seem unsubstantial or inconsequential at first glance, the reality is that it captures effectively the institutional purposes and operational manifestations of JI. Differences in institutional needs and purposes are mediated through differences in structural and operational contexts, configurations and conduits.

For instance, Jemaah Islamiah as a *jama'ah* designates a collectivity which acts as a building matrix for an Islamic order. According to this interpretation, Muslim society is the product of Muslim individuals living under Muslim authority and struggling on behalf of Muslim ideas and interests.[78] The degree to which the group's followers accept Islam and live in accordance with Islamic principles is also the degree to which the *jama'ah* will be successful. Empowerment, in this institutional context, is measured by ideological purity and conformity of practice. Exclusivity of membership is also important so as not to create opportunities for dissent or distraction among the *jama'ah*.

At the same time, however, if JI is to grow and develop as an organization, it must acquire new members and new objectives. Such changes precipitate new structural requirements as well. In order to attract fresh

cadres or retain the cadres it has already assembled, Jemaah Islamiah must develop outreach programmes and membership control mechanisms. Within the Constitution, this role is fulfilled by the *Tanzim* (organizational structure). Its existence is justified by the need of the group to integrate all of its members into one hegemonic organization. Only by consolidating their resources and capabilities and by streamlining their efforts and initiatives will JI be able to ensure that its ultimate ends and objectives be achieved. The mechanical solidarity of voluntary association is thus replaced with the compulsory centralization of membership, structure and purpose. In this fashion, Jemaah Islamiah becomes truly an organization in the Weberian sense of the term. It is capable of exerting authority and imposing its legal order both on the inside and on the outside, retaining its cadres and attracting fresh recruits.

The more JI expands, though, the more difficult it becomes for the group to preserve its identity and purpose. Especially in the context of JI's organizational drive to acquire mass membership, the group will eventually find itself rather hard-pressed to sustain its elitist, conformist and purist status as a *jama'ah*. To mediate between these differences of institutional purpose, JI's Constitution insists on introducing the structural configuration of an *Imarah* (Leadership). Its role is to guide and shape the organization and its activities so that Jemaah Islamiah does not deviate from its original principles and essential objectives.

According to *PUPJI*, the *Imarah* can take various forms and institutional manifestations. It can be personified in the figure of the Emir (JI's Supreme Leader) and his supervisory role for the group.[79] It can also designate the knowledge and expertise of a few key individuals, selected to head the *Fatwa* (Religious) or *Hisbah* (Internal Discipline) Councils.[80] It can also connote the hierarchical ordering of structures and competencies, such as the *Qiyadah Markaziyah* (Central Executive) Council being in charge of appointing and supervising the members of the *Qiyadah Manthiqiyah* (Regional Executive) Council, which in turn is responsible for appointing and supervising the members of the *Qiyadah Wakalah* (Local Representative) Council, and so on.[81] Finally, the *Imarah* can also encompass the group's standardization of norms and procedures and of customs and practices – as manifested in the ritual of *mubayaah* (oath of allegiance),[82] the criteria for group membership and its subsequent obligations,[83] and the required quorum for majority voting during JI's internal meetings.[84] As such, the structural configuration of the *Imarah* completes the operational gaps and institutional voids left between Jemaah Islamiah functioning as a *jama'ah* and Jemaah Islamiah functioning as a *Tanzim*.

In *PUPJI*, JI's Constitution also specifies the operational role of each council and its overall position within the organization. For example, the

task of the *Qiyadah* (Executive) Council is to assist the Emir (JI's Supreme Leader) in conducting his administrative duties. Under its jurisdiction fall the issuing and implementation of directives pertaining to the group's general management.[85] The *Syuro* (Consultative) Council, on the other hand, conducts comprehensive evaluations and appraisals of the group's administrative procedures. On their basis, it proposes necessary amendments to the Constitution.[86] The *Fatwa* (Religious) Council consults the Emir on matters of religion and answers any queries he might have.[87] The *Hisbah* (Internal Discipline) Council monitors and regulates the actions and powers of the Emir and his assistants. Concurrently, it is also takes charge of bringing punitive actions against any potential JI trespassers, who have transgressed disciplinary procedures or neglected their chores.[88] As such, these councils oversee and embody the daily proceedings and processes that comprise JI as an organization.

In terms of the territorially spread-out apparatus of the group, the manual mentions that the *Qiyadah* (Executive) Council acts as an overarching framework uniting the *Qiyadah Markaziyah* (Central Executive) Council, the *Qiyadah Manthiqiyah* (Regional Executive) Council and the *Qiyadah Wakalah* (Local Representative) Council.[89] It does not possess any legislative or executive authority as such, but merely performs the function of an umbrella structure for the activities of the three area commands. In fact, it is they that wield true power and real authority, and, in particular, the *Qiyadah Markaziyah* (Central Executive) Council.[90]

This council is the effective go-between link of JI, binding its territorial infrastructure and technical superstructure into an organic whole. It thereby performs a dual role, being present within the composition and functioning of both administrative branches of JI. As such, it is the ultimate power broker for the organization, working in tandem with the Emir (Supreme Leader) in overseeing and managing the group. It is also the commanding element within the *Qiyadah* (Executive) Council, presiding over and controlling the activities of both the *Qiyadah Manthiqiyah* (Regional Executive) and the *Qiyadah Wakalah* (Local Representative) Councils.[91]

The system of internal checks and balances within JI is carried out on a number of different levels as well. Apart from the functioning of the *Hisbah* (Internal Discipline) Council and its role for maintaining internal control and harmony within the group, the Emir (Supreme Leader) and the *Qiyadah Markaziyah* (Central Executive) Council also act as decisive power brokers. In terms of directing and supervising the activities of the group as a whole, or when it comes to appointing, terminating, and rewarding deserving members, these are the two functional units that bear supreme authority over the group. It is with them that ultimate power rests and from them that it emanates towards the rest of the organization.[92]

To summarize, JI's Constitution in *PUPJI* covers the range of administrative, executive and legal procedures for the group. It provides both a broad, general overview and an in-depth, closer look at how the organization is structured, operated and managed. From stipulating the procedures for appointment, tenure and termination of JI leaders[93] and specifying the criteria, obligations and rights of JI members[94] to discussing the regularity, quorum specifications and majority rule during the group's internal meetings and identifying the sources, assets and allocations of the organization's finances and economy,[95] JI's Constitution thus paints a rich and complex picture of the day-to-day workings of the group. What started out as a collectivity of like-minded individuals became a community of like-practicing followers, and, ultimately, took the shape of a powerful centralized organization, in command of its membership, in control of its activities, and in charge of its destiny.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to take a closer look at JI's most authoritative text. Its driving motivation has been to illustrate the multiple ways in which the pamphlet has brought about and given flesh to the group. A key misconception that it has hoped to dismiss is that Jemaah Islamiah does not exhibit enough organizational functions or operational manifestations to be designated as a tangible organization.

By contrast, the chapter has argued that *PUPJI*-stipulated norms and procedures have been prominent at every level of the group's existence. From the organizational patterns of JI in its various phases of development to the operational dimensions and functional aspects of its administrative and operational branches, JI has behaved as an organization with a clear-cut strategy, compelling trajectory, and forceful command and control. It has carved out an institutional space for itself and has pursued with emphasis and dedication its chosen goals and objectives. Moreover, the group has also been flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances and to include provisions for internal control, inter-body consultation and deliberate decision-making.

To abandon completely the notion that JI does not constitute a tangible organization, it is important also to do away with one last misapprehension. Since *PUPJI* envisioned Jemaah Islamiah to emerge and develop as a counter-society before becoming a counter-state movement, and since JI never reached its full institutional embodiment as a 'secure base' from which it could launch a campaign of armed jihad, how do we explain the outfit's violent activities and involvement in terrorism during the period 1998–2005? A record of such destructive mayhem and bloodshed such as the one JI exhibits is definitely in need of a well-reasoned and well-substantiated explanation.

There are two possible justifications for JI's descent into terrorism before the arrival of the 'opportune' moment specified by its manual. One is of a historical nature, while the other bears more closely on the provisions featured in *PUPJI*. As Ken Conboy has skilfully explained in his book *The Second Front: Inside Asia's Most Dangerous Terrorist Network*, JI's agenda was effectively hijacked by a small contingent of cadres, led by Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali.[96] In the context of the 1998 Declaration of War issued by Bin Laden and his network al-Qaeda, and given the close relationship between the two militant outfits, Hambali decided to take matters into his own hands. With the help of a few like-minded followers, he planned and executed the very first JI attacks.[97] Among them ranked the Medan church bombings, the bombing of the Philippine Ambassador's residence in Jakarta, and the Christmas Eve bombings.

The campaign of the group reached a crescendo with the Bali attack in October 2002, the first terrorist operation in which JI suicide bombers were successfully used. The subsequent list of follow-up attacks – from the Marriott Hotel bombing and the Australian Embassy bombing to the latest triple-suicide assault in Bali in October 2005 – have all been perpetrated by the same roster of terrorist operatives, initially assembled, inspired and given the 'green light' by Hambali.[98] As a terrorist commando team, they were acting on the presumption of joining their local campaign of *jihad musallah* (armed jihad) to the campaign of global jihad against the United States and its Western allies, as initiated by the events of September 11.[99] In this sense, JI's descent into terrorism is both intrinsically and historically linked to the imperative for emergency violence around the world, declared by Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.

The second explanation belongs to the realm of *PUPJI* norms and procedures. Having read the manual, one comes out with a confused sense about the highly centralized nature of JI as an organization, as outlined in the guidebook, and JI's ad hoc violence, as witnessed by the group's historical trajectory in the period 1998–2005. Yet, this apparent contradiction and paradoxical behaviour have their origins in and can be glimpsed from *PUPJI* itself. For one, a clear distinction exists between the group's administrative apparatus and its operational branches according to the manual. Secondly, JI as an organization is a multilayered and multidimensional entity, with multiple chains of command and sources of power. As such, given the organizational autonomy and operational flexibility of JI's operational branch, it is not unthinkable that at some point of the group's existence this unit would have taken matters into its own hands and hijacked JI's trajectory anyway. The fact that it happened so late in the group's evolution – since JI was originally founded in 1993 – has more

to do with the role and authority of Abdullah Sungkar as Emir of JI, than anything else.

It is worthwhile to remember that when Jemaah Islamiah was first established, the group of followers surrounding Sungkar comprised mostly members and supporters of Darul Islam (DI).[100] This steadfast rebellion against the Indonesian state, at the time of its declared independence from Dutch colonial power, exerted immense influence and impact on the country's subsequent history. As argued by Van Dijk in his magna opus *Rebellion Under the banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, it provided a tangible taste and a real-life manifestation of the possibility of an Islamic state as an alternative to the Indonesian republic.[101] With this said, however, it should also be noted that not all DI members were driven by religious fervour or Islamist ideals. For many DI rank-and-file soldiers, the rebellion was also a manifestation of their deeply held social, political and economic grievances, especially in the realm of Java's expanding control over Indonesia's other provinces and the irregular proceedings surrounding the demobilization of the anti-Dutch revolutionary army after the war.[102]

Such differences in motivation and ideology became especially prominent following the sojourn of Southeast Asian volunteers in military training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan during the Soviet–Afghan war. From Abdullah Sungkar to Imam Samudra, various JI leaders and members have acknowledged the profound transformative impact this experience had on them. They returned to their homes as followers of Salafi jihadist religious principles and embraced a more puritanical and rigid interpretation of Islam. In this regard, their association with post-rebellion Darul Islam leaders and members – with their ad hoc mysticism and intra-organizational bickerings – became unsustainable. The rupture between Abdullah Sungkar and DI's leader Ajengan Masduki merely brought to the fore tensions that had been lurking under the surface for quite awhile. This rift also marked the official emergence of Jemaah Islamiah as a distinct organization from Darul Islam.[103]

Following these developments, JI's leaders needed a new organizational model, developmental trajectory and institutional template to embody and sustain the group's unique vision and mission. Therefore, they crafted JI's religious manifesto, strategic programme and operational manual, also known as *PUPJI*. To DI's extensive social network, *PUPJI* counterpoised exclusivity of membership and selective recruitment. To DI's multiplicity of cell rings and small networks, *PUPJI* responded with a centralized, yet flexible structural apparatus. To DI's elasticity in religious matters, *PUPJI* contrasted its emphasis on religious purity and ideological discipline. In fact, the very core notion of JI's guidebook – portraying Jemaah Islamiah

as a counter-society amassing resources, consolidating them over time, and transforming them into organizational and operational strengths before itself evolving into a counter-state movement – originated from the deeply felt desire of JI's leaders not to see their own rebellion and campaign of armed jihad peter out for lack of preparation, capabilities and assets.

In this context, *PUPJI* was instrumental in refashioning Jemaah Islamiah as an alternative community of believers. Apart from endowing it with a distinctive organizational framework and a new programme of action, the manual also provided the group with a new trajectory of development. It laid out the rules of engagement, determined the targeted outcomes, and mapped out concrete projects where JI members could invest their time and effort. As such, *PUPJI* became the normative template from which the institutional entity of Jemaah Islamiah emerged and evolved over time.

From the standpoint of *PUPJI*, the existence of a separate subdivision in charge of paramilitary activities within JI's organizational framework matched JI's role as a hybrid organization. It both captured and reflected the group's parallel emphasis on a gradual, bottom-up, evolutionary approach and a rapid, top-down, revolutionary change. It marked the organization as both an activist group and a terrorist entity, while also simultaneously it transformed *PUPJI* from a religious manifesto into a terrorist manual.

Although *PUPJI* created the context for JI's violent activities, it did not foresee the organization launching them prematurely. When viewed in hindsight from the perspective of JI's involvement in terrorism during the period of 1998–2005, it becomes clear that the administrative branch of the group became subservient to the operational branch. *PUPJI* did not provide for such a contingency. On the road from a counter-society to a counter-state movement – following *PUPJI*'s norms and principles – Jemaah Islamiah sidetracked and abandoned the manual. Al-Qaeda's influence and the September 11 attacks could have only reinforced such tendencies. Nasir Abbas was therefore quite correct in observing that 'JI didn't carry out the Bali bombing as an organization. But JI members (did).'[104] It was the one and only contingency – from within all its norms and principles – that *PUPJI* did not prepare for. The disruptive effects that this violence will have on the organization as a whole will only become evident in the years to come.

Notes

1. A copy of the original *PUPJI* document was obtained and translated by the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. The current author first reviewed and analysed the document while working

as Manager for Research at ICPVTR. The results of this study can be found in Rohan Gunaratna, Elena Pavlova, and Muhammad Hassan Haniff (2004), 'A preliminary analysis of the *General Guide for the Struggle of Jemaah Islamiah*', ICPVTR, IDSS, February.

2. Even though most reports associate the August 2000 car bombing of the Philippine embassy in Jakarta or the December 2000 Christmas Eve bombings of various churches in Indonesia as Jemaah Islamiah's first forays into terrorism, Ken Conboy has convincingly proven that the May 2000 Medan church bombings – one successful and the other one foiled – are more deserving of this title. See, Conboy, Ken (2004), *The Second Front: Inside Asia's Most Dangerous Terrorist Network*, Equinox Jakarta, pp. 109–11.
3. There has been an ongoing debate in Indonesia as to whether Jemaah Islamiah exists as a tangible organization or not. For many, it is an abstract concept due to the ambiguous name it has chosen for itself. In Arabic, the term 'Jemaah Islamiah' stands for 'a society of Muslims' in a narrow sense and 'a worldwide community of Muslims' in a broader sense. Indonesian political figures and security experts, community leaders and ordinary citizens have all voiced concerns that proscribing JI as an organization would nominally ban the entire Islamic community in the country. The Indonesian government, therefore, has had to treat this issue with extreme caution. On the one hand, they have clamped down heavily on JI members and supporters, while on the other hand, they have refused to proscribe Jemaah Islamiah as an organization on the pretext that it does not have a known headquarters or distribute name cards to members. See, 'No indications as yet that Indonesia will ban Jemaah Islamiah', Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), 20 September 2004; 'Megawati's tightrope', *Business Week Online*, 10 March 2003; and, 'President mulls banning Jemaah Islamiah', Laksamana, 26 October 2004.
4. Their decision followed in the footsteps of Bin Laden's 1996 Declaration of War against the Zionist–Crusader Enemy and his 1998 fatwa calling for the killing of American and Western civilians. See Conboy (2004), pp. 136–8.
5. Noor Huda Ismail, 'Understanding how jihadists in Indonesia rejuvenate themselves', alumni.state.gov/bin/alumni/Brussel%20talk.pdf.
6. 'Achmad Roihan (2003), 'This is not the decision of the organization', *Tempo*, **6** (4), 14–20 October. Similarly, Ali Imron, one of the key perpetrators of the 2002 Bali attacks, has also stated before prosecutors that: 'As to whether it was a mission of the JI, I do not know. According to me it was not a mission of the JI because the majority of the JI do not like violence . . . According to me, it could only be the work of Hambali and Mukhlas', 'Bali attack "Planned for 11 September" ', BBC, 21 August 2003.
7. Interview with Sheikh Abdullah Sungkar (1997), 'Suharto's Detect, Defect, and Destroy policy towards the Islamic Movement', *Nida'ul Al-Islam* (author's collection).
8. Zachary Abuza, 'Abu Dujana: Jemaah Islamiah's new Al-Qaeda linked leader', Jamestown Foundation, *Terrorism Focus*, **3** (13), 4 April 2006.
9. 'Confessions of an Al-Qaeda terrorist', *Time Magazine*, 15 September 2002.
10. 'Members of Indonesian President's party on JI hit List', Associated France Press, 22 July 2003; 'Soft targets for JI?', *Tempo*, 46 (3), 22–28 July 2003.
11. For example, Ali Imron, one of the key participants in the 2002 Bali bombings, expressed severe remorse at his actions, stating before prosecutors that 'this incident has destroyed me' and that it 'smeared' Islam. See, 'Bali Attack' "Planned for 11 September," ' BBC, 21 August 2003. For remorse on the part of the Marriott hotel bombing perpetrators, see 'Marriott suspects regret bombing', CNN, 3 November 2003.
12. The two most prominent examples are Achmad Roihan and Nasir Abbas, the former leader of Mantiqi III, who following his detention and subsequent release has been cooperating actively with the Indonesian authorities and throwing light on the workings of JI.
13. 'Indonesia's Abu Bakar Bashir says extremists misguided fighters', MediaCorps News, 15 June 2006.
14. Abbas, Nasir (2005), *Membongar Jamaah Islamiah*, Jakarta: Garfindo, chapter on PUPJI.
15. 'The Emir: an interview with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir', Jamestown Foundation, *Terrorism Focus*, **3** (9), 15 September 2005, footnote 6.

16. For example, right after the explanations that accompany the 43 articles of JI's Constitution, the *PUPJI* text concludes with brief closing remarks, extolling the virtues of the pamphlet and expressing hopes for the successful achievement of JI's aims and objectives. Immediately after that, a considerable portion of material is inserted, starting out with the establishment of *al-Qiy'adah ar-Rosyidah* and continuing for another 28 pages. This segment was neither mentioned nor suggested by the schematic outline of *PUPJI*'s content at the beginning of the pamphlet. *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah (PUPJI): The General Guide of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiah*, (ICPVTR translation), pp. 25–53.
17. 'Jamaah Islamiah and the soya milk factory', *Tempo*, **15** (3), 17–23 December 2002. and 'The bombings in Bali, Makassar and Marriott are linked', *Tempo*, **6** (4), 14–20 October 2003.
18. 'Police enlist Muslim scholars to study JI documents', *Jakarta Post*, 19 September 2003.
19. Abbas, Nasir (2005).
20. 'Bombs in a shoe shop', *Tempo*, **6** (4), 14–20 October 2003.
21. 'God's enemy: Bashir', *Herald Sun* (Australia), 29 October 2004.
22. 'Secret guide details JI plan for conquest', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 1 September 2003.
23. 'Alleged terror group leader goes on trial in Indonesia', AFP, 29 October 2003.
24. For example, in an interview with *Tempo Magazine*, Ali Imron – a low-level JI operative who repented for his role in the 2002 Bali bombings on the grounds that the operation also killed Muslim civilians – claims that he has never seen the document, but has heard of its existence from his brother and higher up in the hierarchy JI cadre, Amrozi. 'Ali Imron: I never thought I'd be a star', *Tempo*, **24** (3) 18–24 February 2003.
25. 'Ba'asyir contacted by Bin Laden', CNN, 2 December 2004; 'The Emir: an interview with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir', *Spotlight on Terror (Jamestown Foundation)*, **3** (9), 15 September 2005, footnote 6.
26. *PUPJI* regulations on this issue are contained in Chapter V, Article 11 of JI's Constitution, *PUPJI* (ICPVTR translation) p. 14. For a good account of how these regulations worked out in practice, see Nasir Abbas's experience as described in his 2005 book, *Membongar Jamaah Islamiah*, pp. 87–137 and Ken Conboy's description of Hambali's rise to power, in Conboy, Ken (2004), pp. 46–9, 53–6, 59–63, 156–7.
27. Chapter V, Article II of JI's Constitution, *PUPJI* (ICPVTR translation), p. 14.
28. *PUPJI* regulations on this issue are contained in Chapter X of JI's Constitution, *PUPJI* (ICPVTR translation), p. 18. For a good account of the oath-taking ceremony, see Abbas, Nasir (2005), and 'Underground video', *Tempo*, **12** (4), 22–28 November 2005.
29. *PUPJI* regulations on this issue are contained in Chapter IX, Article 25–28, *PUPJI*, (ICPVTR translation), p. 17; For a good account of how these regulations worked out in practice at *Markaziyah* level, see 'Zulkarnaen: the commander from Sragen', *Tempo*, **5** (6), 4–10 October 2005; Abbas, Nasir (2005), and various ICG reports on JI.
30. Details on operational planning and attack execution are contained in the *Al Manhaj Al-Amaliy Li Iqomatid Dien* section, *PUPJI* (ICPVTR translation), pp. 6–9. See also, Conboy, Ken (2004), pp. 165–84, 229–35.
31. *PUPJI* (ICPVTR translation) Chapter II, Article 4, Clause 2 of JI's Constitution, p. 13.
32. *PUPJI*, pp. 3, 37–42.
33. *PUPJI*, pp. 3, 42–4, 52.
34. *PUPJI*, p. 9.
35. *Nida'ul Al-Islam*, Interview with Sheikh Abdullah Sungkar (1997).
36. *PUPJI* (ICPVTR translation), pp. 9–12.
37. *PUPJI*, p. 22.
38. *PUPJI*, Chapter II, Article 5 of the JI Constitution, p. 13.
39. *PUPJI*, pp. 25–7.
40. *PUPJI*, p. 28.
41 Paz, Reuven, 'Tangled web: international networking of the Islamist struggle' unpublished manuscript, Appendix 1. R. Paz translation of Arabic text originally published by Dr Abdullah Azzam (1988) in *Al-Jihad* magazine (Pakistan), **41**, April, p. 46.

42. Mitchell, Richard (1993), *The Society of Muslim Brothers*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 30–32.
43. *PUPJI*, pp. 148–50.
44. *PUPJI* (ICPVTR translation), p. 29.
45. *PUPJI*, p. 30.
46. *PUPJI*, p. 45.
47. *PUPJI*.
48. *PUPJI*.
49. *PUPJI*.
50. *PUPJI*, p. 46.
51. *PUPJI*, pp. 47–50.
52. Section on *Jihad Musallah* (armed jihad), *PUPJI*, p. 53. See also endnotes 7 and 21. It states: 'VI. Steps [for armed jihad]: *I'dad* (Preparation); *Ribath* (Standby); *Qital* (Fight)'.
53. *PUPJI*, p. 6.
54. *PUPJI*, p. 7.
55. *PUPJI*.
56. *PUPJI*, p. 8.
57. *PUPJI*, p. 9.
58. *PUPJI*, p. 8.
59. *PUPJI*, p. 9.
60. Conboy, Ken (2004), pp. 165–84, 229–35.
61. (ICPVTR translation) *PUPJI*, p. 9.
62. *PUPJI*, p. 6.
63. *PUPJI*, p. 7.
64. *PUPJI*, pp. 9–12.
65. *PUPJI*, p. 10.
66. Conboy, Ken (2004), Chapter 6, pp. 66–70; 'An underground video', *Tempo*, **12** (6), 22–28 November 2005; 'The Emir: an interview with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir', *Spotlight on Terror* (*Jamestown Foundation*), **3** (9), 15 September 2005, footnote 7.
67. *PUPJI* (ICPVTR translation), p. 11.
68. Abbas, Nasir (2005), pp. 87–137 and 'The General of suicide bombers', *Tempo*, **(6)** 4, 14–20. October 2003.
69. *PUPJI* (ICPVTR translation), p. 11.
70. Abbas, Nasir (2005), pp. 90–95.
71. *PUPJI* (ICPVTR translation), *PUPJI*, p. 9.
72. *PUPJI*, p. 22.
73. *PUPJI*, p. 12.
74. *PUPJI*, pp. 22–4.
75. *PUPJI*, p. 13.
76. *PUPJI*.
77. *PUPJI*, pp. 12–14.
78. See Chapter II, Article 4 and 5 in *PUPJI*, p. 13.
79. *PUPJI*.
80. *PUPJI*, p. 16.
81. *PUPJI*, p. 14.
82. *PUPJI*, p. 13.
83. *PUPJI*, pp. 18–19.
84. *PUPJI*, pp. 17–18.
85. *PUPJI*, p. 14.
86. *PUPJI*, p. 15.
87. *PUPJI*, p. 16.
88. *PUPJI*, pp. 16–17.
89. *PUPJI*, p. 13.
90. See Article XII, Clause 2, *PUPJI*, p. 14.
91. *PUPJI*, p. 14.
92. *PUPJI*, pp. 13–14.

93. *PUPJI*, pp. 13–17.
94. *PUPJI*, pp. 18–19.
95. *PUPJI*, pp. 19–20.
96. Conboy, Ken (2004), Chapters 9 and 10, pp. 108–33.
97. The first attack was the Medan church bombings of 28 May 2000. See Conboy, Ken (2004), p. 110.
98. Conboy, Ken (2004), Chapters 10 and 11, pp. 120–46.
99. See Imam Samudra's justification for the Bali bombing of 2002, posted originally on www.istimata.com (now defunct).
100. 'Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: the case of the Ngruki Network in Indonesia' (corrected on 10 January 2003), *ICG Report*, 8 August 2002, p. 3.
101. Van Dijk, Cees (1981), *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, Leiden University: PhD thesis, Chapter 1 and conclusion.
102. *PUPJI*, Chapter 2.
103. 'Jemaah Islamiah in South East Asia: damaged but still dangerous', Asia Report No. 63, International Crisis Group, Jakarta, 26 August 2003, p. 38.
104. 'Heaven's just a step away', *Tempo*, **6** (4), 14–20 October 2003.

6 Suicide terrorism and Southeast Asia

Adam Dolnik

On 12 October 2002, a man detonated his suicide belt in the Patty's bar in Kuta on the Indonesian resort island of Bali. As people fled out into the street in panic, another suicide bomber detonated a van loaded with nearly 1000 kg of explosives in the middle of the quickly forming crowd. The explosion and subsequent fire killed an overall number of 202 people, marking the ninth-deadliest attack in the history of terrorism. Perhaps even more significantly, the attack marked the arrival of modern suicide terrorism into Southeast Asia. This development is not surprising. In recent years, suicide bombings have become the most influential and fastest-spreading terrorist tactic in the world. Since the commencement of the modern practice of suicide terrorism in 1981, there have been over 600 suicide bombings carried out by at least 30 organizations in 29 different countries, a list that is likely to continue growing. This is especially alarming given the fact that acts of suicide terrorism are extremely lethal: of the 50 deadliest terrorist attacks in the last 15 years, at least 72 per cent have involved suicide delivery. This chapter will discuss the nature and importance of suicide terrorism, with a specific focus on Southeast Asia.

Overview

For the purposes of this chapter, a suicide terror attack is defined as: A premeditated act of ideologically or religiously motivated violence, in which the success of the operation is contingent on self-inflicted death by the perpetrator(s) during the attack. Perhaps the first recorded attack that fits this definition is the biblical story of Samson, who tore down the pillars of the Temple of Dagon, killing himself along with several thousand Philistines. The first modern suicide bombing by a terror group then occurred in 1981 when a suicide bomber from the Iraqi Shia organization called al-Dawa drove a truck laden with explosives into the Iraqi embassy in Beirut, killing 61 people and injuring more than 100 others. Over the next ten years, suicide bombings gained notoriety, mainly through high-profile operations of the Lebanese Hezbollah – such as the 1983 synchronized bombings of the US Marine camp and the French troops' barracks in Beirut, or the two attacks against the American embassy in the same city. The striking effectiveness of the tactic then resulted in its spread across Lebanon, becoming employed by a number of secular pro-Syrian parties, including

the Syrian National Party, the Lebanese Communist Party and the Socialist-Nasserist Party.[1] Further, Hezbollah also helped to introduce suicide bombings in Israel, when in 1992 it provided training for exiled Hamas militants who later initiated one of the most prolific suicide bombing campaigns to date. Similarly, al-Qaeda – which was encouraged to adopt suicide tactics as one of its principal trademarks by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Lebanese Hezbollah – later became instrumental in transferring this capability to groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Indonesia, Morocco, Tunisia, Chechnya and Iraq. Of all the groups that have used suicide bombings, however, the often overlooked Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) should be recognized as the true master of the tactic. Not only has LTTE carried out more suicide bombings than any other organization in the world, but the group has also pioneered many new ideas, such as sea-based and air-based suicide attacks, as well as the concept of a suicide truck convoy. Further, LTTE has demonstrated an unparalleled level of organizational sophistication and patience, as exemplified by the assassination of President Premadasa, whose assassin first infiltrated the president's household and became acquainted with the valet before carrying out the act. Similarly, the terrorist who used a bomb placed on a coconut cart to blow up Sri Lanka's Independence Memorial Hall building in 1995 had been selling coconuts in Colombo for three years prior to the attack.[2] With the peace negotiations currently under way in Sri Lanka, the epicentre of suicide bombing campaigns (with respect to the frequency of attacks) remains with groups in Iraq and Israel, while al-Qaeda-affiliated groups and the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Subversion Battalion of Chechen Martyrs have become the most proficient at the qualitative level.

Why terrorist groups use suicide bombings

In order to understand why suicide terrorism has become such a popular option for terrorist groups around the world, it is helpful to analyse the advantages of such operations from the terrorist perspective.

Despite the heightened focus on suicide terrorism since the early 1980s, ideologically and religiously motivated suicide is a much older phenomenon. Throughout history, acts of self-killing have been used as a methodical demonstration of commitment (samurai *seppuku*), as an effective military tactic (*kamikaze*), as a tool for preventing the possibility of interrogation of spies and assassins (self-poisoning), and as a persuasive form of protest (self-starvation, self-ignition). What is crucial to realize is that the power of the modern act of suicide bombing stems from the fact that it combines all of the above-stated political purposes of suicide into a single act.[3] The first obvious benefit of a suicide operation is its tactical

advantage over other forms of attack. A suicide bomber has the ability to deliver the payload to places that would be difficult to attack successfully by someone hoping to stay alive. The fact that the bomber also has the capability of selecting the location, time and exact circumstances of the attack results in the remarkable effectiveness of suicide attacks, in terms of delivering a high number of casualties. Suicide attacks are also attractive for terrorist organizations because they eliminate the need to plan an escape route, and they practically remove the danger of capture and subsequent interrogation of the terrorist.

In some cases, this tactic was also used partly because of its cost-effectiveness. According to a recent invoice from al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades found by Israeli troops at the Palestinian Authority's headquarters during Operation Defensive Shield, the electrical components and chemical supplies needed to produce a suicide bomb were estimated at about $150.[4] Similarly, the triple suicide bombing in Bali in 2005 reportedly cost only $700.[5] The relatively low expenditures involved in the acquisition of explosives make the costs-per-casualty ratio of a suicide operation a rather favourable one. In addition, suicide bombings are extremely difficult to defend against, and elimination of their indiscriminate use is virtually unattainable without extensive suspensions of civil rights, which in turn can have far-reaching secondary effects on the target population. Finally, the universality of the suicide bomber's possible target causes a widespread feeling of uncertainty and vulnerability among the general public. And even if the local population does eventually become desensitized to the idea of being a target, a well-organized terror campaign can still significantly damage a country's attractiveness for international tourism, resulting in economic harm to the local population.

The seeming irrationality and high casualty rate of suicide bombings are also factors responsible for the extensive media coverage these operations attract. The incomprehensible nature of the attack can also have a legitimizing effect on the cause of the terrorists in the eyes of the international community – the organization gains the status of a resolute actor whose grievances cannot be ignored. As people around the world try fruitlessly to comprehend the motivations of such an act, they are left wondering about the systemic foundations of the enormous dedication and hatred demonstrated by the bomber. The group can then gain the image of committed believers who will do anything to reach their goals, also implying that the present environment is so humiliating that death is preferable to life under such conditions. This is especially the case in cases where female suicide bombers are used.

Suicide operations also convey an important message to an organization's members and supporters. Organizations such as the Kurdistan

Workers Party (PKK) or the LTTE, for example, have initially adopted this tactic with the principal goal of solidifying group morale. An act of self-sacrifice in the name of the organization's cause is a uniting factor. Overt praise of the martyr's accomplishment by prominent members of the group can also increase the self-sense of group prestige and can inspire future volunteers. The willingness to die for a cause is sometimes also used as evidence of superiority of the groups' members over their adversaries, who are portrayed as pleasure-seekers and who – in spite of their military dominance – are essentially weak. The resulting perception among the group is that due to superior determination, their final victory is inevitable.[6]

The tactic of suicide bombings can, of course, have negative effects on the goals of an organization as well. The lack of understanding of 'martyrdom operations' in the Western culture can cause the group to be viewed as irrational fanatics, drawing public opinion closer to the adversary. Further, a prolonged suicide terror campaign against civilians is likely to make the target population more radicalized and less willing to compromise. On the other hand, an emotional military overreaction by the attacked government can suit the terrorists' purposes by providing support for their claims of victimization and injustice. It does not matter who started the circle of violence; as long as innocents suffer from the government's counter-terrorism efforts (and they always do), the terrorists have a hope of attracting popular support against their adversary.[7] Finally, establishing a cultural norm in which suicide bombers become idols to be followed may have serious consequences on the psychological health of the society for generations to come. Nevertheless, the organizations that use suicide operations today have come to the decision that the benefits of these operations outweigh the costs.

As demonstrated by this overview, any group that can create a culture of martyrdom within its ranks gains a powerful terror potential. In fact, the advantages of the suicide bombing tactic are so great that a number of groups have attempted to reap its specific benefits without necessarily resorting to the act per se. For instance, the IRA (Irish Republican Army) has on several occasions extorted individuals to drive trucks packed with explosives via a certain route, later remotely detonating the explosive while the vehicle was passing near the target location. Comparably, terrorists in Chile have trained dogs to carry bombs to targets, while the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucianarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia has used horses and donkeys for the same purpose.[8] The FARC have even gone as far as constructing a remote control system for delivering moving truck bombs without the need to sacrifice living drivers. Similarly, terrorists in Kashmir have experimented with remote-controlled model planes and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to deliver explosives from the air. Besides

the tactical benefits, some groups in Latin America have attempted to reap many of the political benefits of suicide bombings – in terms of evoking images of desperation and ultimate sacrifice – by including terms such as 'suicide command' or 'suicide squad' into their names.

Suicide terrorism in Southeast Asia

Despite the common branding of the 2002 Bali bombing as the first act of suicide terrorism in Southeast Asia, it is important to note that the tradition of self-sacrificial military operations in the region is far from new. According to historian Stephen Frederic Dale, Muslim warriors in northern Sumatra, Mindanao and Sulu carried out suicide attacks against colonizing forces over the span of several centuries.[9] These, of course, did not take the form of suicide bombings, but rather *fidayeen* attacks with edged weapons in which a single fighter would run up to the enemy forces trying to kill as many of them as possible before himself being killed. The first actual suicide bombing in the region then occurred in 1951, when a young communist suicide volunteer assassinated French Brigadier General Charles Marie Chanson in Sadec, Indochina, by detonating a grenade in his pocket. Similar operations also took place on the battlefield during the Vietnam War.

As in many other contexts around the word, the modern practice of suicide bombing as we know it today had reached Southeast Asia as a direct consequence of al-Qaeda's attempts to infiltrate the local struggles in the region. Al-Qaeda has always placed a tremendous expressive emphasis on martyrdom as the principal jihadi vanguard and as the best way to achieve a victory of Islam, as documented by the prominence of martyrdom in seminal al-Qaeda texts such as the 'Declaration of Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders' and Ayman al-Zawahiri's, 'Knights under the Prophet's Banner'. As a result, since 1998 every single attack launched directly by al-Qaeda (AQ) has involved suicide delivery. Further, the group made a concentrated effort to spread the tactic to its affiliates, and groups such as the Algerian GIA, the Moroccan Assirat al-Mustaqim, the Tunisian Combatant Group, the Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamia (JI) or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, have all incorporated this tactic following their ideological cooption into the AQ network. In Southeast Asia al-Qaeda originally applied this strategy in its principal regional stronghold and as far back as 1997 two suspected al-Qaeda trainers, Saudi al-Maki Ragab and Egyptian Muhammad Gharib Ibrahimi Sayed Ahmed, staged a suicide attack on an army camp in Cotabato City in the Philippines.[10] Interestingly, this attack remained isolated, and the expected surge of local suicide volunteers never followed. On another occasion, at the infamous January 2000 meeting in Kuala Lumpur, al-Qaeda operatives not only prepared for

the September 11 attacks, but also reviewed the failed USS *The Sullivans* operation in Yemen and planned the attack on the USS *Cole*. At the time, the main planner Khallad bin Attash suggested launching a similar attack using suicide terrorists to crash a small boat into US naval vessels at Port Klang, Malaysia. In addition, according to the interrogation of Omar al-Farouq, a senior al-Qaeda operative, a Somali member active in Indonesia was plotting to attack US naval vessels in the crowded Indonesian port of Surabaya, but was allegedly unable to recruit the necessary suicide volunteers.[11] The idea of suicide boats attacking ships at port was revived on two more occasions, but never materialized.

Following the successful execution of the 9/11 attacks, top al-Qaeda operatives again turned their focus toward Southeast Asia, the region they now called the 'second front' of the struggle. To commemorate the first anniversary of 9/11, al-Qaeda planned to blow up Western embassies and banks in the region. The plan was to use local allied groups to select the targets, conduct reconnaissance, prepare the staging ground, and then hand the attack over to experienced al-Qaeda operatives and imported Arab suicide bombers. The original attack was first planned to take place in the Philippines, but following the discovery that the preferred targets were too difficult to attack, the plot was moved to Singapore instead. However, the Internal Security Department of the city state arrested the plotters before they could launch their operation. The dismantling of the Singapore JI cell along with the arrests of key al-Qaeda operatives in the region such as Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi and Omar al-Farouq, was a considerable setback to al-Qaeda and its sympathetic wing within the JI. Eager to finally succeed in a major attack in Southeast Asia, al-Qaeda made the decision to deviate from its preferred modus operandi in two important aspects. First, the idea of importing suicide bombers from abroad was abandoned, and from this moment on suicide bombings in the region would be carried out by locals. Further, after realizing the tactical advantages of using non-Arab suicide attackers, who would not be subject to as much scrutiny at American airports as Arabs, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the operational mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, even planned to use Southeast Asians for his plot to hijack an airplane and fly it into the Library Tower in Los Angeles.[12] Another similar plot was then devised around the same time by the remnants of the Singapore cell of JI, whose leader Mas Salamat Kastari plotted both to bomb Singapore's Changi Airport and to hijack an Aeroflot jetliner from Bangkok's Don Muang Airport and crash it into Singapore, in a show of Islamic solidarity with the Chechens. The plot never materialized. The second important aspect in which al-Qaeda changed its operational protocol in the region was to modify its targeting preferences. In order to deliver a strike that would finally succeed, a decision was taken by Hambali, a key

JI leader and the highest-ranking Asian member of al-Qaeda, to switch from attacking hard targets such as embassies and military installations to soft targets such as hotels, bars and clubs frequented by Western tourists. Otherwise the al-Qaeda modus operandi remained constant: multiple synchronized suicide bombings designed to maximize civilian casualties.

Bali would be the first success. On 12 October 2002, a man detonated a suicide belt in the Patty's bar in Kuta. As people fled out onto the street in panic, another suicide bomber detonated a van loaded with nearly 1000 kg of explosives in the middle of the quickly forming crowd. According to one of the terrorists, the bomb weighed 1000 kilograms as a symbolic payback for the 1-ton bombs America dropped on Muslims in the Middle East.[13] The bomb, although only 30 per cent efficient, produced a large enough explosion and subsequent fire to kill an overall 202 people, marking the deadliest attack since 9/11 and the ninth-deadliest attack in the history of terrorism. According to interrogation reports, the Bali terrorists originally planned for an even greater carnage, by incorporating a third suicide bomber who was supposed to ride a motorcycle through the doors of the packed Sari Club and detonate himself. The plan was abandoned only after it was discovered the man chosen for the suicide task could not ride a motorcycle.[14] One of the suicide bombers, Arnasan alias Jimmy alias Acong alias Iqbal 1, left behind a suicide note, in which he stated: 'Dear brothers, don't be distracted by the activities of the others and continue to strengthen the brotherhood of martyrs. We must stand shoulder to shoulder in our struggle, God willing, my brothers, we will be ready as we were before.'[15] Iqbal's words should have been a warning sign of things to come.

Only nine months after the Bali attack, suicide terror would reach the Indonesian capital. On 5 August 2003 a car bomb exploded outside the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, killing 12 people and wounding 150 others. The link between the two attacks was immediately obvious. As in the Bali bombing, the perpetrators in Jakarta used the same kind of explosives, as well as mobile phones for the purposes of remote detonation. In addition, in both attacks the perpetrators tried to scrape off the identification numbers on the vehicles used so that they would not be easily traceable to the original owner.[16] The explosive device in Jakarta was smaller, consisting of six plastic boxes containing 'black powder' weighing 19 kilograms each,[17] but it was still clear the attack was aimed to create as many casualties as possible – in order to increase lethality, the terrorists attached dozens of bars of laundry soap to containers of inflammable liquid which were placed next to the bomb. The mixture of sodium and fatty acids in the soap helped create fireballs which engulfed some of the victims. According to investigators, the bomb was personally detonated via a mobile phone by Dr Azahari bin Husin, JI's top bomb-maker who escaped from the scene

on the back of a motorcycle. The explosion produced a 2-metre wide crater, penetrating through 32-centimetre thick concrete into the basement, and the suicide bomber's head was catapulted all the way to the hotel's fifth floor.[18] It was clear that suicide bombings had taken a hold in Indonesia.

Thirteen months later, on 9 September 2004, a nearly identical suicide truck bombing took place at the Australian embassy in Jakarta, killing ten people and injuring more than 180 others. The pattern was a familiar one: Azahari driving a suicide truck bomb to within several hundred metres from the target, then handing over the wheel to the suicide bomber while himself remotely detonating the device and escaping on the back of a motorcycle.[19] The attack was a clear demonstration that despite the apprehension of Hambali in February 2004, the pro-al-Qaeda wing in the JI was still a potent force. In addition, the timing of the attack was also striking; as in previous cases the attack took place during the three months between August and October, a time period that was already becoming known in Southeast Asia as 'JI bombing season'. This timing pattern was then again confirmed a year later, when terror returned to Bali. In the latest attack on 1 October 2005, three suicide bombers detonated their belts at the seaside area of Jimbaran Bay and the bar and shopping hub of Kuta, killing 23 people and wounding 102 more.

By this time it was clearly established that the principal organizers behind the attacks in Indonesia were two Malaysians, Dr Azahari and Noordin Mohammed Top, both members of Hambali's pro-Al-Qaeda faction within the JI. According to Nasir Abbas, who was a key JI operative until his arrest in 2003, members of this faction 'see themselves as fighting a new world battle . . . They say, we can attack civilians anywhere, just as Americans attack Muslim civilians all over the world'.[20] This is in sharp contrast to the JI core, whose actions and objectives are very much local in nature. The exact nature and strength of this pro-al-Qaeda faction is unclear. On the one hand, as far back as the JW Marriott bombing reports emerged that the suicide bomber may have been a member of a new 15-strong suicide strike brigade called Laskar Khos (Special Force), allegedly led by a man called Mustofa (also known as Pranata Yuda, Abu Tholut, Yono and Imron)[21] – the former head of the JI state-level area called Mantiqi Thalid (III).[22] Then following the latest Bali bombing another new group name surfaced, with the allegation that the suicide bombers came from a group called Thoifah Muqatilah (Combat Unit). And while according to Nasir Abbas the name 'Thoifah Muqatilah' had been around since the first Bali bombing,[23] some analysts believe that the group is in essence a continuation of the Laskar Khos, in the sense that Thoifah Muqatilah's role is to re-establish Laskar Khos after the latter had been crippled by a number of arrests.[24] Either way, this 'suicide battalion' does not appear to

be a permanent body of suicide fighters always prepared to strike, but rather a group of planners and indoctrinators that taps into the resources of other groups to recruit suicide bombers for specific operations.

When it comes to the actual suicide bombers, several patterns are apparent. Firstly, the bombers do not share a clear common sociological profile, as they come from various locations in Indonesia, and from various educational and economic backgrounds.[25] Contrary to popular myth, only one of them was a graduate of the infamous 'terrorist school', the *pondok pesantren* al-Mukmin in Ngruki.[26] Secondly, most of the bombers were not members of Jemaah Islamiah itself, but rather were recruited and indoctrinated specifically for suicide operations by father-like figures within the fringe JI around Noordin Mohammed Top and Azahari bin Husin. Thirdly, it has been common practice for suicide bombers to leave some traces of their intent. Iqbal and Heri Golun from the first Bali and Australian embassy attacks left behind written suicide notes, while Asmar Latin Sani, the JW Marriott bomber, left behind e-mails in which he expressed a desire 'to marry as soon as possible', or carry out a martyrdom operation.[27] Salik M. Firdaus, Misno and Aip Hidayat, [28] the second Bali suicide bombers, all left behind statements on video,[29] possibly signalling intent by the group to use these statements as a recruiting tool for future suicide bombers. Fourthly, all of these suicide notes and videos reveal that while the outlook of the organizers was international, the bombers themselves were inspired by local factors, such as a living legacy of rebellion in West Java or the grievances from recent communal conflicts such as in Ambon and Poso.[30]

Following the elimination of Dr Azahari in November 2005, the future of the Thoifah Muqatilah and its suicide operations in Indonesia is uncertain. On the one hand, the expertise of Azahari, who was commonly dubbed the 'Demolition Man' for his bomb-making skills, will undoubtedly be missed. On the other hand, it seems more than likely that given the codification of Azahari's knowledge in JI bomb-making manuals and the presence of Noordin Mohammed Top, another key operative who is still at large, JI's ability to launch further suicide operations had not yet been crippled. Another key question concerns the proliferation of the practice of suicide bombings into additional theatres in Southeast Asia, particularly Southern Thailand and the Philippines. In the Philippines, there have historically been a number of accusations against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) that the group was training suicide bombers in Mindanao.[31] These allegations seem to be supported by the confession of a key MILF bomb maker and trainer Saifullah (Muklis) Yunos, who told his interrogators of a plan to launch a bombing campaign in Manila that was to include a suicide attack on the presidential palace using a gasoline

tanker.[32] In the case of another group, the Abu Sayyaf, reports have emerged that 50 suicide bombers had been trained and deployed by the group in key areas of Mindanao as early as September 2002.[33] But overall, we have yet to see suicide attacks by either one of the groups.

In Southern Thailand the trajectory of terrorist tactics has been alarming, signalling that suicide attacks might become a part of the local groups' repertoire in the near future. For instance, while three years ago the typical modus operandi in Southern Thailand consisted of motorcycle drive-by shooting attacks and explosions of rudimentary 1–2-kilogram pipe bombs, since late 2005 there has been an alarming progression to Iraq-style tactics, such as 5–10-kilogram roadside bombs, beheadings, and even car bombs. Another disturbing trend has been the increasing sophistication and synchronization of the attacks, and the use of mobile phones for remote detonation. In fact the threat of remotely detonated bombs has been so great that it led the authorities to force Thailand's four mobile phone operators into registering the identity of people buying prepaid SIM cards, in order to deny their anonymous deployment as remote detonation mechanisms.

Triggers of adoption of suicide bombings

When considering the prospects of emergence of suicide terrorism in new Southeast Asian theatres such as Southern Thailand or the Philippines, it is particularly useful to look at the organizational motivations for the adoption of suicide bombings in general. And while the tactical, strategic and political advantages of suicide bombings have already been discussed, it is particularly useful to explore why suicide terrorism has occurred in some contexts and not in others.

All suicide bombings to date have been a group phenomenon, and there are no known incidents in which the operation has been initiated, organized and executed by an individual. Further, a suicide bombing campaign can become the instrument of choice in virtually any conflict, given that an organization in that context makes such a decision at the strategic level, along with providing a system of rewards or threats to motivate individual volunteers. In contexts where suicide bombings have not yet taken place, their absence can be more accurately explained by the lack of an organizational perception that such operations would be beneficial to the group's cause or image, rather than by the absence of motivation on behalf of potential individual volunteers. It is important to recognize that an organization's perception can change over time.

In the past, we have seen several factors playing a role in the initiation of suicide campaigns by new organizations. The first such factor has been the creation of a precedent, at both the individual and organizational levels. At the individual level, for instance, the LTTE's first suicide operation was

initiated in May 1987 by a man known as 'Captain Miller', who volunteered to drive an explosives-laden truck into an enemy military camp following unsuccessful attempts to use this technique with the driver jumping out at the last moment. Miller thus set an example of a martyr and a hero to be followed, creating a breeding ground for the world's most violent suicide bombing campaign in history. A similar assertion can be made in the case of Chechnya, where in June 2000, 22-year-old Khava Barayeva (accompanied by a driver) rammed a car bomb into a Russian military facility in the village of Alkhan-Yurt, killing two servicemen. In this instance as well, the precedent quickly set the stage for the upsurge of suicide operations by Chechen groups. And finally, the possibly accidental demise of Wafa Idris – who now bears the title of the first Palestinian female suicide bomber – triggered a wave of female suicide terrorism in the occupied territories, setting a precedent strong enough even to overcome past religious rulings.

When applied to Southeast Asia, there is one particularly worrying element in Southern Thailand that could potentially serve to set a precedent for suicide bombings, triggering a wave of future volunteers.[34] Given the fact that the groups in that region now possess the capability to detonate explosives remotely via mobile phone, an opportunity has been created to detonate unwilling couriers whose alleged role is only to transport the explosive, and then presenting and glorifying their 'sacrifice' as a suicide bombing. As we have seen in other regions of the world, the glorification of such an act then has the potential of serving as a potent recruitment tool for additional suicide bombers.

Aside from individual precedents set within terrorist groups themselves, precedents set by allied or rival organizations have also prompted the adoption of suicide tactics by other groups. At the level of cooperation, for instance, the December 1981 suicide bombing of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut by the Shia al-Dawa was followed by a wave of such attacks by other Shia groups in Lebanon under the Hezbollah umbrella. Similarly, the Hezbollah – along with Egyptian groups – contributed their know-how on suicide tactics to the al-Qaeda knowledge base, which in turn has been instrumental in the spread of the method to many other countries. And finally, the cult of the 'Black Widows' from Chechnya appears to be spilling into Uzbekistan, where in March 2004, two women detonated suicide belts in separate attacks. At the level of competition, the extreme effectiveness of the Hezbollah suicide campaign in Lebanon inspired a number of other organizations in that country to follow suit, even though most of them frequently suffered from a shortage of volunteers and their attempts had a high failure rate. A similar strategic shift toward the use of suicide bombings as a part of organizational competition can be demonstrated by the Palestinian groups, such as the Islamic Jihad (PIJ) – which competed with

the Hamas for the position of the leading Islamist group in the territories – and the secular Fatah-affiliated al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, whose adoption of suicide bombings in 2002 was driven by the need to counter the monopoly of both of these increasingly popular religious groups. This shift was further reflected by the adoption of suicide operations by other secular groups who in turn compete with Fatah, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

As demonstrated by these examples, the contagion of suicide terrorism is in many cases driven by individual precedent-setting sacrifice from within the group and the aid of allied organizations who embrace this tactic, as well as competition with other groups whose political or operational success can be attributed directly to the use of suicide terrorism. It is likely that these processes – as well as the tactical and strategic advantages described in the beginning of this chapter – will contribute to the further spread of suicide terrorism throughout the twenty-first century. In Southeast Asia, the influence of al-Qaeda on the adoption of suicide bombings in the region is clear. Whether or not groups in the Philippines or Southern Thailand will follow this route can very much be influenced by the setting of a precedent within the given groups themselves, or by the acquisition of know-how and an ideological justification from groups on the outside.

Emerging trends

Another exercise that can help us in understanding the future of suicide terrorism in Southeast Asia is to observe the tactical trends in the phenomenon at the global level. One of the most glaring trends in suicide terrorism has been the increasing involvement of female bombers. While the first wave of suicide attacks during the 1980s involved only five women, the LTTE and the PKK made the use of female bombers a norm during the 1990s, having incorporated them into 40 per cent and 65 per cent of their suicide operations, respectively. The beginning of the twenty-first century has been marked by the emergence of female suicide bombers in additional theatres, including Chechnya, Palestine, Uzbekistan, Jordan and Iraq. There are a number of reasons why female suicide bombers are an attractive proposition. First, there are the tactical advantages associated with the disruption of an established profile used by security and law enforcement agencies, as well as the possibility of concealing the explosive device in a fake belly (utilizing the women's ability to appear pregnant). Another advantage to a group's decision to use female operatives has been the strong message such a move sends to followers and supporters, triggering a guilt trip among men that they are not doing enough to fight the enemy, and strengthening the pressure to do more.

Female suicide terrorism also has several distinct motivational and operational characteristics. In essence, a woman's motivational route to resort to terrorism is a much longer one than for a man, of whom armed resistance is expected if not required. Women essentially become involved as a product of their own decision, often after experiencing a very direct victimization, as opposed to idealistically following abstract ideological or religious themes. This is one of the reasons why they are frequently looked down upon by the male members of the group – especially in Islamist organizations, where additional dilemmas associated with the fundamentalist interpretation of the Quran play a role, such as the restrictions preventing women from operating freely outside of their homes without being accompanied by a male relative. Further, there has been a considerable stigma regarding the reliability and determination of women because of their perceived softness due to motherly instincts. However, women terrorists in general actually tend to be more ruthless precisely because of these instincts – once they decide that their violent actions will benefit their children and future generations, they will not hesitate to do what they feel is necessary for the success of the operation. Further, as experience tells us from left-wing and ethno-nationalist organizations' involvement of female operatives, the desire to prove that they are just as worthy to the organization as men has worked to strengthen their sacrificial resolve even more.

In Southeast Asia, female suicide terrorism is so far an unknown phenomenon. However, this reality could change quickly, especially given the increasing links of the local groups with organizations affiliated with the cause in Chechnya, where female suicide attackers under the banner of Islam saw their global debut in 2000. Chechen operational expertise is renowned, and groups from Iraq to Saudi Arabia have in recent years been emulating Chechen tactics. Even in Indonesia, instructional VCDs (video compact discs) and documents on the Chechen techniques for using land mines as improvised explosive devices have been found, and it is also known that at least three JI leaders on the run in Indonesia as of late 2004 have gone to Chechnya for training. One of them has been implicated in the first Bali bombing.[35] Further, in September 2005 an Arabic propaganda film called the *Islands of the Kings* describing the suffering of Muslims in the hands of Christians in the Maluku islands appeared on the Chechen Kavkaz Center website under the heading 'Genocide in Indonesia'. This development marked the first time the infamous Shamil Basayev-affiliated website has featured propaganda footage on Muslim grievances originating outside of the Caucasus region, possibly signalling a greater globalization of Basayev's worldview and his deeper integration into the global jihadi agenda. Should Basayev's men take an interest in stopping the 'Genocide in Indonesia', this would likely result in a significant capability boost for

groups in Southeast Asia, and the adoption of female suicide fighters would be one of the likely outcomes. This is especially true given Basayev's recent demise, which is likely to weaken significantly the more radical wing of the Chechen insurgency, in terms of both its influence as well as its ability to attract foreign volunteers. Southeast Asia may then provide one of the attractive alternative theatres for foreign jihadists.

Another trend possibly emerging in the future could be the incorporation of Muslim converts, particularly from Europe, as suicide bombers. One example of this phenomenon is Muriel Degauque, the Belgian woman who converted to Islam after marriage and who blew herself up in Iraq on 9 November 2005. While it is too early to tell whether this is an isolated case or an emerging trend, it is clear that Southeast Asian conflicts can hardly rival the battlefield of Iraq as a cause 'worthy enough' for European converts to join. On the other hand, there is the Balik Islam (Return to Islam) phenomenon in the Philippines, where the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM), comprising almost exclusively of Christian converts to Islam, has emerged as one of the most dangerous terrorist groups. It is thus not inconceivable to imagine converts to Islam becoming suicide bombers in Southeast Asia.

Tactical trends

From a tactical perspective, suicide bombings have recently witnessed a number of important trends. First has been the increasing internationalization of the phenomenon, not just in the sense that the tactic has spread to new countries, but also in the sense that terrorist organizations have demonstrated an increasing ability to mount suicide operations outside of their common area of operation. Examples include the operations by Hezbollah in Argentina and Panama; the LTTE in India; the Egyptian groups in Pakistan and Croatia; the Chechen groups in the Russian capital; and al-Qaeda in a variety of countries on four continents.

The second disturbing trend has been the increasing synchronization of suicide bombings, with the clear intention of causing as many casualties as possible. In some instances, suicide bombings have involved secondary and even tertiary devices, the detonation of which incorporated a calculated delay in order to target first-responders and crowds of onlookers. Another recent innovation has been the addition of chemical materials into the explosive devices seen in Israel, where traces of pesticide and even cyanide have been detected on the remains of at least six bombs used in Hamas suicide attacks. In addition, attacks against hard targets such as embassies have recently seen the introduction of suicide truck convoys, which include suicide shooters or bombers whose role is to clear the way for the suicide truck in order to facilitate the explosion of the primary device as close to the target as possible. As a part of this tactic, terrorists

have also recently begun using additional bombers in the suicide truck in order to insure that the explosive is detonated, even in the event of the driver being killed by the security guards during the assault. Similarly, the detonation of bombs carried by suicide bombers on foot has increasingly been insured by the inclusion of a remote detonation mechanism, typically two mobile phones. Overall, worldwide suicide bombings have shown an increasing level of organization, planning, patience, synchronized execution and lethality.

JI's suicide bombings are in line with many of these trends. For instance, the idea of insuring detonation of the suicide bomb by the incorporation of a mobile phone has been common, as has been the idea of using secondary explosive devices to maximize casualties. The suicide truck convoy has yet to be used in Southeast Asia, but if the preference for attacking high-profile hard targets remains present, we could very quickly see the adoption of this tactic as well.

Future outlook

Suicide bombings represent the ultimate terrorist tactic. Besides their tactical advantages, they also have the capability of satisfying many terrorist objectives in a single attack: demonstration of dedication and capability, attracting attention and media coverage, producing a high number of casualties, and instigating general feelings of vulnerability. Finding recruits for suicide missions is never difficult once a precedent has been established. Suicide attacks can be justified on any religious or ideological grounds in the appropriate historical and cultural context. It is therefore very likely that the use of this tactic will become increasingly frequent in areas where it has already been established, and will be introduced to many other struggles around the world.

At the tactical level, several important scenarios for suicide operations are of particular concern. The first such scenario involves air-based suicide operations involving the flying of aircraft into buildings in order to cause destruction. This tactic, of course, achieved notoriety only after 9/11, but it must be emphasized that while the execution and planning in this case was superb, the idea itself is far from new. Between 1976 and 2001, the plan of flying aeroplanes into buildings had been cited on at least 22 occasions, with two successful incidents actually having materialized.

The first of these was a 1976 incident in which a Japanese porn actor crashed his Piper Cherokee into the home of Yoshio Kodama, a rightist leader accused of accepting pay-offs from the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. The pilot wore a kamikaze pilot's headband and shouted the ritual cry over the radio just prior to crashing into his target. The second instance occurred in the US in 1994, when a heavily intoxicated and

drugged suicidal individual crashed a stolen single-engine Cessna 150 onto the South Lawn at the rear of the West Wing of the White House.

A less frequent means of airborne suicide operations has included suicide bombers on board civilian aircraft. For example, in 1986 four members of the Abu Nidal terrorist group hijacked Pan Am flight 73 en route from Karachi, with the intention of blowing up the plane over Tel Aviv. In December 1994, Air France flight 8969 from Algiers, Algeria (bound for Paris) was seized by four members of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) during take-off preparations; three passengers were killed before the plane lifted off from Houari Boumedienne Airport. After some negotiations with the terrorists, the flight was allowed to land in Marseilles in order to refuel. The authorities noticed that the plane took on three times the amount of fuel needed, and two anonymous tips revealed that the terrorists' intention was to use the plane as a missile to attack Paris. As a result, a special operations team of the French military stormed the aircraft in Marseille and killed the hijackers. Similar plots also existed in Southeast Asia, such as the aforementioned Kastarti plot to attack the Singapore airport by using an airliner hijacked in Thailand. Other cases include the 1994 Ansar Allah attack on a twin-engined plane in Panama, and the infamous attempt in 2001 where passenger Richard Reid attempted to ignite explosives hidden in his shoe. A similar tactic was planned by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed for the Library Tower attack, where Southeast Asian hijackers were supposed to use a shoe bomb to help them break through the cockpit door in order to facilitate the hijacking. Most recently, on 24 August 2004, two Russian civilian aircraft on domestic flights originating from Moscow crashed within minutes of each other, apparently after female suicide bombers had detonated explosives on board. Clearly, aviation security has now become a critical focus of attention for countries worldwide.

Another source of concern for the future is the possibility of the use of *shahedeen* for delivering chemical and biological agents. A successful delivery of these agents would certainly be more feasible if the perpetrator were indifferent to staying alive. In addition to greater access to the target and enhanced control over the outcome, elimination of protective measures during the attack – such as gas masks, hazmat gear or anti-radiation shields – decreases the risk of an early detection and obviation of the attack. Of particular concern should be the possibility of the use of chemical or biological weapons by suicide attackers on board aeroplanes in midcourse flight, considering the fact that contemporary airport security measures are not designed to meet this threat. Further, the bodies of terrorists themselves could also be used as crude delivery systems, if the perpetrators are infected with a contagious agent and sent to crowded areas. On the other hand, despite the common tendency to label suicide attacks as irrational,

organizations that have perfected this tactic have demonstrated a great level of rationality, patience and calculation in their attacks. The potential of an uncontrollable spread of the disease by secondary transmission beyond the population that was the intended target of the operation in the event of attacking with contagious agents, would be inconsistent with the targeting logic of most groups that have utilized suicide bombers in the past. This assessment includes the groups in Southeast Asia, whose biological weapons capability is primitive at best. Even JI's chemical and biological manual, recovered from the house of a JI operative Taufiq Rifki in the southern Philippines in 2003, demonstrates only naive thinking and a lack of any expertise in this regard whatsoever. At the same time, this does not mean that the possibility of a biological suicide bomber can be discarded completely.

Conclusion

Suicide terrorism has already taken root in Southeast Asia, and is unlikely to go away. Despite the elimination of Dr Azahari bin Husin, we can expect the suicide bombings in Indonesia to continue. Further, the likelihood of possible proliferation of the tactic into Southern Thailand and the Philippines in the near future is relatively high. With regards to the identity of the bombers themselves, it would not be surprising to see the emergence of females as suicide bombers along the lines of the developments in Chechnya, Palestine, Iraq and other parts of the world, as well as the increased participation of converts to Islam in this role, although locals are still much more likely candidates.

Notes

1. Shaul Shay (2000), 'Suicide terrorism in Lebanon', in Boaz Ganzar (ed.), *Countering Suicide Terrorism*, Herzliya: International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, p. 131.
2. Mickolus, Edward F. (2002), *Terrorism, 1996–2001: A Chronology*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, p. 854.
3. Dolnik, Adam (2005), 'Learning to die: suicide terrorism in the 21st century', in James J.F. Forest (ed.), *The Making of a Terrorist*, Westport, CT: Praeger.
4. Dolnik, Adam and Anjali Bhattacharjee (2002), 'Hamas: suicide bombing, rocket, or WMD?' *Terrorism and Political Violence*, **14** (3).
5. Interview with Sidney Jones: 'The hardliners are called Thoifah Muqatilah', *Tempo* **7** (6), 18–24 October 2005.
6. Paz, Reuven (2000), 'The Islamic legitimacy of suicide terrorism'), in Boaz Ganzor (ed.), *Countering Suicide Terrorism,* Herzliya: International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, p. 93.
7. Dolnik, Adam (2003), 'Die and let die: exploring links between suicide terrorism and terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, **26**, (1).
8. Panama City ACAN-EFE: 'Candle bombs: a new way to attack Colombian police', Army. FBIS ID#: LAP20021208000019.
9. Bhatia, Umej (2003), 'Terror by suicide: as South East Asia too faces the possibility of more such attacks, history could provide us some useful lessons,' *Today*, 26 November.

10. Ressa, Maria A. (2002), 'Infiltrating the MILF', *Newsbreak*, 28 October.
11. Abuza, Zahary (2004), 'Terrorism in Southeast Asia: keeping Al Qaida at bay', Jamestown Foundation, *Terrorism Monitor*, **2** (9), 6 May.
12. Zakaria, Tabassum (2006), 'Bush details Qaeda plot to hit LA', *Reuters*, 9 February.
13. Miller, Wayne (2003), 'Bali attack delayed a day, mastermind reveals', *Age*, 5 July.
14. Wockner, Cindy (2003), 'Third suicide bomber planned', *Advertiser*, 23 July.
15. Aeong suicide note.
16. 'Jakarta bomber: Qaeda group link', *CBS News*, 8 August 2003.
17. Harsanto, Damar (2003), 'Reenactment traces bomb assembly', *Jakarta Post*, 10 December.
18. *Jakarta Post*, 12 August 2003.
19. 'Militant admits surveying Australian Embassy ahead of bombing', AFP, 2 August 2005.
20. McDowell, Robin (2005), 'Indonesians ask why fellow Muslims are turning to suicide bombings,' Associated Press, 4 December.
21. Harsanto, Damar (2005), 'Police confirm Asmar's JI ties', *Jakarta Post*, 18–24 October.
22. Ressa, Maria (2004), 'Fears of new suicide terror squad', CNN, 26 February.
23. Interview with Sidney Jones, 'The hardliners are called Thoifah Muqatilah', *Tempo* 18–24 October 2005.
24. Aglionby, John (2005), 'The price of democracy', *Guardian*, 4 October.
25. Ismail, Noor Huda (2005), 'Quest for the meaning of life drives educated men to death', *Australian*, 12 December.
26. Jones, Sidney (2005), 'Terrorism's toxic strains', *Age*, 5 October.
27. Aglionby, John (2003), 'Jakarta bomber in terror network', *Guardian*, 9 August.
28. Komandjaja, Eva C. (2005), 'Police identify third Bali suicide bomber', *Jakarta Post*, Sunday, 20 November.
29. *OSAC Newsletter*, November 2005.
30. Jones, Sidney (2005), 'Terrorism's toxic strains', *Age*, 5 October.
31. Jacint, Al (2005)), 'Military accuses MILF of training rebels for suicide missions', *Sun Star*, 13 December.
32. Elegant, Simon (2003), 'Her other problem: a confession by a Filipino terrorist could deal a blow to Arroyo's negotiations with Islamic rebels', *Time Asia*, 28 July.
33. Tan, Daniel Kuan Wei (2003), 'The fatal attraction of suicide terrorism', *Pointer*, **29** (4), October–December.
34 Raman, B. (2005), 'Terrorism in Thailand: tech and tactics savvy', Observer Research Foundation document.
35 Wong Chung Wai and Charles Lourdes (2004), 'Seeking clues to JI–Chechen link', *Star*, 27 September.

7 Human tragedy in Sulawesi Indonesia: 1998–2002[1]

James Veitch

Reasons for the conflict[2]

There is no one reason for this conflict in Central Sulawesi just as there is no single explanation for the rise and the influence of Jemaah Islamiah in Indonesia as a whole.[3] But a cluster of factors seem to come together and implode in this situation and it is these that need to be identified.[4]

First, there is a history of Muslim activism in South Sulawesi that continues to influence what happens in the region through movements such as the KPSI (Komite Penegakan Syari'at Islam) and its militant wing Laskar Jundullah. The crisis in Poso and Tentena owed as much to the activities of this group and its allies such as Laskar Jihad as it did to long-standing religious tensions between Muslim and Christian and the earlier influence of Darul Islam.

Second, in the midst of constant change Muslim leaders realize that there is a need to nourish Islam as a religious faith in people's lives. In this situation not only should the influence of Christianity as an alternative to Islam be contained, but the competition for hearts and lives also lies in limiting the influence of Western values on people and in the rejuvenation of Muslim values and beliefs. The continuation of Indonesia as a Muslim nation within a secular state at a time when relationships with the Western world are undergoing radical change threatens these values, making the inspiration of the Darul Islam movement very attractive. So when the normal inter-religious tensions exploded into violence on Christmas Eve 1998 such sentiments began to impact on the situation.

Third, there was the failure of the government to intervene soon enough in situations where tensions led to violence and communities came to blows. The violence seems to have spread often because no one from the area administration was prepared to intervene quickly and fairly to enable local leaders to seek a way forward. The Christian communities seem to have taken the brunt of the violence. This in turn raises the question of why the administration, the police, the military and the judiciary did not act fairly until central government was forced to intervene to reduce the tensions. Provocation leads to feelings of victimization and injustice and these are much harder to resolve once the violence has begun. The neutrality of the

police and the military as well as the judiciary is crucial in dealing with violence. Quite clearly the judicial system needs to have a reputation for fairness and impartiality if judges are to play a part in enabling communities to feel that issues have been settled and all concerned can move on. Taking judicial decisions that turn a defendant into a scapegoat in the eyes of others lowers the reputation of the system and makes it difficult for justice to be obtained. Lorraine Aragon points out that 'no Muslim killers were tried or sentenced (as was Tibo and his fellow conspirators) implying that the State was not yet able to provide justice and security to all'.[5] This was a serious element in the crisis.

Fourth, the blame for starting the crisis was placed firmly by Muslims and by local as well as national leaders on the Christian community. Christian leaders were identified and implicated in the crisis by the police and sometimes the local leaders.

While Christians did attribute a share of the blame to Muslims, their leaders spoke more of corruption in the administration and corruption and rivalry between police and military and even between elements within these organizations as contributing to the crisis and the level of violence.

Fifth, where local power struggles are invested with religious fervour it is essential to intervene before the situation deteriorates into violence: religion empowers people to act in ways they would not normally contemplate.[6] On its own religion is a wild card: when combined with patronage politics[7] religion transforms a conflict into a level of violence that is difficult to restrain and to transform.

Sixth, there is the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) factor and the influence of individuals and groups who ally themselves with the vision of JI. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Central Sulawesi was already a base for activities and training prior to December 1998, and when the conflict flared this became an opportunity for training to extend into the community. The Muslim side in this conflict was always the better organized, trained and equipped and in spite of some clashes with the military and police they seem to have had official support.

Although it is not so obvious in the current situation there seems no reason to believe that the issues that caused the crisis and sustained it have been suddenly resolved. The status of Jemaah Islamiah and its allied groups and the inspiration offered by Abu Bakar Bashir to that movement is still unclear, and while this is the case the situation in Central Sulawesi will remain uncertain.

Seventh, the population of Central Sulawesi was and still is an uneasy balance between Muslim and Christian. Due to the transmigration policy of central government a Christian majority changed into a Muslim majority in

some parts of the province. The national highway that joined Makassar with the far north of the island opened up communities hitherto protected by isolation and geography. This brought entrepreneurs and speculators into the social structure, thus altering ethnic and religious balances. The highway made it easier for people to move in search of new opportunities. The purchase of land by these newcomers, often at the expense of local interests, was a ready cause of friction within extended families where land was communally owned. [8]

Clearly there was more happening than the stress on relationships caused by unexpected changes in the ownership and use of land and in changes to the existing economic and political structures of communities in the area.

Eighth, the changing face of religious affiliation is always a major source of tension.[9] These shifts are important for they give whoever succeeds in the numbers game a renewed source of identity and confidence. Both Christians and Muslims look to swell their numbers and compete with each other. Religion does matter for many, and it translates itself into political tensions as communities decide who shall represent them in local and regional administration.

Ninth, what was the catalyst that drove the conflict between Muslim and Christian that flared in 1998? The trigger has to be something much stronger than local religious rivalries and the changing contours of economic and social factors.[10]

Perhaps it was the presence of training camps in the area post-9/11 linked with Jemaah Islamiah and the vision for the Muslim world of al-Qaeda that aggravated an otherwise tense situation.[11] The groups associated with the camps kept the situation on a knife-edge and those in training had both opportunity and motive to join the Muslim militias from time to time.[12] The camps were welcomed by the political elite and different factions of the military and the police. Central Sulawesi is a suitable location. It is forested and mountainous, making location of the camps difficult. Camps can be moved from time to time. The borders to this region are porous, making it relatively straightforward to enter from the sea. Contacts with Kalimantan and with the southern Philippines provide easy routes of access.[13] There is easy interaction with Halmahera and Ambon, and with centres beyond. In other words, at that time, Indonesia was wrapped into the rising wave of Muslim activism and militarism that had spread across Asia and the Middle East following 9/11. For such activists Indonesia was the centre of the struggle for the hearts and minds of Muslims in Southeast Asia and Central Sulawesi provided the setting for the training of cadres for this struggle.

Given this background the ensuing conflict is not difficult to understand.

The immediate catalyst for the crisis

Early in the evening on Christmas Evening 1998 in Poso, a Protestant Christian, Roy Runtu Bisalembah, stabbed his long-time Muslim friend Amad Ridwan in the arm during a disagreement and the subsequent scuffle set off violent clashes between Muslims and Christians.[14] Both had been drinking as was normal when they got together, but the incident was out of character. Ridwan ran into the nearby mosque with his arm bleeding and attracted immediate attention. The situation was then blown up into a major incident as rumours spread rapidly throughout the town and in nearby areas of an armed clash between Christian and Muslim. Although this phase of violence would be contained, distrust between Muslim and Christian communities had been exposed.

Clashes were subsequently to occur at intervals from the end of 1998 until 2005, leaving many dead and many more wounded, with Muslim and Christian communities traumatized, divided and angry.

Understandably the conflicts in this region attracted international attention. They came in the wake of the fall of the government of President Suharto in 1998 and the increased activity of radical Muslim groups in other parts of Indonesia. In order to put these incidents into context it is useful to recall some of the background history of South Sulawesi especially since independence.

Armed struggles and local history[15]

The Dutch returned to South Sulawesi in September 1945 and removed the Governor who had been appointed by the independence movement of Sukarno and Hatta. Guerrilla groups quickly formed to oppose the Dutch reoccupation and leading opponents were forced to flee to Java where they established resistance groups. In clashes with local militia and the Royal Netherlands Indies Army Captain Westerling's actions were infamous. His reputation for executing hostages and mass killings earned him a reputation that was remembered long after federalism was defeated and Indonesia became a republic on 17 August 1950.[16]

But the struggle was not only against the Dutch: it was also against those who advocated a secular state. It was during this period that Kahar Muzakkar came to prominence.[17] In August 1951 following the founding of the new state he led a rebellion of disgruntled soldiers in the area that was to last for more than a decade of sporadic protest against central government. In January 1952 he pledged allegiance to the Darul Islam movement and South Sulawesi became a centre of opposition to the government.

In March 1957 after increasing dissatisfaction over some years with central government, the Permesta (the Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam) rebellion broke out. The proclamation was issued on 2 March. The military

leaders of both North and South Sulawesi launched a confrontation with the central government with the aim of securing greater political autonomy and financial independence for the region. The central government quickly came to an arrangement with the leaders of the movement in the South but the northern leaders were not as easily won over. Support for the North spilled over into Central Sulawesi.

On 7 June these leaders formed their own autonomous state. Eight months later, on 15 February 1958, the rebels joined the rival government – the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI). Although the short-lived opposition to Sukarno was defeated, the upheaval and the ideals of the movement pushed the Permesta movement underground.

Three years later in February 1961 remnants of the rebellion were offered an amnesty and by the end of May the last members had taken advantage of the offer. However feelings continued to simmer throughout the island as the aims and the agenda of the Darul Islam movement continued to find popular support for its opposition to the central government, and particularly to President Sukarno's backing for the Communist Party of Indonesia (the PKI). In 1964 Central Sulawesi was separated from the North and the Southeast from the South and were given provincial status. This took some of the pressure off the independence movements that continued to surface. In February 1965 Kahar Muzakkar was killed in a skirmish with government troops and the rebellion collapsed.

However the Muslims of South Sulawesi continued to have a reputation for activism and radicalism, especially when they felt that the identity of the country was threatened or had become weak and ineffectual. A secular state with Islam as its preferred religion may not be an issue when things are going well, but when the fundamental political 'unity in diversity' is threatened, the case for an Islamic state becomes a priority yet again.

In the political uncertainties of the post-Suharto era the ideals of the Darul Islam movement once again came to the surface and it is these ideals that lie behind the way this crisis in Central Sulawesi unfolded. [18]

The movement has its origins in another part of Indonesia. It began in the late summer of 1945 in the political vacuum left by the defeated Japanese and a weak Dutch colonial presence. Before an allied army arrived, the independence movement seized the opportunity to establish and position itself politically. But there was a fundamental difference between the leaders. There were those like Sukarno and Hatta who wanted to establish a secular state that was predominantly Muslim. Others like Kartosoewirjo sought to establish a Muslim state based on the sharia.[19] The struggle lasted from 1948 until Kartosoewirjo was wounded on 24 April 1962 and captured on 4 June. He issued an instruction

following his capture urging his followers to surrender; which they did. He was tried in August and executed on 12 September 1962.[20] But the ideal for which he stood never disappeared. The KPPSI (Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syari' at Islam or Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Law) or as it is now called, KPSI (Komite Penegakan Syari' at Islam), the parent organization for the military wing Laskar Jundullah, sees itself continuing the political ideals of Darul Islam in Sulawesi.[21]

The conflict[22]

Phase 1 (December 1998)

As we have already seen, this phase began on 24 December 1998 and was short-lived.[23] This year Christmas fell during Ramadan so the usual tensions between the Muslim and the Christian communities were already present in Poso. However there were extra tensions this year. Not because of the religious festivals, but because of an approaching election for the *bupati* or administrator's position and for various positions on governing councils at district, provincial and central levels. Although the elections were not scheduled until June the following year there was keen interest in who were offering themselves as candidates and in which groups were represented. These were the first elections for such positions in 40 years. The situation was tense but not any worse than usual at such a festival time. But that year Christmas and Ramadan fell at the same time and there was already a decision to limit the availability of alcohol in Poso. The stabbing provided the catalyst for Christians to stop the closure of Toko Lima, the largest liquor shop in Poso.[24] This in turn brought Muslim young people out in protest and the clashes followed and escalated.[25] Houses began to be burnt in the Christian part of the town and news of this spread to other areas.

On 27 December truckloads of Christian supporters arrived from the inland town of Tentena to be followed by Muslims from other areas. Fighting escalated between the two groups with the police doing little to keep the factions apart. Eventually things quietened down amidst heavy rain, leaving an uneasy calm.[26]

Christians took the brunt of the unrest and the perpetrators on both sides were primarily groups of young people. The police arrested Herman Parimo, the leader of the Protestant group who had arrived from Tentena.[27] The group was called the Central Sulawesi Youth Movement – Gerakan Pemuda Sulawesi Tengah, the GPST – in honour of a movement that had existed in the turbulence of the 1950s. Parimo was charged with aggravating the already tense situation. He was later sentenced to 14 years but died in prison awaiting the results of an appeal. A letter circulated accusing the

Christians of starting the trouble and the police identified the anonymous writer as the younger brother of the incumbent administrator or *bupati*. He was detained and charged with inciting violence.[28]

There are those who believe that this incident was not as spontaneous as it first seemed. The struggle for power between Muslim and Christian had tilted in favour of the former, and positions in local government that had been shared by informal agreement were passing into the hands of Muslims, leaving Christians feeling disfranchised and aggrieved. Fuelling this situation was the fear that revenue from the rich resources of the region would not be shared among the communities. In other words Christians were increasingly afraid that they were being shut out of political power by the new economic elite and that this was a policy that had been encouraged by the Habbie government.[29] It was not surprising that in spite of the clashes in Poso being contained, tensions boiled over 12 months later with a new phase of violence.

Phase 2 (April–May 2000)

Conflict spiralled once again as the trial of the administrator's (the *bupati*) younger brother began. He had been accused by the police of inciting violence by circulating a letter accusing the Christians of initiating the conflict in Poso. Christians believed that if the person responsible for the accusations was the administrator's younger brother then the administrator himself was behind the accusations.

A corruption trial that began at the same time added fuel to the tensions when it was suggested that some of the funds had been used to support the rioting.

The entire situation was complicated by an election to fill the vacant position of district secretary and competition was keen on both sides. Suggestions made public that there would be more violence if a particular candidate – a Muslim – were not elected, aggravated the situation.

On 16 April, a Muslim youth reported being attacked by Christians and showed cuts on his arm to support his claim. No one checked out the claims because a group of Muslims immediately retaliated and attacked houses of Christians in parts of Poso. For several days the violence continued with houses in the Christian suburbs being set on fire.

The police chief called in the Mobile Police Brigade (Brimob) from Palu, the provincial capital, and upon arrival they fired on a crowd of Muslim rioters killing two and injuring eight, one of whom was to die of the injuries. After pausing to bury the dead, Muslim groups angered by the actions of the police continued to burn houses, schools and churches in Christian areas of the town – some of those areas were completely gutted by fire and destroyed.

The governor arrived the next day and was met by a delegation of angry Muslims with a set of demands. The Mobile brigade was withdrawn in response but the violence continued when an unidentified body thought to be that of a Muslim was found. The regional military commander in Makassar hastily dispatched 600 troops in to the area to establish law and order. Their arrival dispelled the fighting, enabling the police on 3 May to declare the crisis over. The attacks on each community were carried out in revenge – Christians however appear to have taken the brunt of the attacks. Lorraine Aragon notes: 'by early May, over 700 homes had been burned mostly belonging to Christians, along with several church buildings and a police barracks. Thousands of refugees, mostly Christians fled'.[30] It was now early May and there was a lull in the violence.

Phase 3 (May–August 2000)

On 23 May a group of 12, mainly Catholic militia known as 'ninjas' or 'Black Bats', were believed to have killed a policeman and two others in a skirmish.[31]

The situation appears to have been this: the Christian leader Fabianus Tibo, arrived at the Catholic village of Moengko Baru with his small force to release students held in a dormitory by Muslims from the neighbouring village. The battleground that night was the Catholic church. The ninja retreated to the church building after the deaths were reported and began to negotiate with the police to surrender. In the meantime a Muslim group surrounded the church. Members of the Christian militia then fled the church which was burnt, and fighting broke out over a widening area. Up to five days later the widespread attacks mounted by Christian groups (the 'red' soldiers) against Muslim villages continued.

An incident which inflamed the situation, and which was also linked to Tibo occurred at Kilo Nine, in a village made up largely of migrants from Java. Between 70 and 100 men fled to the school building to take cover but most were killed by gunshot and by machete when the Christian group attacked.[32] The inhabitants were no match for the ninja who rounded up the Muslims, and allegedly 'executed them in the style of the Algerian Islamic Armed Group (the GIA)'.[33] According to another report 'the killing was done in a vicious manner. The remains were rarely found intact. Some were decapitated others were missing limbs.' Neighbouring villages were also attacked with large loss of life. The violence spread with an unknown number being killed and injured. Lorraine Aragon notes: 'over a hundred were executed with homemade weapons, their bodies tossed into the Poso river and mass graves'.[34]

The call went out for Muslims to retaliate and come to the rescue of those caught in the violence. The call was reported at the national Quran

reading contest being hosted at that time by the al-Khaira'at institution in the provincial capital of Palu and those present endorsed the call for assistance. The Crisis Centre of the Protestant Church of Central Sulawesi (GKST) was also becoming active documenting events, supporting those detained by the police and caring for the increased number of displaced people.

A major confrontation between the 'red' (the Christian) and the 'white' protagonists (the Muslims) was seen on 2 June. Hundreds clashed and the leader of a Protestant group A.L. Lateka who was by then being sought by the police was killed. This incident marked a turning point in this phase of the struggle with Laskar Jundullah becoming openly involved.

More troops were sent from Makassar as the central government responded to requests for help. On 6 June Protestants battling with police took casualties. Clashes then became spasmodic as both sides absorbed the significance of events.

During July further arrests of Protestants occurred including Fabianus Tibo the alleged leader of the Catholic ninjas. With police and military units reinforced from Java and undertaking parallel operations the violence began to subside. Units from Laskar Jihad began arriving from 19 July, tipping the advantage in favour of the Muslim community.[35]

In August the governors of South, North and Central Sulawesi met in Tentena to sign a peace accord. With the President of Indonesia in attendance to witness the signing ceremony, they all attended a traditional ceremony and buried the hatchet when a water buffalo head was ceremonially buried with local rites. An uneasy peace ensued.

But the recent violence had divided the communities; Muslims were now on one side and Christians on the other. The resulting bitterness and anger with the authorities for failing to control the situation and for taking sides further inflamed the situation. There was more violence to come.

Phase 4 (July–December 2001)[36]

The early months of 2001 were taken up with the trial of Fabianus Tibo and two associates (Dominggus Soares da Silva and Dom Marinus Riwu), migrants from the Catholic island of Flores. They were charged with murder of a policeman, with murder in the incident at the Catholic church, and with masterminding the attacks at Kilo Nine and in other neighbouring villages. On 5 April, under the watchful eyes of Muslim demonstrators outside the court, all three were found guilty of premeditated murder in three separate incidents and of being the masterminds behind the rioting and the killing spree, and were sentenced to death.[37] Before he was sentenced Tibo named 16 influential Protestants whom he said were the ringleaders of the violence.[38]

Skirmishes between the two sides continued until an incident occurred on 2 July when Muslims prevented a Christian group from travelling to Posos to lodge complaints. This followed a rally of Muslims outside government buildings in Poso on June 30. The local newspaper headlined the incident as the beginning of phase 4.[39]

The following day the conflict escalated with deaths reported as red and white militia attacked each other's villages. At the village of Buyung Katedo 13 Muslims were killed including women, children and the imam of the mosque. In an incident on 5 July Christian militia attacked Toyado and lost six of their fighters to security force intervention. Incidents continued and the violence continued to escalate. Not only was Poso unsafe but so also was the Christian town of Tentena, along with its surrounding area. More troops and police units were drafted into the region and efforts were made to reduce the number of firearms available to all sides in the conflict.

The arrival of Laskar Jihad and associated groups into the area without intervention from the authorities stepped up tensions and added to the casualties. But supporters were sometimes in conflict with the security forces. The government forces were not free from accusations of bias and their behaviour added to the chaos. In an incident in a Muslim village (Mapane) the police were alleged to have tortured detainees and were accused of carrying out a summary execution as an act of revenge for attacks on their units. In court action later, many of the detainees were awarded small amounts of compensation. Both Muslims and Christians in the conflict had reason to feel aggrieved.

In November the violence flared with both sides attacking the other's villages. Reports suggest that the scale of violence was greater at this point than it had been at any stage during the third phase of the conflict.[40] By the end of the month, Hindu Bali migrants had also been attacked. But increasingly Christians became the target of well-organized attacks from Laskar Jihad-led militia. It was a confusing time as security forces also suffered casualties.[41]

In December rumours that an attack on the Christian town of Tentena was imminent attracted attention from central government in Jakarta and from the international community. Christian leaders who had been in contact with former missionaries (who had lived and worked in the northern part of Sulawesi) now living in Europe reporting the ebbs and flows in the crisis now redoubled their efforts. Through such contacts they hoped to attract the intervention of European governments with the government in Jakarta. There was also a lobby with some members of Congress through Indonesian families living in the United States: perhaps with some success, as it turns out.

The white militia, the Muslim groups, were working along the road towards Tentena securing the area's villages and edging closer to their objective. If Tentena was attacked it would affect large numbers of people and the government was not anxious to have the worldwide publicity that this would attract, especially as it was likely to happen around Christmas. During this period, Aragon reports: 'at least a dozen churches and 4000 houses in thirty villages were burned, seemingly under the blind eye of security forces. Roughly 15000 more people fled their homes. Muslim militia seized control of fuel stations and roadside check points, where some displayed posters of Osama bin Laden.'[42]

Central government soon responded. The then Minister for Politics and Security S.B. Yudhoyono announced a joint military–police operation to resolve the situation. The 'Security Restoration Operation' was scheduled for six months' duration and was aimed at bringing the violence to an end and restoring peace. Envisaged also was the confiscation of weapons from all sides, and the expulsion of all outsiders from the area.

The final aim of the operation was to bring about reconciliation of all groups who had been involved, the rehabilitation of offenders and the reconstruction of villages destroyed during the upheavals. But before anything tangible could be put in place there was another incident that undermined government influence.

In a major incident the military were implicated in the abduction of seven Muslims from the village of Toyada, allegedly in retaliation for injuries sustained in an incident a few days earlier. Five of the abductees' bodies were later discovered. The outcries that followed forced the government to mount a full inquiry.[43]

The involvement of senior ministers from 4 December onwards brought about separate discussions with Muslim and Christian leaders from the conflict area. These meetings were held secretly in Makassar with the leaders of each group and led ultimately to an agreement being signed in the resort town of Malino on 20 December. The parties were given choices: the continuation of conflict with a state of emergency in force, an area under the control of the military, or an agreement signed by all parties to cease the conflict and to seek reconciliation. All parties agreed to the third choice and the details were hammered out at Malino.[44] Once the principles of the agreement were signed an implementation programme was discussed and agreed.

Included in the package were the following: an amnesty for the surrender of all weapons, and a specified time was for all who had been displaced to return to their home villages. A period of six months was set in which to allow law enforcement agencies to impose order and monitor security. Finally, all those newcomers who had not registered their presence with the authorities were given time to leave the area.

Official work groups of equal numbers of Muslim and Christian were also established to work on areas of grievance and to encourage and nurture dialogue between the members of the different religious communities.[45] The signing of the Malino agreement was a triumph for the cabinet ministers concerned – especially for Jusuf Kalla, the businessman from Makassar who served in the Megawati administration and who became Vice-President in the current Yudhoyono government.

Phase 5 (2002)

There were a number of incidents during the implementation period following the agreement at Malino that threatened the fragile peace that had been agreed, but none were serious enough to derail the process.

The implementation period ended on 31 July 2002. There was a closed meeting of those who had signed the initial agreement to review what had been achieved. Not all who had signed attended; one notable absence was the Reverend Damanik, the moderator (or chair) of the Protestant Church of Central Sulawesi.

At that meeting it was decided to replace the working groups (the *pokja*) that had operated at district and provincial levels with a Communications Forum (Forkum) to operate at village and sub-district levels. There had been dissatisfaction with the way the *pokja* were able to operate and it was felt essential if dialogue and implementation were to succeed that the work should be done at grass-roots level, in the villages. But even as the group met, violence again flared. Over the next few days the casualties mounted. The GKST Crisis Centre evacuated more than 1500 people from villages that were declared unsafe. Muslim leaders took similar action in their areas. The violence continued with the police attempting to intervene.

On 17 August the Reverend Damanik was stopped, the vehicles in his convoy were searched and the police later announced that a number of weapons and rounds of ammunition had been seized from the vehicle he was in and that a warrant had been issued for his arrest. Damanik surrendered to police later in Jakarta. Further incidents followed in August and September.

On 12 October bomb explosions rocked the seaside resort of Kuta beach in Bali and the violence in Indonesia took a different direction.

An arrest to quell the crisis[46]

There were two arrests of prominent Christian leaders: the Catholic layman Cornelius Tibo and the Protestant minister Rinaldy Damanik. Each was to carry responsibility for their role in the conflict: one would be given a death sentence and the other a term of imprisonment. No Muslim was charged with anything similar during any phase of the conflict.

The case against Damanik began on 17 August 2002 when the police stopped a convoy of three vehicles in which he was travelling and seized weapons. At the time the police took no action because, they later said, Damanik had too many supporters to protect him and that they, the police, were understaffed at the checkpoint and were thus unable to make an arrest. They later announced that they were charging him with possession of seven unregistered rifles, four guns and 144 rounds of ammunition allegedly seized from the vehicle in which Damanik was travelling.

Governor Aminuddin Ponulele ordered Damanik's arrest. At the time he issued the order the governor was reported by the *Jakarta Post* (23 August 2002) to have said: 'there would be less unrest in Poso if minister Damanik was arrested by security personnel'.[47]

Attention switched to Damanik on account of other reasons. Because of the upsurge of violence and the lack of government attention, Damanik along with others had recently resigned in protest from the regional government-sponsored work group tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Malino peace accord. He had also boycotted a further round of peace talks aimed at quelling the recent upsurge in violence. According to the press, police had already declared him a suspect and were seeking his arrest.[48]

Damanik vigorously denied the charges when he heard about them. As the chair of the Protestant Church in Central Sulawesi and the head of the Church's Crisis Centre (established to channel the church's support for those displaced by the three-year clash between the Muslim and the Christian communities) he was widely known and respected.

From the beginning the case against him looked fragile. In fact many Christians as well as Muslims considered that the evidence against him had been trumped up, and that he had been framed by the authorities. With a warrant out for his arrest Damanik was given until 9 September to give himself up to the local police. He was however afraid for his life and travelled to Jakarta and reported to police there on 11 December. Following hours of questioning he was suddenly sent back to Palu on 22 December for more questioning. He survived a serious case of stomach poisoning whilst in police custody and was eventually charged on 8 January 2003.

The case opened on 3 February when he was formally charged with possession of weapons and ammunition. The Minister of Justice changed the charges of possession to that of being a provocateur of the violence. But Damanik protested and refused to leave prison to attend court proceedings seeking leave to appeal to the high court in Jakarta. The charges soon reverted to the original form. On 24 February he was taken ill again and a doctor ordered his immediate hospitalization even though he was expected in court. The lawyers on both sides of the case visited the prison to observe

his condition but he was summoned by the panel of judges and arrived in pain. His legal team, after lodging a strong protest, walked out. The judges had no alternative than to adjourn proceedings and Damanik was hospitalized for a short time.[49]

The three judges were drawn from different ethnic communities in the region: the presiding judge (I Nyoman Somanada) was Balinese, one of the others was a Christian from Toradja and the other a Muslim from the area. The author arrived in Palu in time to hear the defence team sum up his case in the presence of a packed room of supporters. That evening the author was able to talk with Damanik in the prison.[50]

The next week, on 16 June, the court convened with the presiding judge I Nyoman Somonada acknowledging that the case contained irregularities. Although several witnesses had claimed that the police had harassed them and the police admitted that key evidence had been tampered with or had not been properly processed, he sentenced Damanik to three years in prison (less the six months he had already spent in detention).[51] Damanik himself refused to believe that there was ever a case against him, but reluctantly agreed with his lawyers following sentence that he should appeal against the sentence. But it was confirmed, in spite of enormous international publicity and strong support from within Indonesia for his case to be reviewed.

He received one year's remission and was released in November 2004. He was elected the moderator of his church on 17 October whilst in prison and was well received by the community on his release.

However, Damanick was a scapegoat for the situation. In order to diffuse the tension at that time in the Tentena–Poso area, the military and police leadership had reached the conclusion that a key figure on the Christian side should be arrested and imprisoned. Tibo had given the police the grounds to proceed. Damanik was the high-profile figure who had led a remarkably successful organization – the Crisis Centre – in seeking reconciliation between the Muslim and Christian communities and in making sure that refugees from the Christian community were well cared for and protected. He had also protested about the unfairness in the way Christians had been treated by police and the military in the conflict. He believed quite strongly, and set out evidence in his book, that the conflict had been engineered by the authorities against Christians once the trouble began.

His arrest, trial and imprisonment was a local way of preserving the peace by trying to balance the conflicting influences and dissolving the threats. It did not remove him from physical danger, though that should have been the affect of detention and imprisonment: it simply restricted his capacity for hands-on leadership. His arrest and imprisonment was no doubt meant to punish him and the Christian community he represented

for their role in the conflict. But it is doubtful that imprisonment achieved this goal. The entire episode was internationalized and focused attention on the conflict in a way that undermined the affect of punishment. Damanik spent most of his sentence in Jakarta where he was also hospitalized for a time, and where he had contact with, amongst others, Abu Bakar Bashir the alleged leader of Jemaah Islamiah.[52] Part of the sentence was also spent in Palu.[53]

Damanik was, according to his own words, no hero: 'I'm just a normal human being. If there are any injustices being done by the government, I will again voice my opinion against it. I don't have an agenda. I'll just keep doing the same things I did before'. He also held clear views about the conflict: 'From the beginning I've said this is not a religious conflict. The real causes are the injustices we live with – for example, corruption and favoritism, which are not being addressed or handled wisely by the government. This has prolonged the conflict.'[54]

The militia groups and the al-Qaeda factor[55]

Of course Christian militia were involved in the struggle. But they were locally formed and led. They went by various names. Fabianus Tibo, whose involvement has already been noted, was originally a Catholic from Flores and led the Army of the Bat (*pasukan kelelawar*), the ninja. Other groups were the Army of the Tiger led by a local, Advent Lateka, who was killed in an attack on Muslims on 2 June 2000, the Army of the Manguni came from North Sulawesi and supplied ammunition to the other groups, and the Army of Christ also came from the North when required. There were various small ad hoc local groups formed to take care of situations as they developed.

The Muslim groups were better organized, trained, led and financed than their Christian counterparts. The following were the main groups involved.

Laskar Mujahidin Kompak[56] was founded in Poso in 2000 and was led by Arifuddin, a graduate of al-Mukmin Ngruki. He was trained in Solo in 1999. Jakarta Kompak financed the group.[57] Laskar Jundullah was led by Agus Dwikarna, a Makassar businessman who is in prison in the Philippines.[58] Dwikarna was arrested in March 2002 in Manila and sentenced in July to ten years imprisonment for carrying C4 explosives. Laskar Jundullah is the military wing of the KPPSI headquartered in Makassar and at the height of the conflict had about 3500 members. Dwikarna established it in September 2000 with the help of others who planned the renewal of Islam along the lines of the policies advocated by the Darul Islam movement. Almost certainly its founding came out of the recommendations of the Congress of Mujahideen 5–7 August 2000 held in Yogyakarta which he attended.[59]

A three-day congress to establish the KPPSI was held in Makassar in October 2000 and those attending came from all the major Muslim organizations from Makassar and South Sulawesi. Security was maintained at the conference by a security organization called Laskar Jundullah (the Army of God or, more literally, God's Soldier). A major aim of the KPPSI was to seek the implementation of a comprehensive version of the sharia in South Sulawesi under the regional autonomy laws enacted by the Habibie government in 1999. In preparation the KPPSI was in regular contact with other groups throughout the region who sought to police moral behaviour in villages and towns. Laskar Jundullah was to coordinate this vigilante activity and to police for the sharia policy should the regional parliament vote its implementation. The scope of the policy set out in the report of the second congress held on 14–16 December 2001 spread alarm through the Christian community that makes up around 10 per cent of the population of the southern part of Sulawesi. But the KPPSI was led by Muslim intellectuals and was aimed at the renewal of Muslim life and faith throughout South and Central Sulawesi.[60]

However, the Makassar bombings of McDonald's restaurant and a car dealership in December 2002 connected five of those arrested with Laskar Jundullah[61] and reinforced links with the terrorism that had been discussed in the Dwiakarna trial.[62] There is also evidence linking Laskar Jundullah with the conflict in Poso and funding for its activities have been traced to contacts between Omar al-Faruq (the al-Qaeda operative responsible for maintaining contacts in Indonesia) and Dwikarna.[63]

Laskar Jundullah fighters complemented the role of the Laskar Jihad fighters who arrived in Posos on 19 July 2001 under the command of Ja'far Umar Thalib.[64] The governor and the mayor welcomed them. The unit came in response to the incident involving Fabianus Tibo to help the military and the police protect Muslim interests. As they were well trained, the militia was better able to plan strategies and to attack Christian positions with more confidence than either the local groups or the Laskar Jundullah fighters. The injection of this militia group into the situation was an important turning point in the crisis. From the time they arrived, Laskar Jihad published a weekly bulletin and this helped to keep their supporters in touch with the events as they unfolded.[65]

Smaller groups were made up of Laskar Khalid bin Walid, founded in 2001 and led by Sugianto Kaimudin from Poso. It had about 300 members mostly drawn from the al-Khairat organization. Its role was to strengthen Muslim resolve in the conflict and to boost morale. The Poso Muslim Forum sought to unite all Muslims in the area under a single banner and fostered welfare and educational programmes. It was supportive of the efforts of Laskar Jundullah and the Laskar Mujahideen.

The curious case of Fabianus Tibo

Reference has already been made to the role of Tibo in the conflict and of the sentence of death that was passed on him and his two associates. To date (July 2006) these three are the only ones to have been sentenced to death for their part in the conflict. They were found guilty by the Palu Sate Court on 17 May 2001 and sentenced to death. Their appeal was rejected first by the Sulawesi High Court in May and then by the Supreme Court of Indonesia on 11 October 2001. But there was considerable agitation around such decisions, both local and international, and there the matter was left.

On 13 April 2005 the legal team representing the three appealed to the President for clemency. This appeal was supported by the National Committee on Human Rights of Indonesia in its letter to the chief of the Supreme Court sent on 29 June. But the bid for clemency was rejected on 10 November and the next day it was announced that preparations for the executions had begun. The same day as the President's decision was announced, Tibo's legal team appealed for worldwide support to bring pressure on the President to reverse his decision. Five days later Tibo and his two associates wrote to the President expressing dismay at the decision and asking him to review his decision. In the letter the names of 16 persons were mentioned who were 'directly involved in the communal conflict'. The petitioners asked that the role of these people be investigated and the executions delayed until such investigations were completed. The petitioners wrote: 'we are but victims of a political game by a group of elite rulers who engineered horizontal religious and racial conflicts . . . and who have been provoking Poso and igniting clashes.'[66]

Former President Abdurrahman Wahid called in December that year for the executions to be postponed and urged the President to establish an independent commission to review the decisions and to investigate the riots.

Late in January 2006 it was announced by the Advocacy Services for Justice and Peace in Indonesia (PADAM) that they were briefing lawyers to file a second appeal to the Supreme Court citing fresh evidence from witnesses who confirmed the uneasiness with which the initial verdict had been greeted.[67] It was now being alleged that the three, and especially Tibo, were not implicated in the rioting for which they had been charged by the prosecution. A date for execution set for 31 March was halted. In early April it was announced that plans for the executions had been temporarily halted pending the outcome of the second appeal. On 17 April the Supreme Court announced that it would hear the case again and five judges were appointed to sit. On 12 May the Court rejected the application and preparations for the executions recommenced. Preparations were halted for an execution on 12 August, ostensibly because of the approaching National Day but more likely as a result of an appeal from Pope Benedict XVI and other overseas

governments as well as organizations like Amnesty International. However preparations recommenced in September and the executions were carried out early in the morning on Friday 22 September.[68] The comment in the *Jakarta Post* entitled 'Miscarriage of Justice' published three days later summarizes the difficulties surrounding these deaths: 'The executions will be remembered as part of the tragedies besetting the country's efforts to uphold justice for one reason: they took place while there was insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the three uneducated men were the masterminds of the violence.'[69]

Recent events

Other incidents have raised the issue of blame yet again. A bomb blast in May 2005 killed 22 people in the mainly Christian town of Tentena and then on 19 November two Christians were shot and severely wounded at close range in an incident in Palu. A bomb blast in the Christian market at Palu left eight dead and 22 injured. But the major event that caught international attention occurred on 29 October 2005 when three Christian schoolgirls were beheaded on their way to school: a fourth managed to flee the scene with head wounds.[70] About the same time the police reported that they had broken up a religious cult. The President suggested such events – especially the beheading – heralded a return to the earlier Muslim–Christian conflict. The national police chief took a similar stance. The beheadings were an indication that religion was still a major problem in the region, he maintained. But that may not be the view of people in the region who work for reconciliation. Bernard Ndawu of PosoWatch commented: 'The people know that there is no such thing as religious conflict these days. That's why people don't retaliate, knowing that the perpetrators are those from outside.' Prama'artha Pode, also of Poso Watch, echoed this comment with the words: 'There is no more religious conflict in Poso.' Arianto Santo Sangaji from the Yayasan Tanah Merdeka in writing about the cult community that was broken up commented: 'the cult was excess from the combination of injustice, misunderstanding, stigmatization and systematic criminalization'.[71] While not wishing to down play the role of religion in the violence, it seems that fairness and evenhandedness in dealing with differences is crucial for peace. Whenever there is a question of fairness there will always be questions of corruption.[72]

With the deaths of the Poso three, major questions still remain about the real causes behind this period of tragedy in Central Sulawesi. Efforts will be made to move on and to try and forget the incidents, but while that may be easy for the public persona it will be difficult for all the individuals and the families involved. When lingering doubts remain about the quality of justice the Poso three received, it is difficult to forgive and to forget.

Furthermore, 'while both Muslim and Christian have been arrested and tried for sectarian violence, no Muslims were given death penalty sentences, causing some observers to accuse the courts of playing favorites'.[73]And this is basically the problem. The Christian community of Central Sulawesi feels that it has had to bear the blame and to suffer the consequences of the rioting and the deaths that left perhaps as many as 2000 dead. The majority believe that it is inconceivable that the Poso three were the masterminds. Indonesian Legal Aid Institute Association coordinator Hendari was more specific when he suggested that the executions were 'politically motivated'. He went further and added: 'the government has used the law for its political interests and this will have a considerable impact . . . The government can say anything about (the executions) it likes, but the facts show that they were politicized'.[74] In the words of one researcher who has studied the tragedy: 'From late 1998 until late 2000 Muslim and Christian were attacking each other. So how could three persons from one community, [the Catholic Church] who were not even from the dominant ethnic group and denomination, be single-handedly "chosen" to be the masterminds of the riots at that time? The execution . . . is simply an attempt . . . to cover up the real persons and institutions who should be held accountable for the ongoing unrest in central Sulawesi.'[75]

With the executions of the Poso three indelibly imprinted on the minds of the Christians of Central Sulawesi it remains to be seen how their relationships with the dominant Muslim community will pan out in the years that lie ahead. It also remains to be seen if the Muslim community feels that justice has been done in this situation, and how that will relate to the executions of the Bali three and the vision for which those three will die as martyrs.[76]

Notes

1. The number of the dead from the conflicts through all phases is difficult to determine. It appears likely that the figure is between 1000 and 2000. The *Jakarta Post* (20 December 2004) looking back on the crisis reckoned the death toll may have been as high as 2000 but other sources put the figure at 577. However, the latter looks too low to be credible. Around 86 000 were displaced – about equal numbers from each side. Incidents continued into 2004 and 2005 with 15 and 12 to date being recorded by the International Crisis Group. International Crisis Group (2005), 'Weakening Indonesia's mujahidin networks: lessons from Maluku and Poso', 13 October, Appendix F, pp. 27–8.
2. For an excellent overview of the conflict with important detail drawn from field research see the paper published by the Institute For the Development of Legal Study and Human Rights Advocacy (LPSHAM) Central Sulawesi (early 2005), written by Harris Azhar and Syamsul Agus entitled 'Poso: an area put to conflict'.
3. For useful reading see Barton, Greg (2004), *Indonesia's Struggle: Jemaah Islamiah and the Soul of Islam*, Sydney: University of New South Wales. Reissued (2005) as *Jemaah Islamiah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia*, Singapore: Ridge Books, NUS publishing.
4. Nordholt, Henk Schulte (2002), 'A genealogy of violence', in Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (eds), *Roots of Violence in Indonesia*, Leiden: KITLV Press.

5. Aragon, Lorraine V. (2001), 'Communal violence in Poso Central Sulawesi: where people eat fish and fish eat people'. *Indonesia*, **72,** p. 72.
6. Aragon, Lorraine V. (2001), 'Communal violence in Poso Central Sulawesi', pp. 73–6.
7. Aragon, Lorraine V. (2001), 'Communal violence in Poso Central Sulawesi', p. 77.
8. In the years we had lived in Makassar, the Malili industrial centre, operated by PT Inco, had expanded its activities. The company begun in the Sorowako area in 1968 but its relation to the local people has never been resolved as the more recent Karonsi'e Dongi community petition sent to central Government for redress sets out. The document, entitled 'Thirty years – and justice still denied', can be accessed at www.minesandcommunities.org/company/inco5.
9. For example since the foundation of a new area, Tojo Una-Una, in November 2003 the balances have altered between Muslim and Christian. Prior to the change Muslims made up 57.20 per cent, Protestant 40.18 per cent and Catholic 0.53 per cent. Following the change Muslim were 34.46 per cent, Protestant 72.47 per cent and Catholic 0.73 per cent. Sholeh, Badrus (May 2005), 'The dynamics of Muslim and Christian militias in Poso (1998–2005)', unpublished manuscript of field research undertaken in Poso. See also International Crisis Group (2001), 'Indonesia: violence and radical muslims', 10 October.
10. In 2002 when visiting Sulawesi I heard about Jemaah Islamiah and the groups who supported it in South Sulawesi. I heard about training camps involving Muslim activists in the area – one camp perhaps being relocated from time to time rather than more than one camp. I also heard of the presence of foreigners connected with the training. One person I spoke with told me that he had met a small group of foreigners on the ferry to Jakarta. They were leaving the country and were quite willing to talk about their roles as trainers. I also listened first hand to people involved in the conflict. When I returned in 2003 I again heard about the training camps and the activity of JI in the area and was given documentation from security sources to support the reports. Training camps existed earlier in the crisis. For a detailed account of the 2001 camps see International Crisis Group (2004), 'Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi', 3 February, pp. 11–12. According to the *Jakarta Post* (18 January 2003), 'Muchyar Yara a senior intelligence official, said al-Qaeda provided an undisclosed amount of money, along with weapons and explosives for at least 10 camps in jungles near Poso.' This was in 2001. Seven Western men and about 50 Indonesians trained in these camps according to the report. The *Jakarta Post* (7 January 2003) reported that the group behind the Makassar bombing ran military-style camps to the north and south of the capital. See also the International Regional Security Agency Asia Report (26 August 2003) 63, entitled 'Jemaah Islamiah in South East Asia', particularly Part V, 'Training in Mindanao' which is about the training camps.
11. The *Tempo* cover story (28 October – 3 November 2003) entitled 'Behind the conflict' identified the following as the principal actors in the crisis: Fabianus Tibo, Omar al-Faruq, Seyam Reda, Parlindungan Siregar, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi and Mustofa.
12. This is what I concluded from a number of conversations I had in 2002 and 2003 and then again in 2005 when I visited the region.
13. I heard eye-witness stories of gunrunning from the Philippines to both sides in the conflict in Sulawesi as well as in the Moluccas.
14. The names are in an unpublished draft manuscript based on the results of field research by Badrus Sholeh and entitled (n.d.) 'Poso conflicts, Central Sulawesi: a chronology', pp. 1–15. I have also had access to a second paper by Sholeh (unpublished) entitled 'Chronology of riots and peace in Poso (1998–2005), pp. 1–8. A number of excellent reports have appeared chronicling these events, analysing the causes of the conflict and listing recommendations for the consideration of both the government of Indonesia and the international community, and I will be building on these reports and seeking to develop some of the issues that arise from my study of the events in this area.
15. *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of the 'Nguki Network' in Indonesia*, Asia Briefing No.20, International Crisis Group, Jakarta, 8 August 2002, pp. 3–6. See also, Pelras,

Christian (1996), *The Bugis*, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 279–92; Kingsbury, Damien (2005), *The Politics of Indonesia*, 3rd. edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 45.
16. Pelras, Christian (1996), *The Bugis*, pp. 279–82.
17. Pelras, Christian (1996), *The Bugis*, pp. 282–6. Gonggong, Anhar (ed.) (2004), Abdul Qohhar Mudzakkar: Dari Patriot Hingga Pemberontak, Yogyakarta: Ombak. This is a definitive study of the conflicts involving Mudzakkar with detail and some material that supersedes earlier studies.
18. Kingsbury, Damien (2005), *The Politics of Indonesia*, p. 46.
19. See the analysis by Martin van Bruinesssen in a paper entitled 'Islamic State or State Islam? Fifty years of State-Islam Relations in Indonesia', www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessesn/personal/publications/State_Islam.htm, accessed June 2006.
20. Horikoshi, Hiroko (1975), 'The Darul Islam movement in West Java (1948–62): an experience in the historical process', *Indonesia*, **20**, pp. 59–86. Jackson, Karl D. (1980), *Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Van Dijk, C. (1981), *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. See also Van Bruinessen, Martin (updated July 2002) 'Genealogies of Islamic radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia', www.let.uu.nl?~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/genealogies_Islamic_rad. See also *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of the 'Nguki Network' in Indonesia*, Asia Briefing No. 20, International Crisis Group, Jakarta, 8 August 2002, pp. 3–5; 10–11;17–18; 20–2.
21. Van Dijk's study of Darul Islam in South Sulawesi is critical for an understanding of later conflicts. See Dijk, C. van (1981), *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, pp. 155–217.
22. See the account of Aragon, Lorraine V. (2004), 'Waiting for Peace in Poso', *Inside Indonesia*, January–March, for a brief overview of the conflict.
23. Dean, Gary (2000), 'Ethno-religious conflict in Maluku', http://www.okusi.net/garydean/ works/malaku.html, June.
24. Ridawan was not badly hurt. Others exaggerated the incident, giving rise to further rumours among Christians that the event had been used by Muslims seeking to consolidate their control in local politics. Bisalembah on the other hand was to be sentenced to seven years in prison for his part in starting the ensuing chaos in Poso.
25. Badrus Sholeh (n.d.), 'Chronology of riots and peace in Poso', p. 1.
26. In the early hours of the next morning leaflets appeared in mosques and other public places desecrating the figure of Christ. Although these were quickly withdrawn the damage had been done and tensions rose in the town. I heard about this in discussion with some who were close to the events when I visited the region.
27. According to local reports about 1000 Muslims arrived in Poso soon after the Christians from Tentena to reinforce Muslims believed to be in danger of their lives as the fighting escalated.
28. In the elections the Golkar party candidate was elected the *bupati*. Both Christian and Muslim voters shared their disappointment that their candidates had not performed better.
29. The mineral resources are significant and there are also abundant gas and oil reserves in the region. Buggis business interests from South Sulawesi have moved into the region to 'take control at every level' thus displacing traditional structures of leadership and leaving the Christian communities feeling 'Deliberately marginalized'. Of course Muslims saw things differently. From discussions I had when visiting the region.
30. Aragon, Lorraine V. (2004), 'Waiting for peace in Poso'.
31. See International Crisis Group (2004), 'Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi', 3 February. For details of this phase.
32. The attack is called Pembantaian Walisongo, or the Walisongo massacre. It provided the catalyst for Laskar Jihad to join forces with other Muslim militia groups to prevent Christians from obtaining the upper hand.
33. KYRWAY report (2000)–5 prepared by Idris Kyrway, p. 10.
34. KYRWAY report (2000)–5, p. 10.

35. See the article that appeared in *Time Asia* by Simon Elegant 10 December 2001, 'Indonesia's Dirty Little Holy War'.
36. According to well-documented reports there were 124 incidents in 2001, leaving 141 dead, 90 injured and 2438 houses burned. Twenty-seven people were reported missing and 102 were either kidnapped or tortured. See the *Human Rights Watch Report*, **14** (9c), December 2002, p. 20.
37. See the Opinion piece 'Why should they fear the (angry) masses?' in the *Jakarta Post*, 23 September 2006 written by George J.Aditjondro and the pertinent question that he raised about the trial: 'How could these three simple farmers, whose presence in the town of Poso was simply to protect their children in the catholic school in Poso from attacks by angry riots, could at the same time be the master minds and executors of the "attack" on the Walisongo pesantren at Km6?'.
38. For details about the trial see the Human Rights Watch Report, pp. 20–21.
39. *Human Rights Watch Report*, **14** (9c), December 2002, p. 21.
40. *Human Rights Watch Report*, **14** (9c), December 2002, p. 26–7.
41. *Human Rights Watch Report*, **14** (9c), December 2002, p. 27.
42. Aragon, Lorraine V. (2004), 'Waiting for peace in Poso'.
43. Human Rights Watch Report, **14** (9c), December 2002, pp. 28–9.
44. For a report on the Malino conference and the declaration, see the Government of Indonesia announcement on 21 December 2001, entitled 'Malino declaration signed by the two warring parties to end conflict and create peace in Poso, Central Indonesia.'
45. *Human Rights Watch Report*, **14** (9c), December 2002, pp. 29–34.
46. In 2003, I returned once again to Makassar for a conference. I then travelled to Palu to meet with Damanik. When we met, he was in prison undergoing trial.
47. According to the newspaper Damanik's name was on a list of 16 community and religious figures who had been blamed by Tibo for inciting a spate of attacks in the Poso area. But that was old news.
48. Damanik was not the only Christian leader under suspicion at that time. Augustina Lumentut was also a minister of the Protestant Church of Central Sulawesi and only the second woman to have been ordained by her church. Born in the Tentena area she had served her church twice as moderator. She had also served the Indonesian Council of Churches, had been a member of the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches, and had worked with the Christian Conference of Asia. At the time of the crisis she was living in Menado in North Sulawesi and convened the Council of Churches in North and Central Sulawesi. But she died on the night of 21 August 2002 shortly after returning home from chairing an evening meeting on reconciliation – she had complained of being unwell at the meeting. She had also heard at the meeting that next day the police planned to interview her about the part she was playing in the crisis.
49. By the time I visited Palu in June the case was reaching its final stages. I was in time to visit him in prison in the afternoon and then again in the evening, when we talked until late. I was given a copy of Damanik's written account of the crisis, (2003), *Tragedi Kemanusiaan Poso* [The Humanitarian Tragedy of the Poso Conflict], Tentena: PBHI and PS Ham Sulteng. We talked about the crisis and I met other supporters who were also visiting him. The next day, I attended the last sitting of the court before his sentencing a week later. After considerable delays throughout the morning, the court convened shortly after midday. I was not surprised to see that only one prosecutor was in attendance: they had completed the case against him and had asked for a five-year sentence.
50. When I arrived at the prison he had already been interviewed by cell phone with a local radio station, had reassured the Christian community that he was well and had urged them to stay calm. From prison Damanik was constantly to reassure his supporters that he was safe and to encourage them to work for peace and justice. Because of this location the population is made up of a variety of different ethnic groups. Approximately 60 per cent are Muslim and 40 per cent are Christian.
51. It is interesting that one of the witnesses called by Damanik, a law professor and a Member of Parliament who reviewed the evidence, spoke of the case as a fabrication.

He stated publicly in evidence that he believed Damanik was a scapegoat for some of the violence in the region.

52. The text of the interview with Bashir where Damanik's name is mentioned is published (15 September 2005) in Jamestown Foundation, *Spotlight on Terror*, **3** (9), www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news.
53. It appears that his early release may have been assisted by an intervention from an elderly Muslim cleric, Idrus R. al-Habsy, who wrote to the Minster of Justice on 23 August 2004 three days before he died in support of an early release for Damanik. The Muslim cleric was incensed by the injustice of the case against Damanik. If this was the case then this is further evidence that imprisoning him was counterproductive as even some in the Muslim community knew and recognized.
54. Quoted in 'Christian peacemaker released after help from Muslims', Ekklesia, 10 November 2004, www.ekklesia.co.uk/contents/news_syndication/article_041110rin.shtml.
55. Damien Kingsbury (2005), *The Politics of Indonesia*, pp. 207–30.
56. Laskar Mujahideen (the holy or sacred warriors) is the military wing of Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI) the umbrella organization for various militia groups.
57. There were about 2150 active members in this group including 150 from outside the region.
58. For details, see International Crisis Group (2002), 'Indonesia Backgrounder: how the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist network operates', 11 December, pp. 20–23, and International Crisis Group (2003), Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: damaged but still dangerous, 26 August, pp. 19–22. See also Damien Kingsbury (2005), *The Politics of Indonesia*, pp. 224–6.
59. Damien Kingsbury (2005), *The Politics of Indonesia*, p. 224. Almost certainly, Dwikarna established a training camp near Poso.
60. See the discussion by Halim, Wahyuddin, in 'Shari'ah implementation in South Sulawesi: an analysis of the KPPSI movement', Future Islam Insight, www.futureislam.com/20050701/insight, accessed June 2006. See also Pradadimara, Dias and Burhaman Junedding (2002), 'Who is calling for Islamic law? The struggle to implement Islamic law in South Sulawesi', *Inside Indonesia*, (October–December), www.insideindonesia.org. In an article entitled 'Opponents of Islamic Law', *Inside Indonesia*, July–Sept 2004, Jennifer Donohoe discusses the role of the KPPSI or the KPSI as it is now called (Komite Penegakan Syri'at Islam). In this article she notes that 'a research team found that 86.22 per cent of (South) Sulawesi's population did not agree with the formalization of Islamic law at [that] time'. In Makassar in June 2003, I met and discussed the policy and the work of the KPPSI with the General Secretary Azwar Hasan and another member of the executive.
61. See the Reuters reports, 'Indonesia probes al Qaeda link to McDonald's blast', 7 December 2002; and 'Indonesia McDonald's bomber blew himself up', 8 December. Also, 'Indonesia police say suspect in McDonald's blast linked to radical Islamic group', Associated Press, 8 December.
62. The incident occurred on 12 May 2002. See International Crisis Group (2003), 'Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: damaged but still dangerous', 26 August, pp. 13–16 for details about the group behind the bombing and the various connections with the conspirators.
63. The activities and the identity of Omar al-Faruq are intriguing. His connections with Agus Dwikarna are well documented. He was connected with the founding and the financing of an al-Qaeda training camp in Poso and was a regular visitor to Makassar. Al-Faruq was arrested on 5 June 2002 and after initial interrogation by the Indonesian authorities he was handed over to the United States and taken to the fortified Bagram detention facility in Afghanistan. He was arrested on the evidence of Abu Zubayday held (in late 2006) at Guantanamo Bay. According to the Kuwati government he is an Iraqi and his name is Mahmoud Ahmad Mohammed Ahmad. He was one of the highest-ranking members of Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia and directed the activities of Jemaah Islamiah until his arrest. He escaped from the facility on 10 July 2005 with three others.

See 'Confessions of an al-Qaeda Terrorist', *Time.com*, 15 September 2002. *Tempo Interactive* also published a story on 19 September 2002 entitled 'Omar al-Faruq recruited by the CIA'. The *Jakarta Post*, 26 October 2002, reported that al-Faruq had been handed over to the Americans without any undertakings to return him to Indonesia. The US Newswire and the Kuwaiti Information Office reported the story on 21 September 2002 that al-Faruq was an Iraqi. In a cover story in *Tempo* (2 October – 3 November 2003), al-Faruq was identified as a person who triggered the conflict in Poso. Reuters reported on 2 November 2005 that he had escaped from the facility in Afghanistan on 10 July with three others and was reported to have been killed by the British in a gun battle on 25 September 2006. The most senior Al Qaeda operative in Southeast Asia was Hambali alias Riduan Issamuddin. He was arrested in August 2003 in Thailand and handed over to the US authorities. See 'Hambali: the driven man', *Asia Times* (online), 19 August 2003; and 'Asia's Own Osama', *Timeasia.com*, 10–13 November 2003. As at 2006, he was still being held at Guantanamo Bay.

64. See also Fealy, Greg (2001), 'Inside the Laskar Jihad', *Inside Indonesia* (January–March). This article is a report of an interview with Ustad Ja'far Umar Thalib, the *panglima* or leader of what the author calls 'a new, radical and militant sect'. Thalib was arrested in May 2001 for inciting religious hatred and stoning a member of his movement to death. He was later acquitted by the courts. See also 'Laskar Jihad', IRIP News Service, July–September 2001.
65. For an excellent account of this movement, see Hasan, Noorhaidi (2002), 'Faith and politics: the rise of the Laskar Jihad in the era of transition in Indonesia', *Indonesia*, **73**, pp. 45–169.
66. This view has emerged in April 2006. See the opinion piece in *Indonesia Matters*, 30 April 2006, entitled 'Poso conflict prolonged by elites': 'the conflict is now being postponed by leaders in the government, police and military largely for financial gain'.
67. An overview of the case against Tibo and his associates is set out in some detail in an Indonesia Watch report dated 10 July 2006. In this report testimonies given at the original hearing but not considered by the Court are summarized.
68. There are indications that unless there are last-minute appeals the Bali bombers will be scheduled to die by firing squad in early 2007.The execution of the Poso three has been closely linked with the planned executions of the Bali three – on the grounds that the Indonesian government has to be seen to be even-handed in the dispensing of justice. See 'Politically motivated executions?', *Paras Indonesia*, 22 November 2005.
69. These are the first executions of the presidency of Yudhoyono. The government's position was summarized by the Vice-President: 'This is how we serve justice. If they are already convicted and all other legal avenues have been taken; they had to be executed' (quoted in the *Jakarta Post*, 25 September 2006).
70. I met the survivor of this massacre when visiting the area in February 2006.
71. 'Stirring up violence in Poso', *Paras Indonesia*, 31 October 2005, accessed from laksamana.net.
72. On 9 May 2006 the police reported to the Indonesian press that they had arrested seven men for the murder of the three girls. The *Jakarta Post* reported on 10 May that the seven had confessed to the beheading – two of the suspects were reported to have ties with Noordin Top, a key leader in Jamaah Islamiah. See *Indonesia Matters*, 'Schoolgirl beheading case', 9 May 2006. But the outcome is still unclear.
73. Hermawan Ary writing in the *Jakarta Post*, 25 September 2006.
74. Hendari is quoted in the above article.
75. Aditjondro, George (2006), 'Why should they fear the (angry) masses?', *Jakarta Post*, 23 September.
76. The question becomes further complicated when the issues surrounding the Australian six held in Bali on drug charges and sentenced to death (in 2006) runs its course.

8 Jihad in Maluku

Badrus Sholeh

Islamic forces after the new order

The Muslim–Christian conflict in the Maluku islands in Indonesia, which began in 1999 has been a much under-reported civil war, despite the fact that over 10 000 people were killed and over half a million rendered homeless. This chapter will examine how the conflict developed after the setting up of the Java-based radical Muslim paramilitaries of the Laskar Jihad (holy warriors) in the Malukus. The arrival of the Laskar Jihad was itself a response to developments in national politics and assertions by radical Muslims that Muslim-cleansing was taking place in Maluku.

This chapter will argue that religious segregation became much more pronounced within a year of the start of the conflict, as mixed Muslim and Christian regions in Maluku were destroyed in the fighting. The conflict essentially forced the respective communities to take refuge in their own separate areas. The Laskar Jihad will be seen as a type of 'premanism', though it is in this case maintained by a religious creed. Lindsey's analysis of premanism is crucial to our understanding of the conflict. He shows how certain elites employed vigilante groups to inflate the conflict and how they gained economic privileges as a result.[1] Analyses by Aditjondro and Tomagola, in examining the relations between the central elite and the preman-laskar, confirm Lindsey's assessment that both state and privately-funded premanism existed.

According to Lindsey, premanism is:

> derived from the Dutch for 'free man' and originally used to refer to irregular or demobilised soldiers . . . the term [*preman*] came to mean bandit and then gangster or, more commonly stand-over man. At times the term has overlapped with the *jago* (literally, 'fighting cock'), the village 'tough' of ancient tradition who in an urban context became a gang boss; the *rampok* bandits; and the *laskar* (militia or irregular forces).[2]

Premanism has been evident in recent years in Indonesia as part of a trend towards the establishment of Muslim paramilitaries, especially after the demise of the Suharto regime in 1998. Lindsey's concepts of 'state' and 'private' premanism underlie the analysis that follows. This premanism explains the genesis, development and sustenance of the conflict in the Malukus. Indeed, it was the Laskar Jihad militia group that played a

prominent role in the conflict, and it is the contention of this chapter that outsider forces were responsible in large part for the scale and sustenance of the violence in Maluku.

This chapter will begin with an examination of the rise of the jihad movement in Indonesia following the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, as well as the emergence and role of the radical Muslim paramilitary group, the Laskar Jihad, in the Maluku conflict. It will then examine the responses of various actors in the conflict, namely, the national security forces, the Muslims, the Christians, the NGOs and local government, and finally, the central government. The chapter then ends with a discussion of the post-9/11 jihad movement in Maluku, following the disbandment of the Laskar Jihad, and how this has left a legacy for local Ambonese in the form of more radicalized Muslim groups. It concludes with an analysis of the challenges that the central government and the local community faces.

Setting the context: the early beginnings of Muslim–Christian conflict

Islam had become established by the middle of the fifteenth century in Maluku through the influence of Muslim traders. The first Islamized regions were Leihitu and Hatuhaha in the kingdoms of Ternate and Tidore, where the local people had both economic and political reasons to cooperate.[3] From the end of the fifteenth to the middle of the seventeenth centuries, the Muslim kingdoms of Ternate and Tidore then spread Islam to the rest of the Ambonese islands. Islamization continued more gradually after the coming of the Portuguese and the Dutch.[4]

Cooley has observed that the advent of Islam resulted in changes in the local culture. In the indigenous marriage system, for instance, the required dowry was a human head as a symbol of individual prowess. This was later altered to rings, jewellery and other items prescribed under Islamic law.[5] Islamization was challenged by the Christianization of Malukan communities by the Portuguese when they held sway in the islands, from 1512 to 1605. The Portuguese first brought Catholicism to Northern Maluku, but encountered strong resistance from the Muslims there. They subsequently succeeded in Christianizing elites in Central Maluku, where there was less resistance due to the fact that the region had not been fully Islamized.

When the Portuguese first arrived in Maluku, the Muslim sultans welcomed them and the trade they brought. However, armed clashes soon broke out between the Muslims on the one hand, and the Portuguese and, later their local Christian converts, on the other, over economic and religious issues.[6]

Lestaluhu has detailed the history of these clashes.[7] The first was the Hitu War (1520–1605) between Malukan Muslims and Portuguese and Malukan Christians. The Muslim–Christian clashes continued until the

coming of the Dutch in 1605. Soon after the Dutch arrival, some 16 000 Ambonese were baptized in the Leitimor and Lease islands in 1605.[8] The Dutch were to stay on for more than 300 years until 1942. The Dutch colonial government brought the Protestant religion, which made significant inroads into the central part of Maluku. This was aided by the fact that Dutch policy favoured Christians in gaining access to education and lower administrative positions in the colonial government. Chauvel described the discriminatory policy of the Dutch government toward Muslims as follows:

> After some hesitation, and the request from the Christian village leaders from Leitimor in 1607, the VOC [Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie – Dutch East India Company] adopted the policy that Christianity was seen as a means to promote the loyalty of the population to the Christian rulers. The VOC also attempted, with limited success, to curb the process of Islamisation. Together with the destruction of the Ambonese Islamic 'states' and the elimination of the Moslem elite as independent political actors, this meant that the Moslem community was relegated to a subordinate position in colonial society compared with their Christian compatriots.[9]

However, they could not have foreseen the long-term consequences of this type of policy. It resulted in the division of the local community along religious lines and laid the basis for the conflict between Muslims and Christians that has continued to the present day.

The rise of the jihad movement in Indonesia

In a *tabligh akbar* (mass religious meeting) of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah (FKAWJ, or Sunni Communication Forum) in Solo, Central Java, on 14 February 1999, about a month after the Ambon conflict broke out, its leader, Ja'far Umar Thalib, stated that:

> Muslims must be alert to the threat from Muslims' foes and the separatists, who tend to tyrannise the Muslim religious minority. Muslims have an obligation to get behind an Islamic government, which is headed by a pious Muslim man. If the *kafir* (infidel) is to lead the government, based on the *fatwa* (guidance) of Syaikh bin Baz [Syaikh Abdulaziz Bin Baz], Muslims will have to battle against him/her.[10]

Thalib's perspective here was clearly biased against the Christians, as he gave a one-sided elucidation of the teachings of the Salafi Arab cleric, Syaikh Abdulaziz bin Baz[11] (d. 13 May 1999), a Grand Mufti of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Head of the Council of Ulama in Saudi Arabia. For Thalib, Syaikh Abdulaziz was one of the most outstanding figures, not only as a Salafi religious teacher, but also someone with the

international political connections that would help further Thalib's own agenda in Indonesia. The Salafi represent a reformed Islamic ideology in search of Islamic purification by returning to the Quran and the Sunna. The Salafist (reformist) thinkers base their teaching on that of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1896), Abu al-Ala Maududi (1903–49), and the leader of the Muslim Brothers, Hasan al-Banna (1906–64).[12]

To understand the developments of the jihad movement in Indonesia, it is important to examine Thalib's background and that of the FKAWJ. Thalib was born on 29 December 1961 in an Arab family at Malang, East Java. Thalib's father was an advocate of the al-Irsyad movement, an organization of the sayyid community during the colonial period. After graduating from the Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies (LIPIA) Jakarta, a higher institute sponsored by the government of Saudi Arabia, Thalib went to the Maududi Islamic Institute in Pakistan, under the sponsorship of the DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia – Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia), a missionary organization established by Muhammad Natsir (d. 1993) in 1967.

Whilst in Pakistan, Thalib was involved with the Afghan mujahideen in their jihad or holy war against the Soviet Union, which had invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and spent the 1980s battling to control the country. As a volunteer fighter, Thalib was attached to one of the factions led by an Afghan assistant professor of theology who graduated from Mecca. He was associated with Abdul Rabb Rassul Sayyaf's Saudi-supported organization, the Ittihad-I Islami (Islamic Union), Burhanuddin Rabbani's party, the Jami'at-I Islami (Islamic Association) and Gulbudin Hekmatyar's group, the Hizb-I Islami (Islamic Party) before becoming devoted to the Jama'at al-Da'wa ila al-Qur'an wa Ahl-i Hadith (the Association of Propagation toward Quran and the Followers of Hadith), a Salafi faction led by Saudi cleric Maulawi Jamilurrahman (d. 1991).[13] From these experiences, Thalib formulated his own ideas as to how the principles of jihad could be applied to the context of politics in Indonesia.[14]

Thalib returned to Jakarta in 1989 and taught at the al-Irsyad *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) in Salatiga, Central Java. However, Thalib continued to study Salafi doctrines in 1991 under a Yemeni cleric, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi'I, one of the spiritual teachers of today's conservative Islamist Islah party and the Salafi-Wahhabi movement in Yemen.[15] Thalib also studied Salafi doctrine in Yemen under Salafi-Wahhabi teachers during his hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca): each of them (Muhammad Nasr al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999), Abdulaziz Abdullah bin Baz (1912–99) and Rabi' ibn Hadi 'Umar al-Madkhali) were prominent figures giving fatwa (guidance) in support of the *tabligh akbar* and later the jihad in Indonesia, covering an assortment of issues from politics to war against Christians.[16]

Returning from Yemen, Thalib established a *pesantren* and a Salafi community called the Jama'ah Ihya al-Sunnah (the Community to Establish the Prophet's Teachings) in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta in 1994. He recruited students from secular universities and based his teachings on canonical books written by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah and the disciple of Ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad Abu Bakr ibn Qayyim. Thalib's study in Yemen and Saudi Arabia gave him religious legitimacy and a link to financial sources, which were the principal means of support for Thalib's jihad in Indonesia.

Thalib transformed the Ihya al-Sunnah into the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama''h (FKAWJ) in 1998, after the fall of the Suharto regime provided the democratic space for political Islam to emerge from the constraints imposed during the New Order period. He also shifted his focus from non-political Islamic missionary activities to political activism. The FKAWJ was a modern organization with an executive board, led by Ayib Safruddin, a graduate of the Psychology Faculty at the University of Muhammadiyah, Surakarta, Central Java, and by its secretary, Ma'ruf Bahrun, an engineering graduate from Haluoleo University, Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi. Thalib himself was the chief of the advisory board (supreme religious board), which had authority over the central executive board.

The advisory board comprised 54 Salafi-Wahhabi teachers, who had studied at Middle Eastern universities such as the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud and Medina Islamic Universities.[17] The FKAWJ's members were mostly low-income earners, university students or Muslims who had been laid off as a result of the financial and economic crises of 1997–98. The FKAWJ grew very rapidly in a very short time. It established 12 *pesantrens* throughout Indonesia, each with memberships of around 40 000 people. These later formed the core components of the militia organization, the Laskar Jihad.

Apart from deep alienation over the financial and economic crises, Thalib also benefited from the debates surrounding national politics, in the period between the formation of the FKAWJ at the *tabligh akbar* in Solo in February 1999 and the declaration of the Laskar Jihad at another *tabligh akbar* in January 2000 in Yogyakarta. During this period, the FKAWJ, along with other Muslim activists and organizations, not only called for a jihad to Ambon, but also professed that it was compulsory for Muslims to vote for the only Muslim presidential candidate in the 1999 elections. They wanted Bachruddin Jusuf Habibie to continue as President after the 1999 elections, rather than Megawati Soekarnoputri or Abdurrahman Wahid, both of whom they claimed would be *haram* (forbidden) for Muslims to vote for. Megawati as a woman candidate was unacceptable and Wahid was

regarded as a *kafir* (infidel) due to the liberal and eclectic form of Islam that he practiced. Wahid also supported ethnic and religious minority groups, rather than siding with the majority modernist Muslims. Wahid was in fact opposed to some of the main Islamic political movements, such as the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), on the grounds that Islam and politics should not mix.

Thalib argued that:

> Habibie was the only candidate who had Islamic views, in contrast with Wahid (PKB) . . . and Megawati (PDI-P) who were secular party leaders, who competed to assure *salibis* (Crusaders), Zionists and Chinese conglomerates that they were able to devote themselves to the purpose of stopping the dangers of the Islamic sectarians.[18]

Thalib not only backed Habibie in his presidential candidature with the support of a religious fatwa from Wahhabi religious teachers from Arabia, but also argued that the Ambon conflict had led to a general condemnation of the Indonesian military forces and of the government's performance due to their perceived failure to protect Muslims against alleged ethnic cleansing by Christians. After the formation of the Wahid government, Thalib claimed that it was the right time for Muslims to fight against not only the Christians in Maluku, but also against Wahid's government.

On 30 January 2000, the FKAWJ had their second *tabligh akbar* in Kridosono, Yogyakarta and declared their jihad in Maluku. According to Thalib, 'The *tabligh akbar*'s *Jihad* declaration was a response to the arrogance of President Abdurrahman Wahid in disregarding the cry of Malukan Muslims who were hurting as a consequence of the horrible crusade.'[19] This was the official declaration of the formation of the militia organization, the Laskar Jihad Ahlussunnah Wal Jama'ah (the Holy Warriors of the Sunnah Followers and the Prophet's Community), later called the Laskar Jihad. Following this declaration, the FKAWJ sent a delegation of seven members to Maluku on 12 February 2000 to gather evidence of the involvement of the Malukan Protestant Church (GPM) and the Catholic Church of Ambon in the alleged ethnic cleansing of Muslims.

The Laskar Jihad also invited Indonesian Muslims to join the jihad to Maluku. They opened jihad recruitment offices in the major cities in Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi, and also sought financial support from individual Muslims in mosques, markets, restaurants, streets and, more significantly, from high-profile national figures and conglomerates which used to be close to the discredited Suharto regime.[20] During their jihad operation, the Laskar Jihad claimed to have received financial support from many ordinary people, including individual donations from Yemen, Saudi Arabia,

Europe, the USA and Australia,[21] and from Muslim political parties in Libya, the Philippines, Afghanistan and Pakistan.[22] However, there was little transparency as to the identity of these donors, or how they were used to finance the activities of the Laskar Jihad.[23]

The Laskar Jihad recruited many unemployed Muslims, mostly from Java, South Sulawesi, Sumatra and Kalimantan, a number of university students, a few university graduates from secular universities, some veterans of the Afghanistan war and a small number from Islamic universities. Recruitment took place as early as February 1999, after the declaration of jihad by the FKAWJ and other Muslim organizations. The Laskar Jihad also held a mass rally at the Senayan Stadium on 6 April 2000, attended by about 50000 Muslims, including a number of high-profile political figures, such as: Amin Rais, the president of the Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party); Hamzah Haz, the President of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, the United Development Party) and later Vice-President of Indonesia; Yusril Ihza Mahendra, the President of Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, the Crescent Star Party); Ahmad Sumargono, who led the radical organization, the Komite Solidaritas Islam (KISDI); prominent Malukan Muslims such as Ustaz Ali Fauzy; and the former commander-in-chief of the Pattimura military command, Brigadier General. (ret.) Rustam Kastor.[24]

Although the Wahid government opposed the rally, elements in the Indonesian security forces supported it. Jakarta police officer, Lieutenant Colonel (Police) Said Agil, confirmed the involvement of security forces and argued that this rally was therefore better organized and orderly compared to other rallies.[25] Elements in the political elite, in particular those involved in the Poros Tengah (Central Axis) alliance of Muslim political parties, who were disappointed with Wahid government's policies and its lukewarm support for the implementation of Muslim law, also supported the rally.[26]

The Poros Tengah caucus was initiated by Amin Rais of PAN, and other Islamic political parties, such as PPP, PBB, Partai Keadilan (PK) and Partai Nahdlatul Ummat (PNU), which collectively only received a small percentage of the vote in the 1999 elections. They wanted to unite in order to increase their political bargaining power against the larger political parties, such as the PDI-P, Partai Golongan Karya (PGK) and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, the National Awakening Party). The Poros Tengah successfully organized support from parliamentary members for Amburrahman Wahid's candidature as against Megawati Soekarnoputri for the reason that 'Islam' was against having a woman president. They claimed that Wahid was the only candidate able to accommodate the frictions among Indonesians.

However, they were soon to be disappointed. Wahid as president failed to accommodate the various Muslim factions. Differences soon led to the departure of the representatives of Muslim parties from his cabinet. Thus, the *tabligh akbar* in Jakarta represented various disaffected Muslim interests and was organized to challenge the Wahid government. The momentum of the jihad movement, with the evident significant political support from Jakarta elites, resulted in an increase in the confidence of local Ambonese Muslims. This in turn led to the Christians responding by seeking national as well as international intervention in the conflict.

The following sections examine the roles of the various actors in the conflict, namely the national security forces, the Muslims, the Christians, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local government, and finally, the central government.

The response of the national security forces

During the first phase of the conflict, the Christians held the upper hand. During this phase, Muslims sought the support of their Muslim brethren in Java and other parts of Indonesia, holding numerous Muslim rallies to declare the importance of a holy war against the Christians. As a result of the support of the Laskar Jihad, the Muslims were able, during the later stages of the conflict, to reverse their fortunes and gain the upper hand, regaining the Muslim areas that the Christians had taken during the initial phase of the conflict.

This later phase began in May 2000, after the Laskar Jihad came to Ambon with their first group of 3000 members, equipped with standard military weapons.[27] The Laskar Jihad shifted the pattern of the conflict as a result of their access to small arms from Java. Not surprisingly, the Laskar Jihad's arrival had an immediate impact, with a rapid upsurge of violence as soon as they stepped ashore. On 16–17 May 2000 in the Batumerah-Mardika area, in front of the Pos Kota (city post office) in A.M. Sangaji Street, 13 people were killed and 50 people were injured. At the same time, from 16 to 18 May 2000, the conflict also spread to Ahuru and Karang Panjang, leaving 17 people dead. On 20 May 2000, 13 people were killed in Laha. Most of the victims were Christians.[28] By the end of May 2000, the Maranatha Church was desperate enough to seek international intervention by appealing to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to send a peacekeeping force to Maluku.[29]

The violence continued throughout June 2000. In response, the Christians founded the Front Kedaulatan Maluku (FKM, Maluku Sovereign Front) on 15 June 2000 and actively promoted Malukan independence in the months that followed, as a panacea to the increasing sectarian violence.[30] By 27 June, President Wahid was moved to announce a

Civil Emergency.[31] The Pattimura commander-in-chief was shifted from Max Tamaela to I Made Yasa. In response to international criticism and pressure, the security forces then attempted to counter the Muslim domination of the conflict by deploying the Yongab (Yon Gabungan, special alliance forces), which consisted of special forces commandos drawn from the military and the police. The special forces began duties on 22 September 2000, and proceeded to attack Laskar Jihad bases in Ambon, resulting in the deaths of a number of Muslims.[32]

The ascendancy of military forces after the civil emergency was declared reduced the conflict, though it continued on a smaller scale. Forced religious conversion began to be used by the Muslims. For instance, after an attack on the Christian community at Kesui Island in Eastern Seram in November 2000 in which 54 people were killed, some 655 Christians were forced to convert and become Muslims.[33] On 11 December 2001, 80 Christians died when a ferry vessel, the *California*, was bombed. Ambonese Christians responded to this incident by burning the provincial parliament building.

By 2002 however, the conflict began to wane. The central government sponsored negotiations led by the Co-coordinating Minister for People's Welfare, Jusuf Kalla, which led to the Malino II peace agreement in February 2002. The agreement stipulated an end to all violence as well as the banning and disarming of militias. The joint commissions created under the agreement would also monitor compliance and oversee economic recovery. The weariness, on both sides, of the intense and prolonged fighting explains the readiness to reach an agreement so speedily. Indeed, neither Muslims nor Christians responded emotionally when there were further incidents. For example, on 28 April 2002, the burning of the Soya village left 12 Christians dead.[34] On 27 July 2002 a bombing in the Mardika market left one Christian dead and 50 injured.[35] In September 2002, three young athletes died in the vicinity of the Mardika Court. In these incidents, both Muslims and Christians realized that there were outside actors involved in trying to prolong the conflict.

The response of the local Muslims

The arrival of the Laskar Jihad resulted in the division of local Muslims into two groups: local radical groups, which inherited the religious radicalism of the Laskar Jihad, and the dominant moderate Muslim group, which to some extent was opposed to the mission of the Laskar Jihad and was prepared to cooperate with the government in seeking a peaceful solution. These factions had an impact on the dynamics of inter-Muslim relationships and on interfaith and inter-ethnic reconciliation.

The first impact of the coming of the Laskar Jihad was a growth in Islamic radicalism among local Ambonese Muslims. There were two main

radical organizations in Ambon. One was the FPIM (Front Pembela Islam Maluku), chaired by Husni Putuhena. The second was the task force of the Amar Makruf Nahi Mungkar (AMNM, Enjoining Right Forbidding Evil) under the leadership of Muhammad Al-Tamimy, who is of Arab descent and who enjoyed widespread public support after Muslims became dominant in the middle of 2000. The FPIM gave intellectual support to radical Muslims through their role at Muslim rallies and in political activities against the local government and Christians.

The AMNM recruited local Muslims as paramilitary members, who then received paramilitary training from the Laskar Jihad and teaching in the doctrines of Islam. Local Muslims indicated that: 'the Laskar Jihad taught us [local Muslims] how to use an Islamic ethic in the conflict, in killing, burning and terrorising Christians'.[36] Ustaz Dzulqarnain, a leading teacher in the FKAWJ, stated that Muslims had a requirement before attacking and killing Christians: it was compulsory to teach Christians and persuade them to convert to Islam and it was forbidden to kill women and children.[37] Such teaching concerning war changed the nature of the local Muslims' religiosity. They gained a confidence and belief that attacking and killing Christians was legal under Islamic law.[38]

The moderate Muslims, on the other hand, opposed to the doctrines of the Laskar Jihad. A counter-movement began with the foundation of the BIMM (Badan Imarat Muslim Maluku) in 2001, chaired by Ali Fauzy, an Ambonese Muslim leader who had attended the Jakarta rally in April 2000 with Rustam Kastor to seek Muslim support in Java. The BIMM wanted to unite Muslim groups in Maluku to help stop the continuing violence and support reconciliation with Christians. Those involved in BIMM also represented those who are traditional Sunni adherents, different from the radical Salafi tradition of the Laskar Jihad. The Laskar Jihad predictably criticized the BIMM, describing it as 'a product of government design' in Maluku.[39]

The surprising success of the Malino II peace agreement demonstrated that local Ambonese Muslims had supported the Laskar Jihad in order to secure their lives against the perceived threat of the Christians and the separatist RMS (Republic of South Maluku). However, the violent activities of the Laskar Jihad had also become an embarrassment to Indonesia. Hours before the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002, the Laskar Jihad was officially disbanded in Jakarta. According to its legal adviser, this was due to internal divisions over policy and ideology, in particular, Thalib's approach to waging jihad. Its parent organization, the FKAWJ, has continued to carry out its social and educational activities on Java.[40] In Maluku, the Laskar Jihad warriors thus returned to Java after the disbandment. Without this interference from the radical organization, local

Ambonese Muslims were able to find release from their fears and burdens by working towards reconciliation with their Christian counterparts.

The response of Christians

The response of the Christian community gathered pace from early 2000 onwards, especially after the arrival of the Laskar Jihad in Maluku. Early on, Muslims perceived the jihad to be against Christians who had attacked Muslims. A few months after the arrival of the Laskar Jihad, however, the focus of the jihad or holy war changed from one against Christians to one against the separatist RMS movement. Muslims assumed that the separatist agenda had support in the wider Christian community. However, many Christians in fact did not support this, viewing the Maluku Sovereign Front (Front Kedaulatan Maluku or FKM) led by Alex Manuputty as being one of those responsible for inflaming sentiments between the Christian and Muslim communities.

When the FKM was first founded, it did attract significant support from Christians, who saw it as a moral movement criticizing the central government, which had failed to solve the conflict. After the arrival of the Laskar Jihad, the Christians felt compelled to seek international intervention to solve the ongoing conflict. In August 2000, therefore, Alex Manuputty campaigned against human rights violations in Maluku by appealing to the United States.[41] After returning from the USA, however, Manuputty's approach became more political. He opposed the central government by asserting that Maluku ought to be separated from Indonesia, on the grounds that Maluku was illegally taken over by the Sukarno government in the 1950s.[42]

With the failure of the central government in banning the activities of the Laskar Jihad in Maluku, and the rise in number of Christian victims during 2000, solidarity among Christians grew. As a consequence, Christian fundamentalism increased and made the conflict more severe in 2000 than it was in 1999. There were groups that played an important role in the growth of this fundamentalism; in particular, those who had played key roles in defending the Christians against Muslims in 2000. Agus Wattimena, the leader of the Coker (Cowok-Cowok Kristen – Christian Boys),[43] a gang based in Kudamati, claimed that: 'this is a real religious war and we have to protect ourselves. Sometimes protection means attacking first. We have a plan, and when the time comes, we will wipe them out'.[44] The growth of such extremist groups, however, merely exacerbated the conflict.

The Christian Laskar Kristus paramilitary group was formed during the early stages of the conflict, but this movement gained significant momentum after the destruction of the Silo church, the oldest church in Ambon, on December 1999. Agus Wattimena led the paramilitaries until his death

on 22 March 2001, after which Emang Nikijuluw, Semmy Souissa and Melkianus Yusuf Tuhumury led the militia groups. The Christian groups consisted of 25 small divisions of 100–200 militant members in the city of Ambon and in the neighbouring islands. Sixty per cent of members were estimated to be between 12 and 25 years old, with a few women members.[45] They used traditional arms such as knives, machetes, poisoned arrows, home-made guns and small numbers of automatic weapons obtained from corrupt police.[46]

The response of the NGOs and local government

There have been attempts at reconciliation since the early stages of the conflict in Ambon. They have some common features: both local and central governments have made ongoing attempts to initiate reconciliation with the involvement of both civil leaders and military officers. There have been the grass-roots-level involvements of local, national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as attempts by the Ambonese themselves to resolve the situation in their local communities.

These features can be divided into two patterns: top-down and bottom-up initiatives – each with their strengths and weaknesses. This chapter argues that in the case of reconciliation in Ambon, neither the government nor the NGOs on their own have been successful. Both are needed.

The first local government initiative toward reconciliation involved the formation of the 'Team Six' (Tim Enam). It was formed at the end of January 1999 and was given the task of investigating the January 1999 conflict and seeking ways to resolve the issues arising from it. It comprised both Muslim and Christian representatives: Thamrin Elly, Luthfy Sanaky, John Ruhulesin, M.G. Lailosa, Bruno Rumyaru and Condratus Ufie.[47] With the escalation of conflict, it was found necessary to expand this group to make it more representative and include local bureaucrats, religious leaders, military leaders, *adat* chiefs and others in the local elite.

This new team was given the name Pusat Rujuk Social (PRS, the Social Reconciliation Centre). In its early stages, the team was able successfully to look after mosques, churches and other places where there was potential for violence. It set about analysing the roots of the conflict, formulating a reconciliation process, creating suburban security patrol posts, consolidating management of *negeri-negeri* (village areas) and running seminars and workshops discussing the roots of conflict.[48]

The PRS initiated a reconciliation treaty at the Merdeka Square, Ambon on 12 May 1999. Religious leaders, heads of the local communities, youth leaders and other grass-roots Muslims and Christians signed the agreement.[49] However, this agreement was a top-down agreement, which was not understood by the grass-roots, who were largely concerned for their safety

and that of their communities. The team ceased to exist after the second period of the conflict began in July 1999. It was seen by the grass-roots as a government body, which was unable to effectively probe the roots of the conflict because of its top-down approach. The Muslim and Christian communities felt they could not rely on this approach.

The next government initiative was the 'Team Twenty-four', which was initially formed to ensure the protection of President Wahid and his Cabinet during their visit to Ambon in December 1999. It began by distributing some 30 000 pamphlets to communities in both Muslim and Christian regions, dropping them by army helicopter on 7 December 1999. These pamphlets outlined the *Deklarasi Menahan Diri* (Restrain Oneself Declaration), which stated:

> Towards the coming holy month of Ramadhan and Idul Fitri 1 Syawal 1420 H., Christmas (25 December 1999) and New Year 2000, people are expected to refrain from activities, which might instigate violence. Therefore, people are not to hold mass gatherings, nor to fabricate irresponsible rumours . . . nor to shoot, bomb or other similar activities, which would stir up mass feelings . . . and to immediately form security patrol posts in each neighbourhood [to calm the local population, give them a sense of security and a sense of their participation in ensuring their security].[50]

The statement was intended to calm the emotions of both communities before the arrival of President Wahid and Vice-President Megawati on 12 December 1999. However, the temporary peace prevailed until 19 December 1999 when conflict again broke out in Kampung Java, Ambon. Four people were killed and eight were seriously injured.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both at a local and a national level, played a pivotal role in reconciliation attempts. The growth in the number of NGOs was enormous, from under 50 before the conflict to more than 400 during the conflict.[51] This growth can be seen as a consequence of a growth in civil society activity in Ambon during the conflict. The NGOs saw reconciliation as a long-term process. Two examples of successful NGO outcomes were the Wayame regional self-protection units and the TIRUS (Tim Relawan Untuk Kemanusiaan – the Voluntary Teams for Humanity) initiated by 12 NGOs. However, the NGOs were not able to make contact with the radical Muslim and Christian groups, which were involved in mobilizing the communities for battle.

The religious and social leaders of the village of Wayame took the initiative in forming the 'Team Twenty of Wayame'. It was founded in February 1999 to protect the region of Wayame from attack and from influences stemming from conflict in other regions. The team successfully protected their community (Muslims and Christians) from outside influence.

The Wayame team conducted intensive dialogue, prayers for peace and encouraged respect for each other, assisting both the Muslim and Christian communities. From this experience, it can in fact be concluded that the Ambon conflict was not purely a religious conflict, but was instigated by outsiders.[52] However, the team continued to function only until May 2000 when outsiders mounted a full attack on Wayame.[53]

The Yayasan Baileo (Baileo Foundation) also founded TIRUS (Tim Relawan Untuk Kemanusiaan or Volunteers for Victims of Social Unrest) in conjunction with 12 NGOs on 2 February 1999. It attempted to coordinate local NGOs with the support of national and international funding organizations. It aimed to strengthen local organizations and communities in moving towards reconciliation, in rebuilding social ties and helping to support the victims of the conflict. The Baileo Foundation founded volunteer networks in both Muslim and Christian communities. It attempted to help people recover psychologically from what had happened, providing counselling for women, children and disabled victims of the conflict in both Muslim and Christian regions in Ambon, Central Maluku and Southeast Maluku.

After the failure of local government to bring about reconciliation in 1999, local government officials tried again in 2000, establishing a team called Tim Fasilitator Pemda (the Regional Government Facilitator team). On 14 January 2000, Governor Saleh Latuconsina released a statement announcing the formation of reconciliation teams among villages all over the Ambonese islands. These teams had the job of implementing a programme of reconciliation, which was to function at the village level.[54] These local government approaches, however, were ineffective because of a dispute between the civil government and the security and police forces as to who was really in charge during the civil emergency after June 2000.

The response of the central government

In addition, the central government also undertook a number of initiatives. President Wahid gave to Vice-President Megawati the task of coordinating the efforts of the Coordinating Ministers from the Ministry of Politics and Security, Ministry of Religious Affairs, and Ministry for Social Welfare and Poverty Eradication in initiating a long-term programme for reconciliation from January 2000. However, this central government initiative, though ambitious, ran into problems because of the difficulty in getting the executive members to work with each other. This was the result of friction between the Vice-President and President and between other leading figures in the central government.

Under President Megawati's leadership, the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare, Jusuf Kalla, played a mediating role at a meeting between

opposing Christian and Muslim factions in Malino, South Sulawesi, on 11–12 February 2002. They reached an agreement called the Maluku agreement of Malino II (Tomagola, 2002). At this meeting, 35 Muslim and 35 Christian government officers, political leaders, heads of villages, and Muslim and Christian community leaders agreed to sign an 11-point joint declaration.

Amongst its key provisions were: (1) To end all conflict and violence; (2) to abide by the due process of law which is to be enforced fairly; (3) to reject and oppose all kinds of separatist movements, including aspirations for a Republic of South Maluku (RMS); (4) the people of Maluku would have the right to stay and work legally anywhere in the Republic of Indonesia, so long as they respected the local culture, and observed law and order; (5) to ban and disarm illegal armed organizations, groups or militias, in accordance with the existing law; outsider parties that disturb the peace in Maluku will be expelled from Maluku; (6) to establish a national independent investigation team to investigate, for example, the tragic incident on 19 January 1999, and the involvement of Maluku Sovereign Front (Front Kedaulatan Maluku – FKM), Republic of South Maluku (Republik Maluku Selatan – RMS), Christian Republic of South Maluku (Kristen Republik Maluku Selatan – Kristen RMS), jihad warriors (Laskar Jihad) and Christ warriors (Laskar Kristus).[55]

Radical Muslim groups argued that the Malino II declaration was one-sided, as it did not involve them in the process of reconciliation. They argued that Muslims at the meeting were not representative of Malukan Muslims and that there were some Christians in the meeting, whom they claim were involved in separatist activities and the mass killing of Malukan Muslims during the early stages of the conflict.[56]

According to Pariela, the head of the Christian delegation at Malino II, the radical Muslim groups had in fact been invited, but these groups had said that they would only join the meeting if all *kapitan* (leaders) of the Muslim security patrol posts (about 100 people) were involved in the meeting and if they were able to screen members of the Christian delegation to exclude RMS activists. Pariela's view was that this was an irrational approach to take as part of a process of working towards reconciliation.[57]

The Malino II agreement became the key to further reconciliation steps in Ambon covering the broader issues. The agreement sparked a process not just in terms of dialogue but also in the search for political and economic solutions acceptable to both communities. NGOs came to have a prominent role in this reconciliation process, helping not just as a bridge between the Muslim and Christian communities but also acting as a bridge between the government and the local community.

The NGOs were able to reach a broad cross-section of people, from ordinary citizens to those who had actually participated in the violence. In the Muslim regions, the Malukan branch of the Lakpesdam NU (Lembaga Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia Nahdlatul Ulama, the NU Institute for Human Resources Development), an NGO under the biggest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, played a significant role in accommodating the views of grass-roots Muslims in reaching a peaceful solution. The Lakpesdam NU made available psychological treatment for young local Muslims who had been directly involved in the war against Christians, and facilitated dialogue between them and their Christian counterparts.

Jihad after 9/11 and future challenges

As described above, Laskar Jihad forces returned to Java and disbanded shortly after the Bali bombing in October 2002. After that, a general stability descended upon Maluku, although systematic violence has continued, with a number of unexplained killings.

This has been attributed to the Laskar Mujahideen, a radical Muslim network that is the product of the radicalization of local Muslims as a result of the activities of radical activists from outside Maluku. The network comprises of Mujahideen Kompak (consisting of those discontented with the Malino II accord), former members of the Darul Islam (supporters of the idea of an Indonesian Islamic state) and the al-Qaeda-linked Jamaah Islamiah group active in Maluku and Poso.[58] The group has attacked government forces, such as the operation against the police camp in Loki on 16 May 2005, which killed five police, a Loki Christian, and also led to the deaths of two Laskar Mujahideen members. More than 15 Mujahideen members were later jailed for the attacks.[59] The association with the Jemaah Islamiah and such violent activities against the state indicate that the network is linked to the problem of wider regional terrorism.

Laskar Mujahideen was founded soon after the early Muslim–Christian clash in Maluku in 1999. The Muslim organization in Java, the Dewan Dakwah Islamiah Indonesia, had mobilized groups to support Muslims from the threat of the Christians. This group then became the KOMPAK Foundation, which initially undertook humanitarian operations in Maluku and Poso beginning in 1999. This evolved into the Laskar Mujahideen, which, like the Laskar Jihad, took part in combat operations in Maluku. Unlike the latter, however, Laskar Mujahideen prefers to move and attack in small groups, comprising about 10–15 people. According to Ambonese Muslims, Mujahideen forces were more strategically placed and had a greater impact compared to Laskar Jihad forces.[60]

The Laskar Mujahideen network in Maluku has operations at the district level. Each district level post is chaired by a local commander, except in Air

Kuning where Ustaz Arsyad, a Javanese graduated from al-Mukmin Ngruki in 2001, became a commander in Maluku in 2004–2005. The group has a systematic mode of operation, with planners, financial supporters and executors.

The continued presence of such radicalized groups and individuals, coupled with the bitterness generated by the conflict, indicate the potential for the Maluku conflict to emerge again at some point in the future.

Government, civil society and security forces have continued their attempts at peace-building in Maluku under the financial support of national and international agencies. Coser has optimistically argued that the contending parties of the conflict will reduce their activities after reaching a collective accord of peace and development.[61] In Maluku, each ethno-religious group is aware of the need for unity in ensuring Malukan development.

However, there remain serious challenges, such as the plight of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the threat of Laskar Mujahideen forces. In 2005, several thousands of IDPs were still staying in emergency barracks, as emergency funds were siphoned off by a few corrupt government officers. The situation is mirrored in the plight of the IDPs in Poso, Central Sulawesi.

More seriously, Laskar Mujahideen members have continued to carry out jihad in Maluku. From 2004 to date, they have carried out a series of terror attacks against Christians and the security forces. From August 2004 to April 2005, for instance, they killed a Christian priest in Burru islands, bombed Christian regions in Ambon, and planned an abortive attack on Malukan Christians around the anniversary of the RMS on 25 April 2005. The Indonesian army and police have since successfully secured the region.[62] However, the Laskar Mujahideen attack in Loki in May 2005 indicates that the Laskar Mujahideen group remains a serious security challenge for the Indonesian security forces. Given its regional links, meeting this challenge will require stronger security cooperation not only in Indonesia but also internationally through the ASEAN and Asia Pacific security networks.

This chapter has argued that the impact of the Laskar Jihad militia group has been prominent, and that outside forces were responsible in large part for the scale and sustenance of the violence in Maluku. The local community, both Muslim and Christian, largely prefer to negotiate their differences in a peaceful manner, but the Laskar Jihad has unfortunately left a legacy of local radicalized groups that will continue to pose a serious security challenge for some time to come.

Notes

1. Lindsey, Tim (2001), 'The criminal state: *Premanisme* and the new Indonesia', in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (eds), *Indonesia Today: Challenges of History*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
2. Lindsey, Tim (2001), 'The criminal state: *Premanisme* and the new Indonesia', p. 284.

3. Leirissa, Richard Z. (1975), *Maluku Dalam Perjuangan Nasional Indonesia* [Maluku in the Indonesian National Struggle], Jakarta: Lembaga Sejarah Fakultas Sastra Universitas Indonesia, p. 7.
4. Cooley, F.L. (1973), 'Persentuhan Kebudayaan di Maluku Tengah 1475–1675 [A clash of cultures in Central Maluku 1475–1675]', in Paramita R. Abdurrachman, R.Z. Leirissa and C.P.F. Luhulima (eds), *Bunga Rampai Sejarah Maluku (1)* [A Compilation of the History of Maluku (1)], Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian Sejarah Maluku, p. 120.
5. Cooley, F.L. (1973), 'Persentuhan Kebudayaan di Maluku Tengah 1475–1675', [A clash of cultures in Central Maluku 1475–1675], p. 121.
6. Leirissa, Richard Z. (1975), *Maluku Dalam Perjuangan Nasional Indonesia* [Maluku in the Indonesian National Struggle].
7. Lestaluhu, Maryam R.L. (1988), *Sejarah Perlawanan Masyarakat Islam Terhadap Imperialisme di Daerah Maluku* [The History of Muslims' Battles against Imperialism in Maluku], Bandung: PT Al Maarif.
8. Chauvel, Richard (1990), *Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatist*, Leiden: KITLV Press, p. 18.
9. Chauvel, Richard (1990), *Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatist*, p. 20.
10. 'Apel Siaga Umat Islam' [Muslims awareness gathering], *Salafy*, **30**, 1999, p. 44.
11. Syaikh (or Sheikh) Abdulaziz Bin Baz had been a leading figure in the Saudi Arabian government for about 50 years. He came to prominence as a judge of the al-Kharj region in the 1950s and ultimately rose to the highest position among Muslim scholars in Arabia with influence over the Muslim world. He became the Grand Mufti, who was responsible for giving religious decrees on certain issues from family problems to politics until his death in 1999. See the website set up in appreciation of Bin Baz's fatwa (religious decrees) and his life: www.ibnbaz.org.sa, accessed 20 February 2003.
12. Roy, Olivier, (1994), *The Failure of Political Islam*, trans. Carol Volk, Boston, MA:Harvard University Press p. 34.
13. Hasan, Noorhaidi (2002), 'Faith and politics: the rise of the Laskar Jihad in the era of transition in Indonesia', *Indonesia*, **73** (145–69).
14. As a Salafi propagator, Thalib argued that Muslims should not get involved in politics. However, Thalib's jihad and religious rallies were supported by elements in the Islamic political elite and impacted on national politics. Therefore, this thesis argues that Thalib's jihad movement had non-electoral political motives. Because, under salafi teaching and tradition, Thalib pressured his Salafi followers not to join political parties.
15. Hasan, Noorhaidi (2002), 'Faith and politics: the rise of the Laskar Jihad in the era of transition in Indonesia', p. 153.
16. Hasan, Noorhaidi (2002), 'Faith and politics: the rise of the Laskar Jihad in the era of transition in Indonesia', p. 154.
17. Hasan, Noorhaidi (2002), 'Faith and politics: the rise of the Laskar Jihad in the era of transition in Indonesia', p. 158.
18. *Salafy*, **33**, 1999, p. 5.
19. Thalib, Ja'far Umar (2001), *Laskar Jihad Ahlussunnah Wal Jama'ah Mempelopori Perlawanan Terhadap Kedurjanaan Hegemoni Salibis-Zionis Internasional di Indonesia* [Laskar Jihad Ahlussunnah Wal Jama'ah Pioneering to Fight against the Hegemony Crime of International Crusader–Zionist in Indonesia], Yogyakarta: DPP Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah, Divisi Penerangan, p. 14.
20. Some speculative analyses conclude that financial support comes from elites in the Indonesian military forces, under Commander-in-Chief Wiranto, for example from Djaja Suparman and Sudrajat; and from some parliamentary members and politicians during and after the Wahid government. However, it is still difficult to prove these allegations. An interview with Sidney Jones, Jakarta, end of August 2002 and Canberra, January 2003.
21. Interviews with a FKAWJ staff member, Yogyakarta, early September 2002.
22. Schulze, Kirsten E. (2002), 'Laskar Jihad and the conflict in Ambon', *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, **9** (1), p. 61.

23. Interview with a FKAWJ staff member, Dogelan, Yogyakarta, early September 2002. Besides, the sources of the overseas donations were difficult to track down after the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, after which tight restrictions were put in place to prevent support for terrorism in South and Southeast Asia. An interview with a FKAWJ staff member, Dogelan, Yogyakarta, early September 2002.
24. ICG (2002), 'Indonesia: the search for peace in Maluku', ICG Asia Report No. 31, 8 February, p. 6.
25. *Republika*, 8 April 2000.
26. 'Menebar Virus Dari Silang Monas' [Spreading Virus from Monas], *Xpos*, **2** (3), pp. 9–27 January 2000 (5–6).
27. Before the jihad paramilitary deployment to Ambon, Ja'far Umar Thalib claimed that about 2000 of the jihad core members obtained military training in Munjul village, Bogor, West Java under the support of elements in the TNI, Afghan veterans and university student regiment members. [The Trainers are Afghan, Moro and Kashmir Mujahidin Veterans] see, ICG (2002), 'Indonesia: the search for peace in Maluku'; 'Pelatihnya Menwa, Alumni Mujahidin, Moro & Kashmir'. See also an interview with Ja'far Umar Thalib, *Xpos*, **13** (3), 17–23 April 2000, p. 4 and Fealy, Greg (2001), 'Inside the Laskar Jihad', *Inside Indonesia*, January–March.
28. Trijono, Lambang (2001), *Keluar Dari Kemelut Maluku: Refleksi Pengalaman Praktis Bekerja Untuk Perdamaian Maluku* [The Way out of Maluku Conflict: Reflections From Arising Practical Experience in Working for Peace in Maluku], Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, p. 61.
29. Trijono, Lambang (2001), *Keluar Dari Kemelut Maluku: Refleksi Pengalaman Praktis Bekerja Untuk Perdamaian Maluku*, p. 63.
30. Putuhena, M. Husni (2001), *Mengungkap Misteri Konflik di Maluku* [Uncovering the Mystery of the Conflict in Maluku], Ambon: Pengurus Besar Front Pembela Islam Maluku, p. 82.
31 Trijono, Lambang (2001), *Keluar Dari Kemelut Maluku: Refleksi Pengalaman Praktis Bekerja Untuk Perdamaian Maluku*, p. 64.
32. Syafruddin, Ayip and Eko Prasetyo (2002), *Tragedi Kebun Cengkeh Fakta Pembantaian Paramedis, Pasien & Warga Sipil Ambon* [The Tragedy of Kebun Cengkeh: Facts Pertaining to the Slaughter of Paramedics, Patients and the People of Ambon], Jakarta: Jihad Press.
33. KPMM, *Laporan Kerja Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia dan Mediasi di Maluku*, 19 January 2000 – 18 December 2000, p. 28.
34. The Soya is a mountainous region, about three hours walking distance from Ambon city. It was difficult for ordinary people to be involved in an attack on such a region. The victims who survived this incident came to the conclusion that members of the Special Armed Forces in cooperation with Laskar Jihad paramilitary groups were involved in the attack. They listened to the attackers' Javanese accents and observed their obvious military skills (an interviw with Johanes, Ambon, 2 August 2002). Before the incident, the Laskar Jihad seemed to have been coordinating their own attack agenda in consultation with members of the Special Armed Forces and other security groups, without involving ordinary Ambonese Muslims (an interview with Abdulgani Fabanyo, Ambon, 18 August 2002).
35. The bomb went off just a few hundred metres away from where I was standing when interviewing Christians near the Citra supermarket. Christians screamed '*Acang* . . . *Acang*' (Muslims . . . Muslims) Christians were alleging that Muslims had planted this bomb. I saw a group of Special Armed Forces personnel save a person (alleged to be Muslim) by using an *Acang* (Muslim) public car. However, Christians then realized that this person was a police intelligence officer, who operated in the Mardika market area (Ambon, a fieldwork note, 28 July 2002).
36. An interview with Irwan Patty, Ambon, 10 August 2002.
37. *Salafy*, **36**, 2001, p. 19.
38. An interview with Irwan Patty, 10 August 2002.
39. An interview with Ustaz Ali Fauzy, Ambon, 27 July 2002. Ustaz Ali Fauzy is of Malukan origin and who attended the National Muslim Meeting in Jakarta in January

2000. He spoke on the importance for a jihad in Maluku to fight against Christians. Fauzy welcomed Laskar Jihad to Maluku in 2000, but later opposed Salafi teaching used to influence local Sunni Muslims.

40. Tan, Andrew T.H. (2004), *A Political and Economic Dictionary in South-East Asia*, London: Europa/Taylor and Francis, p. 156.
41. Radical Malukan Muslims criticized Tomagola's record as a representative during the campaign. They claimed that Tomagola did not know about what happened in Maluku (an interview with Irwan Patty, 10 August 2002).
42. An interview with Johanes, a Christian and human rights activist, Ambon, July 2002.
43. The Coker was originally a gangster group called Cowok-Cowok Keren (Handsome Boys), but after the conflict they renamed it Cowok-Cowok Kristen. The change in name was important and was intended to foster Christian solidarity against Muslims during the conflict. A discussion with Christian youths in Ambon, July 2002.
44. International Crisis Group (2000), 'Indonesia: overcoming murder and chaos in Maluku', Jakarta and Brussels, ICG Asia Report No. 10, p. 15.
45. Schulze, Kirsten E. (2002), 'Laskar Jihad and the conflict in Ambon', p. 63.
46. Schulze, Kirsten E. (2002), 'Laskar Jihad and the conflict in Ambon', pp. 63–4.
47. Trijono, Lambang (2001), *Keluar Dari Kemelut Maluku: Refleksi Pengalaman Praktis Bekerja Untuk Perdamaian Maluku*, p. 136.
48. Trijono, Lambang (2001), *Keluar Dari Kemelut Maluku: Refleksi Pengalaman Praktis Bekerja Untuk Perdamaian Maluku*, p. 137.
49. The pact was signed by R.R. Hasanusi (MUI chief), S.P. Titaley (the chief of Sinode GPM, Protestant Church), Mgr. Joseph Tethol (Uskup Dioses Amboina, Catholic Church), Hussein Tuasikal (Remaja Masjid, chief of Mosque Youth), Ferry Nahusona (Angkatan Muda GPM, GPM Youth), FR Simon P. Matruty (Catholic Youth), RE Latuconsina (*Latupati*, head, of sub-district, *kecamatan*, of Saparua islands), AL Loilosa (*Latupati* of sub-district Amahai), Corputy (*Latupati* of sub-district Kairatu), Pellu (King of Hitu Lama), Abdul Aziz Abide (Association of South Sulawesi Families), La Hamsidi (Association of Southeast Sulawesi Families) and Ngurah Nyoman Wiandnyana (Bali Community). MUI(2000), *Himpunan Naskah Resmi Disampaikan Kepada: Presiden RI K.H. Abd. Rahman Wahid Pada Pertemuan Dengan Tokoh Muslim Maluku Tanggal 2 September 2000 di Istana Negara* [The Compilation of Official Papers Prepared for the Indonesian Republic President Abd. Rahman Wahid For His Meeting with Malukan Muslim Leaders on 2 September 2000 in the State Palace], Ambon: MUI, p. 173.
50. Pamphlets collected by the Crisis Centre Diocese of Amboinam 2002. (Translation mine).
51. An interview with Jefferson Tasik, Ambon, August 2002. Tasik is a director of the Balieo Foundation, one of the oldest NGOs in Maluku.
52. An interview with Tony Pariela, Ambon, 31 July 2002. Pariela is a senior lecturer at Pattimura University, Ambon.
53. Trijono, Lambang (2001), *Keluar Dari Kemelut Maluku: Refleksi Pengalaman Praktis Bekerja Untuk Perdamaian Maluku*, p. 144.
54. Trijono, Lambang (2001), *Keluar Dari Kemelut Maluku: Refleksi Pengalaman Praktis Bekerja Untuk Perdamaian Maluku*, pp. 138–9.
55. Tomagola, Tamrin Amal (12 July 2002), 'Seminar on the Moluccan communal conflict', a working paper for the Indonesia Study Group, Canberra, the Australian National University.
56. An interview with Ustaz Muhammad Al-Tamimy, Ambon, August 2002. Al-Tamimy became a rector of State Islamic University a few years after the conflict, and has facilitated religious dialogues through his university.
57. An interview with Tony Pariela, Ambon, 31 July 2002.
58. Fieldwork notes in Ambon, 28 September 2005, and in Poso, 19 May 2005. Cahyono, a police officer of Polda Maluku, confirmed this picture. Cahyono is a police investigator on the Loki case and its connection with previous attacks by Mujahidin forces. An interview with Cahyono, Ambon, 30 September 2005.

59. The Loki attackers (and planners) were Asep Jaja (Ciamis, West Java), Ongen Pattimura (Luhu, West Ceram), Fathur (a Javanese married to an Ambonese), Abdullah Umamity (Buru, Ambon), Ikhlas (a Javanese, killed), Ismail Fahmi Yamlehu (an Ambonese police deserter), Zainuddin Nasir (Batusangkar, West Sumatra, a commander of Mujahidin STAIN), Abu Zar (a Buginese of Poso), Jodi (a Buginese of Poso), Mukhlis and Ustaz Arsyad Azad (a Javanese). An interview with local leaders in Ketapang and Loki on 28 September 2005, and with some police investigators in Ambon, 28 and 30 September 2005.
60. Interview with Abdul Ghani Fabanyo in Kebon Cengkeh, 25 September 2005.
61. Coser, Lewis (1972), *The Functions of Social Conflict*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul , p. 112.
62. An interview with Drs Leonidas Braksan, MBA, a Head of Police in Ambon and Lease Islands, Ambon, 28 September 2005.

9 Al-Ma'unah and KMM in Malaysia

Elina Noor

On 2 July 2000, a group of 20[1] members of the Brotherhood of the al-Ma'unah Inner Power dressed in military fatigues, complete with assigned ranks, packed into three olive green four-wheel-drive vehicles and pushed off from their base camp at Bukit Jenalik, Perak for an unspecified project. The men were only informed by their leader, Mohamed Amin Mohamed Razali, that they would be collecting 'packed' weapons from the military. Between midnight and nearly 5 a.m., the group robbed forward Post 2 in Grik, Perak and the Territorial Army's 304th Battalion camp, also in Grik, of 116 different firearms and approximately 7000 rounds of ammunition.[2] The cache included M16s, M203 grenade launchers, light machine guns, general purpose machine guns, Steyrs, tracer bullets, harnesses and trip flares.[3] That same night, Amin fired an M203 at a cable tower in Lata Kekabu with the intention of plunging the whole state of Perak into complete darkness. He then armed three al-Ma'unah members with an M16 and an M203, and sent them back to the group's headquarters in Kelang, Selangor to target a Hindu temple in Batu Caves, Selangor, and the refineries of Carlsberg and Guinness Stout & Anchor in Shah Alam and Sungai Way, respectively. News of the operation was then meant to be posted on the group's website. Amin's ultimate plan was to wreak havoc and topple the government through violent means to establish an 'Islamic state'.

Five months later, members of a local militant group – Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia, later referred to as Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM)[4] – robbed a Hong Leong Bank branch in Petaling Jaya, Selangor of RM98 000 (approximately US$25 000) in December 2000.[5] Emboldened, the group attempted another heist of a Southern Bank branch in Jalan Gasing, Petaling Jaya on 18 May 2001. This time, however, the robbery was botched when a member of the group was fatally shot and the rest were arrested. What followed sent a country still aghast at the al-Ma'unah exposé reeling into even more shock. The robbery arrests uncovered 84 other members and the linking of KMM with a series of violent crimes in furtherance of its grand plan to establish a Daulah Islamiah Nusantara, a pan-Islamic union comprising Malaysia, the southern Philippines and Indonesia.[6]

At least one wing of KMM is believed to have been led by Nik Adli Abdul Aziz, son of Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) opposition spiritual

leader and Kelantan chief minister, Nik Aziz Nik Mat.[7] The group is allegedly responsible for a murder attempt on a non-Muslim foreigner; the murder of Kedah State assemblyman, Joe Fernandez; a mini-market robbery in Shah Alam; an attack on a police station in Guar Chempedak, Kedah; and the bombings of a church and a Hindu temple. Seized documents revealed the group's 40-week training schedule covering ideology, guerilla warfare tactics, weapons training, and analyses of militant movements in the southern Philippines, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Ambon.[8] The group had also been collecting intelligence on police weapons depots and laboratories at tertiary institutions around the country, and hoarding firearms and ammunition at their alleged hideout in Puchong. The assortment included an M16, five magazine clips loaded with 5.56 mm bullets, a revolver, a pistol, home-made bombs and a range of chemicals for bomb-making.[9] The Malaysian government alleges that KMM passed edicts to kill American soldiers for their oppression against Islamic countries. Other planned attacks included bombing a popular shopping district in downtown Kuala Lumpur and an assault against a carload of sailors on an expressway although both were aborted because of tight security.[10]

Undoubtedly parallels may be drawn between al-Ma'unah and KMM. There are similarities in: (1) their objectives of setting up an Islamic state; (2) their self-delusions of being mujahideen and dying as martyrs; and above all, (3) their abuse and misconception of Islam.

An 'Islamic state' revolution

While al-Ma'unah's focus was local, it is believed that KMM, through its ties to the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) and by extension, al-Qaeda, aimed to establish a regional caliphate.[11] What is particularly interesting is that like al-Ma'unah, KMM planned to spark strife between Muslims and non-Muslims as a prelude to an all-out religious conflict within Malaysia and beyond. While al-Ma'unah hoped to trigger a Muslim call to arms once the alcohol refineries and Hindu temple had been bombed, KMM – under the guidance of JI mastermind, Hambali (alias Riduan Isamudin) – intended to disguise bombings of key installations in Singapore as acts of aggression by Malaysia, thereby inducing Singapore to retaliate. Once the countries entered into a full-blown conflict, the portrayal of a Chinese, non-Muslim Singapore threatening a Muslim-majority Malaysia, would spur Muslims to collectively respond in self-defence – a jihad, as it were.[12]

As will be discussed below, the two groups could not have been established more differently. Yet a striking commonality underlies the origins of both groups. Authorities trace the genesis of KMM to a black period in recent Malaysian history known as the 'Memali incident'.[13] On 20 November 1985, a bloody clash erupted between security forces and

villagers in Kampung Memali Caruk Putih, Kedah. Fourteen villagers and four police officers died as a result of the violence. Depending on whom one talks to, there are different interpretations of what happened in Memali. One version endorses the government's decision to use armed force in arresting a religious teacher, Ibrahim Libya, and his followers for involvement in deviant Islamic teachings. The other blames government heavy-handedness in facing simple village folk who were equipped with tapping knives, machetes, crude Molotov cocktails and catapults, and were seeking to prevent Ibrahim's arrest.

Ibrahim Libya, himself, was a personality who meant different things to different people. The man who was born Ibrahim Mahmood worked in the 1970s in the Prime Minister's department dealing with religious affairs and ran for the Bayu state assembly seat for PAS in the 1978 general election but was defeated.[14] He was rumoured to have been trained in Libya – hence his alias – where he was believed to have imbibed radical views about Islam, society and revolution. Ibrahim's death in the 1985 tragedy led PAS to declare him and his deceased followers as *syuhada* (martyrs) despite the Kedah Fatwa Council's ruling to the contrary. Many of Ibrahim's supporters continue to visit his grave and those of the other 'martyrs' and he is still revered by conservative Muslims, particularly in the PAS circle. Police believe that Muslims upset at the death of Ibrahim vowed to carry out his beliefs through revolution.

One such individual was Amin. He studied under Ibrahim Libya and claims to have been present as a child when the Memali incident took place.[15] Amin's cousin began noticing a change in him 'after studying in Memali. He was very religious and started dressing up like an *ulamak*'.[16] Ibrahim's influence coupled with the Memali incident must have cemented Amin's outlook on Islam, the Malaysian government and society. In his rants at Bukit Jenalik, he accused the government of cruelty and insisted that it be toppled for refusing to establish Islamic law in the land.[17] Testifying in court, Ahmad Sarkawi Sulong said he was told by his co-accused, Zahit Muslim, on the last day of the Bukit Jenalik stand-off that Amin was bent on revenge for the Memali incident.[18] It was prescience on the government's part when the then prime minister, Mahathir Mohamed, gave specific orders to security forces to ensure 'Memali will not be repeated.' There were to be no casualties even though al-Ma'unah was armed with launchers and machine guns.

Aspiring mujahideen and martyrs

An important point to note which will be elaborated below is that not all al-Ma'unah members were intent or even had knowledge of Amin's plan to topple the government through violent means to establish an Islamic

state. However, there were certainly those among the 30 at Bukit Jenalik who were inspired to take up arms in what they had convinced themselves of as being the path of the righteous. When interviewed by Zabidi Mohamed, defence lawyer for three other al-Ma'unah members, two imprisoned al-Ma'unah members demonstrated a total lack of remorse for what happened at Bukit Jenalik. The killings of Trooper Matthew and Detective Corporal Sagadevan they attributed to 'fate' and God's unrevealed wisdom: 'When Amin fired the M16, certainly it was God who moved Amin's heart and hand. The fact of the matter is that it was all the work of God. Although it was Amin who pulled the trigger, it was God who willed the action.' The two men, whom Zabidi gave the pseudonyms of Mamat and Tambi to protect their identities, spoke confidently of their righteousness and maintained they had done no wrong in the eyes of Islam. They had simply acted in the name of jihad, as demanded of them by religion.[19]

As explained by then chief of police, Norian Mai, the spirit of revolutionary violence in the name of religion was imbued in select al-Ma'unah members by Amin in gradual stages. These followers were influenced by incendiary speeches at mosques, cassettes which touched on jihad and martyrdom, and publications about Muslim suffering in Chechnya, Kosovo and the southern Philippines.[20] This slow and calculated process of conditioning is consistent with similar tactics used by other terrorist groups. According to the prominent psychologist Albert Bandura, the socialisation of militant means among seemingly well-adjusted individuals is achieved not so much by altering their personality structures or tendencies towards violence but by 'cognitively restructuring the moral value of killing, so that the killing can be done free from self-censuring restraints'.[21] Nevertheless, their passion notwithstanding, only a few al-Ma'unah members had ever participated in conflicts abroad, much less handled firearms.

By contrast, a good number of KMM members belonged to the Afghan mujahideen fraternity (although not many actually fought on the front lines against the Soviets)[22] and were moved to transplant their experiences in Afghanistan to Southeast Asia. KMM, itself, is believed to have been founded by Zainon Ismail who fought in the Soviet–Afghan war and KMM leader, Nik Adli, visited Soviet-occupied Afghanistan while studying in Pakistan. His father, Nik Aziz, however, claimed that Nik Adli's trip was a 'normal thing at that time . . . as Muslims, it is compulsory for us to help other Muslims . . . even America was providing weapons to the mujahideen to fight Russia'.[23] Government documents in 2001 accused Nik Adli of receiving military training in Afghanistan between 1990 and 1996 where he recruited other Malaysians for 'jihad activities', scheming to overthrow Mahathir Mohamed's government, ordering religious assassinations,

ordering the purchase of weapons and explosives from southern Thailand in April 1999, attending Camp Abubakar in Mindanao where he and another KMM member learned bomb-making in late 1999, and sending 16 Malaysians to fight in Ambon in Indonesia's Maluku islands.[24] Other places at which KMM members have allegedly received training are Camp Udaibiah, Mindanao and Afghanistan.[25]

Not in the name of Islam

Al-Ma'unah's website explains the Arabic word *ma'una* as 'something extra-ordinary bestowed to a righteous Muslim (in the form of assistance from Allah) in accordance with specific adherence to tradition and proper sequence emphasising on [*sic*] the Islamic principles and Allah's commandments as stipulated in the holy Quran'.[26] Certainly, *ma'unah* as a derivative of the Arabic root word *awna* does refer to extraordinary, almost miraculous, help or assistance from Allah at a particular time of need.[27] One of the best guarantees of this may be found in the holy Quran itself: 'God has now lightened your burden, for He knows that you are weak. If there are a hundred steadfast men among you, they shall vanquish two hundred; and if there are a thousand, they shall, by God's will, defeat two thousand. God is with those that are steadfast.'[28] History is testament to this promise. Several centuries ago, on the Day of Criterion (Yaum-al-Furqaan) in the city of Badr about 150 miles from Madinah, Muslim forces numbering just 310 defeated a 1000-strong Quraysh army against all odds. However there are ethical conditions implicit in this concept of divine help – conditions which, as will be seen, never came close to being fulfilled by al-Ma'unah.

To start, it is important to use accurate terminology. The word 'jihad' has become a voguish short-hand term of reference to describe acts of violence or terrorism by individuals who profess to be Muslims. Loosely translating *jihad* as 'holy war' is not only careless, irresponsible and false[29] but also a demonstration of how self-serving militants have successfully manipulated polemicists into their (the militants') own distorted religious paradigm. In the words of former US diplomat, Fred Charles Ikle, there has been 'semantic infiltration'. The late senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan defined Ikle's coinage as, 'the process whereby we come to adopt the language of our adversaries in defining political reality'.

As a matter of principle and linguistics, jihad is the struggle to enjoin good and forbid evil (*amar maaruf nahi mungkar*) in the path of God. Jihad may be manifested through the heart (for example, striving to become a better person by controlling one's self-destructive weaknesses), the tongue (speaking out against tyranny and oppression, and preaching the message of Islam peacefully), the hand (offering physical help to the less able), and finally the sword (*jihad-bi-saif*), subject to carefully prescribed restrictions

that protect non-combatants, particularly the elderly, women and children, the environment and prisoners of war.[30]

Most Muslim jurists agree that combative jihad may only be declared by a legitimate religious authority and undertaken by a legitimate and recognized institutional authority, namely a government or an individual appointed by a government.[31] It is only when the government is absent or rendered unable to defend the state are Muslims allowed to organize themselves collectively for jihad. Jihad as an armed struggle can only be undertaken when there is a threat, or actual act, of aggression against Islam or Muslims, and must be subject to the following conditions: (1) *jihad-bi-saif* must adhere to the 'rules of engagement' decreed in the Quran,[32] and the traditions of prophet Muhammad. These rules are also incidentally echoed by present-day international law of armed conflict; (2) cannot be persistent and/or open-ended; and (3) contrary to popular critical perception, cannot be targeted at people of different religions for the purpose of forced conversion.[33]

To credit the actions of al-Ma'unah and the KMM as jihad is to subvert the concept's underlying fundamentals. Instead, both groups and their ilk, such as suicide attackers who unleash destruction on civilians in the name of religion are guilty of *hirabah*, or unholy war against society. An age-old word, *hirabah* as a juridical concept stems from the scope of *fasad*[34] (to cause mischief, mayhem and destruction), and was used to condemn barbaric attacks by raiding tribes which killed, pillaged and enslaved whole communities. Today, as in the past, the term may be applied to violence carried out by groups or individuals with the effect of spreading terror, damage, destruction and helplessness. The distinguishing elements of *hirabah* – what in Western legal understanding would parallel the *mens rea* (the mental element) of the crime – are intimidation, the spread of fear and helplessness, and the recognition of the absence of any effective security measure against the offence. There is no comparable component of *hirabah* to the *actus reus* (the actual act) of specific crimes in Western law. Instead, *hirabah* functions more as an umbrella category for all violent crimes meant to instill fear and extreme vulnerability in the general public with no recourse to aid.

A finding of *hirabah* would render 'the most severely punished crime in Islam, carrying mandatory criminal sanctions (*hudud*)'. Sherman Jackson, professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Michigan, refers to two verses in *Al-Ma'idah* (The Table) of the holy Quran as 'virtually the beginning and end of all juristic discussions on *hirabah*'.[35] Verses 33–34 read: 'Those that make war against God and His apostle and spread disorder in the land shall be slain or crucified or have their hands and feet cut off on alternate sides, or be banished from the land. They shall be held

up to shame in this world and sternly punished in the hereafter: except those that repent before you reduce them. For you must know that God is forgiving and merciful.'[36] There are variances among jurists as to the details of the punishments listed; suffice to say that the severity of each form of punishment illustrates the seriousness of *hirabah* as a crime.

It is interesting to note that whether calculated or not, the effect of the 'secular' sentences of convicted al-Ma'unah members in Malaysia accords well with the grievous treatment of *hirabah* in Islamic law and the specific punishments demanded of it as detailed in the Quranic verses above. For the first time in the country's legal history, ss. 121 and 122 of the Malaysian penal code were put to the test.[37] With no local precedents to refer to, lawyers and judges had to rely on Commonwealth precedents instead. In ruling upon the appeals of all 19 convicted al-Ma'unah members, Steve L. K. Shim, Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Malaysia recalled that the *mens rea* of the crime as correctly outlined by the trial judge was the attainment, by force or violence, of an object of a general public nature which directly struck against the authority of the government. The law, according to decisions and *dicta* of Commonwealth judges referred to, also required that no distinction be made between principal and accessory; that 'all who take part in the treasonable act incur the same guilt and are liable to the same punishment'.[38] Consequently, the punishment by death or life imprisonment mandated by the relevant sections in the Penal Code was to be meted out accordingly without regard to the role played by each participant.

Given how the language of the law on treason above parallels the act of a revolt more so than terrorism as we know it today, it would be remiss of me not to consider the possibility of al-Ma'unah and KMM being guilty of the lesser offence of rebellion (*baghy*) rather than *hirabah*. Recognizing that rebellion might be necessary against tyranny, Islamic jurists left open the door for such recourse in the interests of social justice. Consequently, Islamic laws governing rebellion (*ahkam al-bughat*) are considerably less harsh than those covering *hirabah*.[39] Rebels are given the benefit of the doubt as earnest and dutiful Muslims acting in good faith to uphold the injunction of enjoining good and forbidding evil. It matters little if their interpretation of good governance is unconventional or even 'wrong'; only that the rebels were, at the time of the insurrection, motivated by a 'plausible interpretation' (*ta'wil*) of a justifiable means of redress. This plausible justification should be based on 'the language of the Quran and/or the *sunna*, or the circumstantial and contextual indicators surrounding this language'.[40]

These qualifications, however, are not as indulgent of *baghy* as may be thought. The Prophet's Sunna, for example, reported in Bukhari and

Muslim greatly discourages disobedience to a head of state. Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said, as narrated by Abdullah ibn al-Abbas, 'If somebody sees his Muslim ruler doing something he disapproves of, he should be patient, for whoever becomes separate from the Muslim group even for a span and then dies, he will die as those who died in the pre-lslamic period of ignorance (as rebellious sinners).' Another narration reports the Prophet having said, 'A Muslim has to listen to and obey (the order of his ruler) whether he likes it or not, as long as his orders involve not one in disobedience (to Allah), but if an act of disobedience (to Allah) is imposed one should not listen to it or obey it.'[41]

Apart from 'plausible interpretation', rebels have to be backed by a certain level of force (*shakwah*), measured in numbers and military preparedness. Jurists are divided as to the minimum number required but the rebellion must be organized and widespread enough such that it is supported by a significant number of the public. Even if 'plausible interpretation' is construed in its broadest sense possible for the benefit of al-Ma'unah and KMM, neither group garnered considerable public support for its objectives. Far from that, several of the 19 al-Ma'unah members holed up at Bukit Jenalik repeatedly attempted to escape the area only to be thwarted by unfamiliar surroundings and threats against their lives by a bellicose, volatile and armed leader.

Additionally, both groups were prepared to harm civilians in furtherance of their violent ambitions. Al-Ma'unah's – or more specifically, Amin's – and KMM's selection of targets did, in fact, demonstrate the *hirabah* intent to spread fear and intimidation amongst the public without adequate recourse to immediate security.[42] Indeed, in affirming the death sentence for Amin, Siti Norma CJ of the Federal Court of Malaysia stated, 'Whilst I appreciate that the 1st Appellant is convicted of an offence for which nobody has been convicted before, this trend must be nipped in the bud and public interest demands that in the rarest of such rare cases, life imprisonment would not be an appropriate penalty.'[43] Similarly, in substituting Jemari Jusoh's life imprisonment sentence with death, Steve L.K. Shim, CJ bluntly characterized the appellant's shooting of Mathew Medan as 'a deliberate act of terror'.[44] The laws of Islam and the land are clear: regardless of the religious rectitude that members of al-Ma'unah and KMM had convinced themselves of, theirs were no exalted acts of jihad nor even of the armed political resistance afforded by the concept of *baghy* in Islamic law. Rather, al-Ma'unah and KMM were simply bent on changing a peaceable status quo through ways and means neither encouraged nor sanctioned by the laws of Islam, and are instead punishable by the harshest possible sentences.

The making of a militant group

As alluded to earlier, although al-Ma'unah and KMM seem to share numerous commonalities, there are material differences between both groups that set them apart categorically.

KMM was established with the intention of setting up an Islamic state in Malaysia and possibly beyond, and its members were not only aware and cognizant of the organization's purpose but also fully supportive of it.[45] Each member implicated in the crimes attributed to KMM played his role willingly. Not so with al-Ma'unah. The evolution of al-Ma'unah started innocently enough as a *silat* (a Malay martial art) association which registered as a society in September 1998 with the support of the Selangor state Islamic department. From its initial membership of just 54 people, the group grew to more than 1000 strong all across the country.[46] Its website claims that it has fellowship abroad, as well – in Brunei, Singapore, Egypt and Saudi Arabia – although the exact nature of this affiliation is unclear. In an interview with a local magazine in March 2000, the self-proclaimed Sheikh Amin explained that the inner power of al-Ma'unah's focus was on the art of self-defence based on physical exercise and breathing.[47]

Although the martial art of al-Ma'unah comprised of 'similar *silat* movements', it was neither *silat* per se nor 'any normal physical art of self-defence in that sense'. Instead, in addition to physical skill, an al-Ma'unah member studying under Amin would be able to generate invisible strength obtained from his 'total belief and submission to Allah'. With divine assistance, the force of this 'strange, vital power' could be produced at a point two inches below one's navel, from the reaction of the backbone 'which is surrounded by . . . invisible energy' usually dormant in most people. This energy would be activated by Amin upon acceptance of membership into al-Ma'unah, and could be used for health and vitality, invincibility, marital bliss, influencing others, and 'making an enemy/attacker to [*sic*] freeze on the spot', then hurling him from a distance.[48] Indeed, followers spoke of Amin's ability to read minds, hurl swords remotely, walk on electrical wires 20 feet above ground, disappear then reappear elsewhere, and send opponents flying merely by lifting an eyebrow.[49]

In court, witnesses – including an Islamic Studies graduate from al-Azhar University in Egypt – testified to attending inner power training camps during which one of Amin's opponents collapsed simply from Amin's twist of his beard. Al-Ma'unah members also froze oncoming attackers by shutting their mobile phones and witnessed Amin's ability to remain dry despite having water thrown at him.[50] All these feats were recorded on video to encourage recruitment. One particular 45-minute tape, believed to be a simulation of an attack by mujahideen and distributed only to members between May and September 1999, showed members

at a secluded beach immersing themselves in hot oil and husking coconuts with their teeth. Members who unsuccessfully tried to attack Amin seemed 'possessed' and had to be treated by their colleagues. At the end of the recording, hundreds of members dressed in white robes and bearing al-Ma'unah's flag were divided into small groups to launch an attack against Amin. The footage on the beach, which police believe was meant to simulate an attack across a desert in the likeness of Prophet Muhammad's battles in past centuries, was accompanied by religious soundbites, selective Hadith on jihad, and recruitment propaganda.[51] Training camps such as these – to test members' spiritual and inner energy – were held relatively frequently at different locations throughout Malaysia, and it was in fact the expectation of attending another one of these camps at Bukit Jenalik that unwittingly drew some of the 19 convicted of treason.

The duality of al-Ma'unah is striking. On the one hand, its philosophy was driven by piety, faith and devotion to Allah; a desire to 'carry out voluntary and welfare work and to assist fellow mankind where possible';[52] and to promote a positive relationship among Muslims and mankind. On the other hand, it appeared to exploit the sympathies of Muslims for other Muslims suffering in Chechnya, Palestine and southern Philippines. Al-Ma'unah's homepage asks its visitors if they can bear to stand by and simply watch Muslims being oppressed. It proclaims that it is the backbone of Muslim strength, that jihad is its way, and that Islam will surely triumph. Additionally, the website provides a link to www.qoqaz.net which hosts graphic images and 'News from Chechnya' as well as a now-defunct personal page linked as 'Get to Know the Zionist Israel Regime'.

Follow the leader

Amin's background is as colourful as the organisation he led. Like many cult leaders, he was an image of kindness, generosity, humility and piety among his followers. He taught them al-Ma'unah's style of *silat*, opened free clinics to the public seeking traditional treatment, and arranged for *fardhu 'ain* classes to be taught by an al-Azhar graduate and fellow al-Ma'unah member at the group's headquarters. Sometimes even Amin himself gave lectures on religion although these were more often skewed towards mysticism and occultism, practices in which he dabbled liberally. He professed to being able to communicate with djinns,[53] to having converted to Islam about ten formerly Hindu djinns nearly 300 years old at a rural area in Sungai Petani, Kedah, and to his soul travelling to pray directly in front of the *Ka'abah* in Mecca even as he led his followers in prayer in the flesh. He attributed his *Silat* mastery and other incredible exploits – such as walking on water – to supernatural knowledge obtained from the invisible domain of Allah's pious in Jerai mountain, Kedah.[54]

Amin told members he had been schooled within the *pondok* system in Kedah and at a *pesantren* in Indonesia, and had travelled to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia to deepen his knowledge in Islam. In truth, his religious education was only sporadic. He had studied at an al-Arqam-administered *madrasah* for a year and travelled to Saudi not for education but to perform his *umrah*.[55] Yet to Abbas Bakir (alias Ibnu Abbas), the leader of al-Ma'unah Indonesia, Amin claimed to be a famous and respected Malaysian *ustaz* (religious teacher, in this context).

Amin had twice sought Ibnu Abbas in Jakarta: first, to meet with Ibnu Abbas, and to relate his intention of opening an al-Ma'unah branch in Malaysia; and second, to invite Ibnu Abbas and his family to Malaysia to imbue 23 Malaysian al-Ma'unah members with inner power. Ibnu Abbas warned that the power was to be very carefully used and that if he were not invited back after three months, the power would be rendered invalid. Amin did not contact Ibnu Abbas thereafter. However, news spread that Amin had gained 3000 followers – many of whom were professionals, civil servants and members of the police and armed forces – and he had become al-Ma'unah's great teacher (*mahaguru*). Ibnu Abbas sent several letters requesting that Amin desist from appropriating the name, al-Ma'unah, all of which went unanswered until 22 March 2000 when Amin posted a notice on the Internet, disclaiming al-Ma'unah Malaysia's affiliation from al-Ma'unah Indonesia.[56]

In actual fact, the man followers revered as '*ustaz*', 'sheikh' and grand master was a former private in the Territorial Army at Regiment Camp 304 in Grik, Perak. There, he served as a radio operator in the Signals Platoon from 1992 to 1994 before he was discharged for drug addiction.[57] He then worked as a lorry driver before establishing al-Ma'unah, successfully hiding his chequered past from supporters. Amin frequently passed himself off as a former military intelligence officer who, through his connections with military brass, would someday organize joint training sessions between al-Ma'unah and the military. He even raised the possibility of al-Ma'unah eventually being affiliated with the Territorial Army. To outsiders, the implausibility of this may have seemed obvious. Al-Ma'unah members, however, seemed excited about the prospect which did not seem so far-fetched. They had, after all, been shown a videotape of joint *Silat* training sessions between al-Ma'unah Indonesia and the Indonesian armed forces (ABRI). Al-Ma'unah Indonesia's motto was, in fact, 'Assist the Ruler'.[58] Enthused, many fell for Amin's offer of a certification in twin-bladed sword weaponry – a fraudulent scheme which required that interested members pay Amin RM2000 (approximately US$526) for a RM370 (US$97) twin-sword that he purchased from a crafts and antiques store in the touristy Central Market, Kuala Lumpur. Amin claimed that the money would be

channelled to religious schools and mosques around Malaysia and that to be bestowed the swords, which were inscribed with Quranic verses, was the highest honour accorded to members.[59]

Amin's deceptively wholesome and devout image cultivated unquestioning loyalty among his followers. Followers were required to pledge allegiance through a *bai'ah* (a method also used by KMM, JI and al-Qaeda) loaded with religious language, and were cautioned against questioning Amin's guidance, orders or actions. Absolute loyalty was further cemented through Amin's concept of 'secret within a secret'. Followers were occasionally directed to attend self-improvement courses, tailored to improve an individual's self-defence skills and healing powers. Details of these courses were often revealed by Amin only at the last minute. Participants were simply told to begin their journey late at night and to meet at the appointed place before dawn. There, they would be told the location of their course. Often, these spiritual retreats entailed physically arduous tasks including shouldering a heavy coconut tree trunk while walking on sand in the sweltering heat of the afternoon, and duck-walking around the campsite.[60] Consistent with Amin's 'secret within a secret', the wisdom of these bizarre activities was only revealed at the end of the retreat. Until the confrontation at Bukit Jenalik, al-Ma'unah members had no reason to doubt Amin's intent or actions. Most were captivated by his extraordinary powers and many genuinely believed he was as he claimed – a devout Muslim gifted with special powers from God and capable of leading them to obtain that same divine assistance, '*awna*, from which the name of their group derived.

Although authorities claim that al-Ma'unah began deviating from its originally benign purpose only in March 2000, there are indications that Amin may have planned his so-called jihad even earlier.[61] In July 1999, at the close of a retreat held in Cherating, Pahang, participants were divided into a few groups and ordered to spar bare-handed. Amin stressed that the exercise was in preparation for jihad in the event that Malaysia were ever threatened by external elements. A similar retreat was held a month later. In April 2000, Amin and his deputy, Zahit Muslim, headed to Thailand to purchase 20 vests and ten black long-sleeved tops for a survival skills course in Sauk, Perak where Amin taught his followers how to cook rice in bamboo and how to trap freshwater fish using modified explosives.[62] A series of similar camps was held until June 2000. In May and June 2000, Amin instructed an al-Ma'unah member who was also an active army lance-corporal to buy 28 pairs of military fatigues.[63]

Whether meticulously planned from the beginning or not, Amin's earlier preparations came together beautifully at Bukit Jenalik. He had not only instilled survival and self-defence skills in his followers over a period of

months, but also nurtured unquestioning loyalty among them, such that even if there was an iota of doubt that arose in a member's mind, it was quickly smothered for fear of losing consecration. Despite al-Ma'unah's objective to 'build a sense of brotherhood among Muslims', there was an odd absence of fraternal bonding among al-Ma'unah members around Malaysia. The lack of a firm *esprit de corps* – vital for any effective organization, particularly a combative one[64] – within the group of 20 at Bukit Jenalik ultimately turned out to be expedient for Amin's purposes. It is unclear whether Amin had, by design, selected the 33 men who travelled to Bukit Jenalik from different states around the country. What is clear is that by the time the gravity of the situation finally dawned on those who wanted out, there was enough distrust and suspicion among the group to discourage any concerted attempt to flee or overwhelm Amin. They were not only strangers to each other by virtue of geographical origin, but Amin had also worked them to exhaustion in the initial hours of arriving at Bukit Jenalik so that there was no opportunity to even be acquainted.[65]

By contrast, there is no evidence to suggest that the alleged leader of KMM, Nik Adli Nik Aziz, had the same charismatic hold over other KMM members that Amin had over his own followers. What bound them together was a *bai'ah* based on their shared Afghan experience, a fervent desire to establish a regional pan-Islamic state and a passionate commitment to uphold the integrity of Islam in the violent way they deemed necessary.

It's all about connections

Nik Adli's arrest order issued in 2001 alleged that KMM members numbered 68, 45 of whom had received training in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation and after. Where KMM lacked in numbers, it made up in its connections. Authorities believe that KMM is closely tied to JI and is at least tangentially linked to al-Qaeda.[66] Certainly the overlap in associates between KMM and JI, as mentioned above, has proved opportune for both groups given their shared ideology and objective, and each has been more than willing to assist the other in operational planning and preparation. Singapore JI member, Othman Mohamed, helped KMM purchase a boat to ferry supplies and Laskar Jihad fighters in the Maluku islands. This was reciprocated when KMM (and suspected JI) member, Yazid Sufaat, made available to Singapore JI members four tonnes of ammonium nitrate he had earlier bought.[67] Ties between KMM and JI are so well forged that KMM members on the run are believed to be sheltering with or finding support from JI members in the region, particularly in Indonesia. Azahari Husin, JI's bomb-maker and suspected author of JI's bomb manual, was one of them. He was killed in a shoot-out with anti-terror police at his East

Java hideout in 2005. As of late 2006, his accomplice, Noordin Mohammed Top, alleged mastermind of the Bali bombings of 2002 and the Jakarta attacks of 2003 and 2004, is still being hunted by authorities. Noordin has proven to be elusive. Police were searching for him in the Bandung area but complaints of suspicious activity on a mountain by villagers in the East Javan district of Gondang have refocused the pursuit for him in that area, close to where Azahari was shot. Noordin and five others are believed to have been hiding there since May 2006.[68] Indonesian police reports stated that Azahari and Noordin had planned to increase the frequency of deadly attacks every six months.[69,70]

Unlike al-Ma'unah, the structure of KMM as an organization is more hierarchical. Authorities believe that from the 1990s, KMM shared the same spiritual leader as JI, Abu Bakar Bashir and the same operations planner, Hambali. The third person directing KMM was Mohamad Iqbal Abdurrahman (alias Abu Jibril). All three oversaw two wings of KMM, the first of which was led by Nik Adli and had a mixed membership of Malaysians and Indonesians. This wing was responsible for the series of crimes outlined above, including murders and robberies. The second wing, with members from Singapore and Malaysia, was still in the planning stages of toppling the Singaporean and Malaysian governments when authorities from both countries swooped in and arrested 28 of them.[71] Below Abu Bakar, Hambali and Abu Jibril were state bureau chiefs, followed by heads of units including weapons training and indoctrination. KMM was divided into numerous cells which received instructions from the same individuals but were not necessarily aware of each other's existence.[72] This maximum security precaution parallels JI's strict set of rules detailed in a 12-page manual entitled, *Security of an Organisation* recovered from the hard drive of Singapore cell leader, Khalim Jaafar's computer.[73]

Searching for answers

The al-Ma'unah saga ended at Bukit Jenalik when army commander, Lieutenant General Zaini Mohd Said, deflected a shot fired by Amin and wrestled him to the ground. Of the 33 members who had made the fateful journey there, four surrendered to authorities during the tense four-day stand-off. The remaining 29 were charged under s. 121 of the Malaysian Penal Code for 'waging war against the [King]'. Alternative charges for 14 of the accused were later offered under s. 122 of the Penal Code for 'collecting arms, etc., with the intention of waging war against the [King]' which carries a lesser sentence.[74] Ten of the 14 accepted the offer and pleaded guilty to the charge and were each served with ten years in prison. The prosecution revoked the offer to the other four and the trial proceeded with the remaining 19 al-Ma'unah members under the primary

charge of s. 121. All were found guilty. Three were sentenced to death – Amin, Zahit Muslim and Jamaluddin Darus – while the others received life imprisonment.[75]

As far as is known, KMM operations have been rendered ineffective since the government's crackdown in 2002. As of 2004, 17 KMM members were still being detained under Malaysia's Internal Security Act (ISA), including Zainon Ismail and Nik Adli Nik Aziz. The two have been detained since their arrest in 2001. Under the controversial ISA, detentions may be extended every two years. Lawyers for Zainon and Nik Adli along with five others filed a habeas corpus application for their release alleging their detention orders were 'procedurally flawed'. This was rejected by the High Court in 2004 and the Federal Court in 2005, on appeal.[76]

Much reflection has been warranted since the startling exposé of these two groups. Al-Ma'unah and KMM members were not ill-educated, poverty-stricken, angry young men venting their frustrations through violence. Most, if not all, were respected members of the community who had had, at the very least, a secondary education and who, at the time, were earning honest middle-class salaries. A number of prominent KMM senior members were also educated abroad with doctorates in technical and scientific fields. Azahari Husin, for example, held a doctorate in statistics from the University of Reading in the United Kingdom; Shamsul Bahari Hussein is a married father of four and an engineering professor at the Technology University in Johor who graduated from Dundee University in Scotland with an MSc in mechatronics; and Wan Min Wan Mat is a former university lecturer with an MSc in construction from the University of Manchester.[77] What drove these seemingly ordinary individuals with stable jobs and families to the path of militancy? The composite answers vary.

Band of brothers: buying into ideals

Observers have commented that the disappointment and alienation of urban life provokes soul-searching among professionals who, in seeking more meaning to their lives, turn to religion with fervour.[78] Armed with only rudimentary knowledge of Islam and deferring to the fiery rhetoric of those lacking formal religious education themselves, these world-weary individuals take on the causes of suffering Muslim brethren around the world and see a puritan Islamic state as the answer to all material ills. In the case of al-Ma'unah and KMM members, local political grievances reinforced by a victimized worldview of the Muslim *umma* underlay this bitter disillusionment.

Both al-Ma'unah and KMM were established shortly after the Memali incident in 1985. Authorities believe that prior to the formation of KMM in 1989, a temporary committee had been created in Baling, not far from

Memali, in October 1985 to continue the work of Ibrahim Libya, the former PAS member discussed above.[79] Significantly, many al-Ma'unah and KMM members were found to be PAS supporters although there is no evidence to suggest that PAS, as a political party, formally endorsed either of the two groups. PAS has consistently rejected any affiliation with al-Ma'unah and KMM, going so far as to accuse the government of fabricating the existence of KMM to undermine public support for the opposition party.[80] PAS has also suggested that the arms heist leading to the stand-off at Bukit Jenalik was staged by the government for political purposes, an assertion vehemently denied by the government and al-Ma'unah members involved in the incident. In fact, those committed to the 'cause' were greatly affronted by the indictment of their 'struggle' as a mere government-sponsored stage play (*sandiwara*). Theirs was a superior and justifiable moral imperative, and violence was necessary because there was no other recourse to establishing an Islamic state in a corrupt political system.[81]

Cult receptivity: duped into believing

For a number of al-Ma'unah members at Bukit Jenalik in early July 2001, loyalty was exchanged for a price they never bargained for – freedom. Although a few of Amin's followers had their doubts about Amin from earlier on, those suspicions were either forcibly quashed or pushed to the back of their minds. Indeed, many remained confused about the true purpose of their expedition to Bukit Jenalik even after the arms heist. For Kamarudin Mustafa, a father of seven sentenced to life for his unwitting role at Bukit Jenalik, the full brunt of the situation's severity struck him only when Mathew Medan and Sagadevan were killed in cold blood.

While psychologists have been unable to identify a uniform terrorist profile, experts who have compared terrorist groups to cults have found that the two are not unlike each other. Both terrorist groups and cults revolve around a charismatic leader whose seductive power entices followers to connect at an emotional level in the beginning. The late Margaret Singer, Emeritus Professor of Psychology at the University of California at Berkeley, spoke of the five D's – deceit, dependency, debilitation, dread and desensitization – through which cult members are recruited and slowly transformed. 'It's a step-at-a-time seduction, so the person hardly notices they are being changed . . . they are all extended con games whether it's a cult or a terrorist organisation.' Her interviews of about 6000 former cult members have uncovered the finding that even the most ideologically dissimilar groups recruit and control members in analogous ways.[82]

Indeed Amin lured and pressured members through a mixture of awe and fear, and carefully nurtured their trust and obedience over a number of

years by presenting himself as a caring leader genuinely interested in his followers' welfare. When Amin's deputy, Zahit Muslim, considered leaving al-Ma'unah and stopped going to the group's headquarters regularly, Amin called to enquire after Zahit's family's well-being.

The cult model of al-Ma'unah accords well with sociologists' role theory, which posits that believers are converted over a period of time rather than suddenly, and powerful group dynamics reinforce the social psychological conditioning process as well as enhance group cohesion. This sense of cohesion may be forged through 'depluralization', in which members are cut off from outsiders and alternative viewpoints – such as in isolated communes, or through the types of spiritual retreats organized regularly by al-Ma'unah – or by a group's insistence on confidentiality of even the most mundane details. KMM/JI members, for example, were not even allowed to share details of what they ate for lunch with family members.[83] Former KMM member and JI leader in the southern Malaysian state of Johor in 2001, Wan Min Wan Mat, explained, 'we were mesmerised by the JI leadership and its struggle. When you come into a group, you cannot think rationally. We were confident our struggle was correct.'[84]

Righting wrongs

Wan Min Wan Mat was released from detention in March 2005 after Malaysian authorities concluded he no longer posed a threat to national security. Repentant, he has – with some trepidation – urged Azahari Husin and Noordin Mohammed Top to renounce violence and instead to support the efforts of the present Malaysian government. 'Stop the attacks. It is a useless struggle. This has nothing to do with religion. It is not a religious struggle.' He is realistic though and knows that they will not change because they are willing to die. He says he, himself, is a changed man and simply wants to move forward in life, hopeful of not being judged harshly by society.[85]

There have been similar sentiments of regret, shame and guilt among al-Ma'unah members. During the course of more than 125 days of trial, many of the accused turned on Amin, blaming their misfortune on his deception and coercion and their own naivety. Half of them pleaded for leniency and mercy, and apologized to King and country for their wrongs. However, no one under the death penalty received a Royal Pardon. Zahid, Jemari and Jamaluddin were hung to death a week before Amin's sentence was carried out on 4 August 2006. Although calm when facing the noose, the former gang leader broke down and apologized to his family earlier on, even poignantly urging his nine-year-old son to study hard to become an *ustaz*.[86]

While there are undoubtedly recalcitrant die-hards from al-Ma'unah and KMM who not only remain convinced of their 'struggle' but are also

willing to die for it,[87] the examples of a reformed Wan Min and former al-Ma'unah members are proof that prevention and intervention – beyond theoretical decapitation, explained below – can be highly successful.

Experts advocate snuffing out the influence and hold that charismatic leaders have over their followers. Once the proverbial head of the snake has been cut off, the group is greatly weakened. Disoriented members can then be counselled, rehabilitated and resocialized. However, as with most afflictions, the preferred approach is to prevent rather than to treat.

At the strategic level, there must be recognition of the psychic rewards of terrorism; that is, that for those converted to terrorism, there is a psychology of rewards that fulfills a psychology of needs and desires.[88] The promise of martyrdom and a martyr's guaranteed accession to heaven has become an irresistible lure used by many to mislead the vulnerable. The history of radicalism is replete with the manipulation of religious scripture by those who are themselves devoid of religious credibility. Shukri Mustafa, the founder of the Egyptian group Jama'at al-Muslimeen (Society of Muslims), more popularly known as Takfir wa-l-Hijra (Excommunication and Emigration/Withdrawal), asserted at his trial in November 1977 that as the Quran was delivered in Arabic, the only tool necessary for its interpretation was the dictionary.[89] The fallacy of this assertion is obvious, and especially humorous coming from a man who knew no more about the Quran and Hadith 'than he did about Arabic grammar, of which he was wholly ignorant'.[90] First transcribed in classical Arabic at a time when the Arabic language had not yet developed diacritics, the Quran in Islam's formative years also required specialized exegetical tools through which passages were matched to the recorded sayings and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad in order to root their meaning and interpretation in their proper context. This, however, has not stopped people like Osama bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri, Abu Hamza al-Masri, and Mohd Amin Mohd Razali from reading their own bias into the divine language of the Quran and issuing myriad religious edicts to indoctrinated followers conditioned to group-think, not critically think.

The hijack of Islam's peaceful and tolerant message by wayward extremists must stop. Education as a key step to prevention must be emphasized and harnessed as a tool to counter flawed and shallow religious interpretation. The language of religion should not be shied away from, particularly when religion is being used as a precious commodity to manipulate and ruin lives. At the ground level, there is a need to strike a balance between providing individuals with the spiritual fulfilment they crave and grounding them in the diverse reality of the world today. In light of this, the Malaysian government is to be commended for pausing to evaluate and restructure the country's education system after the uncovering of the

KMM. There is now greater scrutiny of private religious schools as well as their syllabi and teaching standards.[91] The government has also introduced a programme called JQAF aimed at building a Malaysian identity of Muslim primary school students in accordance with Islamic teachings. JQAF is an acronym for the teaching of Jawi – the Arabic alphabet system for the Malay language, the holy Quran, Arabic and *fardhu 'ain* (individual obligations). Further, as Chair of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi repeatedly called for *ijtihad* – the deduction of laws or opinions not already self-evident from the primary and secondary sources of Islamic laws to ensure continued relevance of the religion in changing times. Expounded correctly by learned individuals, *ijtihad* holds great promise against the absolute rigidity of the radical viewpoint of Islam.

At the more strategic level, it is imperative that other aspects of Islam – familial and societal obligations, for example – be impressed upon all Muslims. Islam is not about ruthless conquest nor bloodshed and acrimony as extremist Muslims have made the religion out to be. There are numerous large segments of the holy Quran and the Hadith that regulate some of the more pressing concerns of daily life such as property division and spousal relations. It is just as urgent, if not more so, for men to provide adequately for their families than it is to die struggling in the way of God. The latter would be a windfall, the former is obligatory.[92] Yet, there are many radicals who venture to seek death without first putting into place proper care for their family. Azahari Husin, for example, left behind two children and a cancer-stricken wife who is no longer able to speak and is dependent on generous donations of family members to fund her treatment.[93]

The discovery of al-Ma'unah, KMM and JI in Malaysia, as well as terrorist attacks in the United States, Indonesia, Spain, the United Kingdom and now Iraq have brutally exposed the fragmented, weak and divisive *umma* that the Muslim community has devolved into since its glory days of past centuries. More crucially, it has also uncovered a dire need for Muslims all around the world to reflect, rethink, reclaim and reassert the true spirit of Islam. In a controversial move that some accuse of being politically tinged, but may yet prove expedient for the future, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi has embarked on an initiative to reframe the enduring and dynamic nature of Islam in a more contemporary perspective. Abdullah's push for a civilizational Islam – branded *Islam hadhari* in the country – hopes to refocus Islam as a progressive religion that emphasizes personal and societal development, to alleviate many of the problems besetting Muslims these days. *Islam hadhari* is touted as 'an effort to bring the *ummah* back to basics'; it is neither a new religion nor a new school of jurisprudence or thought.[94] As clarified by the Prime

Minister: 'The teachings of Islam are undoubtedly the foundation and inspiration for our actions but the benefits are intended for equitable sharing by all Malaysians, Muslims as well as non-Muslims alike.'[95] Since its 'unveiling' in 2004, national- and state-level officials have hosted public forums to discuss *Islam hadhari* as well as address concerns and confusion arising from the concept. The touted moderation of *Islam hadhari* is also starkly juxtaposed alongside PAS's severe vision of an Islamic state for Malaysia. PAS's idea of Islamic rule will undoubtedly impact upon non-Muslims as well. Despite the party's earnestness to explain the details of its vision to the general public, the majority of Muslims and non-Muslims are averse to plunging into a system viewed as alien and harshly restrictive.[96]

What of the future?

As alluded to above, the goal of all militant and terrorist groups is inevitably political. The desire to effect political change is in fact what distinguishes the notoriety of terrorism from other violent, criminal acts. It is not that Muslims driven to extremism hate freedom and democracy. On the contrary, it is often the perception of too many governmental maladies stymieing good governance and justice that ultimately fuel dissatisfaction, resentment and anger.

Malaysia has experienced a number of takeover attempts by different militant groups between 1967 and 2001. They included Tentera Sabilullah (1967), Golongan Rohaniah (1971), Koperasi Angkatan Revolusi Islam Malaysia (1972), Kumpulan Mohd Nasir Ismail (1980), Kumpulan Revolusi Islam Ibrahim Mahmood (alias Ibrahim Libya) (1985), Kumpulan Jundullah (1987), Kumpulan Mujahiddin Kedah (1988), Kumpulan Perjuangan Islam Perak (1998), al-Ma'unah (2000), KMM (2001) and JI (2001).[97] None of these groups were institutionally linked to any political party, and they operated on their own ideologies. Aggrieved by local politics and frustrated at the electoral system's shortcomings to establish an administration compatible with their vision of Islam, al-Ma'unah and KMM sought to overthrow the government using violence as a tool and religion as its cloak. Malaysian authorities, however, have a proven track record of strangling militancy in its infancy, whether home-grown or otherwise. In the past, this was met by criticisms of overzealousness and vociferous protests in the name of human rights. But as an increasing number of countries struggle with the same delicate balance between national security and civil liberties, consideration must be had for the fact that it was this same 'zeal', coupled with the significant lack of local support for militant activities, that drove Azahari and Noordin to flee for refuge within the more porous borders of neighbouring Indonesia.

Of course, this does not mean that Malaysia remains blissfully unthreatened. Law enforcement vigilance is but one part of the equation. The government is also acutely aware that socio-political grievances need to be adequately addressed to prevent exploitation by extremist quarters. A change of leadership style since 2004 has seen the cautious unfolding of a more open and democratic Malaysia. The release of jailed former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim restored credibility to a battered judiciary while a tougher stance on corruption and freer public discussion of previously taboo issues all promise progressive developments for this young nation. Paradoxically, however, this greater public space has resulted in growing racial polarization and parochialism.[98] In navigating the tricky waters of religion and race relations in the future, the test for the administration of the day will be to satisfy many without pandering to any one particular group.

An enduring commitment to good governance, equitable political and socio-economic opportunities as well as a sound and balanced education system will not only decrease the pool of disaffected but also ultimately prove that Islam and progress are not zero-sum constituents of the same game. Muslims must be made to realize that development – of self and society – is part of, even a requirement, of Islam and the achievement of such progress in no way necessitates the sacrifice of the values of Islam. Jihad, as such, should be rebranded and repackaged in its original spirit. Reclamation of this religious concept would significantly undermine the radical platform and provide individuals with a meaningful stake in their nation's future, thereby lessening the appeal of fringe militant groups such as al-Ma'unah and KMM. In an ironic twist to al-Ma'unah's clarion call on its website, jihad will indeed be the way of Muslims, just not as Amin saw it.

Notes

1. Although the exact total has been disputed, I defer to the facts as stated in court documents. In his book, counsel for three of the al-Ma'unah members, Zabidi Mohamed, notes there were between 18 and 20 members who were picked for the mission. Some media reports, however, have tended to favour a more conservative estimate of 15 members involved in the arms raid. See, judgment of Siti Norma Yaakob, *Mohd Amin Bin Mohd Razali (and 18 others)* v *Public Prosecutor* and *Public Prosecutor* v *Ibrahim bin Idris (and 15 others*), Federal Court (Criminal Jurisdiction) (in Malay), 26 June 2003, www.kehakiman.gov.my/judgement/fc/latest/MP.BidangkuasaJenayah%20No.05(02–20)-2000(W).htm; Mohamed, Zabidi (2003), *Maunah: Kebenaran Yang Sebenar*, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Zabidi Publication, p. 205; Hussin, Anwar, 'Mohd Amin sering cakap seorang diri sejak didakwa', *Berita Harian* (Kuala Lumpur, in Malay), 5 April 2001; 'Kertas putih kegiatan Al-Ma'unah dikeluar bila-bila masa', *Utusan Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur, in Malay), 7 January 2002; Ahmad, Reme (2004), 'Ex-cult leader warns against blind faith', *Straits Times* (Singapore), 31 May.
2. 'Gerakan militant Al-Ma'unah bermula Mac', *Berita Harian* (Kuala Lumpur, in Malay), 24 July 2000.

3. For a more detailed listing of weapons and ammunition stolen, see Mohamed, Zabidi, (2003) pp. 220 and 225; 'Al-Ma'unah: 97 M-16 dikemukakan', *Utusan Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur, in Malay), 5 October 2000.
4. Replying to a question from Senator Jamilah Ibrahim in Parliament, then Deputy Home Minister Zainal Abidin Zin explained that the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia had come to be renamed Kumpulan Militan Malaysia because its cause 'is [not only] to mount *jihad* or holy war' but it also 'committed crimes that threatened national security. That it why it is also called the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia.' See, 'Only one soldier, two ex-servicemen join militant group', *Utusan Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur, in English), 4 December 2001.
5. Malaysian Chinese Association, 'PAS dicing with bitter harvest', MCA: Commentary, 9 April 2004, www.mca.org.my/story.asp?file5/articles/commentary/2004/4/23884.html&sec=Commentary.
6. MCA: Commentary, 9 April 2004.
7. 'Nik Adli identified as militant group leader', *Star* (Kuala Lumpur), 9 August 2001. The claim was made by then-Deputy Home Minister, Zainal Abidin Zin, in Parliament during a debate on the detention of ten KMM accused members under the Internal Security Act. Police alleged that Nik Adli's appointment was made, and seconded by Tajuddin Abu Bakar, at a KMM meeting attended by 12 others in Kampung Seri Aman, Puchong, in early 1999. As at late 2006, he continues to be held under the ISA. His next review period is scheduled for September 2005. His father, Nik Aziz, has questioned the existence of the KMM and consistently urged for a fair trial in open court for his son.
8. Lee Shi-Ian, (2002), '13 KMM men held under ISA', *New Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), 5 January; Lau, Leslie (2002), 'Arrested KL militants were raising funds for "holy war" ', *Straits Times* (Singapore), 6 January.
9. Wong Chun Wai (2001), 'Step up efforts to thwart militant groups', *Star* (Kuala Lumpur), 14 August.
10. Singh, Jasbant (2001), 'As al-Qaida links in Malaysia probed, authorities focus on home grown radical group', Associated Press, 6 December.
11. KMM and JI membership overlapped. JI chief strategist, Hambali, was the key link between al-Qaeda, JI and the KMM in the Southeast Asian region. Both Hambali and JI spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, were also wanted by Malaysian authorities for their involvement in the murder of Joe Fernandez. Additionally, the second most powerful JI member after Hambali, Mohamad Iqbal Rahman (alias Abu Jibril) was also a senior member of the KMM. He was arrested in June 2001, a month after the Southern Bank robbery. Other KMM/JI members included Yazid Sufaat, who hosted the so-called '20th hijacker' of the 9/11 attacks, Zacarias Moussaoui, in Kuala Lumpur and Wan Min Wan Mat, former KMM head in the southern Malaysian state of Johor. See, Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs (2003), *White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism*, 7 January, www2.mha.gov.sg/mha/detailed.jsp?artid667&type4&root0&parent0&cat0&modearc, Singh, Jasbir (2002), 'KMM had links with al-Qaeda', *New Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), 25 January; 'Johor KMM Chief Arrested in Kelantan', *Bernama* (Kuala Lumpur), 27 September 2002; 'Freed KMM member faces deportation to Indonesia', *New Straits Times*, 24 August 2003; 'Wan Min urges Azhari, Nordin to repent', *Malay Mail* (Kuala Lumpur), 24 March 2005.
12. Charles, Lourdes (2002), 'Suspects wanted to sow mistrust with M'sia', *Star*, 20 September. See also 'The Link of Terror', *Malay Mail*, 21 September 2002.
13. Pereira, Brendan (2003), 'PAS leader was at meeting that Bashir attended', *Straits Times* (Singapore), 9 February.
14. Cumming Bruce, Nick (1986), 'Malaysia "tells all" in battle video', *Guardian* (London), 4 January, 'Ibrahim Libya promoted political ideology in his talks', *Bernama*, 14 October 2002.
15. Mohamed, Zabidi (2003), p. 175.
16. Pereira, Brendan (2000), 'Doomed from the start', *Straits Times* (Singapore), 9 July.
17. Mohamed, Zabidi (2003), pp. 286–7.

18. 'Mohd Amin wanted revenge for Memali incident', *New Straits Times*, 20 June 2001.
19. Mohamed, Zabidi (2003), pp. 314–5, 317.
20. 'Gerakan militant Al-Ma'unah bermula Mac', *Berita Harian* (Kuala Lumpur, in Malay), 24 July 2000.
21. Bandura, Albert 'Mechanisms of moral disengagement', in Walter Reich (ed.) (1998), *Origins of Terrorism*, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, p. 164.
22. Police claim that some followers did not fight in the civil war but had established contacts there after the war. Younger followers trained by mujahideen were claiming themselves to be mujahideen to uphold their image as defenders of Islam. The truth is that those in their thirties now were still at school during the Afghan war. See, Wong Chun Wai (2001), 'Idealistic young men fired by call for jihad', *Star*, 10 August.
23. 'Nik Aziz admits his son had been to Afghanistan', *Bernama*, 5 August 2001.
24. Singh, Hasbant (2001), 'Malaysian suspect allegedly wanted hardline Islamic state', 25 September.
25. Lee Shi-Ian (2002), '13 KMM men held under ISA', *New Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), 5 January; Singh, Jasbir (2002), 'KMM had links with al-Qaeda', *New Straits Times*, 25 January; 'Militants "trained in nearby country" ', *Straits Times* (Singapore), 11 January 2002.
26. Al-Ma'unah Homepage, 'Introduction', members.tripod.com/~al_maunah/intro.htm.
27. Mohamed Noh, Maarop (2000), 'Menjelaskan pengertian sebenar al-Ma'unah', *Berita Harian* (Kuala Lumpur, in Malay), 14 July.
28. Dawood, N.J. (trans.)(1999), '*Al Anfaal* (The Spoils)', 8:66 in *The Koran*, London, UK and New York, US: Penguin Books, p. 132.
29. Scholars of Islam agree that the translation of *jihad* into 'holy war' does not accord with either the principle of Islam or the Arabic language. The so-called 'sword verse' of *Al-Tawbah* (9:5) was revealed at a particular period to deal with a particular situation, historical context often conveniently overlooked by critics of Islam. Moreover, an Arabic translation of 'holy war' would render *harbun muqaddasatun* and the words 'war' would translate into *harb* and/or *qital.* See for example Khaled Abou El-Fadl, (2002), *The Place of Tolerance in Islam*, Boston, MA: Beacon Books, pp. 18–21; Safi, Louay M.(2001), *Peace and the Limits of War: Transcending Classical Conception of Jihad*, Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought; Ali, M. Amir, 'Jihad explained', The Institute of Islamic Information and Education, www.iiie.net/Brochures/Brochure-18.html, accessed June 2006.
30. The rules of war in Islam are collectively known as *siyar*. See, for example, the narrations of Al-Khudri, Abu Sa'id in *Sahih Bukhari*, Vol. 4, Book 52, No. 280, and bin 'Abdullah, Jabir in *Sahih Bukhari*, Vol. 4, Book 52, Number 252, www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/052.sbt.html. As to the relative gravity of each type of jihad, there is a Hadith that relates that upon return from battle, Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said, 'We have returned from the lesser *jihad* to the greater *jihad*.' When asked, 'O, Prophet of God, which is the greater *jihad*?' He replied, 'The struggle against the *nafs* (self).' The Prophet is also reported to have said during the Farewell Pilgrimage, 'The Fighter in the Way of Allah is he who makes *jihad* against himself (*jahada nafsah*) for the sake of obeying Allah.' See, juridical ruling (fatwa) of Shaykh Hisham Kabbani and Shaykh Seraj Hendricks (1998), 'Jihad: a misunderstood concept from Islam', www.themodernreligion.com/jihad/jihad-misunderstood.html.
31. The Muslim jurist Abu Bakr Al-Jazaa'iri said: 'A pure intention and that it is performed behind a Muslim *imam* and beneath his flag and with his permission . . . it is not permissible for them to fight without an *imam*'. See, Shaykh Hisham Kabbani and Shaykh Seraj Hendricks (1998).
32. '*Al-Baqarah* (The Heifer)', 2:190.
33. 'Making sense of *Jihad* vs *Hirabah* (terrorism)', The Islam Project, www.theislamproject.org/education/D05_Hirabah.htm.
34. 'Making sense of *Jihad* vs *Hirabah* (terrorism).'
35. 'Making sense of *Jihad* vs *Hirabah* (terrorism).' See Guirard, Jim (2002), 'It's not *jihad* – it's unholy *hirabah*', TrueSpeak Institute, www.cuii.org/hirabahq.htm, 19 December; and

Jackson, Sherman A (2001), 'Domestic terrorism in the Islamic legal tradition', *Muslim World*, **91** (3/4), pp. 293–310.

36. Interestingly, these very same verses are often cited by critics of Islam as 'evidence' of the religion's inherently violent nature yet Muslim jurists have referred to these verses to determine punishment commensurate with *hirabah*.
37. S.121, headlined, 'Waging or attempting to wage war or abetting the waging of war against the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, a Ruler or Yang di-Pertua Negeri' – of the Malaysian Penal Code (revised 1997) reads: 'Whoever wages war against the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or against any of the Rulers or Yang di-Pertua Negeri, or attempts to wage such war, or abets the waging of such war, shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and if not sentenced to death shall also be liable to fine.'
38. *Mohd Amin Bin Mohd Razali (and 18 others)* v *Public Prosecutor*.
39. According to Jackson, these are based on *Al-Hujuraat* (The Chambers), 49:9–10 and the precedent established by Ali bin Abi Talib. Insurrections are simply to be pacified and captured rebels cannot be tortured or executed. If the rebels repent, they are to be freed without any punishment. According to some jurists, they may only be punished for offences directly unrelated to the rebellion; for example, rape. See Jackson (2001), 'Domestic terrorism'.
40. Jackson (2001), 'Domestic terrorism.'
41. *Sahih Bukhari*, Book 89: *Ahkaam* (Judgments), Nos 257 and 258, www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/089.sbt.html.
42. Apart from ordering three of his followers to bomb the alcohol refineries and a Hindu temple in Selangor, Amin had also intended to bomb the Chenderuh dam in Perak and attack a police station. 'Al-Ma'unah rancang bom Chenderuh', *Berita Harian* (Kuala Lumpur, in Malay), 4 April 2001.
43. Yaakob, Siti Norma, CJ, *Mohd Amin Bin Mohd Razali (and 18 others)* v *Public Prosecutor*.
44. Steven LK Shim, CJ, *Mohd Amin Bin Mohd Razali (and 18 others)* v *Public Prosecutor.*
45. It has been reported that KMM members were initially told that they were being trained in militia tactics to protect PAS in the event of a government crackdown against the party. Unbeknownst to them, however, KMM leaders were instead planning to violently overthrow the government. In the mid-1990s, Abu Bakar Bashir and Hambali swayed KMM members to a radical new worldview of Islam. See Elegant, Simon (2002), 'Eye of the Storm', *Time*, 11 February, www.time.com/time/asia/features/malay_terror/cover.html.
46. Application was relatively simple – membership was limited to Muslims aged 18 and above who could provide a passport-sized photograph, copy of their identification card and a registration fee of RM170 (approximately US$45). See Al-Ma'unah Homepage, 'Introduction', members.tripod.com/~al_maunah/intro.htm, Crisp, Penny and Oorjitham, Santha (2000), 'How can this happen?' *Asiaweek*, **26** (28), 21 July, asiaweek.com/asiaweek/magazine/2000/0721/nat.malaysia.html. Newspaper reports have listed the age requirement as 17. See, Saman, Tajuddin (2000), 'Al-Ma'unah amal ilmu ghaib', *Berita Harian* (Kuala Lumpur, in Malay), 7 July; '1000 ahli Al-Ma'unah', *Harian Metro* (Kuala Lumpur, in Malay), 7 July 2000.
47. Saman, Tajuddin (2000).
48. Al-Ma'unah Homepage, 'Introduction', members.tripod.com/~al_maunah/intro.htm
49. Mohamed, Zabidi (2003), pp. 176, 190, 193.
50. Hussin, Anwar (2001), 'Amin pulas janggut musuh boleh rebah', *Berita Harian* (Kuala Lumpur, in Malay), 25 July.
51. Saman, Tajuddin and Zainudin Isa (2000), 'Pita video dedah rahsia Al-Ma'unah', *Berita Harian* (Kuala Lumpur, in Malay), 30 July.
52. In addition to self-defence, Al-Ma'unah also offered healing treatments for heart and kidney illnesses, high blood pressure, cancer, and others. Payment was voluntary.
53. Unseen beings who are able to choose between good and evil.
54. Saman, Tajudin (2000), 'Al-Ma'unah amal ilmu ghaib', *Berita Harian* (Kuala Lumpur, in Malay), 7 July; Mohamed, Zabidi (2003), p. 176.

55. Al-Arqam was another cult group banned by the government in 1998 for deviationist teachings. Its leader, Ashaari Muhammad, believed himself to be the next prime minister after Mahathir Mohamed and organized his group in hierarchy paralleling a government cabinet. An *umrah* is a voluntary pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina that a Muslim makes at any time of the year.
56. Sintol, Abdul Halid (2000), 'Amin amal ilmu hitam – Ibnu Abbas', *Utusan Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur, in Malay), 26 July.
57. The claim of Amin's discharge due to his involvement in illegal drugs is, however, disputed by his brother, Abdul Rahim Mohamed Razali, who worked with him in Batallion 304, Rejimen Askar Wataniah Gerik. 'Amin: Besar nanti jadi ustaz', *mSTAR Online* (in Malay), 5 August, 2006, mstar.com.my/cms/content.jsp?id=com/tms/cms/article/Article_dcb3ca69-c0a85062-9df61d00-61842da3.
58. Sintol, Abdul Halid (2000), See also Mohamed, Zabidi (2003), p. 178.
59. Mohamed, Zabidi (2003), p. 182.
60. Mohamed, Zabidi (2003), p. 181.
61. 'Gerakan militan Al-Ma'unah bermula Mac', *Berita Harian* (Kuala Lumpur, in Malay), 24 July 2000.
62. Mohamed, Zabidi (2003), p. 184.
63. Idrus, Rosnazura (2000), 'Soldier: I was told to buy army fatigues by Al-Mau'nah leader', *New Straits Times*, 13 September.
64. This theme is recurrent in military strategy dating back to Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. See, Carl von Clausewitz (1976) (trans. Howard, Michael and Paret, Peter), *On War*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 187–9; Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, various editions, *passim*.
65. Hussin, Anwar (2001), 'Bekas ahli Al-Ma'unah tidak percaya anggota lain', *Berita Harian*, 13 July; Mohamed, Zabidi (2003), p. 204.
66. Singh, Jasbir (2002), 'KMM had links with al-Qaeda', *New Straits Times*, 25 January.
67. Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, *White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests*, 7 January 2003.
68. 'Indonesian Police in Fresh Hunt for Militants', Reuters, 2 August, 2006.
69. Ulph, Stephen (2004), 'Influences on Southeast Asian terrorism', International Relations and Security Network, 10 May, www.isn.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=9849; Fealy, Greg (2004), 'Indonesia's enemy within', *Sydney Morning Herald* (Australia), 10 September, www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/09/09/1094530767325.html?from=storylhs.
70. Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, *White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests*, 7 January 2003; and Gunaratna, Rohan (2002), *Inside Al Qaeda*, New York: Berkeley, p. 262.
71. Ahmad, Abdul Razak (2001), 'Militant member tells of his experience and beliefs', *New Straits Times*, 9 September; 'Militants "trained in nearby country" ', *Straits Times* (Singapore), 11 January 2002.
72. Lee Shi-Ian (2003), '13 KMM men held under ISA', *New Straits Times*, 5 January.
73. JI members were required to use only prepaid mobile phone services, shun security cameras and keep secret their movements and activities from even family members. See, 'Part 2: At the Heart of Terrorism, Inc.', *Straits Times* (Singapore), 11 January 2003.
74. S.121 of the Malaysian Penal Code (revised 1997) reads: 'Whoever wages war against the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or against any of the Rulers or Yang di-Pertua Negeri, or attempts to wage such war, or abets the waging of such war, shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and if not sentenced to death shall also be liable to fine.' S. 122 reads: 'Whoever collects or attempts to collect men, arms, or ammunition, or otherwise prepares to wage war with the intention of either waging or being prepared to wage war against the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or any of the Rulers or Yang di-Pertua Negeri or abets the waging or the preparation of such war, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty years, and shall also be liable to fine.'
75. See judgment of Ahmad Makinudin, Zulkefli, J., *PP* v. *Mohd Amin Mohd Razali & Ors*, 2002 5 CLJ 281.
76. 'ISA detention of five ruled lawful', *New Straits Times*, 26 July 2005.

77. Royal Malaysia Police Press Release (in Malay), 'Tangkap Ketua Kumpulan Militan Malaysia Johor & Senarai Ahli KMM Yang Dikehendaki Polis', 27 September 2002, www.rmp.gov.my/rmp03/020927kmm.htm; Lavery, Charles (2002), 'The Scots student wanted for Bali bombing', *Sunday Mail* (UK), 20 October.
78. Crisp, Penny and Santha Oorjitham, 'How can this happen?' *Asiaweek*, 21 July 2000.
79. MCA Commentary.
80. 'Nik Aziz: Many questions have yet to be answered', *Star* (Kuala Lumpur), 10 August 2001.
81. Mohamed, Zabidi (2003), p. 321.
82. Long, James (2001), 'Cults, terrorist groups share chilling similarities, experts say', *Oregonian*, 9 November.
83. Stahelski, Anthony (2004), 'Terrorists are made, not born: creating terrorists using social psychological conditioning', *Journal of Homeland Security*, March, www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/stahelski.html; Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, *White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests*, 7 January 2003.
84. 'Freed terror group leader turns against comrades – but no apology for victims', Agence France Presse, 24 March 2005.
85. Agence France Presse, 24 March 2005. See also 'Bali bombing suspect says he has repented, rejects violence', Agence France Presse, 23 March 2005.
86. Amin's execution was delayed to await his mother's return from the Holy Land. 'Amin: Besar nanti jadi ustaz', *op. cit.*, 'Amin Al-Ma'unah mati digantung', *mSTAR Online*, 4 August 2006, mstar.com.my/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.article.Article_d8c5.
87. Although Wan Min has entreated surrender to his former comrades, he is not convinced that they will ever lay down their arms 'because they are willing to die'. See, 'Freed Terror group leader turns against comrades,' *AFP*, 24 March 2005.
88. Reich, Walter (1998), 'Understanding terrorist behavior', in Reich, Walter (ed.) *Origins of Terrorism*.
89. Ruthven, Malise (2002), *A Fury For God: The Islamist Attack on America*, London: Granta Books, p. 109.
90. Keppel, Gilles (1985) (trans. Rothschild, John), *The Prophet and Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, London: Al-Saqi Books, p. 98.
91. In 2003, following the closure of the Luqmanul Hakiem Islamic School in Johor and the detention of 12 of the school's teachers on the suspicion of being involved in KMM activities, the government decided to stop providing assistance, including funding, to private religious schools many of which were being run by individuals and groups aligned to PAS. Funding was stopped because of the government's concern that students at these schools were being taught to 'hate everything, including the government' and that these institutions were being turned into a breeding ground for future terrorists. See, 'Religious schools – breeding ground for future terrorists', *Straits Times* (Singapore), 17 January 2003.
92. The noble Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said: 'A man came to Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and asked permission to go to Jihad (fighting for the sake of Islam). The Prophet asked him, "Are your parents alive?" The man said, "Yes." The Prophet responded, "Then strive to serve them." '
93. 'Isteri Azahari hidap barah tekak tidak dapat bercakap', *Berita Harian* (Kuala Lumpur, in Malay), 19 September 2004.
94. Department of Islamic Development Malaysia, 'The concept of Islam Hadhari', www.islam.gov.my/islamhadhari/concept.html.
95. Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, 'Islam Hadhari and good governance', speech presented at Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand, 31 March 2005, www.pmo.gov.my/WebNotesApp/PMMain.nsf/0/d33361f0890dd06548256fe700190019?OpenDocument.
96. PAS's Islamic State Document calls for full implementation of Islamic law, including *hudud*. The document may be found at www.parti-pas.org/IslamicStateDocument.php.
97. 'Takeover attempts by 12 groups', *New Straits Times*, 26 September 2003.
98. In reality, the situation is complex and multilayered. Although the government is becoming increasingly concerned about this trend in schools and institutions of higher educa-

tion, polls and surveys conducted among Malaysians seem upbeat about ethnic relations. A public opinion poll asking participants to describe ethnic relations in Malaysia as of 2006 indicated that 61 per cent felt they were good with only 1 per cent believing they were bad. The positive impression was widespread across most demographic variables. When asked to describe ethnic solidarity in the country as of 2006, however, the survey found a 'slightly higher prevalence of superficial unity amongst higher earning respondents', 'Viewpoints on Ethnic Relations: Experience, Perception and Expectations', Public opinion poll conducted by the Merdeka Centre for Opinion Research and funded by the Freidrich Naumann Foundation, 21–26 February 2006 and 2–4 March 2006, www.fnfmalaysia.org/opinion_polls/docs/Ethnic%20Relation%20Perceptions%20Poll%20March%202006.pdf. For another survey on Muslim identity in Malaysian diversity, see, Martinez, Patricia (2006), 'Opinion: thumbs up to living in Malaysian diversity', *New Straits Times*, 10 August.

10 'Radical Muslim terrorism' in the Philippines

Rommel C. Banlaoi

Though the problem of terrorism has become a very serious global security threat, it has deep domestic roots. The threat of international terrorism is inherently local in origin.[1] There is even a view that al-Qaeda, the most notorious network of radical Muslim terrorist organizations to date, will return to their local roots.[2] Thus, it is essential to consider the domestic milieu of terrorist threat to grasp fully its complexities and nuances.

The Philippines is not spared from the threats posed by domestic terrorism. Linkages of domestic terrorist organizations in the Philippines with international terrorist organizations confound the virulence of these threats. The Philippine government even regards the local communist insurgency as a very serious terrorist problem. This chapter, however, focuses on terrorist threats in the Philippines emanating from radical Muslim groups. While the problem of terrorism is not entirely a radical Muslim phenomenon, the lion's share of terrorist acts and the most devastating of them in recent years are said to have been perpetrated by radical Muslim organizations.[3] This chapter examines the following radical Muslim organizations that have been reported to have committed acts of terrorism: Moro National Liberation Front, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Abu Sayyaf Group, the Rajah Solaiman Movement, and the Abu Sofia Group. This chapter also includes a brief discussion on the concept of 'radical Muslim terrorism' and on the historical context of the radicalization of selected Muslim organizations in the Philippines.

What is radical Muslim terrorism?

There is no clear-cut definition of radical Muslim terrorism. A definition of 'radical Muslim' and 'terrorism' is problematic. Existing literatures often use the term 'Islamic radicalism' to refer to the strong wave of radical movements in the Muslim world. Muslim radicalism or Islamic radicalism is associated with many terms like 'Islamic fundamentalism', 'Islamic revisionism', 'Islamic revivalism', 'Islamic activism', 'Militant Islamism', and 'Islamic extremism'. All these terms have acquired pejorative or derogatory meanings in the Western world. These terms are loosely lumped within the broad universe of political Islam.[4] But even the terms 'Muslim'

and 'Islamic' are conceptually ambiguous. They are often used interchangeably in discussions of Islam, though social and political scientists assert that there are important differences on the use of these terms.[5] The term 'Muslim' refers to a religious and cultural reality while 'Islamic' denotes political intent. A RAND scholar simply states that a Muslim country is one in which the majority of its people are Muslims, while an 'Islamic' state is one that bases the legitimacy of the government on Islam.[6]

The origin of Muslim radicalism is often attributed to the preaching of Muhammad ibn Abd-al Wahhab, a Muslim scholar who popularized an Islamic theology that would later be called Wahhabism. Abd-al Wahhab teaches the 'purification' of Islam based on Salafi faith. The word 'Salafi' means 'righteous ancestors of Muslims' in traditional Islamic scholarship. Salafism advocates a return to a sharia-minded orthodoxy that aims to purify Islam from unwarranted accretions, heresies and distortions, which Abd-al Wahhab avidly preaches. Thus, Wahhabism and Salafism are theologically connected. Wahhabism and Salafism are systems of belief that are said to have vigorously informed the 'terrorist acts' of Osama bin Laden and other radical Muslim personalities. They fight for the jihad, seeking to re-create the Muslim umma and sharia to build an Islamic community worldwide.[7]

Wahhabi or Salafi movements are found throughout the Muslim world.[8] After 9/11, Islamic movements and organizations adhering to Wahhabism and Salafism, particularly those associated with al-Qaeda, are labelled radical Muslim terrorists because of their vigorous involvements in a series of terrorist attacks, the largest of which was the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Radical Muslim terrorists are also those persons or organizations committing 'acts of terror' as a means to free themselves from the clutches of Western colonialism. The south Lebanon's Amal and Hezbollah, Khomeini's Revolutionary Guards of Iran, the Hamas of Palestine, and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt are among those organizations that have received the label of radical Muslim terrorism because of their 'acts of terror' committed in the name of Islam to free them from foreign occupation.[9]

In other words, radical Muslim terrorism may be redundantly described as an 'act of terrorism' committed by radical Muslim personalities or organizations. This label is contested because of the worn-out debate on the issue of what constitutes an 'act of terrorism'. Members of the international community have not yet developed a commonly accepted definition of terrorism. Moreover, some scholars are challenging the use of the term 'radical Muslim' as an adjective to the concept of 'terrorism' because persons who are Christians, Buddhists and Hindus can also undoubtedly commit such acts. Thus, the use of radical Muslim terrorism in this chapter

is still subject to further contestation because of its many nuances. But for purposes of this volume, this chapter covers five so-called radical Muslim terrorist groups that are considered threats to Philippine national security: the Misuari Breakaway Group (MBG) of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM) and the Abu Sofia (AS) urban terrorist group.

Brief historical background

To have a better understanding of the so-called rise of radical Muslim terrorism in the Philippines and its contemporary realities, it is imperative to discuss the subject in its proper historical perspective.

Islam arrived in Sulu in the last quarter of the thirteenth century. In 1450, the Sultanate of Sulu was established. Scholars trace Muslim radicalism or Muslim separatism in the Philippines in the mid-sixteenth century when Spain colonized the Philippine islands in 1565.[10] Were it not for the Spanish colonial rule, which introduced Roman Catholicism in the archipelago, particularly in the major islands of Luzon and the Visayas, the Philippines would have been a Muslim state like its Southeast Asian neighbours.[11]

All Muslim radical groups in the Philippines, regardless of political persuasion and theological inclination, believe in the Bangsamoro struggle. The term *Bangsa* comes from the Malay word, which means nation. Spanish colonizers introduced the term *Moro* when they confused the Muslim people of Mindanao with the Moors of North Africa.[12] Though the use of the term 'Bangsamoro' to describe the 'national identity' of Muslims in the Philippines is still contested,[13] Muslim leaders regard the Bangsamoro struggle as the longest 'national liberation movement' in the country covering almost 400 years of violent resistance against Spanish, American, Japanese and even Filipino rule.[14]

The first recorded military confrontation between Spaniards and the Muslims in the Philippines began as early as 1565, which ended in the invasion of Brunei in 1578 and 1581.[15] During this confrontation, the Spaniards were said to have ably checked 'the increasing Bornean political influence and commercial activities in Luzon and the Visayas by capturing the Bornean settlement in Manila in 1571'.[16] Spanish colonial rule of the Philippines lasted from 1565 to 1898. But Spain established a strong and dominant Christian community in the entire archipelago, except for many Muslim communities, which remained unconquered against the onslaught of Spanish colonialism.[17]

During the US colonial rule of the Philippines (1901–35), the Americans inherited the Moro problem.[18] The new colonial master recognized that the

Moro areas had never come under effective Spanish rule. The Americans even kept the Moros out of the Philippine–American War from 1899–1901 by signing the Bates Agreement where the US agreed to protect the Moros from foreign intrusions and to respect the authorities of Sultans and other Muslim chiefs in Mindanao.[19] But the Americans saw the Moros from the very start as a minority to be integrated into the national life of the Philippines.[20] Although political integration took place during the American period with the establishment of a Moro Province, Muslims in the Philippines continued to be seen as a religious and cultural minority, the long-term result of which was marginality, dissatisfaction, and ultimately, rejection of the Philippine nation-state.[21]

Through jihad, Moros in the Philippines continued their resistance during the American occupation. Famous among Muslim resistance movements during the period were that of Datu Tunggul, Datu Camour and Datu Ampuanagus in Lanao (1902–1903), Datu Ali in Cotabato (1903–1905), and Datu Panglima Hassan in Sulu (1903–1905). American response to these resistance movements resulted in the Lanao campaigns from 1899 to 1903, military operations against Datu Ali from 1903 to 1905, the Bud Dajo Massacre in 1905 and the Bud Bagsak encounter in 1913, which is regarded as the last decisive fight of Muslims in the Philippines.[22] But there were organized disturbances in Kidapawan (1917), Lanao (1924, and 1930–34) and Jolo (1927).[23]

After decades of vigorous battle against the American forces, some Moro leaders realized their limitations to resist aggression and gradually accepted 'the new situation which they were powerless to change and sought to make the best of it'.[24] Moreover, the strength of the American military machine left the Muslims 'with no choice but to cooperate or collaborate'.[25] To put an end to resistance, some Muslim leaders laid down their arms and resorted to peaceful means to pursue their cause during the Commonwealth Period.

During the Commonwealth Period (1935–46), some Moro leaders participated in the 1935 National Assembly Election. But only two Muslim leaders won their seats, prompting the Muslim groups to continue their fight for independence. But it was only the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941 'that more or less blunted the Moro independence movement', which resulted in the Japanese invasion of the Philippines.[26] During the Japanese occupation, Moros joined anti-Japanese resistance groups. It has been argued that six months before US forces led by General Douglas MacArthur landed in Leyte to retake the Philippines, 'the Muslim territories in Mindanao were already free of the Japanese'.[27] The end of the Second World War led to the total defeat of the Japanese Imperial Army and to the granting of Philippine independence.

When the US granted the Philippines independence on 4 July 1946, the Moro communities were divided into two major groups: the integrationist or the assimilationist group, and the secessionist or liberationist group. The first group accepted Philippine sovereignty while the other group believes that Mindanao belongs to a separate Islamic state that also deserves independence. Those who continue to defy the authority of the Christian-dominated Philippine government assert their separate identity as Moros and refuse to regard themselves as Filipinos, arguing that:

> The term Filipino can only refer to a segment of our people who bowed in submission to the might of Spain. Certainly, the Muslims do not fall under the category of Filipino. Being a historic people, the Muslims therefore cannot but reject the generalization that the word Filipino applies to them as well. Because when the word Filipino is applied to a segment of our people, the implication is that the word Filipino was derived or at least named in honor of King Felipe II . . . In so far as the Muslims are concerned, the application Filipino does not have any meaning to them.[28]

But the idea of 'Morohood' is being challenged because the term 'Moro' was the appellation applied to the whole Muslim population of Southeast Asia by the Portuguese who seized Melaka in 1511.[29] As stated earlier, Spain used the same label to describe Muslim inhabitants of the Philippine archipelago. Muslims in the Philippines have owned the term 'Moro' to describe their collective identities.

Since the granting of Philippine independence, the government has been contending with Moro separatism. In 1951, some Muslims in the Philippines waged the Kamlong uprising, which lasted until 1955. In 1957, the Philippine government organized the Commission on National Integration (CNI) to provide scholarship to young Muslims and encourage the Moros to accept the authority of the government. The government also implemented a land reform programme that encouraged Christians from the north to settle in the southern Philippines. By the 1960s, the southern Philippines 'had been virtually taken over by a Christian majority except areas like Lanao, Cotabato, Basilan and Sulu'.[30] Thus, the Moro 'had become a minority in many parts of their traditional homeland, with many losing their land to the immigrant settlers through dubious legal transactions or outright confiscation'.[31] From 76 per cent in 1900s, the population of Muslims in Mindanao declined to 20 per cent in the 1990s. The massive influx of Christian Filipinos to Mindanao has terribly angered the Moros.

But the spark that strongly lit the Muslim rebellion was the Jabidah Massacre in March 1968. Otherwise known as the Corregidor massacre, it took place on the Corregidor Island of the Philippines involving Moro army recruits being trained for Operation Merdeka, a codename for the

clandestine destabilization plan of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) aiming to infiltrate Sabah as part of the strategy of the Philippine government to strengthen its territorial claim. Allegedly, their trainers summarily executed 28 and 64 Moro recruits undergoing military training.[32] Though it has been argued that the Jabidah Massacre was a myth,[33] the incident prompted Governor Udtog Matalam of Cotabato to form the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM), declaring the establishment of an Islamic state in Mindanao.[34] But Matalam yielded to the request of the Philippine government to reconsider his cause. Other Muslim leaders who resent the continuing oppression of Muslims in the Philippines continued their resistance, leading to the establishment of the MNLF and other radical Muslim groups.

The Moro National Liberation Front

There is no uniform account of the origin of the MNLF. A former MNLF spokeperson even stressed that Moro rebel leaders are still debating today as to who really founded it.[35] Though Nur Misuari was the known founding chair of the MNLF, it is argued that the organization was conceptualized and organized by Abul Khayr Alonto and Jallaludin Santos who were at that time active with the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) founded in 1969 as a reaction to the Jabidah Massacre. The MIM aimed for the establishment of an independent state covering many parts of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. In the same year, other radical Muslim leaders formed the Union of Islamic Forces and Organization (UIFO) and Anwar El Islam to fight for Moro independence. The MIM and UIFO members reportedly underwent joint combat training in Malaysia that year.

The MNLF was officially established in 1972 as a national liberation movement of Muslims in the Philippines. Unlike other Muslim resistance groups in the Philippines, the MNLF has a more secular ideology. The secular ideology of the MNLF is traced to the left-leaning ideology of Misuari who became a member of a Marxist youth organization in the Philippines, the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) or Nationalist Youth. Key members of KM organized the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which has been waging an armed struggle against the Philippine government. The CPP also has Muslim membership.

Strictly speaking, the MNLF does not embrace Islamic fundamentalism but it religiously adheres to the concept of Moro nationalism. It aims for the establishment of a separate Moro nation in the southern Philippines. Although the MNLF may not be strictly labelled as Islamic fundamentalist, it is arguably a radical Muslim resistance group advocating jihad to liberate the Moro people from the oppression of what it describes as Filipino colonialism of Imperial Manila.

In other words, the MNLF is a national liberation movement of radical, mostly secular-oriented, Muslims in the Philippines. The Manifesto of the MNLF released on 28 April 1974 states that:

> We, the five million oppressed Bangsa Moro people, wishing to free ourselves from the terror, oppression and tyranny of Filipino colonialism which has caused us untold sufferings and miseries by criminality usurping our land, by threatening Islam through wholesale destruction and desecration of its places of worship and its Holy Book, and murdering our innocent brothers, sisters and folks in a genocidal campaign of terrifying magnitude . . . [hereby declare] the establishment of the Bangsa Moro Republic.[36]

According to Misuari, the armed struggle of the MNLF 'is a revolution for national salvation and human justice' based on jihad, which is the 'path of struggle of Muslims, either in the moral, ethical, spiritual or political realm, to bring about a positive transformation of the inner self and the socio-economic and political order'.[37]

Allegedly, the MNLF received support from Muslim backers in Libya and Malaysia. Its core members of 90 Muslim rebels were reportedly trained in Pulao Pangkor, Malaysia in 1969. The 'Top 90' of the MNLF completed their military training in 1971. It was in 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, when they elected Misuari as chairman of the MNLF. Hashim Salamat, who would eventually organize the MILF, joined the second group of trainees in 1972. Salamat was elected chairman on foreign affairs and in 1974, acted as Vice-Chairman of the MNLF. Salamat, however, never received confirmation by the MNLF central committee. In 1978, Salamat and his more 'Islamic' followers broke from Misuari's secular leadership. In 1979, Salamat formed the short-lived Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO). But from 1978 to 1984, Salamat still used the name MNLF to describe his breakaway movement until it formed the MILF, which will be discussed further in the next section of this chapter.

Meanwhile, MNLF members were divided over the issue of appropriate form of struggle during its nascent stage: parliamentary or armed. To try the parliamentary means, Misuari initially participated in the 1971 Constitutional Convention Election for the province of Sulu.[38] Lacking political support, he lost the election. But when the Ilaga, a movement of local Christian politicians in Mindanao, was formed, the MNLF, through its military arm called the Bangsamoro Army, decided to wage an armed struggle to resist the atrocities of Christian leaders in Mindanao. The Ilaga, a term for rats, was responsible for strings of massacres against Muslims between 1970 and 1972. The Ilaga was also responsible for the burning of Muslim houses and mosques during those periods. Furious by the

atrocities committed against Muslims in the Philippines, the MNLF declared on 18 March 1974 the establishment of a Bangsamoro Republic in the Southern Philippines. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) recognized the MNLF as the sole and legitimate representative of the Bangsamoro people. Under the auspices of the OIC, the MNLF and the government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) held a peace talk in 1976 in Tripoli, Libya to settle the Mindanao problem. This peace talk led to the signing of the Tripoli Agreement, which provided for Moro autonomy in the Southern Philippines and for a ceasefire. But after a lull in the fighting, the truce broke down in 1977. Until 1996, the MNLF engaged in armed confrontations with the AFP.

The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) has classified the MNLF as a terrorist organization.[39] Though the Philippine government has not officially labelled the MNLF as a terrorist organization, government forces claimed that the MNLF was responsible for a series of urban terror bombings in Mindanao in 1975 that continued well into the 1980s.[40] Muslim radicals identified with the MNLF allegedly masterminded the throwing of grenades into cinemas, parades and public gatherings. But the MNLF leadership did not claim responsibility for any of these terror attacks. It was speculated that government agents were involved to discredit the MNLF.[41]

In 1986, the GRP and the MNLF held another round of peace talks to provide a just and lasting solution to the Mindanao problem. But the talks collapsed in May 1987. The MNLF reached a final peace agreement with the GRP in 1996, which led to the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Misuari was chosen governor of the said region and was made chairman of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). It was believed that by placing Misuari in charge of both institutions, 'the peace settlement would gain wide recognition among the Muslim community and demonstrate to non-Muslims that autonomy can benefit all groups'.[42] Other MNLF members were integrated into the AFP. In December 2004, at least 5530 officers and enlisted personnel (EP) of the MNLF were integrated into the AFP in compliance with the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. The MNLF integrees have been assigned as regular personnel of the 1st, 4th and 6th Infantry Divisions, 53rd and 54th Engineer Brigades based in Mindanao.[43]

But issues of mismanagement and corruption bedevilled Misuari during his term as governor of ARMM and chairman of SPCPD. When he failed to seek re-election as ARMM governor, he threatened to resort to violence, which he carried out in Jolo in November 2001. Misuari organized what the AFP calls the Misuari Breakaway Group (MBG) of the MNLF, which according to the military has resorted to terrorism. The MBG has been

drawing up support and sympathy for Misuari and conducting massive recruitment in Sulu, Basilan, Zamboanga City and Sarangani. As of December 2004, the MBG has a strength of 450 Muslim fighters loyal to Misuari. They operate largely in Sulu, Basilan, Zamboanga City and Zamboanga del Norte of Southern Philippines. Misuari was put in jail in 2003 for an act of rebellion in Jolo Town, which led to the death of 100 people. According to Misuari, his group is the original MNLF. But MNLF members who respect the 1996 Peace Agreement stress that they constitute the mainstream MNLF. These factions of the MNLF pose a difficult challenge for Philippine national security policy.

Despite the incarceration of Misuari, the MBG/MNLF continues to operate in the southern Philippines. The MBG was said to have forged alliances with the MILF and ASG to plant bombs, kidnap people, and commit murder and other acts of terrorism. According to an intelligence report, the MBG has intensified its alliance with ASG and the MILF 'in the conduct of armed atrocities in pursuit of their common agenda'.[44] ASG members even admit that they have connived with ASG fighters to conduct some of their operations. Ruland Ullah, a former ASG member and a state witness to the April 2000 Sipadan hostage crisis, said that ASG has hired MBG/MNLF fighters to mount terrorist attacks. MNLF members have even acted as mercenaries of the ASG for an amount of at least $1000. MNLF members allegedly provide sanctuaries for ASG members when the need arises.[45] They have also been sharing fighters to mount terrorist attacks not only in the southern Philippines but also in Metro Manila.

On 6 February 2005, MBG forces simultaneously attacked four military posts in Sulu Province resulting in the death of 30 soldiers, the wounding of 80 others and the evacuation of 35 000 villagers. Heavy fighting between the AFP and the MBG also broke out on 24 February 2005 as a result of the Philippine government's decision to mount heavy military operations against the MBG. The Philippine government has utilized the military service of MNLF fighters integrated into the AFP to fight not only the MBG but also the MILF.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front

The MILF was a breakaway faction of the MNLF. As stated previously, the late Hashim Salamat, known before as the vice-chairman of the MNLF, founded the MILF in 1978. Though Salamat traced the origin of the MILF in 1962 when he founded the Moro Liberation Front (MLF) in Cairo, it was only in 1984 when he officially used the name MILF to describe his resistance group.[46] Unlike the MNLF, which is secular in orientation, the MILF is strictly Islamic or fundamentalist, to use the Western label. But Salamat argues, 'There is no such thing as

Islamic Fundamentalism.'[47] Though the MILF aims to establish a separate Islamic state in the southern Philippines through jihad, Salamat contends, 'Fundamentalism is alien to Islam.'[48]

The MILF has a military arm called Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF). As of January 2005, the AFP reports that the MILF has personnel strength of almost 11 000 with firearms of around 9000. They operate in almost whole areas of Southern Philippines, particularly in Maguindanao. But according to Salamat, the MILF has registered more than 70 000 participants from BIAF and more than 100 000 trained but not armed fighters. He even claims that the MILF constitutes 70 to 80 per cent of all fighting forces in Mindanao with a modest navy, short of warships, and some members trained as fighter pilots.[49]

Though there were allegations that the MILF has established strong linkages with al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah (JI), the Philippine government has not officially tagged the MILF as a terrorist organization in order not to undermine the peace talks. Many Philippine politicians believe that tagging the MILF as a terrorist organization will cause the termination of the peace negotiations and the escalation of armed conflict in the Philippines. The MILF has renounced terrorism but persistently argues that it has a legitimate cause to wage armed struggle against the government to liberate the Moros from the bondage of Filipino colonialism.

But intelligence sources have established MILF link with al-Qaeda, which was traced to the Afghan War in the 1980s.[50] Osama bin Laden reportedly instructed his brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, to go to the Philippines in 1988 to recruit fighters. Salamat was reported to have sent 1000 Filipino Muslim fighters in Afghanistan to undergo military training. Salamat saw the training of these Muslim fighters as vital to the strengthening of the MILF.

Khalifa left the Philippines in 1990 but returned to the country in 1991 to establish 'a permanent Al Qaeda network' to support the MILF better. Bin Laden believed that through the MILF, al-Qaeda could establish a permanent presence in the Philippines to serve as its base of terrorist operations in Southeast Asia.[51] Khalifa's front organization in the Philippines was believed to be the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO). It was a charitable organization registered in the Philippines at the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) on 20 September 1991. In the SEC document, Khalifa was listed as the president and chairman of the board of trustees of the IIRO. One of the incorporators of IIRO was Jameela Yabo, a Filipina wife of Khalifa and sister of Abu Omar who was then studying at the Mindanao State University (MSU). Khalifa used Yabo and Omar as conduits to penetrate Muslim Filipino communities through various charitable activities.

Aside from the IIRO, other charitable organizations that Khalifa allegedly used to fund his operations in the Philippines were the International Relations and Information Center (IRIC), Mercy International, the Benevolence International Corporation (BIC) and the Islamic Wisdom Worldwide (IWW).[52] While doing 'charitable' activities in the Philippines, Khalifa reportedly used the Philippines as al-Qaeda's base for other international terrorist operations, particularly in Southeast Asia. Through the IIRO and other Muslim relief groups, Khalifa reportedly channelled money to provide financial support to the MILF.

The MILF continues to deny its link with al-Qaeda. But Al Haj Murad, the MILF Vice-Chairman for Military Affairs, admitted in an interview held sometime in 1998 that Bin Laden and Khalifa helped and assisted the MILF cadres in Afghanistan.[53] Salamat also acknowledged that bin Laden provided financial support to Muslim guerillas to build mosques and help poor Muslim communities.[54]

Based on various intelligence sources, the MILF was said to have also established linkage with JI, the so-called al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. Although MILF spokesperson Eid Kabalu said that the MILF–JI link is a recycled allegation and a black propaganda lodged against their organization, the International Crisis Group (ICG) based in Brussels released a report describing this so-called link. The ICG states: 'While the MILF leadership continues to deny any ties, all evidence points to operational and training links. What is uncertain is whether top leaders are aware of the activity and are unwilling to admit it.'[55] The MILF even earmarked a training camp, called Camp Hodeiba, for JI.[56] Set up in 1994, JI reportedly used Camp Hodeiba to train MILF members in urban terrorism, particularly in bomb making. But some Muslim leaders and military officials claimed that JI members were the ones actually receiving training from MILF fighters. According to a Muslim lawyer who has done research on the Mindanao problem, MILF members had already received excellent training in the Middle East before the JI came in. Thus, 'the MILF does not need training from JI, even in the area of bomb making. MILF is, in fact, training JI in some Muslim military camps in Southern Philippines.'[57]

Aside from JI, intelligence reports also reveal that MILF has also forged tactical alliance with the New People's Army (NPA), the armed group of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). The Philippine government labels the CPP-NPA as a local Communist Terrorist Movement (CTM). Though the MILF says that it has no ties with the CTM, Salamat comments: 'we feel that we have almost the same cause'.[58] Salamat even underscores: 'Since we have the same enemy and we face the same problem, then our religious beliefs cannot prevent us from having alliances even with the so-called godless people.'[59]

In 2002, the MILF and CTM reportedly held a joint two-month Special Explosives and Sniper Course' training course at an NPA camp in Southern Luzon. The training reportedly started on 16 November 2002 and was supposed to have ended in December 2002. Due to skirmishes between the CTM and AFP forces, the training was extended up to February 2003. In March 2003, the Southern Mindanao Regional Community of the NPA reportedly dispatched around 30 armed personnel to Davao Oriental to support MILF forces fighting the government. The Far South Mindanao Region Command of the NPA also directed its front committees to support MILF forces in Sarangani. Joint elements of CPP-NPA and MILF are also operating in Misamis Oriental. According to an intelligence report: 'The NPA is expected to stage more joint offensives with the MILF in areas where both parties exert political and military influence.'[60]

The MILF has also reportedly established links with the Abu Sayyaf Group or ASG, the most notorious radical Muslim terrorist group in the Philippines. Though the MILF continues to deny any links with the ASG, Salamat once said: 'The MILF shares a common goal with the Abu Sayyaf Group: to establish an independent Islamic State.'[61] The MILF leadership even regards Abdurajak Janjalani as a Moro martyr.[62]

Recent intelligence sources reveal that ASG and MILF members share fighters in their operations. A confession of a captured ASG member states that: 'Sometimes the MILF would plant a roadside bomb against soldiers and the Abu Sayyaf would shoot the soldiers wounded in the blast.'[63] MILF and ASG members also conduct joint training with JI operatives, particularly in the area of bomb making. The Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) states: 'During explosives training, JI teaches the MILF or ASG skills in the making of bombs with cell phones, in the identification of the different types of explosives and paraphernalia like TNT, black powder, PETN, Ammonium Nitrate, C4, Detonating Cords, and Detonators.'[64]

The Abu Sayyaf Group

Because of the spate of kidnap-for-ransom activities it has perpetrated, the ASG became an international sensation. But it remains the least understood radical Muslim terrorist group in the Philippines. Many scholars and journalists have mistranslated ASG to mean 'Bearer of the Sword'.[65] But ASG really means in Arabic, 'Father of the Swordsman'.[66]

There is no uniform view of the ASG.[67] The US has listed the ASG in its list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) while the Philippine government has declared the ASG as a home-grown terrorist group with strong al-Qaeda and JI links. Others regard the ASG as the creation of the military. But its founder, Abdurajak Janjalani, said that the ASG was formed

to 'serve as a bridge and balance between the MILF and MNLF whose revolutionary roles and leadership cannot be ignored or usurped'.[68]

The ASG may be traced to the early 1990s when Janjalani formed the Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF) that aimed to wage jihad against the Philippine government in reaction to the so-called atrocities committed against Muslims in the Philippines. The MCFF was a known forerunner of the ASG. When the MCFF attracted some 'hard core' followers who received military training in the Middle East, it was eventually called the ASG. Through the ASG, Janjalani envisioned the establishment of an independent Islamic State in the Philippines. The ASG had very ambitious objectives, among which were the following: (1) to strengthen Islamic faith in the southern Philippines; (2) to eliminate elements of oppression; and (3) to establish a government that implements Sharia law.[69] It has also pursued a two-pronged strategy to pursue its objectives: (1) Building a rural, communal and military base to serve as a network centre for conducting *da'wah* and military training; and (2) creating an urban mobile force to be used in proselitization, politicization and launching of guerrilla warfare.[70]

In 1994, Janjalani renamed the ASG as al-Harakatul al-Islamiya (AHAI) to receive international funding and support. The AHAI drew material and financial support from the extremist element in Iran, through Hezbollah; in Pakistan, through the Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizbul Mujahideen; in Afghanistan, through Hizb-Islami; Egypt, through al-Gamaa al-Islamiya; in Algeria, through the Islamic Liberation Front; and Libya, through the International Harakatul al-Islamia.

The ASG reportedly established links with al-Qaeda in the 1990s.[71] It was said that Janjalani befriended bin Laden while in Peshawar, Pakistan.[72] Janjalani also became a very close friend of Ramzi Yousef, who reportedly planned in the Philippines the Bojinka plots, believed to be the worst terrorist plots in the country. The Bojinka plots aimed to bomb 11 US jetliners and assassinate Pope John Paul II, who visited Manila in 1995. During his travel to the Philippines via Malaysia, Yousef reportedly stayed in Basilan and trained around 20 ASG fighters. The Philippine National Police (PNP) narrates that in September 1994, Yousef had a fully established terrorist cell in the Philippines. Among the identified members of Yousef cell in the Philippines were the following:[73]

- Wali Khan Amin Shah. A 'Pakistani-Afghan' national reported to be a very close associate of Yousef. As stated earlier, Wali Khan had extensive travel to the Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Thailand using seven passports with different names but bearing the same picture of him. He was believed to have been the overall

financial manager of the Yousef cell. While in the Philippines, he was reported to have used an automated teller machine card using the name of Carol Santiago, reported to be Wali Khan's girlfriend. He was also reported to have participated in the plot against Pope John Paul II.

- Abdul Hakim Ali Hasmid Murad. A Pakistani national reported to have arrived in the Philippines between November 1990 and February 1991. In December 1994, he came again to the Philippines to participate in the Bojinka plots aiming to assassinate the Pope. He was trained in bomb making and flying commercial planes. He was arrested in 1995 having been convicted for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
- Abu Omar. A Filipino national who became the brother-in-law of Khalifa. Omar reportedly used a charitable organization as a front organization to channel money and to fund the terrorist activities of the local Muslim militants.
- Munir Ibrahim. Reported to be a wealthy Saudi Arabian from Jeddah who came to the Philippines to support terrorist activities in the country.
- Salem Ali/Sheik Mohammad. Claimed to be a plywood exporter who befriended Rose Mosquera, a bargirl in Quezon City, who opened a bank account for him at the Far East Bank at the SM Megamall. Salem Ali was said to have also supported terrorist activities in the Philippines.
- Mohammed Sadiq Odeh. He admitted to being a member of al-Qaeda. Reported to have participated in various terrorist operations in the Philippines, particularly in Davao City, in the early 1990s and was convicted for his participation in the 1988 US embassy bombings in Kenya. He was suspected of masterminding the 1993 San Pedro Cathedral bombing. In 1995, the Filipino law enforcement agency arrested him for illegal possession of explosive devices.

The ASG was also reported to have established links with JI. Among JI personalities, al-Ghozi became the most sensational terrorist figure in the Philippines having been identified as the major suspect in a series of bombings in the country. Known as 'Mike the Bomb Maker', al-Ghozi was known to be Hambali's most trusted Indonesian colleague and became a student of Bashir in the 1980s. Al-Ghozi used a lot of aliases while in the Philippines. Police authorities arrested him on charges of illegal possession of explosives just three hours prior to his scheduled flight to Bangkok on 15 January 2002. During the investigation, al-Ghozi admitted the following:

- That he first entered the Philippines in 1996 via Manado, Indonesia to conduct 'area study/familiarization' and to establish contacts within the MILF, particularly in Camp Abubakar. He left the Philippines in January 1997 but returned to the Philippines in March 1998 using the name of Edris Anwar Rodin to visit various places in Mindanao. After six months, he returned to Indonesia.
- That in March 1999, he visited Mindanao and went back to Indonesia after three months. In October 2000, he went to the Philippines again. In January 2001, he applied for another Philippine passport using the name Randy Andam Alih. While in the Philippines, he was allegedly given instructions by Hambali to procure explosives at Cebu. After this trip, he proceeded to Malaysia.
- That in November 2001, he went back to the Philippines via Singapore and stayed in Cebu to buy more explosives. He proceeded to General Santos City to acquire a storage room with the help of a certain Malagat.
- That he was the 'Freedom Fighter' who called up a local newspaper office and claimed responsibility for the 30 December 2000 bombing that killed 20 people and wounded 100 others.[74]

In July 2003, al-Ghozi escaped from his prison cell in Manila. But through intensified manhunt and joint military–police operations, he was killed in a shoot-out on 12 October 2003, a date coinciding with the first anniversary of the 2002 Bali bombing. Intelligence sources reveal that the number of JI members in the Philippines collaborating with ASG was placed at 33 as of December 2004. The Philippine National Police Intelligence Group (PNP-IG) estimates a higher figure when it reports that the number of JI operatives in the Philippines may be placed at 60 as of April 2005.[75] These JI operatives continue to exploit local Muslim secessionist rebels in the Philippines by sharing their demolition skills.[76]

In connection with the 2005 Valentine's Day bombings, two Indonesians and a Malaysian allegedly belonging to the JI were arrested by intelligence operatives in Zamboanga City on 23 February 2005. But the arrest of Rohmat alias 'Zaki' on 16 March 2005 gave more substantial information about the recent JI–ASG linkages. Zaki, an Indonesian national, confessed to several crimes involving the ASG since 2000, including training members to make bombs in JI-run camps.[77] Known as 'the ASG bomb trainer', Zaki admitted that he trained ASG members in bomb making, particularly the use of mobile phones as detonating devices and the use of toothpaste as bomb paraphernalia.[78] He also admitted to have coordinated the 2005 Valentine's Day bombings, which resulted in the brutal death of ten people and the serious wounding of at least 150 others.

Contrary to public opinion and some media reports, the ASG is not a homogenous organization. The ASG is a highly factionalized group of radical Muslim terrorist groups in the Philippines. The death of Abdurajak Janjalani on 18 December 1998 aggravated the factionalization of the ASG. Although remaining ASG leaders appointed his younger brother Khadafy Janjalani as successor, the young Janjalani did not have the ideological zeal and leadership charisma of his older brother. At present, the ASG has two major factions operating autonomously in the Basilan and Sulu provinces of Mindanao. Khadafy Janjalani heads the Basilan faction. Galib Andang (aka Commander Robot), on the other hand, headed the Sulu faction, until 16 March 2005 when he met his untimely death during a failed jail-break attempt. Though the military identifies one faction operating in Zamboanga City, other sources say that this faction belongs to the Sulu-based ASG. Interestingly, the Basilan and Sulu factions of the ASG are also factionalized. As of 2002, the Basilan-based faction was composed of ten armed groups while the Sulu-based faction was composed of 16 armed groups. Table 10.1 shows the Basilan-based groups of the ASG. Table 10.2 shows the Sulu-based groups of the ASG.

From these tables, it can be seen that the ASG is a very loose coalition of many groups of radical Muslim terrorist leaders commanding their own loyal followers in the southern Philippines. These groups have mixed objectives from Islamic fundamentalism to mere banditry. Not all groups are truly committed to the idea of a separate Islamic state in the southern Philippines, though there is no doubt that some groups are really committed to the cause. Some Muslim bandit groups in the southern

Table 10.1 Basilan-based faction of the ASG

Name of group	Known leaders of the group
Ampul Group	Mauran Ampu or Abu Mauran
Apting Group	Abu Apting
Danggatil Group	Moto Danggantil or Mata Danggatil
Hapilon Group	Sahiron Hapilon
Isnilon Group	Isnilon Hapilon
Jainuddin Group	Nadjalin Jainuddin
Janjalani Group	Hector Janjalani or Abu Abral
Kaw Jaljalis Group	Kalaw Jaljalis or Boy Granada
Salagin Group	Abu Salagin
Masiraji Sali Group	Hamsiraji Sali

Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3 (2002).

Table 10.2 Sulu-based faction of the ASG

Name of group	Known leaders of the group
Robot Group	Galib Andang or Cmdr Robot
Amil Group	Julius Aminulla Amil
Asiri Group	Basiri Asiri
Badja Group	Datu Panglima Badja
Bauddin Group	Salapuddin Bauddin
Hayudini Group	Nidzmi Hayudinni or Cmdr Takulong
Hadji Radzpal Group	Hadji Radzpal or Abu Rayhan
Irijani Group	Mudjahid Irijani
Jamal Group	Yahiya Jamal or Abu Alvarez
Kalim Group	Pati Kalim
Landi Group	Kumander Landi
Mali Group	Sulaiman Mali
Saabdula Group	Nadzmi Saabulla or Cmdr Global
Sahiron Group	Radullah Sahiron
Sali Group	Hesseim Sali
Shariff Group	Wahid Shariff

Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3 (2002).

Philippines want to be associated with the ASG for prestige, political expediency and economic gains. It has been reported recently, however, that the younger Janjalani is reviving the radical Islamist agenda of the ASG.[79]

Based on the official briefing of the Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF), ASG strength has been reduced to not more than 380 combatants as of the second quarter of 2005, a sharp decline from its peak of more than 1000 combatants in the early 1990s. Despite its small number, the ASG can still wreak huge terrorist havoc because of its enormous ability to solicit strong local support from the Muslim population who are relatives, friends, classmates and neighbours of ASG fighters. Moreover, the ASG continues to have effective alliances with rogue factions of the MNLF, MILF and some JI personalities operating in the Philippines.

A police intelligence report reveals that the ASG has forged alliances with MBG members or gunmen loyal to jailed MNLF leader Nur Misuari.[80] Captured ASG members even admitted during police interrogation that they hired MBG followers or rogue members of the MNLF to mount piracy and terrorist attacks in Mindanao. MNLF members acted as mercenaries of the ASG for an amount of $1000 each and provided sanctuaries for ASG members during hot military pursuits.

As stated earlier, ASG and MILF members have also shared fighters in some of their major operations. According to Ruland Ullah, a former ASG member and now a state witness: 'Sometimes the MILF would plant a roadside bomb against soldiers and the Abu Sayyaf would shoot the soldiers wounded in the blast.' But some scholars still believe that the ASG and the MILF are unaligned organizations despite similar aims and comparable origins.[81] Intelligence reports, however, reveal that MILF and ASG members have been receiving joint training with JI operatives, particularly in the area of bomb making. JI–ASG–MILF linkage, therefore, remains intact and operational. The Philippine National Police Intelligence Group (PNP-IG) estimates that the number of JI operatives in the Philippines may be placed at 60 as of April 2005.[82] These JI operatives continue to exploit local Muslim secessionist rebels in the Philippines by sharing their demolition skills.

The ASG has also developed a capability to wage maritime terrorism.[83] In fact, waging maritime terrorism is inherent in the capability of ASG. Most ASG members and followers belong to Muslim families and communities of fishermen with a century-old seafaring tradition. Because ASG members live on the waters of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, they have gained tremendous familiarity with the maritime environment. Most Muslim Filipinos living in coastal communities are known deep-sea divers. ASG members' deep knowledge of the maritime domain also gives them ample capability to conduct piracy and wage maritime terrorist attacks.

Because of its embedded sea-borne abilities, ASG's first known terrorist attack was maritime in nature when on 24 August 1991 it bombed the MV *Doulous*, a Christian missionary ship and European floating library docked at the Zamboanga port. On August 1993, the ASG abducted Mr Ricardo Tong, a prominent shipyard owner in Zamboanga City. The abduction of Mr Tong demonstrated that during its infancy stage, the prime target for ASG was the maritime sector.

The ASG proved its maritime terrorist capability when it waged another attack on 23 April 2000 when it kidnapped some 21 tourists, including ten foreigners, from a Malaysian beach resort in Sipadan. On 22 May 2001, ASG guerrillas raided the luxurious Pearl Farm beach resort on Samal Island of Mindanao. This incident resulted in the killing of two resort workers and the wounding of three others. Though no hostages were taken during this attack, the Samal raid demonstrated anew the willingness of ASG to pursue maritime targets.

On 28 May 2001, the ASG waged more maritime terror when it abducted three American citizens and 17 Filipinos spending a vacation at the Dos Palmas resort in Palawan. Thus far, the Dos Palmas incident was the most notorious and the most sensationalized attack of the ASG. The incident

received international coverage because several of the victims were murdered and beheaded, including an American citizen. Because American hostages were involved, the US military sent army operation forces to the Philippines to train AFP forces in counter-terrorism. The US Pacific Command even extended a US$2 million assistance to the Philippines from its regional security assistance programme as a result of the Dos Palmas incident. But when the lives of the two American hostages were put in danger, the US Army special operation forces changed the scope of their mission in the Philippines by facilitating the rescue of American citizens. During a rescue operation mounted by the AFP in 2002, two hostages, including an American missionary, Martin Burnham, were killed. His wife Gracia Burnham, the well-known survivor of the kidnap incident, wrote a memoir of her captivity at the hands of the ASG.[84]

The most gruesome maritime terrorist attack of the ASG was the burning on 27 February 2004 of MV *Superferry 14*, a commercial vessel carrying 899 passengers. The ASG claimed responsibility for the explosion and stressed that the incident was a 'just revenge' of the group for the 'brutal murder' of Bangsamoro people amidst the 'on-going violence' in Mindanao. The burning of the MV *Superferry 14* was carried out through the assistance of another radical Muslim terrorist group in the Philippines, the Rajah Solaiman Movement.

The Rajah Solaiman Movement[85]

Some writers have traced the origin of the RSM from the Balik Islam (Return to Islam) movement.[86] While founding members of the RSM have indeed associated themselves with the Balik Islam, it is careless to associate Balik Islam with RSM – it is like associating Islam with terrorism. Started in the 1970s, Balik Islam is a legitimate organization of at least 200 000 Christian converts to Islamic faith. Followers prefer to be called 'reverts' based on the belief that Islam was the original religion of the Philippines. The RSM, organized only in 2001, represents a minuscule fraction of reverts.

Though Ahmad Santos (Hilarion del Rosario Santos III) was the known RSM commander, the group was founded with the leading role of Sheik Omar Lavilla (Rueben Lavilla). With the arrest of Santos on 26 October 2005, Lavilla is believed to be running the daily operation of the RSM to date. Lavilla has called RSM members 'Urban Mujahideens'.

During his interrogation, Santos admitted to have organized in 2001 a group of 20 radical Muslim reverts to undergo '*jihad* trainings' in a camp in Anda, Pangasinan of Central Luzon. Santos and Lavilla originally called this group Haraka or Harakat, which literally means 'The Movement'. General Rodolfo 'Boogie' Mendoza, the father of counter-terrorism

investigation in the Philippines, says that 'the name Rajah Solaiman Movement was initially suggested by Ahmad Santos as a joke but it was eventually adopted'. The RSM was used in honour of the first Muslim ruler of Manila. RSM aims for the Islamization of the entire Philippines.

The RSM was estimated to have a membership of 50–100 'hard core activists'.[87] If we define 'hard core activists' to mean individuals who have the intent and capability to wage terrorism, RSM membership is not more than 30 members. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has so for identified only 27 active members of the RSM. These active members are reported to have been conducting recruitment drives in Luzon and in the Visayas. Though small at present, the RSM draws its strength from its alleged continuing collaboration with likeminded terrorist groups like the ASG, the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) and al-Qaeda.

The RSM has established ties with the ASG. At the time of his arrest in October 2005, Santos served as the chief of the ASG Media Bureau. Prior to that, ASG leader Khadafy Janjalani reportedly gave the RSM the equivalent of about US$200,000 for its initial operational activities in Manila, which included the recruitment and conversion of Christians to Islam, then sending them for terrorist training.[88] The RSM collaborated with the ASG in the 2004 *Superferry 14* bombing and the 2005 Valentine's Day bombings, which were reportedly planned as suicide missions.[89] The RSM has allegedly formed its own armed-wing called Khalid Trinidad Army (KTA), a small group of terrorists named after Khalid Trinidad, an RSM member himself. Police operatives killed Trinidad in an encounter on 1 May 2002.

The RSM was also reported to have established links with JI. Santos confessed that he collaborated with Omar Patek, one of the key suspects in the 2002 Bali bombings, while hiding in Mindanao in early 2004. Patek allegedly gave the RSM an amount of P250 000.00 (US$5,000) to be used in the foiled Ermita Plot. Ermita is a place in Manila frequented by foreign tourists. Santos admitted to have used this money to conduct surveillance operations in Ermita and to rent a house in Quezon City where he hid 600 kilos of explosive materials discovered by police and military authorities on 23 March 2005.

During its embryonic stage, the RSM reportedly established links with al-Qaeda. Santos confessed that the RSM 'aided in training and giving shelter to the terrorists responsible in the September 11 terrorist attack'. General Mendoza's paper on the RSM states that: 'The Al Qaeda pilots got their first training in Angeles City, Pampanga . . . But before leaving for the US, the pilots were said to have gone to the RSM training camp established by Ahmad Santos in their family property in Barangay Mal-Ong, Anda, Pangasinan.'[90]

The PNP regarded the International Information Center (IIC), a Muslim centre based in Quiapo, Manila, as a front of the RSM. The Philippine Association of Muslimah Darul Eeman, Inc. (PAMDAE, Inc.) was also reported to be a front of the ASG to recruit Metro Manila-based Islam converts into its fold.[91] The following Balik Islam groups have also aroused official curiosity: al-Maarif Education Center (Baguio City), Da'rul Hijra Foundation, Inc. (Makati City) and the Islamic Learning Center (Pangasinan).

Police authorities have said that the RSM is the newest terrorist threat facing the Philippines today.[92] Though the RSM may be the smallest among the radical Muslim terrorist groups operating in the Philippines, it has trained some suicide bombers to become 'martyrs of Islamic faith'. Santos admitted during police interrogation to have trained potential suicide bombers from the ranks of RSM hard core jihadists.[93] Santos confessed that he started the training of suicide bombers as early as February 2002. Trainees were indoctrinated on the belief that 'the greatest sacrifice is giving one's life for Allah and Islam'. After a month of training, five RSM members reportedly took the *shaheed* (martyrdom pledge) to undergo a suicide mission scheduled in May 2002. This mission allegedly aimed to assassinate PGMA with the use of a truck bomb.

But the raid of RSM hideouts in Central Luzon that year halted the mission. The raid resulted in the death of one and the arrest of four potential suicide bombers. The raid also indicated the strong resolve of the Philippine law enforcement authorities to clamp down on terrorists. In April 2004, the RSM revived the mission after 7 different potential suicide bombers took another *shaheed*.[94] But the mission was pre-empted as a result of the series of counter-terrorism operations conducted between May to June 2004. Out of the seven potential suicide bombers, two were arrested while another two were reportedly declared 'inactive' because of intensified intelligence operations of the Philippine government. But the remaining three potential suicide bombers remain allegedly at large as at late 2006.

The RSM has also penetrated some legitimate Balik Islam organizations to radicalize some of their members. Though Islam is undoubtedly a religion of peace, RSM's radical interpretation of Islam makes the group an instrument of political violence. The Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) has reported that more than 110 000 Filipinos have converted to Islam as of the first quarter of 2005. But another source states that Balik Islam comprises nearly 200 000 of the more than 6.6 million local Muslim community in the Philippines.[95] Records also show that Balik Islam is now the seventh-biggest group of the 13 local Muslim tribes.[96] As of January 2003, at least 33 mosques in Metro Manila have been constructed while 29 mosques have

been built in Northern Luzon, 15 in Central Luzon, 56 in Southern Luzon, and 38 in the Visayas. Because of this trend, Islam is becoming the fastest-growing religion in the Philippines. It has also been reported that at least 20 000 Balik Islam live in traditionally Catholic Luzon. According to General Mendoza, 'The spread of Islam is not necessarily the problem; it's the spread of the radical interpretation of Islam.'[97] OMA Chief Zamzamin Amaptuan commented that converts are heavily prone to indoctrination to the 'deviant' interpretation of Islam because they are more aggressive and so engrossed in a faith that they recently accepted.[98] Amaptuan feared that 'In some way, this aggressiveness can be converted to something else', like terrorism. Amaptuan also reported that OMA has accredited 78 Muslim organizations in the Philippines. According to him, most of these organizations listed *da'wah*, or propagation, as their primary objective.[99] The practice of *da'wah* has triggered police suspicion because of the allegation that this practice is being used as an RSM front 'for terrorist operations, or at least as an avenue for laundering money used to finance training and the acquisition of weapons, ammunition and bomb-making paraphernalia'.[100] RSM's alleged link with ASG has created further suspicions that Muslim converts are being used for urban terrorism.

As stated earlier, the blasting of the *Superferry 14* on 26 February 2004 has been described as the handiwork of ASG–RSM conspiracy. Redento Cain Dellosa, an RSM member, confessed that he deliberately planted a bomb on *Superferry 14*. The ASG even claimed responsibility for the explosion and stressed that the incident was a 'just revenge' of the group for the 'brutal murder' of Bangsamoro people amidst the 'on-going violence' in Mindanao. ASG Chief Khadafy Janjalani strongly warned that the 'best action of ASG was yet to come'.

Though the Philippine government initially denied the involvement of ASG and RSM in the incident, the Marine Board Inquiry in charge of investigating the *Superferry 14* incident confirmed that the ASG indeed masterminded the explosion with the assistance of RSM. In a telephone radio interview pertaining to the *Superferry 14* incident, ASG spokesperson Abu Soliaman even taunted the Philippine government by saying, 'Still doubtful about our capabilities? Good. Just wait and see. We will bring the war that you impose on us to your lands and seas, homes and streets. We will multiply the pain and suffering that you have inflicted on our people.'[101]

The RSM, upon instruction of the ASG, allegedly masterminded the three simultaneous bombings in Makati City, General Santos City and Davao City on the eve of the Valentine's Day celebration in 2005. These bombings resulted in the death of seven people and the wounding of at least 150 others. RSM reportedly assisted the ASG in the bombing that occurred in Makati City. The RSM had also planned to mount another

terrorist attack on the eve of the 2005 Holy Week celebration. But military intelligence operatives foiled this plan when they arrested RSM member Tyrone Dave Santos (alias Daud Santos), for carrying ten sacks of explosive materials, in a raid conducted in an alleged RSM building in Quezon City. These explosives were intended to be used during the Lenten season to bomb soft targets in Metro Manila in retaliation for the killing of ASG members during the aborted jailbreak in March 2005. The Philippine police charged Daud Santos with illegal possession of explosive devices. But he was released after posting P200 000 (US$4000) bail. The Philippines does not have a law on terrorism and illegal possession of explosives is a 'bailable' offence under the existing Philippine criminal law.

Interestingly, Daud Santos, tagged by police authorities as an ASG member, is a brother of RSM founder Ahmed Santos. RSM links with ASG, therefore, run in the family. In fact, Amina Lim Dungon, one of the wives of ASG spokesman Abu Sulaiman, is the sister of Lorraine Lim Dungon, who is a wife of RSM leader Ahmed Santos. ASG leader Khadafy Janjalani's wife, Zainad Lim Dungon, is a sister of Amina and Lorraine. These make Sulaiman, Santos and Janjalani not only 'brothers-in-arms' but also brothers-in-law. Some ICC officers are also kin to Fi-Sabillilah and RSM leaders.[102] According to a chief police superintendent: 'If you make an extended family tree of top Islamic radicals, you will come out with something like a tightly woven spider's web.'[103]

This view is shared with another top police officer that argues that that ties between ASG and RSM and even MILF and MNLF 'are more personal than ideological' because 'there are blood ties, and they have an experience of strife with government'.[104] General Florencio D. Fianza, the President's Special Envoy on Transnational Crime, says that ASG, RSM and even MILF and MNLF help each other to carry out terrorist activities.[105] But Fianza contends that though they help each other, they also have their own share of infightings and turf wars.

The Abu Sofia Group

Another small, but loosely labelled, radical Muslim terrorist group in the Philippines was the Abu Sofia Group. Military sources described the Abu Sofia Group as a breakaway faction of the MILF engaged in banditry and kidnap-for-ransom activities. Bebis Binago, a brother of a local MILF commander, headed the said bandit group.[106] There were reports indicating that Abu Sofia had established links with the ASG in terms of providing shelter to fugitive members and conducting kidnap for ransom activities.

Though Abu Sofia did not have a veneer of ideology attached to it, its alleged links with the ASG and MILF, however, prompted police authorities to subsume it under the terrorist threat.[107] The group was suspected for

its involvement in the bombings of shopping malls in central Mindanao in 2002 and 2003. The group was also reported to have given refuge to top ASG leaders, particularly Khadafy Janjalani and Isnilon Hapilon. But the death of Binago on 6 January 2004 in a military encounter has led to the hibernation of the Abu Sofia Group.

Alo Binago, brother of the slain leader Bebis Binago, revived the group when he headed the kidnapping of a South Korean national in early 2006. But Alo Binago, along with two other members, were arrested on 28 July 2006 in Maguindanao province. According to the joint PNP–AFP Anti-Terror Task Force based in Sultan Kudarat, the three members of the Abu Sofia Group were plotting more bombings and kidnapping activities and had been meeting with radical Muslim terrorists in Mindanao prior to their arrest.[108] Law enforcement authorities believe that some members of the Abu Sofia Group are still active and continue to have links with the ASG and the MILF.[109]

Conclusion

Muslim radicalism in the Philippines has deep historical, economic, social and political roots. But among the radical Muslim groups in the Philippines, only the ASG and the RSM have officially been tagged as terrorist organizations by the government. Though the MNLF-MBG and the MILF have not been officially labelled as terrorist organizations, the police and military establishments have reported their 'acts of terrorism' that warrant the label. But the Philippine government is cautious in labelling the MNLF as a terrorist organization because of the 1996 peace agreement. The government also faces difficulties in labelling the MILF as a terrorist organization because of the ongoing peace talks. But all groups discussed in this chapter are called Muslim radicals, except Abu Sofia, which is considered by the Philippine government as a mere bandit group.

The use of the term 'radical Muslim terrorism' as a label to describe Muslim separatist groups in the Philippines remains hotly contested. There are reports, however, of 'terrorist acts' committed by these groups, prompting the police and military establishments to describe all armed groups fighting the government in Mindanao as southern Philippine terrorist groups.[110]

Though the idea that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' is vigorously abused and a worn-out description, all so-called radical Muslim terrorist groups in the Philippines, except Abu Sofia, believe that their followers are freedom fighters. Those who died in the fight were even called martyrs by Moros. In fact, a former congressman from Davao Oriental stressed that contrary to media and military reports, many people in Mindanao 'consider the MNLF and MILF as allies and not enemies',

and argued further that: 'The MNLF and MILF are one with us in our aspirations for an independent Mindanao.'[111]

There is no doubt, however, that some activities of so-called radical Muslim groups have sown tremendous fear, wreaked havoc and cost the lives of many innocent civilians. These activities may constitute acts of terrorism. But the absence of a commonly acceptable definition of terrorism and the pejorative meanings attached to 'radical Muslims' make the term 'radical Muslim terrorism' a continuing subject of tremendous contestation not only in the Philippines but also among its Southeast Asian neighbours.

Notes

1. For lengthy discussion, see Banlaoi, Rommel C. (2–3 December 2004), 'Local government response against terrorist threats in the Philippines: issues and prospects', paper presented at the 12th International Conference of the East and Southeast Asia Network for Highly Performing Local Governments organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Local Government Development Foundation, Rendezvous Hotel, Singapore. Forthcoming for publication by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
2. *BigNews Network*, 10 November 2004, feeds.bignewsnetwork.com/redir.php?jid=855f4c0dfb7e7357&cat=c08dd24cec417021, accessed on 10 November 2004.
3. Bar, Shmuel (2004), 'The religious sources of Islamic terrorism', *Policy Review*, **125**.
4. See Ayubi, Nazih (1991), *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, New York: Routledge.
5. Rabasa, Angel, et al. (2004), *The Muslim World After 9/11*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, p. 5.
6. Rabasa, Angel et al., *The Muslim World After 9/11*.
7. Rabasa, Angel et al. (2004), *The Muslim World After 9/11*. See also GlobalSecurity.org, 'Salafi Islam', www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-salafi.htm.
8. Rabasa, Angel, et al. (2004), *The Muslim World After 9/11*, p. 15. Also see Maududi, Sayyid Abul A'la (1981), *A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam*, Lahore: Islamic Publication Ltd.
9. Cole, Juan (7 March 2005), 'Foreign occupation has produced radical Muslim terrorism', www.juancole.com/2005/03/foreign-occupation-has-produced.html.
10. Tan, Andrew (2003), 'Southeast Asia as the second front in the war against terrorism: evaluating the threat and responses', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, **15** (2), p. 115.
11. Pelan, John (1959), *The Hispanization of the Philippines*, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. See also Banlaoi, Rommel C. (2004) 'Globalization and nation-building in the Philippines: state predicaments in managing society in the midst of diversity', in Sato, Yoichiro (ed.), *Growth and Governance in Asia*, Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, p. 208.
12. See Gowing, P. (1964), *Mosque and Moro: A Study of Muslims in the Philippines*, Manila: Federation of Christian Churches. See also Banlaoi, Rommel (2004), 'Globalization and nation-building in the Philippines: state predicaments in managing society in the midst of diversity', pp. 207–8.
13. Banlaoi, Rommel (2004), 'Globalization and nation-building in the Philippines: state predicaments in managing society in the midst of diversity', p. 208.
14. Tan, Samuel K. (2003), 'History of the Mindanao problem', in Rasul, Amina (ed.), *The Road to Peace and Reconciliation: Muslim Perspective on the Mindanao Conflict*, Makati City: Asian Institute of Management, p. 4.
15. Majul, Cesar (1973), *Muslims in the Philippines*, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, p. 108.
16. Majul, Cesar (1973), *Muslims in the Philippines*, p. 108.

17. Tan, Samuel K. (2003), 'History of the Mindanao Problem', p. 5.
18. For an excellent account of Muslims in the Philippines during American colonial rule, see Gowing, Peter G. (1983), *Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899–1920*, Quezon City: New Day Publishers.
19. Che Man, W.K. (1990), *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand*, Manila: Ateneo de Manila Press, p. 47.
20. Amoroso, Donna J. (2005), 'Inheriting the Moro problem: Muslim authority and colonial rule in British Malaya and the Philippines', in Julian Go and Anne L. Foster (eds), *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives*, Manila: Anvil Publishing, p. 142.
21. Amoroso, Donna J. (2005), 'Inheriting the Moro problem: Muslim authority and colonial rule in British Malaya and the Philippines', p. 143.
22. Tan, Samuel K. (1995), *Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle*, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, p. 27.
23. Tan, Samuel K. (1995), *Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle*, p. 28.
24. Che Man, W.K. (1990), *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand*, p. 55.
25. Tan, Samuel K. (1977), *The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 1900–1972*, Manila: Filipinas Foundation, Inc., p. 57.
26. Tan, Samuel K. (1995), *Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle*, p. 28.
27. Alonto, Robert Maulana (1999), 'Four centuries of jihad underpinning the Bangsamoro Muslims' struggle for freedom', www.muslimedia.com/archives/sea99/phil-jihad.htm.
28. Glang, Alunan (1969), *Muslim Secession or Integration?* Quezon City: R.P. Garcia, p. 21. Also cited in Che Man, W.K. (1990), *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand*, pp. 55–6.
29. Mckenna, Thomas M. (1998), *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines*, Manila: Anvil Publishing.
30. Majul, Cesar (1973), *Muslims in the Philippines*, p. 29.
31. Tan, Andrew (2003), 'The indigenous roots of conflict in Southeast Asia: the case of Mindanao', in Kumar Ramakrishna and Tan See Seng (eds), *After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing/Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, p. 99.
32. 'Jabidah Massacre', http://www.moroinfo.com/hist8.html. Also see Vitug, Marites D. and Glenda M. Gloria (2000), *Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao*, Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs and Institute for Popular Democracy, pp. 2–25.
33. Azurin, Arnold M. (1996), 'The Jabidah Massacre myth', in his *Beyond the Cult of Dissidence in Southern Philippines and Wartorn Zones in the Global Village*, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, pp. 93–103.
34. Majul, Cesar (1973), *Muslims in the Philippines*, p. 30.
35. Iribani, Abraham S. (2000), *GRP–MNLF Peace Talks, 1992–1996: Issues and Challenges*, Quezon City: National Defense College of the Philippines, p. 99.
36. *The Manifesto of the Moro National Liberation Front* (28 April 1974).
37. Misuari, Nur (1984), *MNLF Guidelines for Political Cadres and Military Commanders*, Jolo: Bangsa Moro Research Center of the Moro National Liberation Front, pp. 6–7.
38. Iribani, Abraham S. (2000), *GRP–MNLF Peace Talks, 1992–1996: Issues and Challenges*, p. 100.
39. See MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 'Moro National Liberation Front', www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=202.
40. Mckenna, Thomas M. (1998), *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines*, p. 181.
41. Mckenna, Thomas M. (1998), *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, p. 324.
42. Bertrand, Jacques (2000), 'Peace and conflict in the southern Philippines: why the 1996 peace agreement is fragile', *Pacific Affairs*, **73** (1), p. 42.
43. 'DND cites gains in campaign vs CPP-NPA, Abu Sayyaf, other criminal elements', 3 January 2005, www.news.ops.gov.ph/archives 2005/jan03.htm.

44. Office of the Chief of Staff for Intelligence (2002), *Updates on the Activities of the ASG and the MBG*, Quezon City: General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
45. Canlas, Jomar (2005), 'State Witness Bares MNLF, MILF Links with Abu Sayyaf', *Manila Times*, 28 March.
46. Hashim, Salamat (2002), *Referendum: Peaceful, Civilized, Diplomatic and Democratic Means of Solving the Mindanao Conflict*, Camp Abubakre As-Siddique: Agency for Youth Affairs – MILF, p. 30.
47. Hashim, Salamat (2002), *Referendum*, p. 32.
48. Hashim, Salamat (2002), *Referendum*, p. 32. See also Salamat, Hashim (1984), *The Bangsamoro Mujahid: His Objectives and Responsibilities*, Mindanao: Bangsamoro Publications.
49. Hashim, Selamat, p. 33 and 102. See also Salamat, Hashim (2001), *The Bangsamoro People's Struggle Against Oppression and Colonialism*, Camp Abubakre As-Siddique: Agency for Youth Affairs-MILF.
50. This particular section is based on Banlaoi, Rommel C. (2004), *War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, Quezon City: Rex Book Store International, pp. 34–5.
51. Abuza, Zachary (2003), *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., p. 91.
52. Gunaratna, Rohan (2002), *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, New Delhi: Roli Books, p. 182.
53. Banlaoi, Rommel (2004), *War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, p. 35.
54. Gunaratna, Rohan (2002), *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, p. 185.
55. International Crisis Group (2004), 'Southern Philippine backgrounder: terrorism and the peace process', ICG Asia Report, No. 8, 13 July, p. i.
56. Ressa, Maria A. (2003), *Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia*, New York: Free Press, p. 7.
57. Conversation with a Muslim lawyer who is providing consulting services for the ARMM and other Muslim organizations in the Philippines.
58. Hashim, Salamat (2002), *Referendum: Peaceful, Civilized, Diplomatic and Democratic Means of Solving the Mindanao Conflict*, p. 34.
59. Hashim, Salamat (2002), *Referendum: Peaceful, Civilized, Diplomatic and Democratic Means of Solving the Mindanao Conflict*, p. 34.
60. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Plans and Programs (2004), 'CPP-NPA-MILF Tactical alliance', Moro *Islamic Liberation Front Reference Folder*, Quezon City: Department of National Defense.
61. Hashim, Salamat (2002), *Referendum: Peaceful, Civilized, Diplomatic and Democratic Means of Solving the Mindanao Conflict*, p. 46.
62. Hashim, Salamat (2002), *Referendum: Peaceful, Civilized, Diplomatic and Democratic Means of Solving the Mindanao Conflict*, p. 57.
63. Banlaoi, Rommel (2005), 'Leadership dynamics in terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia: the Abu Sayyaf case', paper presented to the international symposium, The Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia, 18–20 April, organized by the Institute of Defense Analyses in cooperation with the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism and the US Pacific Command held at Palace of Golden Horses Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Also in John T. Hanley, Kongdan Oh Hassig and Caroline F. Ziemke (eds) (2005), *Proceedings of the International Symposium on the Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia*, Aexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.
64. A paper obtained from the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on 29 March 2005.
65. See, for example, Turbiville, Jr. (2002), 'Bearers of the sword: radical Islam, Philippines insurgency and regional stability', *Military Review*, March–April, pp. 38–47.
66. Torres, Jose, Jr. (2001), *Into the Mountain: Hostages by the Abu Sayyaf*, Quezon City: Claretian Publications, p. 35.
67. For a detailed discussion on the origin of the ASG, see Banlaoi, Rommel C. (2006), 'Roots and evolution of terrorist movements in the Philippines: the Abu Sayyaf

experience', paper presented to the Second Bi-Annual International Symposium of the Council of Asian Terrorism Research (CATR) held at Mount Lavinia Hotel, Colombo, Sri Lanka on 1–3 March.
68. Quoted in Tan, Samuel K. (1995), *Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle*, p. 96.
69. Wadi, Julkipli M. (1996), 'Philippine political Islam and the emerging fundamentalist strand', in Carmencita C. Aguilar (ed.), *Cooperation and Conflict in Global Security*, Quezon City: International Federation of Social Service Organization, p. 210.
70. Wadi, Julkipli M. (1996), 'Philippine Political Islam', p. 210.
71. See Banlaoi, Rommel C. (2003), 'American strategic intentions in the War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia', in Wang Xinsheng, Yu Changsen and Lee Xee (eds), *International Anti-Terrorism and Asia Pacific Security*, Guangzhou, PRC: Center for Asia Pacific Studies, pp. 10–13.
72. See Abuza, Zachary (2002), 'Tentacles of terror: al Qaeda's Southeast Asian linkages', paper presented at the conference Transnational Violence and Seams of Lawlessness in the Asia Pacific: Linkages to Global Terrorism held at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, 12–21 February, p. 6. Also published in *Contemporary Southeast Asia* (2002), **24** (2), pp. 427–66.
73. Abuza, Zachary (2002), 'Tentacles of terror: al Qaeda's Southeast Asian linkages'. See also Clamor, Ma. Concepcion B. (2002), 'Terrorism and Southeast Asia: a Philippine perspective', paper presented at the conference Transnational Violence and Seams of Lawlessness in the Asia Pacific: Linkages to Global Terrorism held at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, 12–21 February.
74. Abuza, Zachary (2002), 'Tentacles of terror: al Qaeda's Southeast Asian linkages'.
75. Interview with Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan, Director of the Philippine National Police Intelligence Group, held at Camp Crame, Quezon City on 1 April 2005.
76. Alcuin Papa, 'Military: JI members still training locals', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 18 January 2005.
77. 'Alleged bombs expert for Jemaah Islamiyah regional network arrested in Philippines', *Channel News Asia*, www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/southeastasia/view/138779/1/.html, accessed 12 April 2005.
78. Interview with General Marlu Quevedo, Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, held at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City on 29 March 2005.
79. For detailed discussion, see Banlaoi, Rommel C. (2006), 'Abu Sayyaf group: from mere banditry to genuine terrorism', in Daljit Singh and Lorraine Salazar (eds), *Southeast Asian Affairs 2006*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 247–62.
80. Gomez, Jim (2005), 'Filipino Terror Group's Reach Grown Nationally', Associated Press, 8 March.
81. Donnely, Charles (2004), 'Terrorism in the Southern Philippines: contextualizing the Abu Sayyaf Group as an Islamist secessionist organization', paper presented to the 15th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia held in Canberra, 29 June – 2 July, p. 4.
82. Interview with Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan, Director of the Philippine National Police Intelligence Group, held at Camp Crane, Quezon City on 1 April 2005.
83. This section is largely based on Banlaoi, Rommel C. (2005), 'Maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia: the Abu Sayyaf threat', *US Naval War College Review*, **58** (4). For a more detailed analysis of ASG's maritime terrorist capability, also see Banlaoi, Rommel C. (2006), 'The Abu Sayyaf Group: Threat of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism', in Peter Lehr (ed.), *Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Terrorism*, New York: Routledge.
84. Burnham, Gracia and Dean Merrill (2003). *In the Presence of my Enemies*, Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers.
85. This particular section is based on Banlaoi, Rommel C. (2006), 'Suicide terrorism in the Philippines: the rise of the Rajah Solaiman movement', manuscript, 5 July.

86. See Chalk, Peter (2006), 'Christian converts and Islamic terrorism in the Philippines', *Terrorism Monitor*, **4** (8). Also see International Crisis Group (2005), 'Philippines terrorism: the role of militant Islamic converts', Asia Report, No. 110, 19 December.
87. Chalk, Peter (2006), 'Christian converts and Islamic terrorism in the Philippines'.
88. 'Summary of Report on Rajah Solaiman Movement', www.westerndefence.org/articles/philippinesRepublic/May04.htm (12 April 2004).
89. Philippine National Police (n.d.) 'Fact sheet on the Rajah Solaiman Movement'.
90. Mendoza, Rodolfo B., Jr. (2006), 'Radical Islamic converts in the Philippines and their networks', manuscript.
91. A paper obtained from the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, 1 March 2005.
92. Cochrane, Joe (2004), 'Filipino authorities say the newest threat to the country is a shadowy terror group made up of radical Muslim converts', *Newsweek International Edition*, 17 May, msnbc.msn.com/id/4933472/, accessed 28 August 2004.
93. Philippine National Police (2005), 'Executive summary: update on the arrest of Hilarion Santos', 28 October.
94. Philippine National Police (2005), 'Executive summary: update on the arrest of Hilarion Santos'.
95. Villaviray, Johnna (2003), 'When Christians embrace Islam', *Manila Times*, 17 November, www.manilatimes.net/others/special/2003/nov/17/20031117spe1.html. Also at www.geocities.com/WestHollywood/Park/6443/Philippines/mt1.html, accessed 23 June 2005.
96. Villaviray, Johnna (2003), 'When Christians embrace Islam'.
97. Villaviray, Johnna (2003), 'Muslims identify with "terrorist" ideals', *Manila Times*, November, www.manilatimes.net/others/special/2003/nov/19/20031119spe1.html, accessed 23 June 2005.
98. Villaviray, Johnna (2003), 'When Christians embrace Islam', p. 2.
99. Villaviray, Johnna (2003), 'Islam attracts the disillusioned', *Manila Times*, 17 November, www.manilatimes.net/others/special/2003/nov/18/20031118spe1.html, accessed on 23 June 2005.
100. Villaviray, Johnna (2003), 'Islam attracts the disillusioned'.
101. Garrido, Marco (2004), 'After Madrid, Manila?' *Asia Times*, 24 April, www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FD24Ae01.html, accessed 28 August 2004.
102. Espina-Varona, Inday (2005), 'Brothers in arms', *Philippine Graphics*, **15** (38), p. 24.
103. Espina-Varona, Inday (2005), 'Brothers in arms'.
104. Espina-Varona, Inday (2005), 'Brothers in arms', p. 25.
105. Interview with General Florencio D. Fianza of the Office of the Special Envoy on Transnational Crime on 1 April 2005.
106. Ulph, Stephen (2005), 'Philippine terror war goes on despite peace talks', Jamestown Foundation *Terrorism Focus*, **2** (3), p. 3.
107. Rasul-Bernardo, Amina (2005), 'Ethnic conflict, peace and development: a Philippine case study', paper presented at the CSID 6th Annual Conference, Washington, DC, 22–23 April, www.islam-democracy.org/documents/pdf/6th_Annual_Conference-AminaRasulBernardo.pdf, p. 1, accessed 23 June 2005.
108. Agence France Press (2006), 'Three Muslim extremists captured in Maguindanao', *ABS-CBN News*, 29 July.
109. A phone interview with military official in Cotabato City, 30 July 2006.
110. Vitug, Marites D. and Glenda M. Gloria (2000), *Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao*, p. 229.
111. Dayanghirang, Gico (2005), 'Federal Republic of Mindanao', email message sent on 30 June.

PART III

ARMED SEPARATIST INSURGENCIES

11 Separatist insurgency in the southern Philippines*

Paul A. Rodell

Islamic insurgency has plagued the southern Philippines since the late 1960s and provided a secure base for radical Islamic teachings and terrorists since the early 1990s. However, the fundamental nature and causes of the Philippine Muslim insurgency should not be equated with the radicalism of either al-Qaeda or the Jamaah Islamiah. Rather, the main Philippine insurgency is a domestic phenomenon with deep historical roots, and results from the unsuccessful integration of the Muslim population into the Christian dominated nation-state and society. Throughout most of their history, the Muslim peoples of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago have lived a separate cultural and political existence. That autonomy was largely maintained during the long Spanish colonial period and was only curbed with the advent of American colonial occupation. Under the United States and, then, the independent Philippine Republic, Muslim autonomy came under increasing pressure as Christian Filipinos encroached on Muslim lands and came to dominate much of the region's political life. The Philippine nation-state's ideology held that once integrated into the larger whole, Muslims would enjoy an equal share of the national bounty, but this never came to be and the region remained desperately poor.

The myth of national integration disintegrated in the late 1960s thanks to two distinct, but related, developments, the first of which was the increasing influence of reform Islam coming from the Middle East that began to transform the region's previously lax religiosity. More Philippine Muslims participated in the annual hajj to Mecca and received a more rigorous religious instruction, the consequence of which was a greater consciousness of the Islamic community's distinctiveness from the dominant Christian Philippines. The second development was the Jabidah massacre of 1968 that sparked the creation of an Islamic 'imagined community', and led to the armed insurgency that continues to the present day. The original organization to oppose the government, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), was formed as a direct response to that massacre, while the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) broke from its parent due to a combination of pragmatic and religious factors. The latter organization proved receptive to the call of radical Islamic teachings in the 1990s, but grew

increasingly uncomfortable with al-Qaeda's terrorist violence after the 9/11 attacks.

By 2004 a number of factors provided the opportunity to initiate peace talks between the MILF and the government. Beyond a number of important political and economic issues such as configurations of power-sharing and ancestral lands, the peace talks represent something more profound for the Muslims: the abandonment of aspirations for a separate independent state and identity. After losing their autonomy at the turn of the century in exchange for the false hope of national integration, the Philippine's Muslims reconstituted themselves as the independent Bangsamoro People in the 1960s. Now, this new Islamic identity is endangered as Muslims must reconsider their identity and role within the largely Christian state to which they will be committed upon the signing of a final peace agreement. The larger challenge for all Filipinos is whether the country's Islamic people will truly be integrated into the national whole so the events of the past 30 years will not be continued.

Historical roots for insurgency

In the late fourteenth century, Arab merchants and missionary scholars from the neighbouring islands of today's Indonesia and from as far away as South Asia introduced Islam to the Philippines. The entry point was the Sulu archipelago which includes the southwestern peninsula jutting off the island of Mindanao and the island chain of Basilan, Jolo and Tawi-Tawi. The new arrivals brought a message of a single god who was more powerful than the multiple spirits and natural phenomenon that had been worshipped. The newcomers also married into the families of local rulers, increasing their prestige and enhancing the spread of the faith. From this beginning, Islam spread rapidly to Mindanao and some of the Philippine central islands known as the Visayas and even reached present-day Manila.[1] When the Spaniards arrived in Manila Bay in 1570, the local ruler used the title of rajah.

Since Spain had expelled the Moors from the Iberian Peninsula only as recently as 1492, Spanish animosity toward Islam was intense and they were anxious to reverse the Islamic advance they found in Asia. To this end, the Spanish crown liberally supported the missionary activities of Catholic priests and in a relatively short time the 'friars' achieved remarkable success reversing the Islamization process in recently converted areas. However, the more established Islamic bastions in the south remained true to the faith, perhaps in large part because their identity had become closely linked to their religion which differentiated them from the rest of the archipelago. Islam thus remained the faith for five distinct ethnic groups: the boat-dwelling Badjaos; the fierce Tausugs warriors of the Sulu archipelago; the

Samal of the Zamboanga peninsula; the Maranao of the Lake Lanao region of northern Mindanao; and the Maguindanao in the southwest of that island.

Spain's 300-year rule of the Philippines never truly included unchallenged control of the Muslim south. In 1635, Spain built a fort in the port of Zamboanga from which it mounted military raids against Muslim strongholds, but these attacks did not subdue the independent Muslims. Instead, Muslims continued their raids on Christian villages in the nearby Visayan islands of the central Philippines where they took captives who were then sold into slavery. In an effort to protect their people, missionary priests in the Visayas and further north used church bell towers as lookouts and linked churches along coasts into a signalling system to warn residents of approaching danger, but Muslim raids and depredations continued. Only in the latter years of the nineteenth century when Spain introduced steam-powered patrol boats did it gain the upper hand over the fast-moving Muslim sailing boats that had easily outrun heavy Spanish sailing ships. Spain also had some success at political manipulation by intervening in succession disputes in Sulu and Maguindanao, thus weakening these traditional rulerships. Despite these efforts, Muslim resistance remained very much alive through the end of Spain's colonial reign.[2]

After defeating Spain in 1898, the United States tightened its grip on its Philippine colony, including Muslim areas. In August 1899, Brigadier General John C. Bates signed a treaty of peace and reconciliation with Sultan Jamalul Kiram II of Sulu. Much to the later chagrin of many Muslims, the treaty was never ratified by the US Congress and the English version included a reference to United States 'sovereignty' that the sultan innocently signed. Shortly after in October, the Military District of Mindanao was created and the islands of Jolo and Palawan were occupied as were other Muslim territories in Mindanao despite armed opposition. In June 1903, military rule was replaced by a civilian Moro Province controlled by American colonial officers.[3] This new colonialist intrusion was challenged by fighters in Sulu and a three-year guerrilla war was waged by forces loyal to Datu Uto of Cotabato in Mindanao. Meanwhile, Theodore Roosevelt's unilateral abrogation of the Bates Treaty in March 1904 further intensified Muslim bitterness. The fighting in Sulu was finally ended in March after the 1906 slaughter of over 600 men, women and children at Bud Dajo, an extinct volcano on Sulu. This sickening massacre was replicated in June 1913 at Bud Bagsak on Jolo where the killing of hundreds of Muslim civilians ended their renewed defiance of American authority.[4]

Despite the peace, the Muslims' problems had just begun. With the end of active resistance the intrusion of American colonial interests as well as those of Christian Filipinos was virtually unchecked. Resettlement

programmes brought many thousands of Christian settlers to Mindanao so that before the Second World War almost 97 000 hectares of Cotabato was occupied by the settlers. Meanwhile, US corporations, such as Del Monte and BF Goodrich, held thousands of hectares on Basilan Island, and in Cotabato and Bukidnon provinces. Concurrently, the American government introduced Christian Filipino civil servants into Muslim territories where they controlled local offices of the national government and traditional Muslim leaders were co-opted with appointments to government positions, thus depriving the region of leaders who might otherwise have continued resistance.[5] This onslaught resulted in a rapid marginalization of the Muslim population in their own region. By 1948, Mindanao's 933 101 Muslims made up only 32 per cent of the island's total population, down from 76 per cent in 1903. In the 1950s and 1960s the demographic percentage of Mindanao's Muslims deteriorated even more rapidly as new large-scale resettlement programmes introduced many more thousands of Christian Filipinos. By 1970, the island's 1 669 708 Muslims comprised a mere 21 per cent of the population. As well, the best land was held by the settlers and corporations, while most of the region's economic investments and government services went to the Christian population. Today, provinces with majority Muslim populations are among the poorest and most backward in the country.[6]

The Jabidah Massacre and the beginnings of separatism

Despite increasing deprivation the southern Philippines remained pacific until a March 1968 massacre of young Muslim recruits in the Philippine Army showed the government's programmes and propaganda promoting ethnic accommodation were shams. As a result, a new Islamic consciousness emerged that envisioned an independent Bangsamoro (Muslim nation) and its people. This psychological turn provided the critical rationale for all subsequent separatist movements. The actual massacre victims were young Tausug recruits who were part of an ultra-secret Philippine Army unit with the code name Jabidah.[7] The unit was part of a covert government plan would have launched a phony rebellion in neighbouring Sabah, then being incorporated into the new state of Malaysia. The Philippines had claimed Sabah in 1922 and the phony rebellion was to have been a pretext for Philippine military intervention to thwart Malaysian control. In December 1967, the recruits were transported to Corregidor Island at the entrance to Manila Bay to prepare for their mission. For reasons that are still unclear, the programme soon deteriorated to such a degree that the trainees attempted to petition President Ferdinand E. Marcos about their grievances. Many were transferred to regular military camps, but on 18 March, two batches of 12 men each were told to pack

their personal effects for a flight home. Instead, all the recruits except one were massacred. A wounded Jibin Arulas escaped to the sea where he was picked up by fishermen who brought him to the governor of nearby Cavite province. The resulting exposé and scandal led to a congressional investigation and caused an international incident with Malaysia's Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman.[8]

Events moved rapidly after Jabidah; only a few months later Governor Datu Udtog Matalam formed the Muslim Independence Movement while Congressman Rashid Lucman sent a batch of 92 young Muslim men to Malaysia for training with the Royal Malaysian Special Forces. Upon returning, the new ethnic fighters built training camps in Sulu and Mindanao and by 1971 they had trained an estimated 30 000 others in weapons and guerrilla tactics. In response to this increased Islamic militancy, Christian gangs called Ilagas, or rats, perpetrated attacks on Muslim civilians and appeared to enjoy the support of Christian politicians.[9] The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) seemed unable to control the violence and President Marcos used the escalating conflict as one of his justifications when he declared Martial Law in September 1972.

From separatism to Islamic consciousness: MNLF to MILF

A member of the first batch of Malaysian-trained Philippine Muslims was Nur Misuari, a Tausug student, and later professor, at the University of the Philippines. Though initially allied with titled Muslim political elites, Misuari and his fellow trainees broke from their sponsors and formed the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). After Marcos declared martial law, fierce fighting broke out in Jolo that only ended with the virtual destruction of the city under a government counter-attack. Despite this initial defeat, the MNLF's prestige grew and the movement spread throughout the Muslim south. By 1975, 60 AFP battalions were based in Mindanao at a cost that threatened the national economy and the stability of the Marcos regime. For his part, Misuari also realized that while the MNLF had managed to fight the government to a stalemate, his forces could not defeat the AFP to win independence and, further, that the Muslim people were suffering and could not sustain the impact of continued war. Both Marcos and Misuari realized that they had to reach a political accommodation. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) facilitated talks hosted by Libyan President Mu'ammer al-Gaddafi that led to an agreement signed in Tripoli in December 1976 offering an autonomous government covering Mindanao and Sulu.[10]

Though the Tripoli agreement should have ended the conflict, Marcos undermined the accord by going ahead and creating his own regional government and appointing its leaders. Caught off-guard by the Marcos

betrayal, Misuari and the MNLF suffered a severe loss of credibility. Not only had Misuari broken from established Muslim political leaders tainted by their collaboration with the Christian Filipino power structure, but he also created a secularist MNLF organization that eschewed overt religious influences and transcended the region's ethnic divisions and rivalries. With Misuari's loss of prestige these strains in the Philippine Muslim community reasserted themselves. Traditional political leaders such as Sultan Rashid Lucman and Senator Salipada Pendatun tried to reassert their earlier dominance, while Misuari's religious rivals offered more serious competition. That rivalry was led by Salamat Hashim, a member of the MNLF ruling council, who led an unsuccessful power grab in December 1977. Though Misuari won the immediate political battle, the departure of Hashim and his followers further weakened the organization. In March 1984, after years of leading a separate MNLF faction, Hashim founded the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) an organization whose very name signified a religious turn in the separatist struggle. Hashim, himself, was an *ustaz* (Islamic teacher) with a degree from the Institute of Islamic Research, al-Azhar University, Cairo. Under his leadership the MILF gave weight to religious considerations and Islamic imam (religious leaders) and *alim* (Islamic scholars) played prominent roles in the organization.[11]

In addition to igniting a spark of political-religious activism, the MILF's founding also led to a re-emergence of traditional ethnic divisions. Hashim's MILF was identified with the Maguindanaos of western Mindanao although the organization also included Maranaos from the Lake Lanao area who were included in a delicate alliance. Meanwhile, Misuari's remaining MNLF loyalists were largely fellow Tausugs from the Sulu archipelago. Later, a more radical organization, the Abu Sayyaf, was founded by another Tausug from Sulu, Abdurajak Janjalani. The MNLF's decline also facilitated the growing influence of strong local leaders who frequently acted independently of any organization's control. These independent groups, sometimes called 'Lost Commands', often turned to criminality, such as the notorious Pentagon gang which specialized in spectacular kidnapping and robbery activities. Even the relatively small Abu Sayyaf group was plagued by numerous factions that greatly complicated the process of communication with the right faction and delivering ransom to the proper people to effect the release of kidnap victims. Ethnic divisions and factionalism became especially problematic for the MILF in recent years when some of the more radical of its local leaders seem to have protected Indonesian Islamic militants of the al-Qaeda-linked Jamaah Islamiah (JI).[12]

Though damaged, the MNLF under Misuari's leadership remained the principal separatist movement recognized by the government and the

outside world. Meanwhile, the MILF portrayed itself as moderate and sought to win OIC recognition away from the MNLF. In the meantime, by 1999 Hashim had built an armed force of 8000–15 000 fighters led by commanders trained in Libya and Palestine, some of whom gained additional combat experience in Afghanistan. In addition to creating a rival organization with its own military wing that sought to win international favour with the OIC, Hashim attempted to undercut Misuari's position by entering into peace negotiations with the Marcos government. By 1986, therefore, the two Muslim organizations were deadlocked against each other with neither strong enough to threaten the government. At the same time, Manila could not end the state of virtual rebellion.

The January 1986 People Power Revolution with its days of peaceful massive civil disobedience removed Marcos from power and brought Corazon Aquino, the widow of the former Marcos adversary Benigno Aquino, to the presidency. Both Misuari and Hashim were delighted and agreed to reconcile with each other, and enter into joint negotiations with the new government. However, in September Aquino made a private visit to Misuari, indicating her clear preference as to who should represent the country's Muslims. In response, the MILF began a short offensive early the next year to demonstrate their displeasure and to remind the government of their importance in achieving a peace.[13] Despite initial hopes, the talks with the MNLF got nowhere because the government insisted on implementing the autonomy provisions of its new constitution without negotiating the specifics with the Muslim group. In early August 1989, the Philippine Congress created the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), but in a November plebiscite only four provinces voted to join the new body. When the ARMM was inaugurated in November 1990 both Misuari and Hashim objected strongly to the plebiscite and the size of the autonomous region, but they were ignored. Not willing to accept either the national government's dictate or the reduced area of ARMM control, both Muslim leaders continued the separatist–government stalemate.

Aquino was succeeded by former General Fidel Ramos in May 1992 and he soon re-entered into talks with the MNLF in Tripoli and the MILF in the Philippines. The resulting agreement of September 1996 with Misuari and the MNLF included an amnesty commission and a ceasefire. Although Misuari finally accepted the government's peace solution and the existence of the ARMM, Muslim aspirations were once again thwarted as Mindanao's Christian politicians along with key senators modified and delayed the final peace treaty. Additionally, Ramos issued an Executive Order modifying important points in the agreement, so the ARMM's authority remained limited and it never received sufficient resources to fulfil

its mission.[14] Compounding the situation were Misuari's limitations as the ARMM's administrator and the concessions he made to prominent Muslim families. The ARMM's bloated bureaucracy never delivered basic social services and did little to alleviate the region's poverty.[15] While some former MNLF rebels were incorporated into the country's military in accordance with the agreement, many were not, which led disgruntled MNLF rebels to join the ranks of the MILF. As a consequence of the flawed 1996 agreement that created a weak and ineffectual ARMM, the MILF emerged as the greater hope for the majority of Philippine's Muslims. Salamat Hashim enjoyed a respectable reputation as an Islamic scholar, his inner circle was composed of honest, competent and dedicated men, and its increasingly formidable fighting force gave promise of success. The MILF then engaged the AFP in a series of 'pocket wars' in 1996–97 while conducting peace negotiations and in July 1997 the government agreed to a cessation of hostilities and recognized 44 MILF camps as 'zones of peace and development' in which the AFP would not interfere.[16]

Misuari's end as a leader came in 2001, the first year of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's presidency. By this time, Misuari had little social or economic progress to show for his work as ARMM governor and concurrent chair of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). In late April, an impatient MNLF council removed him as MNLF chair and President Arroyo named someone else to head the SPCPD. Then, in August, Arroyo announced the holding of a plebiscite in late November to determine, once again, the ARMM's provincial composition and leadership, including the governor's position. Realizing the threat to his remaining position, Misuari led a boycott of the plebiscite and refused to run for re-election. A week before the vote, Misuari led an ill-planned revolt in Jolo that failed completely. He then attempted to flee to Malaysia where authorities arrested and deported him to Manila where he continues to languish under government detention.[17]

The odyssey of the Abu Sayyaf

While the MNLF-dominated ARMM plodded along, events in Sulu were heating up with the emergence of the Abu Sayyaf. The original organization was created by a young radical Tausug from Sulu, Abdurajak Janjalani, who quit the MNLF in 1987. Janjalani studied Islam's ultra-conservative Wahhabism in Libya and fought with the mujahideen in Afghanistan. In 1990, he returned to the Philippines and with fellow radical Muslims founded the core of what became the Abu Sayyaf. Key to Janjalani's rise was his relationship with Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law Muhammad Jamal Khalifa who recruited the young man to his radical Islamist ideology. Khalifa had married a Filipina and set up a rattan

import–export business as a cover to funnel money to al-Qaeda through established Islamic charities. He also recruited volunteers such as Janjalani to fight in Afghanistan. During his time in Afghanistan, Janjalani met another important al-Qaeda agent, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, who came to the Philippines in 1991–92 with two other agents to instruct the Abu Sayyaf group in the use of explosives. Later, in the autumn of 1994, Yousef and three other al-Qaeda agents established themselves in Manila and began terrorist operations under the codename Oplan Bojinka. Their main objective was a simultaneous bombing of 11 airliners while in flight over the Pacific. A test bomb was exploded on a Philippine Airlines flight to Japan, killing a Japanese passenger. However, an apartment fire in January exposed this small al-Qaeda cell, and scattered its accomplices before their plot could be hatched.[18] Meanwhile, the new Abu Sayyaf radical group gained national notoriety when it participated in a bloody raid along with a dissident MNLF faction on the town of Ipil in Zamboanga del Sur in 1995.[19]

In December 1998, Janjalani and two other Abu Sayyaf members were killed in a gun battle with police on Basilan after which his younger brother, Khaddafy, and Aldam Tilao, aka Abu Sabaya, succeeded him. With the elder brother's death the Abu Sayyaf seemed to lose any claim that it was an Islamic religious group and its new leaders shifted to criminality for personal profit. In 2000, Abu Sayyaf raiders kidnapped a group of 21 tourists, many of whom were Europeans, from a Malaysian resort. This incident was resolved successfully by the payment of an estimated $10 million to $25 million ransom provided by the Libyan government.[20] Earlier, another Abu Sayyaf group kidnapped 27 elementary and high school students along with 21 teachers and a Catholic priest, resulting in the deaths of five teachers and the priest.[21]

The ransom money from the Malaysian resort kidnappings encouraged the Abu Sayyaf's new bandit tendency and in May 2001 it kidnapped another group of hostages from the Philippine's Dos Palmas resort off Palawan Island, among whom were an American businessman and a Protestant missionary couple. This time, the Abu Sayyaf group was hotly pursued by the Philippine military who scoured the island of Basilan where the hostages were taken. Attempts to elicit ransom money met with resistance, leading to the beheading of the American businessman. After the September 11 attack on New York's twin towers, the Philippine drama became linked with the US President George W. Bush's 'War on Terrorism', and American troops were dispatched in early 2002 to assist Philippine forces. On 7 June 2002, a Philippine Marine contingent ambushed the kidnappers and in the firefight, the missionary husband was killed while the wife was injured.[22] Since then, American support has played a critical role

in helping the Philippine military deal a number of setbacks to the Abu Sayyaf, including the death of Abu Sabaya, then the group's principal spokesman. With its numbers reduced, some of the remaining forces adopted a low profile while others, including Khaddafy Janjalani, scattered to new areas including the Maguindanao region of western Mindanao. In 2002 and 2003, it seemed as though elimination of the Abu Sayyaf would only be a matter of time as counter-insurgency measures chalked up one success after another, including the arrest of some principal leaders such as Ghalib Andang, alias Commander Robot. However, in mid-March 2005, Robot along with two other top Abu Sayyaf detainees, Commanders Kosovo (Alhamsar Manatad Limbong) and Global (Nadsmi Sabdullah) were killed by police after they and other inmates took over the jail in the PNP's Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan south of Manila.[23] This and other jailbreaks demonstrate just how dangerous Abu Sayyaf members are, even after captivity.

Ironically, the AFP's increased pressure and the failure to elicit more ransom money helped return the group to its original Islamist mission of fostering jihad in the Philippines. That the Abu Sayyaf had returned to its ideological roots was dramatically demonstrated on 27 February 2004 when the passenger ship *Super Ferry 14* suffered a huge explosion as it sailed out of Manila Bay, sinking quickly with loss of over 100 people. Abu Sayyaf spokesman Abu Sulaiman and Khaddafy Janjalani claimed responsibility. A month later some careless boasting by the bomber led authorities to break up a six-person Abu Sayyaf cell in Manila. Of especial note in this particular case was the key participation by recent Filipino Christian converts to Islam who were members of a new organization, the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM).[24] If anyone doubted the Abu Sayyaf's Islamist path, analysts were soon able to confirm that the newly reinvigorated group had returned to its long-deceased founder's vision of jihad as caches of explosives were discovered and undetonated bombs defused.[25] In addition, the Abu Sayyaf terrorist threat seemed to have expanded to include renewed linkages with the Jemaah Islamiah and disaffected radical members of both the MNLF and the MILF. In the second week of February 2005 a combined Abu Sayyaf–MNLF force of almost 800 men staged a brief uprising in Jolo. Then, on Valentine's Day a combined group of Jemaah Islamiah, Abu Sayyaf and MILF members detonated a near simultaneous series of bombings in the Manila suburb of Makati and the Mindanao cities of Davao and General Santos. Suspects from both organizations were soon taken into captivity with enough evidence to convict them of the bombing.[26] The Abu Sayyaf–RSM was again implicated in a foiled bombing plan for the 2005 Easter Holy Week where the converts allegedly planned to use a tonne of explosives purchased with funding from

JI militants Omar Patek and Dolmatin.[27] Recent testimony by a former member of the Rajah Solaiman Movement has underscored how deep the RSM – Abu Sayyaf – JI – al-Qaeda linkage is, which should serve as a caution against complacency.[28] Still, and despite the fact that Philippine jihadists will remain deadly, terrorism only alienates both Muslims and Christians alike. Without a positive political agenda the Abu Sayyaf may continue to survive, but should remain a fringe extremist organization.

MILF and al-Qaeda + Jemaah Islamiah: coupling and decoupling

While the Abu Sayyaf never broke its links with al-Qaeda, the course of the relationship between the MILF and Osama bin Ladin's organization appears to be quite different. This is an important distinction as it lies at the heart of the difference between the two Philippine Muslim organizations and indicates how terrorism in the Philippines can be isolated. The MILF's ties with first al-Qaeda, and later the Jemaah Islamiah, reached their apex with the collaboration of the MILF and the Jemaah Islamiah in the training of Indonesians and Filipinos at MILF camps in Mindanao. However, that cosy relationship was weaken by the Philippine government's 2000 military offensive and a decoupled process began after the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks in the US and has rapidly accelerated since then. The American interest in waging war upon Islamic terrorists anywhere in the world made the MILF leadership rethink its relationship with outside Islamicist organizations. It soon became apparent that the basic goals of separatist Philippine Muslim insurgents and radical Muslims were not compatible. Philippine Muslim separatists, whether of the secularist stripe of Nur Misuari and the MNLF, or the more religiously oriented MILF established by Salamat Hashim, are fighting to improve the lives of the Bangsamoro people. This fight includes issues of either separatism or autonomy, the restoration of the Muslims' 'ancestral lands', economic and human development, and general peace and security. The notion of a jihad against the Christian world and the possible creation of a caliph for Southeast Asia is simply not a part of the Philippine Muslim separatist agenda. Once the MILF's association with external groups on the US terrorist organization list became a liability to their long domestic struggle, ties with these radical foreigners could be sacrificed. This is what happened from 2002 onward and has led to productive peace talks between the MILF and the Philippine government.

As mentioned earlier, Salamat Hashim sent a number of MILF recruits to Afghanistan for military training and to participate in the struggle against the Soviet Union's occupation of that Muslim country. Though short-lived, this experience was critical in helping the MILF develop a well-seasoned officer corps that rapidly built the organization's military force

upon their return from South Asia. Additional important links were created in the mid-1990s through Muhammad Jamal Khalifa's companies and via international phone calls between al-Qaeda's Abu Zubayadah and key MILF officials. An important part of the relationship was the coupling of the Indonesian organization Jemaah Islamiah with the MILF through Salamat Hashim and his friend Abdullah Sungkar who co-founded the Jemaah Islamiah with Abu Bakar Bashir the radical Islamic cleric. In 1995, as a consequence of this linkage, the Indonesian group was granted permission to establish training facilities in the MILF's main Camp Abubakar in Mindanao. One of the Jemaah Islamiah agents assigned to set up the camps and serve as a trainer was the Afghan veteran Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, originally from Madiun, East Java.[29]

The coupling of the MILF and JI was disrupted by President Joseph Estrada who had succeeded Ramos in 1998. Estrada demanded that the ongoing negotiation process with the MILF accelerate to deliver a final agreement by December 1999, or risk a renewed government offensive. With the deadline past, Estrada ordered the military into action in early 2000 and by July a number of MILF strongholds, including Camp Abubakar where Hashim made his home, had fallen to the Philippine military's assault. The offensive scattered MILF forces and seriously weakened their credibility as a fighting force capable of resisting the government military.[30] Usually, 30 December is noted as a Philippine holiday in honour of the national hero Jose Rizal. However, in an apparent response to the AFP offensive, on Rizal Day 2000 JI operatives al-Ghozi and Riduan Isamuddin, alias Hambali, al-Qaeda's representative for Southeast Asia, set off a wave of bomb attacks in Metro Manila. They were supported by an MILF 'special operations group' headed by Saifullah Yunos. Their targets included the city's light rail transit system, shopping malls and various other locations, and led to the deaths of 32 people and the wounding of slightly less than 200 others. Philippine authorities knew of al-Ghozi's role in the bombings and began hunting for him. The elusive JI operative was eventually arrested in January 2002 and led authorities to tonnes of explosives that, he claimed, were to be used in suicide attacks on Western embassies and other targets in Singapore.[31]

Meanwhile, after a series of political and corruption scandals, Estrada was ousted by a 'People Power' uprising in January 2001 that brought his vice-president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, into office. During the first half of 2001, the new president's energies were spent defending her regime from attacks by Estrada loyalists and in a fruitless chase after the Abu Sayyaf kidnappers who invaded the Palawan Island resort. Within this context the September 2001 al-Qaeda attack on New York City's Twin Towers served to redound to the Philippines' advantage as the country became an early

recruit in George W. Bush's 'coalition of the willing'. President Arroyo had a previously scheduled state visit in November and the woman president told her American counterpart about the brutality of the Abu Sayyaf who had recently beheaded their businessman captive from California. President Bush gave Arroyo his complete attention and total sympathy. He also made substantial commitments of economic and military assistance.[32] By early 2002 the US had sent military advisors and equipment to support the AFP's tracking of the Abu Sayyaf kidnappers, who were discovered and attacked by Philippine troops in early June 2002. This operation was followed by a series of annual Philippine–American exercises called Balikatan (shoulder-to-shoulder) that provided assistance and training to revitalize the AFP, whose capabilities had deteriorated since 1991 when the US cut back its assistance levels after losing its military bases to the Mount Pinatubo eruption and a hostile Philippine Congress.[33] Concurrently, the revitalized Philippine–American relationship was further deepened with the signing of the Military Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) in November 2002 to facilitate the coordination of supplies, military hardware, storage facilities, and communications equipment between the two militaries. As a result, security-related assistance began arriving in increased amounts with almost $78 million coming in 2003 and the early scheduling of $115 million in aid for 2004.[34] In addition, on 18 October 2003 President Bush made a brief eight-hour visit to the Philippines while en route to an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Bangkok. During his visit he officially announced the Philippines' elevation to the status of a 'major non-NATO ally', which further increased possible levels of military assistance.

With their military wing clipped by the government's 2000 offensive and a new Philippine president in office, the MILF decided to return to the negotiating table, but little seemed to be accomplished after months of deliberations. Like her predecessor, President Macapagal-Arroyo ultimately became dismayed with the lack of progress and showed that she, too, could take a hard line. In February 2003, after warning the MILF about its lack of progress, Arroyo ordered a brief offensive against the MILF's new headquarters, the Buliok complex, that straddled the provinces of North Cotabato and Maguindanao.[35] This offensive further demonstrated the MILF's military weakness and resulted in additional losses of men and material and disrupted MILF administrative and logistical capabilities. In March, shortly after Buliok's loss, a series of bombings struck power lines in Mindanao and, more dramatically, the airport and public wharf in the city of Davao, killing numerous innocent civilians. Soon after the attacks, Philippine National Police (PNP) intelligence director Roberto Delfin identified five JI operatives led by Zulkifli bin Hir, a member

of that organization's central command. Additionally, AFP intelligence further claimed that prominent MILF leaders met with these and other JI members to plan out retaliatory attacks as a response to the loss of Buliok. Although the circumstantial evidence seemed strong, neither intelligence group could present conclusive evidence that a JI–MILF conspiracy was responsible for the attacks.[36] Nevertheless, the government chose to believe the reports and charged 138 MILF leaders with complicity in the bombings.

The MILF bombings also turned out to be counterproductive diplomatically for the MILF and elicited a sharp rebuke from the international Islamic community, especially Malaysia. In this regard, the rapprochement that President Arroyo had cultivated with Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad since she came into office has paid off handsomely. Rather than helping Muslim rebels as they had in 1968 after Jabidah, Malaysian officials now strongly condemn any terrorist activity and have expressed unequivocal support for peace negotiations.[37] For instance, in late April 2003, in a keynote speech before delegates to the National Conference on Regional Security held in Makati, Metro Manila, Mohamad Najib Tun Abdul Razak, Malaysian Minister of Defence, let his audience know that Kuala Lumpur stood with the Philippine government. He said that Malaysia did not support or condone Islamic secessionists seeking change through 'extreme' behaviour outside the political arena, and that 'extremism is loathed by Islam and that resorting to violence is equally condemned by true believers'. 'If indeed it claims to represent Muslims,' he elaborated, 'the Moro movement must combat radicalism and militant elements within its organization.' Instead, the rebels, 'must concentrate on bringing greater development to the community instead of merely aiming to seize power. Let us call for a jihad against poverty, against ignorance, against underdevelopment, and against prejudice.'[38] Only a little more than two months after the defence minister's speech, Kuala Lumpur also exerted pressure on the Philippines to drop its arrest warrants against the MILF leadership for the Davao bombings. Kuala Lumpur let it be known that if Manila did not drop the charges, Malaysia might withdraw its standing offer to serve as a peace treaty mediator.[39]

The MILF had an additional reason to give serious consideration to resuming peace talks and rejecting extremist ties. As part of its 'War on Terror', the US began to assemble a global list of terrorist organizations against which severe sanctions would be applied. Both the Communist Party of the Philippines and the Abu Sayyaf were added to the list, and the MILF did not want to be included as well. Beginning shortly after the Davao bombings, Manila orchestrated a high-pressure campaign to push the MILF into denouncing terrorism, or risk being included on the US list.

The campaign began with a briefing paper prepared by the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency that linked the Muslim organization with bombing plans through their 'Special Operations Group' and as having a working relationship with Tahir Alonto, the leader of the dreaded Pentagon kidnap gang. President Arroyo set conditions for the MILF to meet and a specific deadline if the separatist organization was to avoid being added to the US terrorist list. Finally, in June, Salamat Hashim issued a clear and definitive denunciation of terrorism as being 'anathema to the teachings of Islam'.[40] The process of decoupling was clearly underway.

The turning point in the decoupling process came in the following month of July when three events combined to have a significant impact on the MILF and its relationship with Jemaah Islamiah, and by extension al-Qaeda. The first event was the signing of a ceasefire agreement with the government that had the clear implication of being the first step leading to the resumption of talks and a final peace pact.[41] More dramatically, on the 10 July, JI terrorist al-Ghozi and two Abu Sayyaf inmates made a bold night-time escape from a high-security jail in the Manila headquarters of the PNP. The escape sparked a national manhunt that finally ended in mid-October when al-Ghozi was gunned down at a police checkpoint in North Cotabato province. During the manhunt, it soon became known that individual MILF commanders had given the Indonesian refuge, thus throwing into question Hashim's recent denunciation of terrorism.[42] Also, it became known that some JI instructors who had worked in the MILF's old camp Abubakar had remained in Mindanao and set up a new training camp in a remote area on the slopes of Mt Kararao in Maguindanao province. This information was confirmed on 2 October 2003, only days before the AFP gunned down al-Ghozi. At that time, Philippine government agents picked up Taufik Refke, a JI financial officer, who confirmed the existence of the new camp. Then, in January 2004, Malaysian authorities intercepted six Indonesians who had just finished their training on Mindanao and were on their way home.[43]

However, it was the third event in July that proved to be the most decisive. On 13 July, the MILF lost Salamat Hashim to a fatal heart attack which dealt a profound blow to the organization's leadership. Due to his prestige, Salamat Hashim had been able to maintain discipline over a potentially fractious collection of ethnic groups and competing locally based strongmen. This task had grown increasingly difficult after the 2000 and 2003 military reversals necessitated that local commanders be granted significant autonomy, thereby increasing the potential that the organization could disintegrate.[44] The seriousness of the leader's death was underscored by the fact that the MILF did not announce his passing for three weeks, by which time the Vice-Chair for military affairs, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, had

emerged as the new leader against his rival Alim Abdulaziz Mimbantas.[45] Chairman 'Kagi' Murad, a civil engineer by training rather than an Islamic scholar, was widely perceived as more moderate than Hashim, and it was assumed that the MILF would be more open to constructive engagement under his leadership than it had been under Hashim. In fact, Murad's MILF soon took a number of steps to distance itself even further from the Jamaah Islamiah and reach a long-term agreement with the government. As a reflection of the new policy shift, in December an unnamed MILF 'political chief' was quoted as saying that Philippine Muslims are interested in the help that foreign Muslims can offer, but 'that doesn't mean we are interested in . . . fighting their fights'.[46]

By 2004, the MILF under Murad's leadership was clearly committed to decoupling itself from various local outlaw gangs and the Jemaah Islamiah. In March, Brigadier General Generoso Senga, then chief of the 6th Infantry Division in Pikit, North Cotabato, noted that the number of kidnappings had fallen off since the government's capture of Buliok in the prior year. By June, a joint MILF–AFP operation secured the release of three kidnapped engineers who worked for Globe Telecom, and in August the MILF turned against its former Pentagon allies by providing intelligence to government forces operating in the Liguasan marsh area of central Mindanao.[47] In June retiring AFP vice-chief of staff, Lieutenant General Rodolfo Garcia, noted that the MILF 'is now more aware' of the 'terrorist virus' that had infected their ranks and they were inspecting their field commands to weed out the JI. Defense Secretary Eduardo Ermita was more critical and made the accusation that a radical faction of MILF commanders in the Lake Lanao area were harbouring Abu Sayyaf and JI operatives, a charge that MILF officials rejected.[48] In fact, the expulsion of the JI from the MILF and Mindanao has been a difficult and lengthy process, but the MILF leadership seems to be committed to the decoupling. By September, Brigadier General Alexander Yano, chief of the government Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities, confirmed that the MILF organization did not have links with the JI even as an advanced team of OIC ceasefire monitors arrived from Malaysia. This news seemed to confirm information gained from an earlier 23 April arrest of four men who were making bombs in a safe-house in Cotabato City. Under interrogation, they admitted to having worked with Taufiq Rifki before his October 2003 arrest, and that they had conducted two bombings earlier in the year. They also claimed to be members of the JI, even though they had formerly belonged to the MILF. In an interview Lieutenant General Garcia claimed that the suspects confessed that their switch of loyalties was due to their dissatisfaction with the MILF. According to the general, the suspects preferred the JI, 'because the MILF no longer wants to practice terror-

ism'.[49] By 2005, the AFP acknowledged that JI operatives were still in Mindanao, but gone were references to the MILF. Instead, the Philippine Muslim group collaborated with government troops hunting for Abu Sayyaf leader Khadaffy Janjalani who was sighted in Maguindanao province.[50]

Also critical to the decoupling process was the outcome of the hard-fought May 2004 national election that saw the re-election of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo who bested her rival, the popular Philippine film star Fernando Poe, Jr. When the election began, President Arroyo had fared badly in the polls, but she reversed the tide and emerged victorious by putting together a winning slate of senatorial and congressional allies while the Poe opposition conducted a remarkably inept campaign. Slowly, the polls had turned around and before the election they showed the incumbent with a statistically feasible victory. Last-minute endorsements from critical religious groups and strong showings in key bailiwicks proved decisive as the woman president emerged the winner by approximately one million votes. Arroyo's six-year renewal of her presidency had significant implications for Muslim Mindanao because with a fresh mandate, plus majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives, and an experienced hard-nosed military–civilian advisory team, there would be no significant change or softening of policy. Any election-time hopes of getting a better deal from a Poe presidency were dashed, confirming that an expeditiously negotiated peace agreement would be better than holding out any longer.

Negotiating peace and limiting terrorism

Resolving differences with the MILF had been an elusive goal of numerous Philippine presidents and administrations. It was not until the government's 2000 and 2003 military offensives, the death of Salamat Hashim, and the negative implication of associating with radical Islamicists in the post-9/11 world all combined that the MILF was induced to engage in serious talks. With the apparent success of the MILF's decoupling from the JI, a major stumbling block was removed. Equally important was the government's August 2004 dropping of the criminal charges against the 185 MILF leaders for their alleged role in the March 2003 bombings in Davao, which cleared the way for talks to begin.[51] In January 2005, Saeed A. Daof, director general of the Center for the Promotion of Peace and Development in Mindanao and former MILF Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, noted that both sides had given sufficient concessions and conducted necessary confidence-building activities to pave the way for the holding of productive discussions.[52] While it, too, was optimistic, the MILF still recognized that some key points might prove difficult, including an agreement on a just political settlement, finalizing guidelines to

coordinate operations against criminals, and ancestral domain. This latter point is especially important because it would grant today's Muslim population the right to control all of the territory formerly under Muslim control, plus all mineral rights, before the movement of Christian immigrants into Mindanao. How this extensive property would be administered, and what would happen to the Christian population's land titles and real estate developments, had to be worked out. Clearly, this issue loomed large as it called for the creation of a homeland with sufficient control over the whole Muslim population, plus many Christians, and economic resources to enable a genuinely autonomous region of considerable wealth. The implication was that the MILF's conception of ancestral domain is quite different from the current ARMM and would involve granting of effective power and autonomy much beyond anything that the government has ever granted to any other minority peoples.[53]

Although a number of logistical considerations and some outbreaks of violence delayed the start of the talks, they convened in the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur on 16 April 2005 thanks to that government's 'unremitting commitment' to host the negotiations through to a successful conclusion.[54] The talks moved forward exceptionally well on a number of issues, perhaps in part because MILF chair Murad Ebrahim had solidified his control and was clearly in charge of the organization. On 28–29 May, Murad's control was vividly displayed by a huge 'general consultation' of the MILF at Camp Darapanan in Sultan Kudarat town in Maguindanao province that was attended by an estimated half a million to 700 000 people. This show of political force served both as a harbinger of peace and a not-so-subtle reminder of the MILF's ability to mobilize a politically, and militarily, significant bloc of supporters.[55]

In fact, Chairman Murad is heavily invested in achieving a successful outcome for the talks. The consultation at Camp Darapanan may have bolstered his position within the organization, but his ability to remain powerful will be contingent on gaining autonomous self-rule and an improvement in the general condition of the Muslim people. Murad has also expressed the fear that a lengthy peace process will only promote the factors that enable terrorism. In an interview at the Camp Darapanan consultation Murad said: 'If there is a peace agreement, there is effective governance in the area, there is an authority, then it will be very difficult for the terrorists.'[56] Chairman Murad's assessment was seconded by Philippine Defense Secretary Avelino Cruz who told an Asia-Pacific conference of defence ministers and top military officials that a peace agreement would isolate any local MILF commanders who tolerated terrorists. Elaborating, the secretary said: 'We are also hopeful that a peace agreement with the MILF will draw the line that will separate its moderate members, who will

return to the fold of law, from its rogue elements who may have been providing support and sanctuary to local and foreign terrorists . . . once isolated, the AFP could focus on neutralizing these rogue elements.'[57] A successful peace treaty may also be expected to have implications that will extend far beyond the Philippines, since Mindanao has long been identified as a regional training base for the JI which then sends the graduates on missions throughout Southeast Asia. Undersecretary Rene Sarmiento, of the Office of the Presidential Assistant on the Peace Process, said that other Asian nations are hoping for a regional stabilization to be one of the benefits of a peace agreement.[58]

The MILF's commitment to the talks was so strong that the Arroyo administration's extreme political problems sparked by claims of election fraud and the release of a highly suggestive tape recording of the President in conversation with an election official, did not derail the negotiation process. While a final agreement had not been reached by the time of this writing, on 17 September 2005, President Arroyo reported a breakthrough on the ancestral domain question. The current agreement would grant a Bangsamoro government its own charter with wide-ranging political and economic powers that are not that different from sovereign countries.[59] With progress such as this, there have been expressions of hope that the peace process would be on track to complete its work before the end of the year. While that expectation might be a little too extravagant, there is reason to hope that a final agreement will be ready soon.

Hopefully, too, the government will live up to both the letter and spirit of the agreement. As Saeed Daof argues, if Manila will promote Muslim Mindanao's economic development as part of a comprehensive peace implementation process, many of the grievances that have sustained separatism will be accommodated. At a security level, once terrorists and their supporters are isolated, their elimination will be a matter that Filipinos can handle for themselves with minimal external assistance. A reduction in the AFP's need for United States military advisors, military assistance, joint operations and training programmes will mean that these resources can be directed more toward traditional programmes of national defence, and the defeat of the communist New People's Army, a group whose apparent sincerity in reaching an accommodation with Manila is clearly not as genuine as the MILF's.

Notes

* Portions of this chapter were first presented at the Seventh International Philippine Studies Conference hosted by the International Institute for Asian Studies, University of Leiden, The Netherlands, 16–19 June 2004.

1. Majul, Cesar Adib (1999), *Muslims in the Philippines*, Diliman, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, pp. 39–88.

2. Majul, Cesar Adib (1999), chapters 4–8, pp. 121–375; and Warren, James F. (1981), *The Sulu Zone, 1768–1898: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State*, Singapore: Singapore University Press.
3. Jubair, Salah (1999), *Bangsamoro: A Nation Under Endless Tyranny*, 3rd edn, Kuala Lumpur: IQ Marin Sdn. Bhd., pp. 59–66.
4. Jubair, Salah (1999), pp. 72–74; Lucman, Norodin Alonto (2000), *Moro Archives: A History of Armed Conflicts in Mindanao and East Asia*, Quezon City: FLC Press, pp. 276–83; and Che Man, W.K. (1990), *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand*, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, pp. 49, 51.
5. Jubair, Salah (1999), *Bangsamoro*, pp. 75, 77–8, 89–90, 96–7; Lucman, Norodin Alonto (2000), *Moro Archives*, pp. 284–7; and Kamlian, Jamail A. (1999), *Bangsamoro Society and Culture: A book of Readings on Peace and Development in Southern Philippines*, Iligan: Iligan Center for Peace Education and Research, p. 16.
6. Jubair, Salah (1999), *Bangsamoro*, pp. 119–20; Che Man, W.K. (1990), *Muslim Separatism*, p. 25; and Muslim, Macapado Abaton (1994), *The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines: The Nonviolent Autonomy Alternative*, Marawi City: Mindanao State University, pp. 33–72.
7. The most authoritative investigation of the massacre was by Vitug, Marites D. and Glenda M. Gloria (2000), *Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao*, Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs and the Institute for Popular Democracy, pp. 2–23. See also, Lucman, Norodin Alonto (2000), *Moro Archives*, pp. 301–5.
8. See Muslim, Macapado Abaton (1994), *The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines*, pp. 93–4. The foundation for the awakening of a separate identity is described by McKenna, Thomas M. (1998), *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 3–4, 5–7 and Chapters 5, 6 and 11.
9. Jubair, Salah (1999), *Bangsamoro*, pp. 134–43, and Muslim, Macapado Abaton (1994), *The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines*, pp. 94–104.
10. Cayongcat, Al Rashid I. (1986), *Bangsa Moro People in Search of Peace*, Manila: Foundation for the Advancement of Islam in the Philippines, pp. 78–85; Muslim, Macapado Abaton (1994), *The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines*, pp. 114–15; and Lucman, Norodin Alonto (2000), *Moro Archives*, pp. 309–12.
11. Jubair, Salah (1999), *Bangsamoro*, pp. 153–7; Che Man, W.K. (1990), *Muslim Separatism*, pp. 84–90; Abinales, Patricio N. (2003), 'The recluse', *Newsbreak*, 1 September, p. 33; and Zonio, Aquiles Z. (2003), 'Good-bye, Ustadz Salamat Hashim', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 10 August, online. For a comparison of the religiosity of the two organizations, see Gutierrez, Eric (2000), 'Religion and politics in Muslim Mindanao', in Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch (eds) (1999), *Rebels Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines*, Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, pp. 152–8.
12. Che Man, W.K. (1990), *Muslim Separatism*, pp. 89 and 90–97 and Agence France-Presse (2003), 'MILF commander protecting Al-Ghozi, says military', *Philippine Daily Inquirer* online, 14 August.
13. Gutierrez, Eric and Abdulwahab Guialal (2000), 'The unfinished Jihad: the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and peace in Mindanao', in Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch (eds) (1999), *Rebels, Warlords and Ulama*, pp. 281–2 and Vitug, Marites D. and Glenda M. Gloria (2000), *Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao*, pp. 36–41.
14. Ramos, Fidel V. (1996), *Break Not the Peace: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Negotiations, 1992–1996*, Quezon City: Friends of Steady Eddie, and Vitug, Marites D. and Glenda M. Gloria (2000), *Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao*, pp. 43–51.
15. Gutierrez, Eric and Marites D. Vitug (2000), 'ARMM after the peace agreement', in Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch (eds) (1999), *Rebels, Warlords and Ulama*,

pp. 183–221, and Gutierrez, Eric (2000), 'The problem of peace', in Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch (eds) (1999), *Rebels, Warlords and Ulama*, pp. 225–61; Vitug, Marites D. and Glenda M. Gloria (2000), *Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao*, pp. 74–102; and May, R.J. (2001), 'Muslim Mindanao: four years after the peace agreement', *Southeast Asian Affairs 2001*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 263–9.

16. Gutierrez, Eric and Abdulwahab Guialal (2000), 'The unfinished Jihad', pp. 265–92; May, R.J. (2001), 'Muslim Mindanao: four years after the peace agreement', pp. 269–70; Vitug, Marites D. and Glenda M. Gloria (2000), *Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao*, pp. 143–8; and Jubair, Salah (1999), *Bangsamoro*, pp. 197–208.
17. Rodell, Paul A. (2002), 'The Philippines: Gloria *in Excelsis*', in Singh, Daljit, and Smith, Anthony L. (eds), *Southeast Asian Affairs 2002*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 230–33.
18. Ressa, Maria A. (2003), *Seeds of Terror*, New York: Free Press, pp. 28–38.
19. Barreveld, Dirk J. (2001), *Terrorism in the Philippines*, San Jose: Writers Club Press, pp. 113–32. See also Vitug, Marites D. and Glenda M. Gloria (2000), *Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao*, pp. 192–204 for the Ipil raid, and pp. 204–6 and 211–13 for information about Janjalani before the Abu Sayyaf. For Julkipli Wadi's analysis of Janjalani's religious thinking see 'They come this far', *Newsbreak*, Special Issue, (January–June), pp. 16 and 18–19.
20. Aventajado, Roberto N. (2004), *140 Days of Terror: In the Clutches of the Abu Sayyaf*, Pasig City: Anvil Publishing.
21. Torres, Jose, Jr. (2001), *Into the Mountain: Hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf*, Quezon City: Claretian Publications.
22. Burnham, Gracia with Dean Merrill (2003), *In the Presence of My Enemies*, Wheaton, IL: Tyndal House Publishers.
23. Bordadora, Norman, Jocelyn R. Uy and Luige del Puerto (2005), 'Cops storm jail; 23 dead', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 16 March, p. A1.
24. Labog-Javellana, Juliet and Philip Tubeza (2004), 'SuperFerry 14 bombing solved, says Arroyo', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 12 October, p. A1.
25. Elegant, Simon (2004), 'The return of Abu Sayyaf', *Time Asia* 30 August; and Villanueva, Marichu (2004), 'Super ferry sinking a terrorist act', *Philippine Star*, 12 October, online.
26. Ressa, Maria A. (2005), 'The new strategic base of Jemaah Islamiyah', *Newsbreak*, 25 April, pp. 16–17; and Puerto, Luige A. del and Tarra V. Ouismundo (2005), 'It's death for 3 bombers', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 29 October, p. A1.
27. Pazzibugan, Dona Z. and Leila B. Salaverria (2005), 'Terror suspect on bail tied to Metro bomb plot', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 4 November, online.
28. Tubeza, Philip C. (2005), 'Al-Qaeda funding Abus, RSM – witness', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 16 November, p. A2; and McCawley, Tom and Simon Montlake (2005), 'Southeast Asia's next tack on terror', *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 November, online.
29. International Crisis Group (26 August 2003), 'Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: damaged but still dangerous', ICG: Jakarta/Brussels, Asia Report No. 63, pp. 16–17 and 40.
30. International Crisis Group (2004), 'Southern Philippines Backgrounder: terrorism and the peace process', ICG: Singapore/Brussels, Asia Report No. 80, pp. 6–7, for a concise summary of the events leading up to the April–July offensive and the immediate consequences.
31. Tubeza, Philip (2003), 'Terrorist raps filed vs. Asia's most wanted man', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 8 July, online; and 'Al-Ghozi is a key figure in regional terror network', Agence France-Presse, 15 July 2003.
32. Sarmiento, Juan, Jr. (21 November 2001), 'Macapagal reaps bonanza for backing US War vs. Terror', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, online and Doronila, Amando (2001), 'Initial scrutiny of the package', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 23 November, online.
33. Zachary, Abuza (2003), *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 204–5; and Simon, Sheldon W. (2004),

'US–Southeast Asia relations: a WMD discovery in Malaysia and counter-terrorism concerns in the rest of Southeast Asia', *Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations*, **6** (1), p. 63, www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0401q.pdf.

34. Labog-Javellana, Juliet (2003), 'Macapagal thanks US for "special" relations', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 10 October, online.
35. 'Filipino forces seize Islamic rebel stronghold', Agence France-Presse, 16 February 2003; *New York Times* and Salamat Hashim (2003), 'Message to all peace loving people from the MILF leadership', 26 February, www.codewan.com.ph/CyberDyaryo/statement/st2003_0228_03.htm.
36. International Crisis Group (2004), Southern Philippines Backgrounder, pp. 19–20.
37. Vitug, Marites Danguilan (2004), 'New tack in peace talks', *Newsbreak*, 10 May, p. 30.
38. Bordadora, Norman (2003), 'Peace talks with MILF not fast enough, says Malaysia', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 30 April, online.
39. Ubac, Michael Lim (2003), 'US "Keen" on brokering peace talks, as Malaysia balks', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 6 July, online.
40. Pablo, Carlito (13 March 2003), 'Salamat Hashim in RP: intelligence report', and Guinto, Joel and Martin P. Marfil (2003), 'Macapagal sets conditions, June 1 deadline for MILF', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, online, 14 May, online; and (2003), 'Philippine gov't ready for peace talks', *New York Times*, 22 June, online.
41. *BBC News* (2003), 'Manila signs ceasefire with MILF', 18 July, BBC online http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3077137/stm.
42. Rodell, Paul A., (2005), 'The Philippines and the challenge of international terrorism', in Paul J. Smith (ed.), *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 122–3 and 134–7.
43. Sipress, Alan and Ellen Nakashima (2003), 'Al Qaeda affiliate training Indonesians on Philippine island', *Washington Post*, 17 November, p. A18; Lyall, Kimina (2003), 'JI grows terror in Philippines', *Weekend Australian*, 13 December, p. 16; and Cabacungan, Gil C., Jr. (2004), 'Training of 6 Indonesian militants in RP probed', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 9 March, online.
44. International Crisis Group (2004), 'Southern Philippines Backgrounder: terrorism and the peace process', pp. 10–12.
45. International Crisis Group (2004), 'Southern Philippines Backgrounder: terrorism and the peace process', p. 9.
46. Koss, Mitchell (2003), 'Near enough to view militancy's many faces', *Los Angles Times*, 7 December.
47. See the following reports from the *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, online: Tupas, Jeffrey (2004), 'MILF appears keen on peace pact: army general', 2 March; and Senase, Charlie C. and Edwin O. Fernandez (2004), 'Government-MILF drive forces abductors to free engineers', 29 June. See also, Labog-Javellana, Juliet (2004), 'Arroyo: Hand of Steel vs. Pentagon gang justified', *Philippine Daily Enquirer*, 15 August, p. A1.
48. These assessments can be found in the *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, online stories of Cabreza, Vincent (2004), 'Military exec says MILF weeding out JI', 27 June; and Esguerra, Christian V. and Avendano, Christine O. (2004), 'Ermita accuses MILF faction of coddling JI, Abu Sayyaf', 6 April. See also the excerpts of Marites Danguilan Vitug's interview of Secretary Ermita (2004), in 'They [MILF] have not shown any proof that they have helped', *Newsbreak*, 10 May, p. 28.
49. Roel, Pareno (2004), 'No links between MILF, JI Found', *Philippine Star*, 29 September, online and Esguerra, Christian V. (2004), '2 of 4 terror suspects admit JI links, says AFP', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 27 April, online.
50. Agence France-Presse (2005), '33 JI members in RP – Defense Department', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 13 October, online; and Maitem, Jeoffrey and Aquiles Zonio (2005), 'MILF says Abu Sayyaf leaders in Maguindanao', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 2 August, p. A16.
51. Unson, John (2004), 'MILF ready to resume talks', *Philippine Star*, 28 August, online.
52. Daof, Saeed A. (2005), 'All signs point to peace, progress in Mindanao', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 2 January, p. A4.

53. Nawal, Allan A. (2004), 'MILF Sees tough, lengthy peace talks', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 29 December, p. A16; and MILF spokesperson Eid Kabalu's important explication of ancestral domain in Lira Dalangin-Fernandez's report (2005), 'MILF to seek expansion of ancestral domain when talks resume', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 24 March, online.
54. Avendano, Christine (2005), 'Gov't, MILF peace talks start on April 16 in KL', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 19 March, online.
55. Elusfa, Romy (2005), 'MILFs show of force', *Philippine Graphic*, 13 June, pp. 28–9.
56. Associated Press (2005), 'MILF: peace pact to stop entry of terrorists to RP', *Philippine Star*, 5 June, p. 1.
57. Agence France-Presse (2005), 'Peace seen in south by year-end', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 6 June, p. A5.
58. Inquirer News Service (2005), 'Peace with RP rebels seen key to stability in Asia', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 22 September, p. A14.
59. Liro, Gerry (2005), 'Philippines grants MILF own gov't charter', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 13 October, p. A1.

12 The Aceh conflict: phases of conflict and hopes for peace

Kamarulzaman Askandar

The Acehnese struggle for self-determination has been one of the longest and bloodiest insurgencies in Southeast Asia. It has gone through several phases over the years, and is currently winding down after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki, Finland. This MoU presented Aceh with a ceasefire and the best alternative to conflict and war for a very long time. The details of the MoU are still being tested and implemented – the decommissioning of troops on both sides, the surrender and destruction of GAM weapons, amnesty for GAM members, both jailed as well as those at large, and the laying down of the foundation for a new political structure for Aceh with the potential involvement of GAM and other 'local' political parties in the politics of Aceh. This chapter will look at the different phases of the Aceh conflict, concentrating on the period since 1976, which is seen as the most intense period in Aceh insurgency, before going into the current arrangements under the Helsinki Agreement. Attention is also focused on the roles of the civil society as one of the peace-building actors in this conflict over the years and especially since the tsunami of 2004. It will be argued that throughout these events, the civil society continues to play a major role in making sure that the voices of the people are heard, their concerns and needs are addressed, and that their continued involvement in addressing their own problems and managing their own lives in a 'new' Aceh in these post-tsunami and post-conflict days are guaranteed. Lastly, the chapter will look at what the future holds for Aceh.

Background

Aceh is situated at the northernmost tip of the island of Sumatra in the Indonesian archipelago. It has a population of about 4.2 million people, most of whom are living under the poverty line as a result of the economic crisis of the late 1990s, and the armed conflict between the GoI and GAM (84 per cent in 2002).[1] A brief exploration of Aceh's history explains the mix of factors that led Aceh into a war of national liberation and turned thousands of its people into insurgents and exiles. The Acehnese culture

has always been influenced by Islam, and the combination of culture and religion have been dominant in determining the directions of Acehnese society. Religious leaders, or *ulamas*, play a major role in Aceh society, and together with the village heads, basically ran Aceh societies of the past. According to historians, Islam first entered the Indonesian archipelago, and possibly all of Southeast Asia, through Aceh sometime around the year 700. The first Islamic kingdom, Perlak, was established in the year 804. Much later, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the port of Aceh became entangled, along with the rest of what is now Indonesia, in European colonial powers' competition for worldwide political and economic dominance. Interested parties included the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch and British. For many centuries Aceh was a very distinct and influential political entity. The Sultan of Aceh and the Sultan of Malacca were major controllers of trade through the Straits of Malacca. One of the most significant events in Aceh's history came in 1824 with the signing of the London Treaty often referred to as the Anglo-Dutch treaty in which the Dutch gained control of all British possessions on the island of Sumatra including Aceh. Yet the Dutch colonialists failed to capture Aceh fully. Only after all the neighbouring territory was conquered did they mount a final campaign to subdue Aceh. That war took them 35 years. The next major agreement was the Linggarjati Agreement mediated by Britain and signed by Indonesia and the Netherlands in March 1947. In this agreement, the Dutch recognized Indonesian sovereignty over the islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura. Perhaps the most critical event in explaining the attitude of many Acehnese is the signing of the 1949 Round Table Conference Agreements. Brokered under the auspices of the United Nations, the agreements provided for a transfer of sovereignty between the territory of the Dutch East Indies and fully independent Indonesia. The Kingdom of Aceh was included in the agreements despite not having been formally incorporated into Dutch colonial possession. Subsequently the Indonesian government used armed troops to annex Aceh. Since the annexation, the Acehnese have continued to resent what they consider as foreign occupation. The lesson from Aceh history points to the fact that the Acehnese have always had a sense of independence and belonging to the Aceh nation which is seen as distinct from the rest of Indonesia. Many Acehnese would look back at their history and argue that since they have never been colonized by outside powers their incorporation into Indonesia as part of any trade-off or agreement is thus illegal.

The first phase of the Aceh conflict

The precursor to Aceh's independence movement began in 1953 when Indonesia experienced the Darul Islam rebellion, a movement to establish

an Islamic state in Indonesia led by *ulamas* from the major Indonesian island of Java. This movement was soon joined by Acehnese *ulamas* and other leaders. Many Acehnese leaders who had earlier participated so enthusiastically to gain independence for Indonesia during 1945–49 became very disappointed with the position of Aceh after independence. This was basically for two reasons. Firstly, because it became clear that the new republic would be ruled on the basis of the philosophy of the secular Pancasila rather than Islam; and secondly, because of the fusion of Aceh into the province of North Sumatra in 1950. Therefore, in 1953, many of the *ulamas* and other leaders who had led the Acehnese during the 1945–49 period led their followers into the Darul Islam (Abode of Islam) revolt. This revolution was aimed at establishing Aceh as an autonomous region within an Islamic Indonesia. They were quite explicit about these aims, declaring themselves part of the Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State) earlier declared by Kartosoewirjo, another Darul Islam leader in West Java.[2] This revolt continues to be important simply because the response of the Indonesian government since then has mostly been to address the demands of this revolt – that is, autonomy and the power to implement aspects of sharia or Islamic law. For example, in 1959, the Indonesian government responded by giving Aceh the status of a 'special territory' which ostensibly confers some degree of autonomy in religious, educational and cultural matters. Although this managed to pacify the *ulamas* and effectively ended this revolt in the early 1960s, it has not been able to prevent future conflicts from arising as can be seen from events that unfolded in the second and third phases of the conflict. This has also not been helped by the responses of the Indonesian government which seemed to be frozen in the past in response to the demands of the *ulamas* of the 1950s.

The second phase of the Aceh conflict

Despite this 'special territory' status, there was a resurgence of the conflict in the 1970s following the declaration of Acehnese independence on 4 December 1976 by Hasan di Tiro, an Acehnese businessman and intellectual who had previously been an overseas representative of the Darul Islam movement. He was also a descendant of one of the chief *ulama* leaders of the war against the Dutch. He founded the movement for Aceh Merdeka or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement), an armed resistance group demanding complete independence of Aceh. The group was small at the beginning, probably involving no more than 200 active members moving around in the mountains of Aceh. It had, however, support from a wider base, including villagers in the various provinces. It had few weapons and the authorities were able to suppress it quickly. In the

late 1970s, Indonesian authorities conducted mass arrests of Aceh Merdeka members and shut down their activities. This effectively paralysed them until the mid-1980s when there was a sort of revival of the movement, with an increase in their numbers and activities led by about 800 that received military and ideological training in Libya.[3] In 1989, a group now also calling itself the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF) came out of hibernation and vigorously renewed its quest for independence, often through attacks on police and military installations. This prompted the Indonesian military to strike back hard against the insurgents, destroying most of GAM's military capacity within the first few years, continuing harsh counterinsurgency efforts till 1998.[4] In the same year, Indonesia designated Aceh a military operations area or DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer) giving the army a free rein to crush the separatists. In what became known as the 'DOM period' (1989–98), the Indonesian military resorted to all the tactics of a dirty counter-insurgency war. Torture, disappearances, rape, the deliberate display of corpses and many other techniques became common. Passive sympathizers as well as active supporters of GAM were affected, and many ordinary villagers also became victims. Amnesty International reported that between 1989 and 1992 alone about 2000 people were killed in military operations in Aceh.[5] In all about 12 000 people, mostly civilians, have either been killed or lost since fighting began. Although the military at times succeeded in suppressing the movement, they also ended up creating greater resentment in Acehnese society. This always led to a general escalation of the conflict situation.

If we look at the progress of the conflict in Aceh, it can be concluded then that the conflict has escalated in two ways over the years. First of all, the attitudes of the Acehnese have been hardened. In the beginning, the chief demand was for autonomy and the implantation of sharia law. This later became a demand for independence, spearheaded by the GAM. Secondly, we see an escalation in terms of popular support. This is especially so in the second phase of the conflict, the GAM period. The movement started out small in 1976, but by 1999, mostly in response to the very policies that had been used to suppress the movement, it had become much larger. Disillusionment with Jakarta and the way the conflict has been managed has enhanced this feeling and contributed to the emergence of a nationalist sentiment. The conflict dynamics changed during this period. A sense of Aceh identity and pride among common Acehnese faced with brutal repression by a perceived colonizer re-emerged. GAM benefited from this and the movement expanded during this period.

The mid-to late 1990s brought a series of changes to the complex picture of Indonesian conflicts. The Asian economic crisis of 1997 brought down

the government of President Suharto in 1998, which was replaced in quick successions by the administrations of B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri. New hopes began to blossom for peace in Aceh, the window opening with the ouster of Suharto and prospects for referendum and peace in East Timor. After the resignation of President Suharto in May 1998, Aceh's independence movement experienced a major revival. The situation is now open enough to express unhappiness with the way Jakarta has been handling the Aceh conflict over the years. Revelations of past human rights abuses, especially those done during the DOM period, fuelled the demands for independence. This context saw the rise of a new peaceful referendum movement, which mobilized huge crowds throughout Aceh in November 1999. It also saw the resurrection of GAM, especially in rural Aceh. This new situation confronted the Indonesian government with major challenges. Successive governments responded with a mixture of concession and repression. The government of Abdurrahman Wahid initiated a process of dialogue with GAM at the end of 1999, a process which persisted fitfully until mid-2003, while on the other hand, military hardliners favoured a repressive response and continued with severe repression against civilians. A non-governmental organization, the Henri Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), was invited to act as a facilitator in this dialogue. The HDC was able to persuade the Indonesian government and GAM to sign on 9 December 2002 the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) which was then seen as an accord that could possibly end 26 years of rebellion. HDC's efforts were greatly helped by a number of factors including:[6] (1) The need to give peace a chance: on both the government and GAM sides, factions favouring dialogue gained ascendancy, recognized opportunities for an agreement, and were able to secure commitments from hard-line colleagues who were happy to continue the war to 'give peace a chance'. (2) The desire for legitimacy: GAM's participation in the negotiations leading to the 2000 humanitarian pause and the 2002 CoHA was strongly motivated by a desire for greater international legitimacy. This status was enhanced by the involvement of an international body like the HDC as a third party and by having the negotiations at various locations outside Indonesia. Outward-looking government officials also appreciated that a peaceful approach to Aceh would help improve Indonesia's image in the wake of the East Timor debacle. It is also possible that senior TNI commanders were prepared to allow the peace process to go forward with the knowledge that a breakdown attributable to GAM would provide greater legitimacy for further military operations. (3) Personal commitment to the process: the negotiation would not be possible without the personal commitments of key leaders. This includes President Abdurrahman Wahid, who invited

the Henry Dunant Center (HDC) in 1999 to provide third-party mediation and Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

This agreement contained several important points, among others, the cessation of all violent actions and hostilities, establishment of a Joint Security Committee (JSC), the development of peace zones in the area, the implementation of an All Inclusive Dialogue (AID), and conducting the 2004 general election for democratic governance in Aceh.

Compared to previous agreements, this 9 December 2002 one had larger expectations for developing peace in Aceh. This is because of three things, namely:

1. There is active international involvement from the initiation to the implementation processes.
2. There is a sanctioning mechanism for any violation of the agreement.
3. There are reasonable stages for conflict resolution embedded within the agreement. The process begins with trust-building, developing peace zones, demilitarization, and continues with involving the civil society in formulating a political settlement. It ends with establishing a democratic government by general election.

With these advantages, this agreement became a promising milestone toward sustainable peace in Aceh. It became possible when both sides agreed to compromise on key strategic goals. As part of the agreement, the Indonesian government agreed to foreign monitors, mostly military officials from Thailand and Philippines, to supervise the ceasefire. This was a positive development because the Indonesian government had consistently refused to internationalize the conflict in Aceh. The central government also passed 'special autonomy' legislation which gave the Acehnese a larger share of natural resource revenues, the right to implement aspects of Islamic law, plus other concessions.

Nevertheless the peace process suffered some setbacks after sporadic acts of ceasefire violations by both sides despite the presence of the HDC, the international monitors, and the newly created Joint Security Committee (JSC). These violations reflected the need for more continuous conflict prevention and peace-building efforts as well as independent monitoring activities by international organizations, especially the UN. Things got from bad to worse from here. Abdurrahman Wahid was removed as president and replaced by Megawati Sukarnoputri. Despite promising that she would resolve the Acehnese conflict and not allow 'a single drop of Acehnese blood to spill', the conflict continued to rage on. This was partly due to the fact that Megawati was in a position where she was forced to appease the

powerful armed forces in order to gain their support in parliament. In the end, the Indonesian government went back on its promises to achieve a negotiated peace in Aceh and resumed the war against GAM.

The third phase of the Aceh conflict

In May 2003, martial law was implemented again in Aceh which effectively killed off any advances made in the peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts of the previous years. In fact, the CoHA began to unravel as early as March 2003 and the Joint Security Committee (JSC) was powerless to halt the collapse of the agreement. Huber concluded that the following factors led to the demise of the CoHA:[7] fragile bargaining zone; lack of intraparty cohesion; narrowing and acceleration of the negotiation process; suckering and spoilers; and lack of credible security guarantees. These observations are correct.

Furthermore, both parties look at the solution from starkly different perspectives – the Indonesian government was committed to territorial integrity and saw autonomy, perhaps with some minor adjustments, as the ceiling for Achenese aspirations, while GAM was still keen on independence. This fact was glossed over in the hope that an early ceasefire could act as a catalyst for mutual confidence-building and open up further discussion for a long-lasting settlement. This did not happen. Moreover, the question of representation kept coming up, as well as internal cohesion on the part of both parties. On the side of GAM, differences on how to go about the peace process came up between the exiled leadership in Sweden, the leaders and members on the ground, and Acehnese civil society leaders, who were strong opinion leaders but not really involved in the process.

On the Indonesian government side, the problem was even more serious as the military and executive branch never really embraced the agreement. Criticisms of the peace efforts were made by parliamentarians, and the Indonesian military was quick to disavow and eventually derail the implementation of the CoHA. The internal divisions within both parties also resulted in the narrowing of the negotiations to focus mainly on the Sweden-based exiles and sidelining other groups, as well as allowing the government side to accelerate the process without reflecting on other options which could have happened if they had been more careful to build support and constituent for the process. This narrowing also resulted in the JSC being sidelined as the parties began to exploit ambiguities within the agreement to further their objectives and undermine their opponent. Neither the JSC nor the HDC can do anything about this.

Finally, despite the initial success of the ceasefire, implementing other parts of the agreement would make the parties even more vulnerable than they were already. These include the establishment of peace zones, and

demilitarization, with credible sanctions for truce-breakers. The problem was the existence of a credible third party, apart from the ineffective JSC, which could oversee the process. This actually points to the political will of the parties, and especially the government side which was in a state of trauma over the involvement of third parties after foreign involvement in East Timor in 1999. In the end, the process broke down and the conflict resumed.

The GAM negotiators were arrested on their way to Tokyo for negotiations and more than 30 000 Indonesian troops were sent to suppress the separatists within a span of a few days in May 2003. The speed with which the troops were mobilized and sent to Aceh shows the readiness and willingness of the Indonesian military to resume war efforts and to use force to defuse the Aceh problem. The brutality of the DOM period and the second phase continued. Many civilians and non-governmental activists fled the province, continuing the trend of exodus to find a safer place to live. At one point during this time documented Acehnese refugees in Malaysia, for example, numbered around 25 000, while other estimates have put the number at more than 40 000.[8] Martial law was removed after a year, and replaced with a 'civil emergency', but without any major improvement on the ground. This emergency status was then removed in May 2005, but by then there had been changes in the dynamics of the conflict situation. Megawati Sukarnoputri was replaced by her security minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as the Indonesian president, bringing with him yet more promises for peace in Aceh. In fact, he promised during the run-up to the presidential election that he would end the Acehnese conflict within three years of taking power. Events that have happened since January 2005 have shown that this might actually happen.

The 2004 tsunami and the Helsinki peace process

At the end of 2004, Aceh was once again hit with a major calamity, this time a natural one. The tsunami of 26 December 2004 resulted in the death of more than 150 000 Acehnese with tens of thousands more missing. It brought the attention of the world to Aceh and ignited again the sparks for peace between the warring parties, this time pushed by humanitarian concerns and the need to set aside the confrontations and help the victims. The devastations of the tsunami were such that to continue fighting would constitute an inhuman concern for political interests and not the people of Aceh. Both sides also lost many of their combatants in the tsunami and a regrouping and re-evaluation exercise was necessary. Both armed parties quickly called for a ceasefire in the area.

Initiatives for peace were carried out involving Finnish contacts close to Vice-President Yusuf Kalla. There were positive responses from both sides to these initiatives, resulting in meetings in Helsinki, Finland, facilitated by

the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) foundation, an organization led by former Finnish president Maarti Ahtisaari. After a slow start, the talks then progressed well and went through several rounds from January to August 2005 in Helsinki: the first on 28–29 January, the second on 21–23 February, the third on 12–16 April, the fourth on 26–31 May, and the fifth on 12–17 July. In the beginning, the Indonesian government again offered a special autonomy status for Aceh and amnesty for GAM separatists, and stated that it would reject any demand for Aceh's sovereignty.[9] The response from the GAM side was initially equally uncompromising and it seemed that the peace process would be derailed even before it had a chance to be further developed. However, by the third round, the process was well on the way. Negotiators from both sides were able to push aside hardline positions, and to explore new solutions. The facilitator, Maarti Ahtisaari, said after the third round of talks that the three meetings had come up with understandings that:

> Both parties seek a permanent and comprehensive solution with dignity for all. The negotiation will seek to define the framework for the local administrative structure for Aceh. The negotiations will define the details of providing amnesty. Transparency will be enhanced for the collection and allocation of revenues between the central government and Aceh. Both parties welcome the possible involvement of regional organizations in monitoring the commitments that will be undertaken by the parties in the agreement. Both parties will do their utmost to restrain their security forces in the field during the negotiation process.[10]

These comments sum up the whole general feeling at that time that peace was finally achievable for Aceh, and that the parties were really serious about achieving peace and were willing to set aside hardline positions and look at all options including the active involvement of third parties in the implementation and monitoring processes.

The process took an even more positive turn in the fifth round when it was agreed that an agreement would be signed in August 2005. This Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of 15 August 2005 between the government of Indonesia and the GAM was made possible by a few factors – the first being the realization that both sides needed to put aside their differences to rebuild, reconstruct and rehabilitate Aceh after the devastating tsunami. This was the basic premise of the whole peace process as mentioned in the preamble of the MoU:

> The Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) confirm their commitment to a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh with dignity for all.
>
> The parties commit themselves to creating conditions within which the government of the Acehnese people can be manifested through a fair and

democratic process within the unitary state and constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

The parties are deeply convinced that only the peaceful settlement of the conflict will enable the rebuilding of Aceh after the tsunami disaster on 26 December 2004 to progress and succeed.

The parties to the conflict commit themselves to building mutual confidence and trust.[11]

This also helped the sides overcome any major hurdles and barriers in reaching an agreement. Some provisions from the MoU can be highlighted. For example, there were provisions for the decommissioning of the troops in Article 4: 'Security Arrangements'. This article provided for the cessation of violence between the parties; the demobilization of 3000 GAM military troops; the surrender and destruction of GAM weapons with the assistance of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), starting 15 September 2005 and ending 31 December 2005; and the withdrawal of Indonesian military and police forces, numbering about 23 000, to coincide with the decommissioning of GAM arms starting 15 September 2005 and done in four stages ending by 31 December 2005.[12]

The MoU also provided for the amnesty of GAM members and the release of political prisoners and detainees unconditionally not later than 15 days after the signature of the MoU.[13] In the next article, 'Reintegration into Society', the MoU provided for the framework to reintegrate former GAM combatants, numbering about 3000, back into society. Among provisions mentioned are economic facilitation which include the allocation of farming land as compensation for political prisoners and affected civilians, as well as the establishment of a 'reintegration fund'.[14]

What was more difficult was the question of GAM's role in the post-conflict situation. At the outset, GAM agreed not to continue pushing for independence, albeit putting forward a condition that it and any other Acehnese groups wishing to do so would be allowed to set up local political parties as vehicles to run in local elections. The breakthrough came when the Indonesian government side agreed to this request, although it did come across initial oppositions from its own parliamentarians and other political parties in the country, especially from former president Megawati Sukarnoputri's Parti Demokratik Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P). Indonesian law stipulated that only nationwide Jakarta-based parties are allowed, making it difficult for 'local' parties from Aceh to participate in purely 'local' politics. This was remedied by simply pushing through the agreement with an understanding that a solution for this would be found later, possibly through the amendment of the special autonomy law for Aceh allowing local political parties to be created only in Aceh. Debate is currently going on in Aceh and Jakarta regarding the promulgation of a

new legislation to govern Aceh, and how to allow local independent parties to run for election in the upcoming state-wide election in June 2005. The MoU said that this new law must enter into force not later than 31 March 2006. This constitutes the drawing of a new 'social contract' governing Aceh and shall be based on the following principles:

- Aceh will exercise authority within all sectors of public affairs, which will be administered in conjunction with its civil and judicial administration, except in the fields of foreign affairs, external defence, national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and freedom of religion, the policies of which belong to the government of the Republic of Indonesia in conformity with the Constitution.
- International agreements entered into by the government of Indonesia which relate to matters of special interest to Aceh will be entered into in consultation with and with the consent of the legislature of Aceh.
- Decisions with regard to Aceh by the legislature of the Republic of Indonesia will be taken in consultation with and the consent of the legislature of Aceh.
- Administrative measures undertaken by the government of Indonesia with regard to Aceh will be implemented in consultation with and with the consent of the head of the Aceh administration.[15]

Regarding the economy, provisions were made to allow Aceh to 'set and raise taxes to fund official internal activities'. Aceh will also have 'jurisdiction over living natural resources in the territorial sea surrounding Aceh'. Lastly, regarding revenue from gas petroleum, an issue that had fostered the conflict in the 1970s, the MoU said that 'Aceh is entitled to retain seventy (70) per cent of the revenues from all current and future hydrocarbon deposits and other natural resources in the territory of Aceh as well as in the territorial sea surrounding Aceh'.[16]

Lastly, provisions were also made for the monitoring of the peace process, involving monitors from the EU and ASEAN countries, called the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). The period of stay for the AMM, first fixed to last until March 2006, was extended to June 2006 to coincide with the holding of direct local elections in Aceh for the first time. This is to prevent any untoward incidences by potential 'spoilers' leading up to the election. There is a strong call for the AMM to stay on even longer, for example until the General Election in 2009 or at least until peace can be guaranteed by the stakeholders, but there are also elements in Indonesia including from the armed forces and the nationalists that still see this conflict as an internal matter and want the foreign monitors to leave.

The reality on the ground is that the situation is still very fragile despite the achievements of 2005. Peace cannot be achieved only through a settlement by armed parties. It has to be built upon that foundation, and the involvement of other stakeholders including the civil society has to be considered. This is where we turn our attention next.

Building peace in Aceh and the roles of the civil society

During the height of the Aceh conflict, one of the questions that was frequently asked during seminars and workshops on Aceh was, does the situation in Aceh need a 'big fix', or would a 'people's process' be more suitable?[17] The usual answer is that the most comprehensive strategy would have to accommodate both. Peace-making and peace-building strategies would both have to be used. Any resolution would need a settlement involving both the armed parties, addressing the many issues, and providing means for the implementation process (that is, the Helsinki process or the MoU of 15 August 2005). However, it would also need a bottom-up approach where the aspirations and needs of the society are fulfilled (that is, the post-tsunami reconstruction and rehabilitation, the post-conflict reconstruction, and the peace-building process involving the Acehnese civil society). The agreements need to be made, but the foundation needs to be built too, in order for the agreements to be socialized and accepted. Hence the importance of both approaches. The problem is how to convince the armed parties of this need for involvement of the civil society and how to engage them in a meaningful way. We also need to look at what is currently being done by the civil society in Aceh and to what effect. Civil Society groups can be classified into those concentrating on various types of activities, and whenever possible, collaborative efforts should be made by groups playing the same roles and with the same interests. Their activities should also be reviewed for adequateness and sustainability, both in the short and long term. Lastly, we also need to look at the issue of the safety and security of members of the civil society. There have been many incidences where they have been harassed while doing their work, and in extreme cases there have also been cases of arrests, and even disappearances. These also need to be addressed.

For best results, the peace-building process should be initiated from within. This means the peace structure created should involve all parties who are in the conflict and are feeling the impacts of the conflict. They are the ones who have the biggest responsibility and opportunity to transform the conflict. In the context of Aceh, civil groups led and inspired by the students, NGOs, *ulamas* (religious leaders), intellectuals, journalists and other concerned groups have from time to time voiced the values of peace, non-violence and humanity. Their activities however have been hampered

by the nature of the conflict and the continuing seriousness of clashes between the armed parties, the GoI and the GAM. Peace-building activities carried out in Aceh include the raising of awareness and advocacy, especially nationally and internationally; lobbying and pressuring the Indonesian government and GAM to stop the violence; capacity-building and education especially in promoting peace, including peace education and peace studies; research and data gathering, especially about human rights abuses by both warring parties; and legal and non-legal advocacy for the victims of the conflict. Examples of civil society groups that were active in Aceh after the tsunami based on their primary focus areas include the following:

- Short-term recovery – People's Crisis Center (PCC); Save Aceh (SEFA); Indonesia Menangis (Indonesia Is Crying) (Metro TV) (especially after the tsunami); Relawan Perempuan untuk Kemanusiaan (Women Volunteers for Humanities).
- Peace-related activities – Aceh Civil Society Task Force; Institute for Peace and Human Security Studies (Lakasspia); Program Pendidikan Damai Aceh (Aceh Peace Education Programme); Aceh Working Group (an umbrella organization for NGOs focusing on peace for Aceh in Jakarta).
- Democracy and justice – Forum Rakyat (People's Forum); Solidaritas Mahasiswa Untuk Rakyat (SMUR) (Student Solidarity Movement for the People); Front Perlawanan Demokratik Rakyat Aceh (FPDRA) (Acehnese Fight for Democratic Front); Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh (SIRA) (Aceh Referendum Information Center).
- Human rights – Kontras; LBH Banda Aceh (Legal Aid Council of Banda Aceh); Koalisi NGO HAM Aceh (NGO Coalition for Human Rights NGO); Yayasan Peduli HAM Aceh (Foundation for Human Rights Concerns); Perhimpunan Pemantauan HAM (Human Rights Monitor Assembly); Pos Bantuan Hukum dan HAM (Legal Aid and Human Rights Post).
- Education – Muhammadiyah Aceh; Yayasan Masyarakat Iqra (Iqra Society Foundation); Aceh Institute; various *dayahs* (religious schools).
- Empowerment of women – Flower; Kelompok Kerja Transformasi Gender (Gender Transformation Working Group); Mitra Perempuan Sejati (MISPI).
- Corruption and good governance – Solidaritas Masyarakat Anti Korupsi (SAMAK) (Anti Corruption Solidarity Group); Aceh Damai Tanpa Korupsi (ADTK) (Peace for Aceh Without Corruption).

- Economic livelihood and income generation – Suloh (The Torch); Forum LSM Aceh (Aceh NGO Forum); People's Crisis Center.
- *Ulamas* – Himpunan Ulama Dayah Aceh (HUDA) (Aceh Dayah Ulama Group); Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama (MPU) (Ulama Council).
- Media – Acehkita.com; Aceh Media Watch.

These are just some examples of civil society groups that operate in Aceh today. There are hundreds more, with varying focuses.

Throughout the history of the conflict, the nature of many of their activities has been more clandestine compared to their counterparts in other parts of the region such as Thailand and the Philippines, due mainly to security reasons. Their strengths have also fluctuated over the years with varying results. A strong civil society has, in the past, managed to influence the government to reject unpopular and repressive policies, especially military ones. A strong civil society also has the capacity to control and prevent violent actions from both sides and pressure them to find peaceful solutions to the problems. This is evident in the way they managed to push the government to negotiate with the GAM in mid-2000. However, the position of civil society in Aceh has not always been strong. Repressive actions and space restriction against them by the Indonesian security forces have weakened them. Since 2000, and especially during martial law, Indonesian security apparatus has raided many offices of NGOs and student groups, prohibiting meetings and workshops and arresting many activists. Activists and civil society figures have suffered terror, arbitrary arrests and even kidnapping. Some of them have even been assassinated because of their activities. Koalisi NGO HAM Aceh (NGO Coalition for Human Rights) recorded that during the period of January 1999 to October 2001 there were 75 cases of violence against NGO and student activists.[18] This figure did not include victims who were journalists, intellectuals or religious leaders. In the same period, heads of the biggest two universities were assassinated, namely Professor Dayan Dawood of Syiah Kuala University (Unsyiah Banda Aceh), and Professor Safwan Idris of the Ar-Raniry Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN Banda Aceh). Civil society has also suffered from the nature of civil society organizations, with one analyst saying that it is 'difficult to involve civil society in conflict resolutions, because it is disorganized, differing in characteristics and interests, and difficult to reach consensus'.[19]

The highly repressive circumstances under the martial law and civil emergency rule have forced many prominent activists to flee from Aceh to other places. At the height of the repression, there were Acehnese activists doing advocacy, humanitarian and capacity-building work in Penang, Kuala

Lumpur, Jakarta, Bangkok, London and many other cities and countries. This situation has resulted in a weakened civil society position within Aceh. The declining bargaining position of the civil society has resulted in increasing violence during this period, and the cycle of violence was also progressively destroying the strength of the civil society. That is, until the role of civil society became important again in the post-tsunami days.

Lastly, we have seen the signs that civil society has finally been accepted as an important partner for peace in Aceh. The post-tsunami and post-conflict situations have been the catalyst for this. This has not always been so. During the pre-HDC days, the civil society was largely seen as the bystanders in an armed conflict between two armed groups. The HDC brought civil society into the discussion for the CoHA of 2002, and provisions were made to push for an All Inclusive Dialogue (AID) which would have included members of the civil society. This however, faltered with the collapse of the 2002 CoHA. Now, it is accepted that civil society has a very important role to play – for peace, as well as for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Aceh. During the peace process in Helsinki, the civil society was engaged regarding their interests and needs. Civil society representatives were invited to several meetings organized by the GAM. Many of the issues surrounding the conflict were discussed and a 'position statement of the Aceh civil society' was made. This includes support for the peaceful, just and dignified solution to the Aceh conflict and a rejection of the use of force by both armed parties to resolve the conflict.[20]

This statement shows the determination of the civil society in not only pushing for peace, but also in putting their position clearly within the GoI and GAM peace process. They made it clear that civil society voices will have to be listened to. They will play an important role in socializing any agreements reached between the parties, and as such, they have to be convinced too that the solutions will be the best for all in Aceh. After that first meeting with GAM, they had another two, one in Sweden again and the other in Kuala Lumpur prior to the signing of the MoU in August 2005. These consultations show a departure for GAM too because they have in the past been reluctant to accept civil society's voices. The strengthening of the civil society over the years has resulted in their voices being heard and their position strengthened *vis-à-vis* the warring parties, and this bodes well for building the foundation for long-lasting peace in Aceh. The tsunami has also opened up Aceh to outside attention in a way that could never be done before. International attention has been focused on Aceh and foreign NGOs have stepped in to provide humanitarian assistance for the short term and other types of assistance, including economic and political, in the long term.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the Aceh conflict is well on its way to peace. The Helsinki process and the MoU between the Indonesian government and the GAM have paved the way for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The Indonesian government has agreed to a new 'social contract' with the Acehnese as outlined under the MoU, and as a result GAM has agreed to cease its separatist demands and armed struggles.

The most urgent task now is to make sure that the ceasefire is not violated and the provisions of the MoU are fully implemented according to the letters and spirit of the agreement.

The role of civil society in this peace-building process will be crucial. However, this has still to rely on the goodwill and acceptance of the main parties to the peace agreement. This acceptance has fluctuated over the years, but with the potential of peace looming in the future, the role being played by the broader civil society should be expanded. Some of the challenges for civil society in Aceh include the following:

1. Continuing the activities under the post-tsunami reconstruction process. Many civil society elements are directly working to alleviate the suffering of the people with support from governmental and international agencies. The challenge is to locate specific needs and to sustain long-term development projects and activities. The challenge is also to sustain the civil society organizations themselves. Many of them have been given a boost (financial, morale, and so on) after the tsunami. The challenge will be to maintain the momentum after the initial support and attention have worn off. There is also a related problem of the civil society being 'stretched' due to a lack of qualified and dedicated personnel. There are already many working in the various NGOs, both local and international, but there is clearly a need to train more people.
2. Supporting the peace process and communicating the needs of the Acehnese to both sides. This can be done through continuing dialogue with the main parties and highlighting specific needs to them. The challenge is for civil society to be able to play an effective linkage role; one that is not only effective but also representative.
3. To create structures that promote long term sustainable growth and social stability. The need today is to focus on the 'post-conflict' vision for Aceh – to look beyond the conflict and to visualize a peaceful Aceh and the needs of a peaceful Aceh. The discourse on the 'Aceh conflict' needs to be transformed, in terms of the context and the issues, as well as mindset of the actors. These positive transformations need to be maintained and translated into a structural transformation on the

> ground. Peaceful ways of thinking and doing things need to be socialized and institutionalized. It has started with the ceasefire, disarmament of both sides, and promulgation of a new law for Aceh, and it should continue with the creation not only of structures for managing future problems but also of structures that promote development and peace.

Peace-building efforts, however, can only be fruitful in the long term if they are supported by a comprehensive developmental programme. Given the current climate in Aceh, humanitarian and development-related peace-building activities should complement each other. Development planning for the future should take into account the realities of the conflict situation and develop programmes and development strategies that can contribute towards overcoming existing cleavages rather than perpetuating or aggravating them. A re-evaluation of current development programmes is thus necessary.

As such, this 'post-conflict' vision involves not just rebuilding and reconstruction, but also creative forms of development that address the fundamental causes of conflict and which could prevent its recurrence. In short, a new 'social contract' for Aceh on the basis of the MoU and forthcoming legislation on Aceh will have to be forged, taking into account the needs of the former GAM combatants and the interests of Indonesia, as well as the long-term goal of building and sustaining peace in Aceh. The active role of the civil society in forging and implementing this social contract with other parties at all levels is paramount. Only through this exercise can real and positive peace be enjoyed by the long-suffering Acehnese.

Notes

1. *Aceh in Numbers 2002*, quoted in Moch Nurhasim, Abdul Rahman Patji, Fadjri Alihar and Lamijo (2003), *Konflik Aceh: Analisis atas sebab-sebab konflik, actor konflik, kepentingan dan upaya penyelesaian* [The Aceh Conflict: An Analysis on the Causes, Actors, Interests, and Resolution Attempts], Jakarta: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI), p. 7.
2. On the Darul Islam revolt in Aceh, see Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin (1985), *The Republican Revolt*: *A Study of the Acehnese Rebellion*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
3. Huber, Konrad (2004), *The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of NGO Mediation and Implementation*, Policy Studies No. 9, Washington, DC: East West Center, Washington, p. 13.
4. Rizal Sukma (2004), *Security Operations in Aceh: Goals, Consequences, and Lessons*, Policy Studies No. 3, Washington, DC: East West Center Washington, pp. 3–11.
5. See *Manila Times*, 14 December 2002.
6. Huber, Konrad (2004), *The HDC in Aceh*, pp. 18–19.
7. Huber, Konrad (2004), *The HDC in Aceh*, pp. 30–32.
8. Data collected by Aceh Refugee Center, Penang, and interviews with Acehnese leaders in Malaysia circa 2003 and 2004.

9. *Jakarta Post*, 'Talk with GAM "tough", but government to see it through', 30 January 2005.
10. Statement of former president Maarti Ahtisaari on 16 April 2005, *Jakarta Post*.
11. *The Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement*, from the *Jakarta Post*, www.thejakartapost.com.
12. *The Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement*, Article 4, Security Arrangements.
13. *The Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement*, 3.1 Amnesty.
14. *The Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement*, 3.2 Reintegration into Society.
15. *The Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement*, 1.1 Law on the Governing of Aceh.
16. *The Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement*, 1.3 Economy.
17. See Askandar, Kamarulzaman and Ang Ming Chee (eds) (2005), *Building Peace in Aceh: Problems, Strategies, and Lessons Learnt from Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland*, Bangkok: Forum Asia.
18. This data and other information about the treatment of civil society members by the authorities are given by a member of the Coalition, who prefers to remain anonymous, in an interview, September 2002, Banda Aceh.
19. Billah, M.M. (2005) 'The peace framework and peace accord: the case of Aceh', in Kamarulzaman Askandar and Ang Ming Chee (eds) (2005), *Building Peace in Aceh*, p. 101.
20. From a memorandum after a meeting between the civil society and GAM at Saltsjöbaden, Sweden, 24 May 2005. Memorandum distributed to the Acehnese community at save_aceh@yahoogroups.com, 26 May 2005.

13 The Malay-Muslim insurgency in Southern Thailand

Thitinan Pongsudhirak

Introduction: conceptualizing the problem

The resurgence of separatist violence that flared up in Thailand's predominantly Muslim southernmost border provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat from 4 January 2004 has spawned a cottage industry of academic analyses.[1] While the intensifying spate of violence has been vivid and well publicized, its nature, dynamics, direction and near-term ramifications have remained remarkably murky. Although a growing number of studies, including a handful of book-length expositions,[2] have stimulated debate about the causes and consequences of the violence, few have been widely accepted. Two primary accounts by the International Crisis Group, which drew heavily on substantiated first-hand accounts in the field, arguably have been the most persuasive and resonant among the mushrooming research community interested in Southern Thailand.[3] Other studies have been seen by some as excessively focused on domestic political factors,[4] and by others as overly skewed towards regional and international linkages to the violence.[5] On the other hand, a number of studies have usefully tried to tease out both the domestic and international dimensions of the violence.[6]

This short chapter is intended to contextualize the prolonged and protracted violence in southern Thailand. It is not a definitive account but a modest attempt to provide a brief backdrop for those who are relatively uninitiated. The insurgent violence whose aims range from greater administrative autonomy to outright separatism in Southern Thailand against the Thai state is triangulated between historiography, domestic politics and external involvement, with considerable overlap. An understanding of Thailand's longest and most conspicuous internal conflict is not achievable without sufficient appreciation for the burden of history, the importance of Bangkok-centred policies, and the enabling international environment. The chapter will conclude with tentative observations on the future directions of the conflict and the challenging tasks for researchers who want to come up with fuller and more reliable accounts of Thailand's southern violence.

The burden of history

Without doubt, the violence in Thailand's southernmost provinces is complex, an imbroglio whose roots should be seen as a confluence of fluctuating variables, not as a static set of explanatory factors. Historical parallels certainly demand attention.[7] To be sure, the unrest is a recurring phenomenon traceable to formation of the Chakri Dynasty in the late eighteenth century. Following the collapse of the Ayuthaya Kingdom to Burmese conquest in 1767, the Kingdom of Patani[8] rebelled against Siamese domination. By 1786, with Siamese independence regained and a new kingdom established, King Rama I forcefully conquered the Patani Kingdom, which was later carved into seven administrative provinces headed by local rulers under overall control from Bangkok. Siam's loosely structured suzerainty over its southern dominions underwent a drastic overhaul in 1902 when the country was forced to cede the Malay states of Kedah, Trengganu, Kelantan and Perlis to British-controlled Malaya. What remained of the Patani Kingdom was then formally annexed by Siam in order to ensure its territorial integrity. The Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 effectively recognized the annexation and new territorial demarcation between Great Britain and Siam against the backdrop of competing colonial ambitions in the Southeast Asia region. Since then, periodic bouts of Malay-Muslim rebellion in Thailand's southern provinces, met each time with varying degrees and tactics of suppression, pacification and accommodation from Bangkok, have characterized the political life of the southern border region.[9]

Key periods of Malay-Muslim revolts began in earnest with the immediate aftermath of the Siamese annexation and the Anglo-Siamese Treaty. As Bangkok's integration policy waned in the early 1920s in response to the fierce resistance, the Malay-Muslim rebellion entered a period of relative accommodation. Outright revolt came to the fore again with the rise of the ultra-nationalist government of Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkram (Phibun) in 1938, continuing throughout the Second World War period to the 1960s and 1970s, mostly under successive military-authoritarian governments. The two Phibun governments (1938–44 and 1948–57) implemented forced assimilation policies that adversely affected all facets of Muslim identity and ethnicity, including matters of attire, bureaucratic administration, education, judicial settlements and revenue collection. The famous rebellion during this period that was indelibly etched in the Malay-Muslim consciousness centred on an uprising at Dusun Ngor village in Narathiwat province on 26 April 1948, just days after Phibun became prime minister for the second time. The two-day clash claimed the lives of some 400 Malay-Muslims and 30 Thai police officers, with 2000–6000 Malay-Muslims forced to flee across the border into Malaya.[10] The Malay-Muslims later petitioned the United

Nations for assistance in their irredentist claims for autonomy, but to no avail. The southern disturbances under Phibun's watch also claimed the life of Haji Sulong, a charismatic Muslim religious leader who had inspired the rebellions against Bangkok. His mysterious death – many saw it as assassination – transpired under the custody of the Thai authorities in August 1954. Much like Dusun Ngor, Haji Sulong's death became a perpetual symbol of the Malay-Muslim struggle for greater autonomy.[11]

The government of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1958–63), also a military strongman, perpetuated these assimilation policies with the aim of channelling Muslim allegiance to the 'nation, religion (Buddhism), and the monarchy', the newly instituted mantra of the Thai state. However, the assimilation policies were redirected during the two decades following Sarit's time. A renewed and relatively inclusive focus was placed on education, economic development and career mobility. In what was tantamount to affirmative action, Malay-Muslims were given quotas to enter Thai-Buddhist schools. State budget for education was increased. Malay-Muslim representation in national politics was encouraged. The bureaucracy actively recruited Muslims. Study tours – visits to Bangkok – were arranged for Muslim community leaders and religious teachers. The government launched campaigns to rid 'dark influences' – that is, corrupt officials – from the bureaucratic machinery in the deep south. Finally, during the 1980s, the government of General Prem Tinsulanond employed accommodation policies in pacifying and integrating the Malay-Muslims. The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), the Community Development Centre and the General Education Centre were set up to redress Malay-Muslim grievances and promoted their public participation. The SBPAC in particular succeeded in providing a vehicle and a voice to disaffected Malay-Muslims to channel and resolve their disenchantments with the Thai authorities. An amnesty programme was also promulgated during the 1980s to reintegrate former Muslim insurgents into the broader Thai society.[12] The more accommodating institutional environment set up and measures taken in the 1980s succeeded in restraining and mollifying the Malay-Muslim insurgency. The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and the onset of the 1988–95 economic boom was also conducive to a new atmosphere of relative accommodation with less emphasis on ideological movements and greater focus on economic prosperity and career mobility. By the mid-1990s, the separatist insurgency became low-key, fractured and ineffectual.

However, the flames of separatism were never completely extinguished. They just became manageable. Ruptures came to the surface again with the rise to power of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his two Thai Rak Thai Party-led governments (2001–2005 and 2005–2006). During this

period, Thaksin employed strongman and repressive tactics much akin to Phibun and Sarit in his treatment of the southern region. By early 2004 when the separatist insurgency became pronounced once again, Thaksin had much to answer for. His nationalist platform, coupled with populism, appeared to have led to a renewed sense of alienation and repression. The next section will briefly review the political underpinnings of Thaksin's rule that contributed to the resurgence of the insurgency and the spiralling violence in Southern Thailand. This section suggests that the separatist insurgency in Thailand's southernmost border provinces is not new. It has tended to flare up in reaction to international and regional conditions and outcomes and to the Bangkok-centred policy responses. A key observation to note is that when the central government in Bangkok became overweening and repressive the Malay-Muslims of the southern periphery tended to rise up to reclaim their ethno-nationalist sense of identity based on a rich history centred on the old Kingdom of Patani.

Domestic sources of the southern unrest

Few would claim that the recurrence of the southern violence is coincidental. On the contrary, most accounts have indicated that the ascendancy of Thaksin, his top-down management style, blatant nationalist inclinations and iron-fisted rule created the indispensable enabling environment for the separatist insurgency to regain its footing. When he took office after a convincing victory in the January 2001 general election, Thaksin proceeded to monopolize the political space by taking over smaller political parties, re-arranging the military, politicizing the independent accountability-promoting institutions such as the National Counter Corruption Commission and the Constitutional Court, and marginalizing the opposition and civil society groups.[13] The southern region, including the three southernmost provinces, was a thorn in his side as the ruling Thai Rak Thai Party fared poorly at polling booths. After Thaksin was narrowly acquitted in his assets concealment trial in August 2001, he tried to rearrange the south and take over what had long been the heartland of voters for the opposing Democrat Party.[14]

Almost all accounts of the southern violence have pinpointed the dismantlement in mid-2002 of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) and the Civilian–Police–Military Task Force 43 (CPM-43), effectively the infrastructure for governance in the deep south that had been set up under Prem during the 1980s, as a turning point.[15] The demise of the SBPAC left a gaping vacuum in which local grievances and disaffection were left to fester. Compounding the lack of effective governance was a series of policy controversies that involved state-perpetrated violence under Thaksin's order. Chief among these was the 'war on drugs'

during February–May 2003 that claimed more than 2275 deaths[16] through extrajudicial killings, an unspecified number inflicted on Malay-Muslims. By the time the southern violence erupted in January 2004, the Thaksin administration was already viewed as one of the bloodiest governments in Thai history, comparable only to past military dictatorships under Phibun and Sarit. To make matters worse, the Thaksin government's overt nationalism, which was exploited hand-in-hand with populism to reinforce Thaksin's regime, further alienated Muslims in the deep south.

The Muslim militants' raid on a Thai military arsenal and arson on state schools and police posts on 4 January 2004 marked a new chapter in the domestic causes of the crisis. The attacks infuriated Thaksin and elicited a sustained heavy-handed response. From one episode to the next, the post-January 2004 southern violence grew in frequency and intensity. It was exacerbated by the 28 April 2004 incident where 120 young militants simultaneously carried out attacks across Pattani, Yala and Songkhla provinces. As dawn broke, the assailants, who were organized into groups of 10–20 carrying small arms and machetes, attacked 11 security checkpoints manned by the police and the army. Having gathered intelligence from an earlier arrest of ten Muslim youths, the security forces were on alert for a possible attack. When the Muslim militants sped their motorbikes head on against the security forces, most of them were mowed down by gunfire. The rest took their last stand at the historic Krue Se mosque in Pattani. As dusk approached, the Thai authorities stormed and killed all 34 holdouts in the mosque. Apart from the 108 Muslim attackers that were killed, 15 were captured, whereas five soldiers and policemen died in the day-long battle.[17]

Just six months later, another bout of state-perpetrated violence took place in Tak Bai district of Narathiwat province. A boisterous but peaceful protest at the district police station demanding the release of six local Muslim men accused of firearms theft swelled from 200 at dawn on 25 October 2004 to more than 2000 by midday. By dusk, a violent crackdown by the security forces had killed six of the protesters, injuring 17. As midnight passed, another 78 protesters died of 'suffocation' and 'convulsion' as they were piled on top of one another into military trucks for transport to a military camp in Pattani for detention. Another three dead protesters were fished out of the Tak Bai river subsequently. In a 24-hour span, the authorities became responsible for 87 deaths. By his own admission, Thaksin took charge of the situation from 11 a.m. on that tragic day, providing the green light for the crowd dispersal and suppression tactics several hours thereafter. Thaksin's righteous, glib and dismissive tone towards the protesters no doubt emboldened the security forces on the ground to exercise their authority and weaponry with less restraint than was warranted.[18] The Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents, not dissimilar to Dusun Ngor 58 years

prior, became the updated metaphors of the Thai state's repression and deprivation of Malay-Muslim historical grievances.[19]

As the southern violence showed no sign of abatement throughout 2004, it became a dent in Thaksin's previously invincible aura. It was the first serious challenge that he was unable to overcome despite repeated pledges and self-imposed deadlines. Notwithstanding the adverse political fallout from Tak Bai, Thaksin rode the tidal waves of the tsunami on the 26 December 2004 into a landslide re-election victory in the 6 February 2005 general election.[20] After his resounding re-election triumph, Thaksin appeared to have had a rethink, and launched what seemed like a kinder, gentler rule.[21] Addressing the joint sitting of the bicameral legislature, he placed emphasis on conflict resolution in the deep south, hinted at previous mistakes, and pledged a partial troop withdrawal from the southern region. Above all, Thaksin established the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) under the chairmanship of respected former prime minister Anand Panyarachun, who was given substantial latitude in selecting fellow commissioners and directing the commission. Whatever softer side and possible legacy Thaksin may have contemplated, they did not last long. By July 2005, his draconian responses were back with the promulgation of an emergency decree to govern the restive south.[22] In short, Thaksin has been a central player from the beginning of the current spate of southern violence to date. His administration's policies in trying to penetrate and capture political power bases in the south by dismantling the SBPAC, launching the gruesome war on drugs, and mishandling Krue Se and Tak Bai were critical to the intensification of the violence. The domestic causes specific to Thaksin's rule thus play an instrumental role in understanding the nature, causes and dynamics of the southern violence.

The regional and international dimensions

Just as domestic causes are salient in understanding the southern violence, so are the external causes. Most analyses of the external causes behind the violence appear to draw direct and indirect linkages to regional and international Islamist terrorism – that is, Jemaah Islamiah (JI) and al-Qaeda – that has proliferated since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and the consequent American invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq (for example Gunaratna, Acharya and Chua 2005; Abuza 2006). Yet the inferences to regional and international terrorist elements have been criticized as overstated and linguistically manipulative.[23] Admittedly, researching the external causes of Thailand's southern violence is a constrained exercise in view of the US-led 'war on terror' due to the sensitive information involved and the inability of researchers to locate and cite sources adequately. In short, few would deny that external factors

play a key role in the violence. But what type of role, to what extent, and by which dynamics are issues that are difficult to fathom. Yet apportioning the role of external factors in Thailand's southern violence is a challenged but indispensable research exercise.

The heightened awareness of Muslim identity worldwide in the aftermath of September 11 provides a context for local Muslim grievances in Thailand's deep south. Thaksin's decision in June 2003 to join the 'war on terror', after initially sitting on the fence in the face of the disagreement between the United Nations and the US over the latter's invasion of Iraq in March 2003, was one factor that further alienated the Malay-Muslims in the southern border provinces.[24] The upgraded Thai–US alliance brokered in June 2003 during Thaksin's visit to Washington and meeting with President George W. Bush nudged Thailand firmly into the US-led 'war on terror'. The Thaksin–Bush meeting led to Thailand's newfound status as a US major non-Nato ally and Bush's agreement to commence negotiations towards a bilateral free-trade agreement. In exchange, Thaksin signed on to the Container Security Initiative and the exemption on US citizens, particularly US servicemen, from extradition to the International Criminal Court for criminal prosecution. To grease the new Thai–US deal, the Thai authorities apprehended three suspected Jemaah Islamiah operatives in Narathiwat just hours prior to the top-level talk, and arrested Riduan Isamuddin, or Hambali, the alleged operations chief of JI in Southeast Asia, two months later.[25]

The involvement of JI operatives in Thailand and in nearby countries, particularly Indonesia, further complicated the southern unrest. Although JI's and al-Qaeda's direct connections to the Malay-Muslim insurgency in the deep south have yet to be concretely established, the force, tenacity and resilience of regional terrorist campaigns in Indonesia and the Philippines have led a number of analysts to warn that Thailand's deep south was inexorably headed in the same direction.[26] This trend partly stemmed from the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan during the 1980s in which a small band of Muslims from Southern Thailand and other countries in the region took part. The Afghan connection among Muslim militants from Southeast Asia and elsewhere is said to have provided the basis for JI penetration and participation in Thailand's Malay-Muslim insurgency against the backdrop of increased international Islamist solidarity and jihadist radicalism towards injustices in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, the Islamic schools in Southern Thailand, commonly known as *pondoks*, have acted as places for radical indoctrination and operational training and coordination for the southern violence. Many southern Malay-Muslim students who received host-country scholarships to study in Middle East countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Libya during the 1980s and 1990s also

may have been radicalized there, having established networks of contacts with like-minded militants from other parts of Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East.

Accordingly, the aforementioned external conditions conduced and contributed to the eruption and proliferation of Thailand's southern insurgency from January 2004. They helped shape the nature, direction, frequency, intensity, and coordination of the violence the insurgency has perpetrated throughout 2004–2005. Key insurgent groups featured the Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which comprised the BRN Ulema, the BRN Congress, and the BRN Coordinate. Other groups included the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) the New PULO, the Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani (BNPP), the Barisan Islam Pembebasan Pattani (BIPP), and Barisan Kemerdekaan Pattani (Bersatu).[27] These names connoted the struggle for the liberation and independence of the old Patani Kingdom. What has been murky was the hitherto absence of insurgent demands and stated political objectives. Such absence was not supportive of the connection between the southern insurgency and JI. Few were certain, in other words, as to what the insurgents wanted and even who they were. Their presumed goals appeared to range from greater administrative autonomy to an outright separate homeland. They may well have been too fragmented and incoherent to make political demands thus far. What has been evident, however, is that their perpetration of violence has hitherto been confined to the southernmost border areas. They appeared to have been unified in their violent acts against the Thai state but disunited in their common strategy and objectives.

Prospects of the southern violence

The escalating violence in Thailand's deep south has been a frustrating conundrum. On the one hand, it has intensified markedly from early 2004 to March 2006 with almost daily killings of and injuries to Thai state officials and Muslim and Buddhist civilians carried out by a shadowy Malay-Muslim separatist insurgency. On the other, the intensification of the violence has not palpably affected economic conditions such as the stock market and foreign investment, and has not captured the attention of Bangkok dwellers. Unless the pattern of insurgent attacks deviates sharply and spills over to areas outside the three provinces, such as Bangkok or Phuket, the population outside the affected areas is likely to remain impervious, even complacent. Such a business-as-usual attitude, however, is misguided. Thailand is just a bomb away from security risks on a par with Indonesia's. Nothing may change and the deep south may degenerate into a war zone without affecting Bangkok's perceptions, but if something does

change, the downside risks would be sudden and precipitous. A few factors indicate that the risks of violence widening beyond Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat may have increased over the period between January 2004 and March 2006, as the insurgency gains strength in numbers and lessons by doing.

First, the southern Muslim insurgency has established its wherewithal to carry out violent attacks at will, aimed at selected targets ranging from local leaders and informants to Buddhist monks, soldiers, policemen and bureaucrats. The campaign of violence has been sustained with growing sophistication. Although it has decidedly kept its identity under a cloud of mystery, academic research, investigative journalism, and official intelligence and military data suggest that Malay-Muslim insurgent operations draw their strength from the groups listed above. While the organization, coherence and objectives of these separatist groups are as yet unclear, subgroups known as the BRN Coordinate and the GMIP are believed to be behind the most violent and coordinated attacks. It is also unclear to what extent the personnel, plots and tactics of these groups are based in Southern Thailand as opposed to across the border in Malaysia's Kelantan state.

What is clear is that the insurgency has a command-and-control system and can dictate outcomes on the ground. The next watershed to observe is whether these insurgent groups can coalesce into a unified, organized and coherent movement with stated political objectives. Such a movement can then demand a dialogue with the Thai authorities, much akin to the peace process in Aceh. Along the way, there is the danger that these insurgent groups will be germinated with Muslim extremist elements operating around the region, particularly JI. That the violence has been largely confined to the three southernmost provinces suggests that no germination with regional extremism has taken place. However, the likelihood of external and regional jihadist involvement increases as the insurgency progresses, especially given the insensitive responses from Bangkok.

Second, the Thaksin government's prolonged mishandling of the southern insurgency is likely to further the flame of Malay-Muslim discontent. In early September, 131 Thai Muslims fled to Malaysia for fear of their safety, creating a refugee crisis, eliciting the attention of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and souring Thailand–Malaysia relations.[28] Shortly thereafter, Thaksin made acerbic remarks at the UN aimed at the UNHCR and the Malaysian government, further internationalizing the issue that the Thai government had tried to keep within its domestic realm. Just days later, an incident at Tanyonglimo village in Narathiwat marked another escalation in the level of violence. Two Thai marines were stabbed to death by unknown assailants after being

taken hostage by villagers who were outraged by the gangland-style shooting of several local Muslims earlier in the day.[29] Thaksin quickly condemned the deaths of the marines but failed to redress the anger and grievances of local villagers. He also promised to go on the 'offensive' against the insurgents. In mid-October 2005, the insurgent killings of a Buddhist monk and two attendants at a temple further infuriated Thaksin. Around the same time, the Thaksin government renewed for another three months the emergency decree governing the three southern provinces, virtually designating them as a war zone. The pattern of insurgent attacks, met by harsh government responses, is discernible and reminiscent of historical examples under Phibun and Sarit. What is at stake is no less than an unconventional, limited war between the Malay-Muslim insurgent groups and the Thaksin government.

The southern crisis appears likely to get worse before it gets better as long as Thaksin remains in charge. Thaksin can be counted on to keep up his nationalist rhetoric against the aims of separatism and to continue the harsh crackdown. The insurgents are likely to keep up their regular attacks. The long road ahead may well involve a negotiating process if the insurgents can organize themselves. However, Thaksin will not easily be drawn to a negotiating table. Given the political crisis engulfing Thaksin following accusations of his constitutional violations, corruption, and treason from the sale of his family's business empire to a Singaporean company in January 2006, his political demise may be in the offing.[30] If it comes to pass, there will be fresh opportunities to steer Bangkok's policies towards the deep south into more constructive, accommodating and less belligerent and less repressive directions. A post-Thaksin government would do well to rebuild trust and conflict-resolution institutions as well as to promote dialogue with the Malay-Muslims in favour of the relative accommodation that prevailed throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s.

Research avenues and constraints

Clearly, the most daunting task for researchers focused on Thailand's southern insurgency is the fluidity and unpredictable nature of the subject. Analysing Thailand's deep south is tantamount to aiming at a moving target. Daily events on the ground directly impinge on research design, aims, scope, and data collection and analysis. It is difficult to put a time frame on the research to demarcate where it begins and ends. The second and equally daunting challenge is the access to data. The combustible downward spiral of events since January 2004 could well put researchers' personal safety at risk. The air of suspicion and mistrust among the local Malay-Muslim populace adds a further challenge to fieldwork data gathering. While primary research is most useful in understanding the southern

violence, it is difficult to come by in view of recent developments on the ground.

Despite these constraints, several productive research avenues can be pursued. First, a historiography study would be useful, focusing on the apparent correlation between Thai nationalism and ethno-nationalist Malay-Muslim insurgency. Such work can draw up a set timeline, tap available secondary sources, and provide the analytical backdrop for understanding the southern insurgency up to the period of Thaksin's rule. Second, analysts may attempt to tease out, sequence and apportion weight to the domestic and regional and international factors involved. Such a study would be ambitious, and should be undertaken by researchers who have access to the data, preferably local researchers who are familiar with the issues and who can rely on a reliable network of contacts. This would be the most useful and possibly most comprehensive kind of study. Third, research can be aimed at conflict resolution dimensions. This kind of research would probe the insurgency movement, its make-up and political objectives with a view towards promoting a dialogue between the insurgency and the Thai government that could lead to the cessation of conflict and acceptable accommodation between both sides. It could also draw on comparative work involving third-party mediation in nearby areas, such as Aceh. The conflict-resolution research track has become more attractive in light of the military putsch in Thailand on 19 September 2006, as the lead coup-maker, General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin, had been calling for political dialogue with southern insurgents in conflict with Thaksin's strong-arm approach.[31] These three research avenues should incorporate policy-oriented implications, providing effective and substantiated assessments for public understanding and realistic options and recommendations for decision-makers on both sides of the Thai and Malay-Muslim divide.

To be sure, the ongoing violence in Thailand's southernmost provinces is difficult to pinpoint, having confounded analysts near and far, including Thailand's own intelligence services. By most accounts, the violence appears to emanate from longstanding ethno-nationalist grievances and identity issues, with the aims of separatism ranging from greater administrative autonomy to outright independence. Domestic politics in view of Thaksin's authoritarian tendencies and repressive policies since he came to power in January 2001 also figures prominently in assessing the causes and dynamics of the violence. Yet the wider regional and international 'jihadist' networks cannot be excluded altogether from Thailand's southern morass. The task of the researcher is to untangle the knotty imbroglio between historical southern Muslim separatism, domestic politics, and regional and external Islamist linkages by apportioning weight to each of these causes over time in a persuasive fashion.

Notes

1. From 4 January 2004 to the end of February 2006, the violence has claimed more than 1200 lives. See 'Propaganda drive could backfire', *Nation*, 1 March 2006.
2. For example, Gunaratna, Rohan, Arabid Acharya and Sabrina Chua (2005), *Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand*, Singapore: Marshall Cavendish.
3. International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005), 'Southern Thailand: insurgency, not jihad',. Asia Report No. 98, Singapore and Brussels; International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005), 'Thailand's emergency decree: No solution', Asia Report No. 105, Singapore and Brussels.
4. See, for example, McCargo, Duncan (2006), 'Thaksin and the resurgence of violence in the Thai south: network monarchy strikes back?', *Critical Asian Studies*, **38** (1).
5. Abuza, Zachary (2005), 'A conspiracy of silence: the insurgency in Southern Thailand', unpublished mimeograph; Sheridan, Greg (2004/2005) 'Jihad Archipelago', *National Interest*, winter Gunaratna et al. (2005), *Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand*.
6. For example, Croissant, Aurel (2005), 'Unrest in South Thailand: contours, causes, and consequences since 2001', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, **27** (1), pp. 21–43; Dorairajoo, Saroja D. (2004), 'Violence in the south of Thailand', *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, **5** (1), pp. 465–71; Chongkittavorn, Kavi (2004), 'Thailand: international terrorism and the Muslim south', *Southeast Asian Affairs 2004*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
7. Pitsuwan, Surin (1985), *Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay Muslims of Southern Thailand*, Bangkok: Thai Khadi Research Institute; Che Man, Wan Kadir (1990), *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malay of Southern Thailand*, Singapore: Oxford University Press; Aphornsuvan, Thanet (2004), 'Origins of Malay Muslim "Separatism" in Southern Thailand', Working Paper Series No. 32, Singapore: Asia Research Institute.
8. This chapter follows the more popular usage of 'Pattani' as opposed to 'Patani', which is the indigenous transliteration among Malay-Muslims. The old Kingdom of Patani included the provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Satun, and parts of Songkhla.
9. Che Man, Wan Kadir (1990), *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malay of Southern Thailand*.
10. Che Man, Wan Kadir (1990), *Muslim Separatism*, pp. 66–7.
11. See Aphornsuvan, Thanet (2004), 'Origins of Malay Muslim "Separatism" in Southern Thailand'.
12. Pitsuwan, Surin (1985), *Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay Muslims of Southern Thailand*; Che Man, Wan Kadir (1990), *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malay of Southern Thailand*.
13. Pongsudhirak, Thitinan (2003), 'Thailand: democratic authoritarianism', *Southeast Asian Affairs 2003*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
14. Pongsudhirak, Thitinan (2005), 'Thai politics after the 6 February 2005 general election', Trends Series, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
15. For example, see Croissant, Aurel (2005), 'Unrest in South Thailand: Contours, Causes, and Consequences Since 2001', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, **27** (1), pp. 21–43; International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005), 'Southern Thailand: insurgency, not jihad', Asia Report No. 98, Singapore and Brussels; Chongkittavorn, Kavi (2004), 'Thailand: international terrorism and the Muslim South', *Southeast Asian Affairs 2004*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; McCargo, Duncan (2005), 'Thaksin and the resurgence of violence in the Thai South: network monarchy strikes back?', *Critical Asian Studies*, **38** (1).
16. Cited from Human Rights Watch in Kurlantzick, Joshua (2006), 'The rise and fall of imperial democracies', *Washington Monthly*, January/February.
17. See www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/south2years/apr 290402.php; International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005), 'Southern Thailand: insurgency, not jihad'.
18. International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005), 'Southern Thailand: insurgency, not jihad', Pongsudhirak, Thitinan (2004) , 'Southern bloodshed deserves answers', *Bangkok Post*, 29 October.

19. For anecdotal evidence, see Janchitfah, Supara (2005), *Violence in The Midst*, Bangkok: Kobfai Publishing.
20. Pongsudhirak, Thitinan (2005), 'Thai politics after the 6 February 2005 general election'.
21. Pongsudhirak, Thitinan (2005) 'Thaksin surprises with his gentler side', *Straits Times*, 26 March.
22. International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005), 'Thailand's emergency decree: no solution'.
23. Hamilton-Hart, Natasha (2005), 'Terrorism in Southeast Asia: expert analysis, myopia and fantasy', *Pacific Review*, **18** (3):303–25. See also Gunaratna, Rohan, Arabinda Acharya and Sabrina Chua (2005), *Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand*, Singapore: Marshall Cavendish; and Abuza, Zachary (2006), *Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand and its Implications for Southeast Asian Security*, Washington: US Institute of Peace Press.
24. Chongkittavorn, Kavi (2004), 'Thailand: international terrorism and the Muslim South'.
25. The three Narathiwat Muslims were eventually freed by the criminal court due to a lack of evidence. After his arrest by the Thai security forces, Hambali was handed to the US authorities.
26. Abuza, Zachary (2005), 'A conspiracy of silence: the insurgency in Southern Thailand'; Gunaratna, Rohan et al. (2005), *Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand*; Kurlantzick, Joshua (2006), 'The rise and fall of imperial democracies'; Sheridan, Greg (2004/2005), 'Jihad Archipelago'.
27. See Table 1 in Croissant, Aurel (2005), 'Unrest in South Thailand: contours, causes, and consequences since 2001'.
28. International Crisis Group (2005), 'Thailand's emergency decree: no solution'.
29. International Crisis Group (2005), 'Thailand's emergency decree: no solution'.
30. See Pongsudhirak, Thitinan (2006), 'Thaksin's challengers have responsibilities, too', *International Herald Tribune*, 14 March.
31. The conflict between Gen Sonthi and Thaksin over the management of the southern insurgency appeared to be a contributing factor to the military's seizure of power. See Pongsudhirak, Thitinan (2006), 'Stepping in to heal the breach', *Bangkok Post*, 22 September.

14 Separatism in Papua

Philips J. Vermonte

Since declaring its independence following the end of the Second World War in 1945, the Republic of Indonesia has survived many internal rebellions that have questioned the legitimacy of the state, such as the Madiun communist uprisings in the late 1940s, the regional uprisings and the Darul Islam in the 1950s, and the abortive communist coup in 1965. Other armed rebellions have also broken out along the periphery throughout the short history of the Republic, such as that mounted by the armed separatist Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) since 1976 in the northern Sumatran province of Aceh, and the independence movement in East Timor, a territory that Indonesia invaded in 1975 and forcibly incorporated the following year.

Another territory that has been agitating for independence has been West Papua, the easternmost province along its periphery. In this case, separatist sentiments could be dated to the early 1960s, when West Papua became formally integrated into Indonesia. The impetus towards separatism in the territory increased since the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 following economic and political crises in Indonesia at the time, which were sparked by the Asian financial crisis. The government has been making efforts to counter such sentiments, such as granting West Papua special autonomy status to give the province a much greater share of resource revenue and control over its affairs. Despite the government's endeavours, however, the local Papua communities have continued to agitate for a separate Papua state. These sentiments are clearly growing, but overt demonstrations of such intent have been countered by tough security action on the part of the government. For instance, the attempt by separatists to fly the Papua's national flag, the 'Morning Star' (Bintang Kejora) in Abepura, the state capital, on 1 December 2004, was met by a harsh response by the security services. Hundreds of people either watched or participated, but the security services arrested the two flag-raisers, who were then charged and face life imprisonment for their action.[1] The incident illustrates the deep unease within the government over the extent and depth of separatist sentiments in the province. West Papua is therefore an important issue that deserves attention given that it is one of the provinces most likely to secede from Indonesia should the centre weaken or the state face disintegration at some point in the future. This chapter traces the roots

or causes of Papuan separatism and examines the responses of the international community and the Indonesian government to the problem.

The historical roots of separatism

New Guinea itself is the second-largest island in the world. The eastern half of the island came under Australian rule in 1902 and later became the independent state of Papua New Guinea. The western half of the island came under Dutch colonial rule. Despite tribal divisions and the division of the island into two halves, the Papuan people identify themselves as Melanesians, different from the majority of Indonesians. Melanesians are found in neighbouring Papua New Guinea and also in the Pacific islands. The majority of the Papuan people are also either animists or Christians, as opposed to the fact that Indonesia is dominated by Muslims. There are thus deep ethnic and religious differences between Papuans on the one hand, and the rest of Indonesia on the other.

The historical background of Papua is also different from that of other parts of Indonesia. Papua did not take part in the independence struggle against the Dutch colonial government. When Indonesia became independent from the Netherlands in 1949, Papua was treated separately and remained under the rule of the Dutch colonial government. However, Indonesia did make a claim to the territory, then known as West New Guinea, or Irian Jaya to the Indonesians, though the term 'West Papua' is also used to denote the territory. The Dutch government argued, successfully, with Australia's backing, that historically and ethnically, the territory was largely Melanesian and therefore deserved to be treated separately from the rest of Indonesia. This stand contributed to a strong sense of national injustice in Indonesian nationalist circles, who regarded the independence struggle as incomplete so long as the territory was not recovered. The territory was eventually incorporated into Indonesia in the 1960s; however, by that time, Papua nationalism had become well entrenched within the Papua community.

Local Melanesian nationalism had always been strong, and there were a number of uprisings against the Dutch and the occupying Japanese during the Second World War. When the Netherlands resumed control in 1945, they set up a partially elected New Guinea Council in order to encourage local political participation. Indeed, the Suara Rakyat (Voice of the People) was formed in 1945, with the objective of achieving independence. Indonesia's proclamation of independence in August 1945 resulted in a split amongst the nationalists, with some supporting integration with Indonesia and others opposing Indonesia's claim to the territory by forming the Gerakan Persatuan Nieuw Guinea (New Guinea Unity Movement) or GPNG. From then, Melanesian national identity developed rapidly.[2]

Following the tense situation from the late 1950s arising from Indonesia's continued claim on the territory, resulting in a rapid deterioration of relations between the Netherlands and the government of Indonesia, the Dutch governor in Papua thought it was necessary to form a national committee consisting of 21 people, with a later addition of 70 educated local people.[3] This committee was meant to prepare for Papuan independence, and soon received broad popular support. It decided that their new country's name would be Papua Barat (West Papua), with Hai Tanahku Papua as the national anthem, and the Bintang Kejora (Morning Star) as the national flag. The Dutch government declared that this political statement represented the voice of the Papua people, who wanted a free and independent nation. The initial plan to fly the national flag on 1 November 1961 was cancelled because the government in the Netherlands had not given its approval, but after the formal approval arrived, the Bintang Kejora (Morning Star) flew over the territory on 1 December 1961.

At this time, the Sukarno government was playing the nationalist card in pressing Indonesia's claim to the territory, given economic malaise and a delicate political balancing game amongst contending groups in Jakarta. Sukarno hoped that the active pursuit of a popular nationalist cause such as Papua could distract from the political contestation in Jakarta involving himself, the communists, the Muslims and the military. The government thus formed a national security council on 11 December 1961, charged with the objective of liberating Papua from the Dutch. On 19 December 1961, President Sukarno declared a military mobilization showing Indonesia's readiness to use force. The context of the Cold War played a large part in persuading the USA to intervene in order to resolve the issue and prevent an open anti-colonial conflict that could strengthen the hand of anti-West communists in Indonesia. The Kennedy administration, realizing the strength of the Indonesian Communist Party at this time, then sponsored talks between the Netherlands and Indonesia in the spring of 1962.[4]

The US-sponsored talks led to the New York Agreement that was signed by the Netherlands and Indonesia on 15 August 1962. The people of West Papua were excluded from the decision-making process. The New York Agreement stipulated that the territory was to be placed under the authority of the United Nations (UN), which, after a transitional period, would in turn hand it over to the Indonesian authorities. After seven years, Indonesia was required to consult the West Papua people on whether they wished to remain a part of Indonesia or become independent.

After taking over, the government of Indonesia proscribed political activity in the territory, imposed central control, displaced Melanesians from the local government, and imported immigrants from Java under the transmigration programme. Melanesians in the local government were also

displaced from their positions as the central government moved to assert control. The local Melanesians felt overwhelmed by the migrants and saw the move as a deliberate attempt to destroy their self-identity and to assimilate them.[5]

From July to August 1969, UN officials conducted the so-called 'Act of Free Choice' (or PEPERA). Article 18 of the New York Agreement gave the right to all adult Papuans to participate in an act of self-determination that would be monitored by the UN. However, instead of the 700 000 Papuans whose opinions were supposed to have been consulted, Indonesian authorities selected 1022 Papuans to vote publicly and unanimously in favour of integration with Indonesia. The result of PEPERA was thus not accepted by the Papua community because it perceived that Indonesia had engineered the voting. To this day, PEPERA continues to be regarded as illegitimate by the native people of Papua. On 19 November 1969, however, the United Nations General Assembly, with 84 votes for, and 30 abstentions, adopted the resolution that formally accepted the result of PEPERA, ignoring the failure of the Indonesian government in actually fulfilling the terms of it.[6]

This acceptance of PEPERA and the lukewarm international attitude, particularly on the part of the United States and the Western powers, can be attributed to the prevailing Cold War context. Locked into a deadly ideological battle with the communist bloc, the USA was anxious to build a worldwide network of allies that could contain the spread of communism. Whilst initially suspicious of the Indonesian nationalists, the USA was won over when the Indonesian government proved willing to put down, by force, the communist-led Madiun uprising in the late 1940s. Thereafter, the USA watched with concern the internal domestic struggle for power between the military, President Sukarno and the communists. Indeed, the Communist Party in Indonesia at this time was the third largest in the world, after those in the Soviet Union and China. With the ascendancy of the anti-communist military following the abortive communist-led Gestapu coup in 1965, there was palpable relief in Washington despite the massive bloodshed, and there was no desire to undermine the new military-led Suharto regime that had engineered PEPERA.[7]

Fundamental grievances

The cultural, historical and political background has also been exacerbated by the policies undertaken by the Indonesian government since the formal integration of Papua in 1969. Compared to the Dutch occupation, the Indonesian government has implemented a much greater degree of control and assimilation. During the Dutch occupation, the native Papuans were highly involved in local government activities, enabling

Papuans to learn many skills that helped to improve their lives. The Indonesian government, however, displaced Papuans from the local administration, which is dominated by migrants from Java and other parts of Indonesia as the result of the state-sponsored transmigration programme. This has led to the progressive marginalization of the native Papuans.[8] For many Papuans, the Dutch occupation thus seems to compare more favourably to Indonesian rule. Moreover, the Dutch had pledged to provide for the right of self-determination in 1961.

The development of a capitalistic economy through outside investment has also led to economic exploitation. Papua has been a main target for investments from transnational corporations since it is a resource-rich province, with extensive timber and fossil fuels. Indeed, West Papua's forests constitute a quarter of Indonesia's total forested area. However, commercial profits as a result of the exploitation of these resources have mainly flowed to Jakarta, not to West Papuans.[9] Besides this much-criticized unfair distribution of wealth between the local and national governments, another source of the Papuans' grievances can also be traced from the occupation by transnational corporations of vast areas of land, displacing Papuans from their traditional hunting and food-gathering activities.[10]

During the 40 years since West Papua's integration into Indonesia, there has been a great deal of violence and political oppression attributed to the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). The heavy and indiscriminate use of force by Indonesian security forces has been fairly well documented.[11] Human rights violations during this period have long been the source of international criticism from some Western countries as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In July 1998, for instance, it was reported by the Indonesian Council of Churches that over 100 Irian Jayan demonstrators gathered around an independence flag were tortured, raped and massacred.[12]

All these have led to the reinforcement of existing pro-independence sentiments among the Papuans.

The struggle for independence in Papua

West Papuan resistance against Indonesian occupation emerged around 1963, when temporary authority over the territory was handed over from the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) to the Indonesian government. The opposition against the Indonesian government has basically taken two forms: those in favour of a federation with Papua New Guinea and those who prefer full independence as West Papua or 'West Melanesia'.

Melanesian opposition leaders who fled abroad set up a West Papuan government-in-exile in Netherlands to campaign for independence. One of

the most important and widely known organized resistance movements for an independent West Papua is the Independent Papuan Organization or OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka), which was officially founded and began the struggle in 1964. The name OPM itself was actually given by the Indonesian government to every organization struggling for the independence of Papua. Introduced in 1964 in Manokwari when its leader Terianus Aronggear and his colleagues were captured by the Indonesian government, the name OPM become more popular and later accepted by the pro-independence activists themselves since they considered the name shorter and easier to remember than the names created by themselves.

The aim of the OPM is to liberate and obtain independence for West Papua from Indonesia. As the OPM has stated: 'It is (now) our united goal to bring the governments of Indonesia, the kingdom of the Netherlands, and the UN secretary general to the conference table with West Papuan leaders to discuss the political independence of West Papua before the year 2003'. Central to the OPM's case for independence is PEPERA (or the 'Act of Free Choice'), which it feels, had it been properly implemented, would have resulted in an overwhelming vote for independence rather than incorporation into Indonesia.

The OPM as an organization basically consists of two parts. The first is the widely known OPM, which is based inside the territory of West Papua and carries out its armed struggle against the Indonesian state. The second is the OPM Revolutionary Council (OPMRC), which is based outside of the territory and outside of Indonesia, in Madang, in neighbouring Papua New Guinea. OPMRC is now headed by Chairman Moses Werror, with the functions of overseeing the OPM, and also the diplomatic struggle for the West Papuan independence, through international forums such as the UN, the Non Aligned Movement, the South Pacific Forum, and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The OPM is not a homogenous organization. It consists of various factions that are divided over policy and personalities. The OPM originally consisted of two main factions. Aser Demotekay founded the first faction in 1963 in Jayapura. This faction chose cooperative strategies with the Indonesian government, and most of the activities took place peacefully in churches and other social arenas.[13] Aser Demotekay and his colleagues such as Jacob Pray, preached the message that Papuans should be patient in the face of the oppression of the Indonesian military. As devout Christians, they believed that in the future, God will surely end the suffering and grant the Papuans their independence. This peaceful faction thus had no specific or organized plan and was therefore unable to struggle for independence effectively.

The second faction of OPM was founded in Manokwari in 1964 by Terianus Aronggear. This faction adopted both diplomatic and armed

strategies in their struggle against what they considered as Indonesian colonization. This faction used the Morning Star or Bintang Kejora flag, which was designed by Mr De Rijke and raised for the first time on 1 November 1961, as a symbol of Papuan independence.

The factions of the OPM in Papua have also actively communicated with Papuan leaders abroad (especially in the Netherlands), and they successfully convinced them to struggle together for an independent West Papua. Markus Kaisiepo and Nicolas Jouwe are two prominent OPM leaders in Europe who have actively designed plans for the political and military struggle to support the OPM's endeavours. Kaisiepo leads the West Papuan Independent Committee whose purpose is to build the state of West Papua, while Jouwe leads West Papuan National Front, which aims for a Federation of Melanesia (West Papua and Maluku).[14]

The OPM has thus not only adopted the armed struggle (which is reflected in the other name of OPM, TPN – Tentara Pembebasan Nasional or National Liberation Army), but also a political strategy through diplomacy in the international arena. The adoption of both strategies is also reflected in the following seven successive stages of struggle conducted by the OPM since its founding. These stages are:

1. 1964–69: preparation for the Act of Free Choice which was to take place in 1969. The OPM was formed in 1965 to agitate for independence.
2. 1970–75: the symbolic nature of the Act of Free Choice in 1969 and the territory's formal incorporation into Indonesia resulted in a restructuring of the OPM organization. The OPM now emphasized armed struggle through guerrilla warfare, and in 1971, made the bold declaration of a Provisional Republic of West Papua New Guinea.
3. 1970–75: following the independence of neighbouring Papua New Guinea, the OPM went through a period of reorganization, to take better advantage of ethnic ties with ethnic sympathizers in the Pacific region.
4. 1982–87: this period saw the establishment of the OPM Revolutionary Council (OPMRC), which is based in Madang, Papua New Guinea. The OPMRC pursued a comprehensive approach that included both military action as well as international diplomatic action to push the cause for Papuan independence.
5. 1988–93: the OPM concentrated on an international diplomatic campaign during these years to try to raise international consciousness and support for an independent Papuan state.
6. 1994–99: during this period, there was a swing back to a strategy of attempting to pursue independence through direct action, given signs

of weakness and malaise within the Suharto government during these last years of the regime, that culminated with the economic and political crises of 1997–98 and the fall of the Suharto regime.

7. 2000–2006: during the post-Suharto era of democracy, the pro-independence activists have had greater latitude to operate, though OPM itself remains underground. The priority has been to rebuild the sense of community and nationhood within West Papua and to bide time for the right moment to press for a popular push for independence.

As the Indonesian government has continued to support political repression and military violence in Papua, particularly through its infamous Kopassus (Army Special Forces), it is not surprising that the OPM has throughout this period continued to wage armed struggle against the Indonesian occupation. One of the significant early uprisings was led by Permenas Ferry Anom in 1965 in Manokwari, which was followed by various popular uprisings and sporadic military actions in various parts of West Papua. Insurgent activities over the years have created a sense of instability, despite the fact that they were poorly armed, sometimes using only spears, bows and arrows. The Indonesian army has dubbed the OPM as the GPK/L (Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan/Liar), which means 'Security Disturbance Movement'.

At the same time, however, the OPM has also made serious efforts to try to push the West Papuan independence agenda through diplomatic efforts. Terianus Aronggear, for instance, wrote an independence document, which was to be smuggled to the UN in New York. The document recommended that the UN review the New York Agreement of 1962 and reconvene a General Assembly meeting to once again discuss the West Papua issue. However, Indonesian security officials discovered this plan; Aronggear was captured in May 1965 and the document was seized.

The international communities' response

Compared to the other separatism issues in Indonesia such as Aceh and Timor Leste (formerly East Timor), West Papua has not received much attention from the international community. Although there have been continuing calls from the OPM to bring the issue up at the UN General Assembly, no state has been prepared to sponsor such a demand. This tepid response by the international community, which overwhelmingly endorsed the farcical PEPERA process as implemented by the Indonesian government in 1969, has been explained earlier to be attributable to the Cold War context. The thundering international silence since then, despite the energetic activism of the independence leaders abroad, can also be explained by the reluctance of states to interfere in what are regarded as the internal

affairs of a state. Besides, raising the West Papua issue in international or regional forums would open the door for a large number of other contentious issues to be debated, such as Aceh, Mindanao, Patani and the various ethnic minority states in Burma/Myanmar. This would unravel the nation-building objective of the post-independent Southeast Asian states. The attitude of the regional states is summed up by Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who, albeit in reference to the Aceh issue, stated that 'nobody wants and nobody sees any benefit in the breaking up of Indonesia'.[15] Indeed, Aceh and Papuan independence could only come about due to weakness in the centre, and any disintegration of the State of Indonesia would be an extremely destabilizing event which the international community and the region would wish to avoid. The scenario in such an event could well be a balkanized Malay Archipelago, much like the old Yugoslavia, with a number of mini-states locked in contending ethnic and religious rivalries and strife, leading to regional instability.[16]

However, the Papuans' struggle has not been completely neglected by international society. There have been international campaigns demanding a new referendum in West Papua sponsored by human rights activists in Australia and the United Kingdom. The efforts made by the Papuans' leaders abroad have also resulted in sympathy from some countries. The Netherlands and Papua New Guinea are two of the most prominent countries in this respect. Having not only been one of the parties who signed the New York Agreement but also a favourite place for Papuan leaders seeking asylum abroad, the Netherlands remains an important venue for the struggle of the Papuans. In 2000, on the basis of the Papuan community leaders' argument of Holland's 'historical responsibility' to the people of the territory, the Dutch parliament requested the Dutch government to conduct an independent inquiry over what had happened during the Act of Free Choice. However, the Dutch government also attempted to prevent any damage to relations with Indonesia by also declaring that the subsequent report would not change its attitude towards the territorial integrity of Indonesia.

Not surprisingly, the Indonesian government, both under the Abdurrahman Wahid administration and particularly under Megawati Sukarnoputri, has reacted negatively toward such efforts. Retaliatory policies, such as refusing entry to Papua to representatives of Dutch development agencies in 2003, and excluding Dutch citizens from the visa-on-arrival scheme for tourists in 2004, were adopted by the Indonesian government.[17]

Apart from Holland, Papua New Guinea (PNG) has also played an important role in the issue, as it shares a direct border as well as ethnic solidarity with the people in Papua. The PNG has long been a favourite destination for the OPM leaders hunted by the Indonesian army, given the

long and porous border. The OPMRC is today still located in Madang, PNG. The importance of PNG grew since some factions in the OPM (such as the faction led by N.P. Nere) argued that the OPM should obey the instructions of the government of Papua New Guinea. In February 1975, Port Moresby, the capital of Papua New Guinea, was chosen as the place to sign a statement addressed to the Indonesian government, demanding the right of self-determination. This statement was signed by eight leaders of West Papua. However, the PNG government has in recent years become less sympathetic towards the OPM struggle, due to the incessant infighting and factionalism within the OPM, as well as the problems arising from the conflict, such as the continuous flow of refugees, and problems with border security.

Outside PNG and the Netherlands, OPM activists are also active in countries such as Sweden and Senegal. In these countries, the OPM is led by younger neo-Marxist activists, such as Ben Tanggahma and Saul Hindom. In Senegal, President Senghor has provided both moral and financial support. Somewhat incongruously, the main theme of the OPM campaign in Africa has been that the Papuans belong to the Negroid race, so that they deserve to be recognized as a 'National Liberation Movement' similar to that of Namibia and other African countries. The Papua cause has attracted support from some quarters in Africa, such as from Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa, who has called for a review of the New York Agreement. Elsewhere, support has also been voiced in the Irish parliament and by the New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nonetheless, while there is some international consciousness of the issue, there is clearly little impetus towards forcing Indonesia to review the status of the province, given the evident reluctance of the international community of states in seeming to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

The Indonesian government's response

The policy adopted by the Indonesian government towards this issue has varied from time to time. In the main, the Indonesian government has paid less attention toward the problem in Papua compared to the attention that has been given to similar separatist issues, such in Aceh and Timor Leste, primarily because of the scale of the separatist challenges in both places, and also the broader international support for independence, particularly in the case of Timor Leste.

Suharto's New Order government after Sukarno's ousting in the late 1960s brought a new chapter of violence and repression in West Papua. The military-dominated Suharto regime placed military personnel in charge of the province. It undertook various measures to suppress the Papuans'

pro-independence sentiment, particularly in the 1970s. This policy later continued by the implementation of DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer – Military Operation Region) status, that was marked by the placement of troops in posts located in the border and the transmigration area.[18] These military-oriented policies resulted in the intensifying armed conflict between the OPM and the TNI, and also the growing number of civilian casualties.

A number of military abuses have been recorded over the years. In 1984, the raising of the West Papuan flag on the provincial assembly building in the state capital of Jayapura resulted in mass arrests and 12 000 refugees fleeing into neighbouring Papua New Guinea. In July 1998, the Indonesian Council of Churches reported that over 100 demonstrators who had gathered around an independence flag were tortured, raped and massacred. In December 1999, another flag-raising incident in Timika in the province resulted in 28 of the people involved being shot and killed by soldiers. In October 2000, at least 40 people were killed following another flag-raising incident.[19]

Despite the continuing military abuses, however, the reform era since the end of the Suharto regime in 1998 did bring about a more democratic atmosphere, and also renewed hopes for an independent West Papua. The Habibie administration took a further step by meeting the 'Team 100' of West Papuan representatives. Although the result of the seminal meeting was inconclusive, it gave hope to the Papuans that they could achieve independence through negotiation and other non-violent means.

The Abdurrahman Wahid administration that succeeded Habibie has been widely recognized as the most democratic administration from the West Papuan point of view. Internationally known as a democrat, Abdurrahman Wahid allowed the West Papuans to raise the Bintang Kejora flag as long as its position is still lower than Sang Merah Putih ('The Red and White', the Indonesian national flag). In December 1999, he also agreed to restore the name Irian Jaya into its original name, Papua.[20] Abdurrahman Wahid went further and also financially supported the Papuan Congress II in 2000, the results of which were later legalized in the settlement of PDP or the Papuan Presidium Council in June 2000. The PDP is a council accommodating seven important constituent elements of the Papuan community, and is led by a former pro-Indonesian Papuan leader, Ondolofo Dortheys Hiyo Eluay, who was later assassinated on 11 November 2001.[21]

During the subsequent Megawati administration, the Special Autonomy bill (Otsus) was enacted in 2002. The bill provided that 80 per cent of revenues from forestry and 70 per cent from oil and gas would be retained by Papua. The bill also confirmed that the name of the province would now be

Papua, not Irian Jaya as it was known, and also legalized the use of the Papuan flag.[22] Feiji Duim, from the Protestant Church in the Netherlands (PCN), considered this law had taken the complaints of the West Papuans seriously. However, many Papuans remain dissatisfied since it only meant that the province could have financial autonomy as well as keep the bulk of its revenues. This was something that the West Papuan local assembly chairman described as not really reflecting 'the real aspiration of the Papuans'.[23]

As the new Otsus was not equipped with a proper control function, many problems arose and there was confusion over its implementation. This confusion worsened after the Megawati administration issued the Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No.1 in 2003, which divided Papua into three new provinces: Papua, Central Papua and West Papua. This presidential directive was widely perceived to have undermined the Otsus law since it was issued without any prior consultation with the Papuan community.[24]

The Megawati administration also contributed significantly in eroding trust by the Papuans. Her administration was also associated with the outbreak of political violence, such as the assassination of the PDP leader in November 2001.[25] It is therefore not surprising that the lever of armed conflict increased during Megawati's tenure from 2001 to 2004. The Timika shooting in the end of August 2002 and the military operation in Wamena from April to June 2003 were two of the worst episodes of political violence in the province.

During the current Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration, the West Papua issue seems to be have been more neglected than ever, given many major problems, such as the natural disaster arising from the tsunami in Sumatra in December 2004, and the continuing economic difficulties besetting the Indonesian state. It is also important to note that during the previous administration, Yudhoyono had described the OPM and those who struggled for an independent West Papua as 'separatists'.[26]

Nevertheless, President Yudhoyono endorsed the establishment of a representative Majelis Rakyat Papua (Papuan People's Council – MRP), which he hoped would defuse pro-independence sentiments. The selection process of the members of the council started in 2005. However, this new development did not receive the popular support of the people of the province, who perceived this to be another government attempt at denying them what they really want, the right of self-determination. In May 2005, around 500 indigenous Papuans organized by the Papua Youth Group held a demonstration against the Indonesian administration at Trikora in the province. This peaceful rally, which was held in the form of a joint prayer, proposed five demands, three of them directed towards the UN Secretary-General, and the rest directed towards the Indonesian government. Aside from demanding the right of self-determination and the

release of all the OPM political prisoners from the Indonesian government, the demonstrators also stated that the Papuans explicitly rejected both Otsus and the MRP. The West Papuans also demanded a review of PEPERA by the UN, immediate withdrawal of TNI troops from their territory, and also an opportunity for a free and confidential referendum under the UN's supervision.[27]

The Indonesian government, not surprisingly, considered the Special Autonomy status granted to the province as the final solution. It is reflected in a statement made by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the plenary meeting of the Regional Representative Council on 23 August 2005, in which he reaffirmed that the province is legally a part of the Republic of the Indonesia.[28] The rest of international society as well as the Indonesian people are less likely to be convinced by the statement, as national TV stations also showed images of the Indonesian police's violent reaction toward the people joining a rally related to the trial of two Papuans who had raised the Bintang Kejora flag on 1 December 2004.

Conclusion

It is clear from the above explanation that Papua has posed a significant challenge to the government of Indonesia. The Indonesian government's response to the challenge has seemingly remained unchanged. Despite some attempt at placating the aspirations of the West Papuan people, such as granting autonomy and providing for greater representation, it has also continued to sanction the use of very tough security measures against pro-independence activists. Although the democratization process that began since the end of the Suharto regime in 1998 has given an opportunity for the government to take a fresh approach toward the issue in Papua, such as to implement fully the Special Autonomy status for the Papuan province, the result of this new, more sophisticated approach remains to be seen. The question of past as well as continuing human rights abuses committed by the TNI in the troubled province also needs to be addressed if the people of Papua are to be placated. In short, the challenges remain serious, as the aspiration for independence remains strong in the province.

Notes

1. 'Indonesia: Prisoners of Conscience Action 2005 Case sheet: The Jayapura Flag-raisers', Amnesty International, 1 February 2005, web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ ENGASA 210042005?open&of=ENG-IDN, accessed 20 July 2006.
2. Tan, Andrew (2000), *Armed Rebellion in the ASEAN States*, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Center, Australian National University, p. 64.
3. The Sukarno government nationalized all Dutch enterprises in 1958 in an attempt to force Holland's hand over Irian Jaya. See Schwarz, Adam (1994), *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s*, St Leonards, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, p. 17.

4. Declassified documents on how the US government supported Indonesia can be accessed at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB128/index.htm.
5. Tan, Andrew (2000), *Armed Rebellion in the ASEAN States*, pp. 64–5.
6. Singh, Bilveer (2002), 'Flashpoint Papua: what it means for Indonesia and beyond', *Asian Defence and Diplomacy*, January, p. 46.
7. For a brief summary of the PKI, see Tan, Andrew (2004), *A Political and Economic Dictionary of South-East Asia*, London: Europa/Taylor & Francis, pp. 235–6.
8. The transmigration programme, especially that around the Freeport site, has been accused of being the cause of the social problems see Leith, Denise (2003), *The Politics of Power: Freeport in Suharto's Indonesia*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
9. See Suther, Keith (2001), 'Independence for West Papua?' *Bulletin of The Atomic Scientist*, May/June.
10. See Siregar, Latifah Anum (2004), 'Konflik Separatis di Papua', *Potret Retak Nusantara: Studi Kasus Konflik Di Indonesia*, Jogjakarta: CSPS Books.
11. See, for instance, *Australian*, 27 January 1996.
12. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 November 1998, p. 27.
13. This faction is related to the Cargo movement, which resulted from the merge of the indigenous religions and Christianity.
14. 'OPM di Dunia Internasional'.
15. 'Independent Aceh will be isolated: Lee Kuan Yew', AFP, 13 December 2003.
16. For a study of the implications for regional security in the event of a disintegration of Indonesia, see Huxley, Tim (2002), *Disintegrating Indonesia? Implications for Regional Security*, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies.
17. For further information on this independent inquiry, see Duim, Feije (2004), 'Fixing Papua's history? scholarly research and political reality meet in a Dutch inquiry into Papua', *Inside Indonesia*, July–September.
18. See See Siregar, Latifah Anum (2004), 'Konflik Separatis Di Papua'.
19. See Tan, Andrew T.H. (2004), *Security Perspectives of the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War on Terrorism*, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, pp. 186–90.
20. The name 'Irian' is said to be an acronym of 'Ikut Republik Indonesia Anti Nederland' or 'Join the Republic of Indonesia, anti the Netherlands'. It was coined by Sukarno, Indonesia's first president.
21. These seven elements are the youth, students, women, religious leaders, the traditional leaders, former political prisoners, and historians.
22. *The Far East and Australasia 2004*, London: Europa, Taylor & Francis, p. 349.
23. See Siregar, Latifah Anum (2004), 'Konflik Separatis Di Papua'.
24. Tan, Andrew T.H. (2004), *A Political and Economic Dictionary of South-East Asia*, p. 101.
25. The West Papuan Community and The Alliance of Papuan Students, explicitly tried to convince the readers that Megawati has a direct link to the assassination of Theys Hiyo Eluay. See Papua Menggugat (2004), a report published by Watch Papua in Jayapura.
26. Theys Hiyo Eluay was said to have expressed his objection towards this accusation by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. See Papua Menggugat (2004).
27. See Amemori, Tani (2005), 'Papuans demand UN conduct review of 1969 "Act of Free Choice"', 3 May, www.westpapua.ca.
28. See 'Response to SBY's statement on West Irian Jaya', *Kabar-Irian* (Irian News), 2 September 2005, http:www.kabar-irian.com.

15 Ethnic conflicts in Burma: from separatism to federalism

Martin Smith

Since independence from Great Britain in 1948, ethnic insurgencies have remained endemic in many minority-inhabited regions of Burma (Myanmar).[1] An often bewildering array of armed ethnic struggles has continued throughout all periods of government. Over the decades, the ideological visions and strategies of many nationality movements have adapted to the changing geopolitical landscapes. During different eras, the goals of the leading ethnic parties have ranged from separatism to seeking federal systems of government. None of the ethnic parties, however, has succeeded in achieving its political objectives, and there has been no secession of any ethnic minority territories from Burma. At the same time, none of the major ethnic insurgencies has ever been totally defeated nor have ethnic grievances been addressed by an inclusive process of reforms.

The evidence is compelling. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, there continued to be over 30 different ethnic forces still in control of their own territories and arms. Some groups had ceasefires with the military government of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and some remained in armed struggle (see Table 15.1). Equally critical, decades of ethnic conflict and humanitarian suffering have witnessed Burma decline from a resource-rich country that was once regarded among the most potentially prosperous in Asia to one of the poorest and most conflict-torn lands in the contemporary world. In the process, hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost due to the fighting, with over 1 million persons internally displaced from their homes, and as many more have taken refugee flight into different countries abroad.[2]

Four main historical factors underpin such a perennial state of strife. First is the ethnographic complexity of the country.[3] Located on the strategic crossroads between India, China and Thailand, Burma is among the most ethnically diverse countries in Asia. Ethnic minority peoples constitute an estimated third of the 55 million population, among whom over 100 different dialects or languages have been identified.

Secondly, although approximating the territories claimed by ethnic Burman kings during the Konbaung dynasty, the colonial state of British Burma was always a piecemeal creation achieved more by force

than precedent during nineteenth-century annexation. Many inequalities became entrenched during a century of 'divide-and-rule' government. In consequence, the central and borderland regions of Burma were set on very different paths of political and economic development, that are yet to be reconciled in the twenty-first century. Ethnic minorities, for example, were

Table 15.1 Armed ethnic groups in Burma, 2006

1. Main ceasefire groups at National Convention	
Name in state media	Usual name/other details
Burma Communist Party (Rakhine Group)	Communist Party of Burma (Arakan)*
Kachin State Special Region-1	New Democratic Army-Kachin*
Kachin State Special Region-2	Kachin Independence Organisation**
Kayah State Special Region-1	Kayan National Guard: 1992 breakaway from Kayan New Land Party
Kayah State Special Region-2	Karenni Nationalities Peoples Liberation Front*
Kayah State Special Region-3	Kayan New Land Party* **
New Mon State Party	New Mon State Party**
Shan State (North) Special Region-1	Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang)*
Shan State (North) Special Region-2	United Wa State Army*
Shan State (North) Special Region-3	Shan State Army: ex-Shan State Progress Party**
Shan State (East) Special Region-4	National Democratic Alliance Army (Shan state east)*
Shan State (North) Special Region-5	Kachin Defence Army: 1991 split from KIO 4th brigade
Shan State (South) Special Region-6	Pao National Organisation**
Shan State (North) Special Region-7	Palaung State Liberation Party**
Shan State National Army	Shan State National Army: 1995 MTA split: 2005 new split
Shan State Nationalities People's Liberation Organisation	Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organisation*

Notes:
* Former ally or breakaway group from CPB
** Former National Democratic Front member
N.B. The KIO, NMSP, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), UWSA, SSA, National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and SSNA have continued to maintain forces of 1000 troops or more. The UWSA is by far the largest, with estimates of around 15 000 troops under arms.

Table 15.1 (continued)

2. Splinter ceasefire groups at National Convention from larger ethnic forces

Name in state media	Usual name/other details
(a) From the Karen National Union (non-ceasefire)	
Democratic Kayin Buddhist Association	Democratic Karen Buddhist Army: 1994 split
Haungthayaw Special Region Group	Karen Peace Force (ex-KNU 16th battalion): 1997 split
Phayagon Special Region Group	1998 split: Hpaan district
(b) From the Karenni National Progressive Party (non-ceasefire)	
Kayinni National Development Party Dragon Group	1999 split
Kayinni National Progressive Party (Splinter, Hoya)	1999 split: Hoya district
Kayinni National Unity and Solidarity Organisation	
(c) From the defunct Mong Tai Army (1996 'surrender' ceasefire)	
Homein Region Welfare and Development Group	
Shwepyi Aye (MTA) Group	
Manpan Regional Militia Group	
(d) From the National United Party of Arakan (non-ceasefire)	
Arakanese Army (AA)	Ex-armed wing in NUPA: 2002 split
(e) From the New Mon State Party (1995 ceasefire)	
Mon Armed Peace Group (Chaungchi Region)	Mon Army Mergui District: 1996 split
Mon Splinter Nai Saik Chan Group	

3. Main non-ceasefire groups (not at National Convention)

Name in state media	Usual name/other details
Arakan Liberation Party**	
Arakan Rohingya National Organization	
Chin National Front**	
Hongsawatoi Restoration Party	2001 split from NMSP
Karen National Union**	1995–96 peace talks broke down: resumed 2003
Karenni National Progressive Party**	1995 ceasefire broke down
Lahu Democratic Front**	
Mergui-Tavoy United Front*	
National Socialist Council Nagaland (Khaplang faction)	
National United Party of Arakan	

Table 15.1 (continued)

3. Main non-ceasefire groups (not at National Convention)	
Name in state media	Usual name/other details
Rohingya Solidarity Organization	
Shan State Army-South	ex-MTA; reinforced 2005 by SSNA split
Wa National Organization**	1997 talks broke down

Notes:
* Former ally or breakaway group from CPB
** Present or former National Democratic Front member
N.B. Of the above groups, only the KNU, KNPP, SSA-S, CNF and National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) currently maintain forces of several hundred troops or more. The KNU and SSA-S can each put around 2000 troops in the field. A number of other small groups also exist in name around Burma's borders. Several are affiliated to the National Council Union of Burma or the Ethnic Nationalities Council. However they do not generally have broad or active military organization inside the country.

Source: Smith, Martin (2005) 'Ethnic politics and regional development in Myanmar: the need for new approaches', in Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Tin Maung Maung Than and R.H. Taylor (eds), *Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 78–80.

preferred for recruitment into the British Burma army; many hill peoples (especially Chins, Kachins and Karens) converted to Christianity; and there was large-scale immigration of settlers into central Burma from both India and China. Such different experiences caused resentment among the Buddhist Burman majority, leading to communal violence against ethnic Indians, especially, during the 1930s and 1940s.[4]

Thirdly, the politicization of ethnic differences was further accentuated by the bloodshed and destruction during the Second World War when Burma became a major theatre of international combat. Crucially, whereas Aung San and the Burman nationalists of the Burma Independence Army (BIA) initially joined with the forces of Imperial Japan, such minority peoples as the Karens, Karennis and Kachins stayed loyal to the British. As a result, inter-ethnic conflict broke out during which minorities very much suffered the worst. This created a dangerous legacy of new grievances. Karen leaders, in particular, believed that they had been promised independence from Burma by the British authorities after their many sacrifices in the fighting.[5]

Fourthly, reinforced by such military experiences during the war, powerful ethnic insurgent movements emerged at the very dawn of Burma's independence amidst the national descent into countrywide insurrection that followed the British departure. Other emergent states in Asia also suffered

outbreaks of post-colonial rebellion. However in Burma's case the phenomenon of insurgencies became sustained over subsequent decades by a number of regenerating factors – including political, economic and international – that has seen armed struggles in the country become among the most structured and long-standing in the modern world.

Prior to independence, a number of efforts were made to try and reconcile the looming differences. A conference was held at Panglong in February 1947, where the independence leader Aung San agreed the principles for a new Union with Chin, Kachin and Shan representatives from the frontier areas. However leaders of such minorities as the Mon, Pao and Rakhine were not included in most discussions, while the most influential ethnic party, the Karen National Union (KNU), boycotted elections to the 1947 constituent assembly. Equally ominous, Aung San was assassinated along with most of his cabinet in July 1947 by the gang of a political rival, thus depriving the country of the one national leader that all sides seemed ready to trust.

The result was a constitution undermined by anomalies that ended up satisfying few parties at all. A Shan state and a Karenni state, for example, were created with the rights of secession after a ten-year period in recognition of their traditions of independence, while a Kachin state was also established but without this extraordinary right (apparently borrowed from the constitution of the Soviet Union). Equally inconsistent, the designation of a Karen state was left to be decided after independence; the Chin received only a special division; and such peoples as the Kokang, Mon, Palaung, Pao, Rakhine and Wa were granted no ethno-political recognition at all. Even the political language of the new constitution was unclear for, although federal in principle, it was not explicitly so in name.[6]

Against this backdrop, the 1947 constitution proved unable to forestall the violence that erupted at independence. Even before the British departure, law and order were breaking down, with many dacoit bands and pro-communist militias active in the countryside. A particular flashpoint was Arakan, where Buddhist Rakhine nationalists led by the monk U Seinda began what Reuters described as 'essentially a rebellion for the separation' of the territory from Burma.[7] Meanwhile, in Arakan's far north, Muslim activists established a Mujahid party to fight for the creation of an Islamic 'frontier state' and join with the newly-created Muslim state of East Pakistan.[8]

The main ethnic tempo, however, was set by the KNU. Along with the Shans, the Karens are the largest minority group in Burma, and Karen officials, many of whom supported the newly formed KNU, had played important roles in the colonial administration and armed forces. In the run-up to independence, Karen representatives submitted different political

demands that varied from complete separation from Burma (which their Karenni cousins also demanded) to claims for a substantial Karen state within a federation of autonomous national states in the new Union. Like other nationality leaders of that time, KNU officials later explained that their intention was to take a position of strength from which negotiations could follow.[9] But KNU statements always made clear the belief that the Karen people still had the right to their own 'homeland' or nation-state. 'Growing discontent and final destruction' would occur, the KNU claimed in 1947, if the Karens were forced to join in 'numerical minority' with such a 'different civilisation' as the Burman majority.[10] Such warnings, however, went unheeded, and the Karens have since become the largest indigenous group in mainland Southeast Asia to fail to gain the recognition of an independent nation-state.[11]

In subsequent decades, the dilemmas about Karen ethnic rights and national identity have come to be reflected by many other non-Burman groups in the country. At root is a belief shared by many ethnic minority parties that their peoples possess the characteristics of nations and therefore retain the historic rights to independence. 'There is undoubtedly no community of language, culture or interests between the Shans and the Burm[ans] save religion', claimed the then Shan State Independence Army in a 1959 statement.[12] Over the years, similar sentiments of independence have been expressed by Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Mon and Rakhine groups, especially, which regard their lands as unrecognized 'colonies' or 'disenfranchised nations' within Burma.[13]

In fact, few ethnic forces have ever fought for complete secession from Burma in sustained ways. Instead, many nationality movements have taken long ideological journeys in the decades since independence, with their strategies and political platforms often shaping in response to the changing political contexts. Two political theories, in particular, have stood out: communism and federalism. In addition, as David Brown has pointed out, 'ethnicity' itself has become an ideology in modern-day Burma.[14] But whatever the exact political goals, a common claim among many ethnic movements is the right to self-determination which, over the years, has often been identified with the right to bear arms. Into the twenty-first century, these twin demands have become particular stumbling blocks to conflict resolution since, after so many years of struggle, few insurgent groups have been willing to lay down their weapons until such rights are guaranteed and political reforms achieved.

Finally, to complete the military environment, it needs to be stressed that ethnic insurgents have by no means been the only groups maintaining arms in support of their demands since independence. There has been a long continuum in armed struggle and guerrilla warfare strategies, which includes

the ethnic Burman majority as well. Some of these movements have been built upon earlier traditions. In particular, a practice of forming local militia known as 'tats' or pocket armies was frequently utilized by different political leaders in the years before Burma's independence.[15] The largest of these was the 100 000-strong People's Volunteer Organisation (PVO), formed by Aung San for BIA veterans, which later factionalized to become a major insurgent force itself into the 1950s.

Such armed struggle tactics have also been employed by mainstream political movements. The most long-standing was the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), which remained the most powerful insurgent force between 1948 and its 1989 collapse. But the deposed prime minister U Nu also took to the forests in the late 1960s to begin a pro-parliamentary insurgency against the Ne Win government, while thousands of students fled into Burma's borderlands in 1988 to join with ethnic insurgent forces after pro-democracy protests were quashed in the towns and cities. Such regular recourse to arms has further sustained the momentum behind insurgencies within the country.

Similarly, the national armed forces or 'Tatmadaw' should not be regarded as independent from political alignments nor from the tactics of armed struggle in order to gain power. Indeed from the 1941 inception of the BIA to the modern-day military regime of the SPDC, the armed forces in Burma probably represent one of the best examples in the contemporary world of the phenomenon known as 'political armies'.[16] Military rule has endured for over four decades.

In summary, the history of post-colonial Burma is dominated by men in both government and opposition who have taken up arms, at some stage, in pursuit of their goals.[17] The consequences have been epoch-shaping in the modern development of the country. In many respects, contemporary Burma provides a classic model of the political paradigm of 'weak state: strong societies', developed by Barry Buzan and others, where post-colonial governments have been unable to countenance effective actions across all social and ethnic sectors, except by the use of force.[18] Against this back-drop, insurgency has remained a virtual way of life, and ethnic struggles have become a central feature of the country's fractious, socio-political landscape. As David Keen has warned, 'Conflict generates ethnicity.'[19]

The parliamentary era: 1948–62

Burma's independence was born out of bloodshed. Within a year, U Nu's Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) administration became known as the 'Rangoon six-mile government' since this was the limit of its control. The first major blow to national unity was the insurrection of the mainstream 'White Flag' CPB in March 1948. An ethnic Karenni uprising

also started in August after the murder of the local nationality leader U Bee Tu Re by Union Military Police. Meanwhile Rakhine and Muslim insurgencies continued to gather pace in Arakan, where Red Flag communists were also active.

The collapse into national breakdown was then complete in January 1949 when, to a backdrop of growing communal violence, the KNU took up arms to be followed by ethnic Mon and Pao rebellions. Battle-hardened Karen troops – as well as several Kachin units – mutinied from the Burma army to join the insurgencies, as towns as far apart as Mandalay, Toungoo, Henzada and Twante fell to the different rebel forces. No side kept figures, but 60 000 conflict-related deaths and over 1 million made homeless could well be the final toll in the first two years of the insurrections alone.[20] Perhaps the most critical battle in all the insurgencies was fought at Insein on the doorstep of Rangoon, from which KNU forces eventually retreated after a 112-day siege. But despite the failure to seize state power, insurgent groups continued to control vast territories across Burma throughout the parliamentary era. Indeed even in the twenty-first century, there are borderland districts where central government authority has never reached.

The question, then, remains why such conditions of countrywide insurgency did not eventually begin to die down after this initial blow-up. Certainly, few insurgent veterans ever expected that this would be the start of what KNU supporters call the 'father-to-son' war. A number of underlying reasons can be identified, however.

Firstly, in a landscape already devastated by the Second World War, Burma's rugged terrain was ideally suited to the tactics of guerrilla warfare. With deep forests, long mountain ranges, little-policed frontiers and disaffected populations, many of the military logistics in the countryside were advantageous to armed opposition groups.

Secondly, despite relative isolation, Burma has never been immune from international influence. After independence, especially, political activists were greatly affected by communism and the strategies for peasant-based rebellion that swept across the region following Mao Zedong's victory in China. Revolutionary booklets, such as Mao Zedong's *On Protracted War* and *On Guerrilla Warfare*, became essential reading for many insurgent commanders, convincing many anti-government groups of the effectiveness and legitimacy of pursuing armed struggle in order to achieve power.

Thirdly, the fledgling Union received a further major set-back during 1949–51 when remnant Kuomintang (KMT) forces invaded the Shan state from China. With clandestine USA backing, these heavily armed troops rapidly became part of the insurgent landscape in the Thai borderlands.[21] There were two immediate consequences. As government forces

heavy-handedly rushed in, the Shan state was put under military administration. This inflamed resentment among the local population and, within a few years, armed resistance had broken out among the ethnic Shans. Equally serious, the KMT commanders elevated Burma's illicit opium trade to its lucrative international proportions to continue financing their struggle. After two UN interventions, the last KMT troops were supposedly evacuated to Taiwan in 1961. However exiled KMT influence in both the black market and insurgent worlds continued in Shan state, and into the twenty-first century the twin issues of insurgency and narcotics have remained inextricably interlinked.[22]

These two major fallouts from political left and right, both at the inception of Burma's independence, were to have resonant impact on the spread of ethnic insurgencies during the 1950s. Most nationality movements, in fact, resisted joining completely with either the CPB or KMT. Veteran insurgent leaders nevertheless say that the turbulent experiences of these years marked a formative period in the evolution of their armed struggles.[23]

A key influence was in the development of strategies. For while the KMT attempted to work with the KNU, Karenni and Mon forces to drive a military supply route from the eastern borderlands to the sea, CPB cadres preached a very different gospel in the insurgent *macquis* of lower Burma. In particular, in 1953 KNU officers in the Irrawaddy Delta region decided to set up their own 'vanguard' party, the Karen National United Party (KNUP), which, like the CPB, was intended to lead rural-based support for the Karen's revolutionary cause using 'people's warfare' tactics.[24]

Ultimately, the KNUP's emergence was to lead to a split with the KNU 'mother party', which echoed later divisions among other nationality movements over their relationships with the CPB. Cooperation with the CPB was always a controversial issue, and many ethnic leaders remained diametrically opposed to communism. In Burma's political vocabulary, 'national democracy' rather than 'people's democracy' has been the aim of most ethnic forces.[25]

Nevertheless ethnic leaders say that the establishment of nationality parties on revolutionary footings in the 1950s still marked an essential stage in the transformation of their struggles from being spontaneous 'mass movements' led by guerrilla commanders to patriotic organizations that were run according to political philosophies and regulations.[26] The importance of these early decisions soon became clear. Such parties as the KNU (formed 1947), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP, formed 1957) and New Mon State Party (NMSP, formed 1958) have since run 'liberated zones' with civilian administrations running parallel with their armed wings for five decades in different parts of the country.

Equally important, such interrelationships with both the CPB and KMT caused many ethnic opposition leaders to prioritize the importance of 'united front' tactics in trying to achieve change through the overthrow of government. Contrary to popular belief, no international support of real military consequence ever came to the different ethnic forces after independence, a situation that has long pertained.[27] Instead, ethnic leaders quickly recognized that their parties were unlikely to achieve many of their goals on their own. Thus, beginning in the parliamentary era, the result has been a succession of insurgent alliances that have risen and fallen over the years. Some of the first fronts were entirely ethnic minority-based, notably the Democratic Nationalities United Front (1956–58) and the Nationalities Liberation Alliance (1960–63). The most important, however, in the parliamentary era was the National Democratic United Front (NDUF), established with the CPB in 1959 by the KNUP, KNPP, NMSP and short-lived Chin National Vanguard Party, and which lasted as an effective military alliance until the mid-1970s.

Finally, in understanding the intractability of insurgencies in Burma, it is vital to include the failings of government. Somewhat remarkably, until the post-1988 government of the SPDC, there were notably few attempts at resolving the insurgent conflicts by peace talks. In 1949, U Nu briefly met with the KNU leader Saw Ba U Gyi during the Insein siege, and in 1960 Tatmadaw commanders also held short talks with KNU officers during General Ne Win's 'Military Caretaker' administration (1958–60). In 1958, too, several thousand ethnic insurgents officially 'entered the light' under U Nu's 'arms for democracy' amnesty. U Seinda's Arakan People's Liberation Party, the Pao National (Liberation) Organization, the Mon People's Front and short-lived Shan State Communist Party all laid down their weapons in official ceremonies; Rakhine, Pao and Mon leaders were reputedly promised ethnic states for their peoples before they came in.[28] In Arakan, 500 heavily-armed 'Rohingya' Mujahid guerrillas also surrendered in 1961, briefly bringing the prospect of an end to the little-reported Muslim insurrection in the northwestern borderlands.[29]

Such peace initiatives, however, were very much the exception. Instead, governmental policy was increasingly driven by the new Tatmadaw chief-of-staff, General Ne Win. Built round the nucleus of troops from the 4th Burma Rifles (his old battalion), the Tatmadaw grew under his domination from just 2000 remnants in the difficult days of 1949 to over 100 000 troops by 1962.

In explaining such an exponential rise, political analysts have pinpointed the shock of the KMT invasion as the main catalyst behind Ne Win and the Tatmadaw's emergence as the 'national protector' of the country among the many quasi-state forces operating during the 1948–52 period. As Mary

Callahan has written, fears about international interference from either China or the USA was one of the key elements in the transformation of government soldiers from 'warriors' to 'state-builders' in the parliamentary period.[30]

Ne Win, however, never pursued 'accommodationist' policies in dealing with opposition challenges within the country.[31] In particular, Ne Win and his socialist allies were critical of what they regarded the 'Karenization' of the post-colonial Tatmadaw, which was an uneasy mix of forces from two very different military traditions: the Japanese-trained BIA and British-trained ethnic minority units. In consequence, with Ne Win replacing the Karen General Smith Dun at the outset of the KNU rebellion, the Tatmadaw was quickly purged of perceived 'leftist' (CPB) and 'rightist' (KNU) influences; British military traditions were ended; ethnic-based 'class' battalions were dismantled; and ethnic Burmans began to fill all the senior ranks. For these reasons, ethnic opponents mark Ne Win's rise as the beginning of the creation of an 'ethnocratic' state in Burma, one that is dominated by the Burman majority.[32] Indeed, in recent decades, few members of ethnic minorities have ever been appointed to top positions in either the Tatmadaw or the government, further fuelling the sense of ethnic division and conflict within the country.

As the 1950s wore on, the scale of Ne Win's actions began to have an increasing effect on national politics. Ironically, following U Nu's 'arms for democracy' initiative, in 1958 the insurgencies were probably at their lowest ebb since the earliest days of independence. However following a factional split in the AFPFL government, Ne Win was quick to assume power as prime minister, establishing his Military Caretaker administration in October that year.

Ne Win's brief interregnum was ostensibly to prevent communists from getting into government. But in many respects this first army 'coup' proved a trial run.[33] Hundreds of dissidents were arrested and intensive military operations were launched against insurgent forces in the countryside. In 14 months, the government claimed 1872 insurgent deaths (including 723 KNU supporters) against just 520 Tatmadaw losses.[34] Similarly, the hereditary Sawbwa leaders in the Shan and Kayah (Karenni)[35] states were constrained to sign away their traditional rights. Both territories had been granted the right of secession in the 1947 constitution after a ten-year period, which was something that Ne Win was determined to forestall.

Government power was handed back to U Nu after the 1960 general elections, but tensions were rising all the time. Following the 1958 formation of the underground Noom Suik Harn (Young Warriors) group, a new resistance movement spread rapidly among young Shans, which was signalled by the dramatic 1959 attack on Tangyan town. Then in 1961 the

Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) was formed, fuelled by disquiet at U Nu's attempt to make Buddhism the state religion of Burma (most Kachins are Christians). These movements marked a new insurgent generation and could not be dismissed as legacies of the political chaos after independence. Kachin and Shan leaders were signatories to the Panglong agreement and for the past decade they had mostly stayed apart from ethnic conflicts in other parts of the country.

Ne Win's immediate concern, however, was for a new initiative that was being organized in the open political arena. Spearheaded by Burma's first president Sao Shwe Thaike (an ethnic Shan), a Federal Movement was formed to advocate a looser 'federalized' form of constitution in which powers would be equally balanced between the minority states and Burman-majority areas (which, in turn, would have to be reconstituted as one ethnic state). Any such discussions, however, were anathema to Ne Win.

In March 1962, as Federal Movement leaders prepared to meet with U Nu, Ne Win seized power in a military coup. 'Federalism is impossible,' he said. 'It will destroy the Union.'[36] U Nu, his cabinet and the leaders of the Federal Movement were arrested. Most were to spend the next five years in prison where Sao Shwe Thaike died shortly afterwards. Burma's brief era of democratic government had been brought to an abrupt end.

Ne Win's 'Burmese Way to Socialism': 1962–88

For 26 years, Ne Win attempted to close off Burma from the outside world behind a tight security curtain. In pursuit of his goals, he pursued a two-course strategy: launching all-out offensives against insurgent groups in the rural countryside, while attempting to build up a monolithic system of rule under the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) which would radiate out from Rangoon into the ethnic minority borderlands. In one innovation, a new constitution was introduced in 1974 after a much-criticized referendum. This reshaped the political map and for the first time brought a semblance of balance to the ethnic divisions within the country. Burma was now delineated into two kinds of territories: seven divisions, where the Burman majority mostly live, and seven ethnic minority states, the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah (Karenni), Mon, Rakhine (Arakan) and Shan.

However, far from bringing peace, Ne Win's era of government only provoked further insurrections around the country. An odd admixture of Buddhist, Marxist and nationalist principles, Ne Win's 'Burmese Way to Socialism' never disguised the military and increasingly Burmanized nature of his rule. A new ruthlessness in tactics was immediately apparent. From the outset, hundreds of political and ethnic leaders from all walks of life were routinely arrested; key sections of the economy were nationalized; and

an estimated 300 000 Indians and 100 000 Chinese fled from the country as all foreign influences were shut out.[37]

Only during 1963–64 did Ne Win briefly appear to hesitate. A nationwide 'Peace Parley' was held in Rangoon to which the KIO, KNU, newly-formed Communist Party of Arakan (CPA), Noom Suik Harn and other fledgling Shan forces sent representatives. The KNUP, KNPP and NMSP also attended as part of a joint delegation with the NDUF that included the CPB. During these rare face-to-face meetings, none of the ethnic insurgent parties demanded actual secession, although they continued to claim the conceptual right. The KIO, for example, called for an independent Kachin state with the rights of secession and self-determination; the CPA wanted a 'Republic of Arakan' with the right of secession; and the Shan groups called for a federal system of states.[38] But ethnic delegates later complained that, during the talks, Tatmadaw officers only ever really called on their groups to surrender. Ne Win, especially, was concerned that formal ceasefires could lead to the partition of Burma, as had happened in Korea and Vietnam.[39] In the event, only one ethnic force agreed to lay down its arms, a KNU faction led by Saw Hunter Tha Hmwe, a Christian and staunch nationalist, who said that he had become tired of the endless 'rightist' versus 'leftist' arguments in the insurgent camps. Significantly, it was during the Peace Parley period that the KNU–KNUP split broke out into the open.[40]

Following the Peace Parley failure, the Tatmadaw embarked on near continuous offensives that ranged back and forth against different insurgent groups across the country over the next 25 years. Only during unsuccessful peace talks with the KIO and CPB in 1980–81 was there an interruption and another amnesty. But for the most part, Tatmadaw officers expressed only the intention to 'liquidate the insurgents'.[41] In particular, in the mid-1960s there was the first advent of the much-criticized 'Four Cuts' campaign, which was intended to cut all links in food, funds, intelligence and recruits between insurgent forces and local villagers.[42] Modelled on the British 'new village' tactics in Malaysia and the US 'strategic hamlet' operations in Vietnam,[43] military officers claimed that it was the Tatmadaw's version of 'people's war'.[44] There appeared to be little attempt to win hearts and minds, however.

In the following decades, thousands of villages across the country were destroyed and large areas declared 'free-fire zones' in the attempt to flush out insurgent groups. In purely military terms, such counter-insurgency operations had their successes. Starting in the Irrawaddy Delta, by the mid-1970s the Tatmadaw had virtually cleared much of the plains area of lower and central Burma, as well as the Pegu Yoma highlands, of local insurgent groups (principally the KNU, KNUP and CPB). In these areas, thousands

of insurgent supporters were reportedly killed or forced to surrender during the 1965–75 period.[45] Such relentless tactics, however, were never likely to succeed in the ethnic minority borderlands, where insurgent groups were able to make use of the sanctuary of international frontiers.

In contrast, under Ne Win's style of rule, three very different political and economic factors were now dramatically to increase the overall scale of insurgency within the country at large, and bring Burma to the verge of social and political breakdown by the late 1980s.

Firstly, Ne Win's military coup had de facto left ethnic insurgent groups as the only opposition parties representing minorities within the country. In the following years, ethnic grievances were further compounded by such measures as the nationalization of schools, the suppression of minority languages and state control of the economy, which impoverished many minority villagers. In response, a new generation of ethnic forces sprang up around the country, including the Rohingya Islamic (later Patriotic) Front (1963), Shan State Army (1964), Kayan New Land Party (1964) and predominantly Pao Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organization (SSNLO, 1966). Various Chin, Kokang, Lahu, Naga, Palaung, Rakhine and Wa groups were also under arms, with the result that, by the late 1960s, the insurgent map of Burma outrivalled even the most chaotic years of 1948–52 in its complexity.[46]

Secondly, despite Ne Win's attempt to close Burma off, international influence had even greater impact on the escalation of insurgencies within the country. In particular, following anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon, in 1968 the CPB opened up a major new front in the northeast of the country with a decade of full-scale military backing from the communist government in China. Thousands of lives were lost in fierce battles in the remote mountains, rarely reported in the outside world.[47] The CPB's advance was eventually halted on the western edge of the Shan plateau. Nevertheless the CPB was still able to build up extensive 'liberated zones' along the Chinese border, which compensated in many respects for the loss of CPB strongholds among the Burman populace of central Burma during these years. Led by the famed Kachin commander Naw Seng, the CPB's 15 000-strong 'People's Army' in the northeast region consisted of 90 per cent ethnic minority recruits, especially Wa, Kokang and Lahu, and the CPB's radio station on the Chinese border claimed that 500 000 ethnic minority villagers had been 'liberated' under its organization.[48]

The Thai border also became a major base area for insurgencies during the Ne Win era. In part, this was due to the 'buffer-state' policy of Thai governments in tolerating armed opposition groups along its borders in order to prevent communist movements from linking up. At the time, Cold War 'domino theories' of spreading communist insurrections were much

in vogue. In military terms, the Thai strategy was very successful, since the CPB and Communist Party of Thailand were barely able to meet up, despite active insurgencies on either sides of the common frontier. Indeed the Thai government even allowed the Shan United Army (SUA) of the opium kingpin Khun Sa, the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) led by Gon Jerng and the remnant KMT forces under Generals Li Wenhuan and Tuan Shi-wen to have operational footholds on Thai territory until the early 1980s.[49]

Furthermore the whole insurgent momentum in southeast Burma received another major boost in 1969–70 when the deposed prime minister U Nu went underground with several colleagues from the democracy era of the 1950s to establish the insurgent Parliamentary Democracy Party (PDP) in the Thai borderlands. With quasi-CIA backing, U Nu allied with his erstwhile opponents in the KNU and NMSP in a new coalition, the National United Liberated Front (NULF). This new alliance marked an extraordinary about-turn in the political strategies of all the different sides.

The NULF, however, proved short-lived. At the initial signing ceremony in Bangkok in May 1970, U Nu apparently rectified what many minorities regarded as a major failing in the 1947 constitution by agreeing to support the formation of a new 'Federal Union Republic'.[50] But two years later Karen leaders argued that, by agreeing to join a federal union, the KNU had wrongly given up the right to self-determination. The KNU and NMSP thus demanded that the right of secession be restored. Most PDP leaders had few objections. U Nu, however, baulked at this on the grounds that this right could encourage foreign interference in Burma's affairs, and he resigned, eventually going back to Rangoon under the 1980 amnesty.[51] Nevertheless, despite the NULF's failure, the 1970s–1980s still came to mark a high point in the ethnic insurgencies along the Thai border, with the KNU and such allies as the KNPP, NMSP and Shan State Army (SSA) being able to call on over 20 000 troops under arms throughout this period.

Ethnic forces were also able to survive in the rugged terrain along the India and Bangladesh borders during the BSPP era. Much of the Indian border region has always been something of a frontier no-man's land. Indeed it is the only area where ethnic insurgent movements have sometimes operated on both sides of the border in tandem, principally Naga (with the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland mainly based on the Burma side) and related Chin (Zomi)–Kuki–Mizo groups criss-crossing the Mizoram frontier. India-based insurgent groups, such as the United Liberation Front of Assam, have also taken sanctuary across the Burma border.[52]

In the Bangladesh borderlands, in contrast, anti-Ne Win groups often appeared to be helped by open tolerance of their activities by governments

in Dakha after the country gained independence from Pakistan in 1971. This support was further motivated by the flight of over 200000 Muslim refugees into Bangladesh in 1978 after the BSPP's heavy-handed Nagamin census operation. However it was not only the Muslim-based Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) that was able to continue its armed struggle from the sanctuary of the Indo-Bangladesh borders but the CPB and such ethnic Rakhine forces as the CPA and two new insurgent groups: the KNU-trained Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) and the KIO-trained Arakan Independence Organization (AIO).[53] The activities of these insurgent groups were also viewed in Dakha as a useful buffer against the spread in the adjoining Chittagong hill tracts of the Shanti Bahini movement, which took up arms in 1973.

Such a degree of borderland control by anti-government groups leads to the third major reason behind insurgent escalation during the BSPP era: the economic. As the national economy collapsed under Ne Win's isolationist dogmas (in 1979 Ne Win even withdrew Burma from the Non-Aligned Movement), the black market dramatically increased in every part of the country. It was insurgent groups who controlled many of the key border areas and who were in the perfect position to benefit. For over two decades, lucrative trades flourished in everything from cattle, jade and opium (as exports) to medicines, electronic items and luxury goods (as imports). Insurgent strongholds such as Three Pagodas Pass (KNU–NMSP), Pieng Luang (KMT–SURA–later Mong Tai Army) and Loije (KIO) became flourishing frontier towns as trade in the millions of dollars annually passed through opposition-controlled gates.[54] Indeed so dynamic was the scale of this trade that it caused an insurgent momentum of its own. With arms supplies cheap and plentiful on the Thai black market, many local forces in the border areas were able to build up military strengths beyond their real political capacities. As since the earliest days of the insurgencies, warlordism was frequently rife in the field.

In the Shan state, especially, the illicit opium trade became a central source of conflict. Huge revenues were involved so that, in many areas, control of the opium trade became the key to military control. As KMT General Tuan Shi-wen once noted: 'To fight you must have an army, and an army must have guns, and to buy guns you must have money. In these mountains, the only money is opium.'[55]

For its part, the Ne Win government attempted to defuse the scale of insurgencies by the creation of local militia, known as Ka Kwe Ye (KKY), that were allowed to continue controlling their own territories on condition that they did not turn against the government. In these actions, Tatmadaw critics see a forerunner of the ceasefire strategies of the SPDC government after 1989. Certainly, two of the most powerful KKY commanders, the

Kokang leader Lo Hsing-han and SUA leader Khun Sa, came to be identified as the leading 'drug warlords' of their era.[56] As a result, in 1972–73 the KKY system was abandoned with both men eventually returning underground to resume their insurgencies.

The scale of the divisions caused by narcotics trafficking also caused the SSA, always the most political of the Shan forces, to try to take control of the opium trade in the mid-1970s for pre-emptive sale to the USA.[57] They were to fail in these endeavours. Instead, it was Khun Sa, a Shan-Chinese, who emerged as the most powerful insurgent actor in the Shan-Thai borderlands, seizing local control from the KMT remnants before expanding his territory along the frontier and merging his forces in 1984 with another Shan force, the SURA, to create the 15 000-strong Mong Tai Army (MTA). The MTA, however, was always a maverick force, and in its activities can be seen many of the machinations over trade and territory that resurfaced during the ceasefires of the 1990s. Avowedly anti-communist, Khun Sa's forces always appeared to concentrate more resources on attacking rival insurgent groups than ever fighting with the Tatmadaw.

Against this complex backdrop, ethnic insurgent politics came to be dominated by two much more formidable political movements during the Ne Win era: the ethnic minority National Democratic Front (NDF) and the CPB. Established in 1976 at the KNU's general headquaters (GHQ) on the Thai border, in its early years the nine-party NDF operated more as a loose coalition of ethnic forces from across the country. But at its Third Plenary Central Presidium meeting in 1984, all groups, including the KIO, KNU and SSA, made the historic decision to drop demands for secession and agreed to seek a 'unified Federal Union' with all ethnic groups, including the Burman majority. From this moment, a new sense of energy and direction was achieved, with joint battalions being formed on three different fronts in the country: in the northeast, east and south.[58]

NDF members, however, always remained in intense rivalry with the better-equipped CPB. By the late 1970s, not only were CPB forces entirely based in ethnic minority regions of the country, but the CPB was able to convince a number of ethnic minority groups to join to its 'people's war' cause. As a result, a number of nationality movements divided and fought over this very issue, including the KNPP (from which the Karenni Nationalities People's Liberation Front broke away in 1978) and the SSNLO (which split in 1974). But following the NDF's 1984 Presidium meeting, greater unity was found among the pro-federal groups, and in 1985–86 an NDF delegation made the long trek from the Thai border to the KIO GHQ on the Chinese border, before travelling on to the CPB GHQ at Panghsang. Here the NDF and CPB signed a joint military accord, for the first time bringing all the major insurgent forces in Burma together in

alliance. It was a controversial decision, and the KNU's anti-communist leader, Bo Mya, later rejected it. But the moment was still poignant and the timing very crucial.

As the 1980s progressed, Burma's economy was rapidly declining to the point of collapse. In a country with no external enemies, over 40 per cent of the budget was being spent on defence. Ne Win twice desperately demonetized the currency, and in December 1987 Burma was admitted to Least Developed Country status at the United Nations (UN). The following July Ne Win resigned, sparking mass pro-democracy protests as millions of people took to the streets.

It was a short-lived moment of euphoria. In September, the security services crushed the protests and a new group of Tatmadaw loyalists reassumed state control.

The SLORC/SPDC: post-1988

Into the twenty-first century, the ethno-political landscape in Burma has maintained many traces of its militarized and deeply divided past. On an incremental level, there have been gradual changes as Ne Win's shadow slowly dissipates. Two important developments have been 'open-door' economic policies and closening relationships by the post-1988 regime with the governments of all Asian neighbours. Ne Win's era of isolationism is at an end. The internal pace of conflict resolution, however, has remained agonizingly slow, and there has been no quantum leap of change. Against this background, although reduced in terms of casualty rate, the phenomenon of armed politics in Burma has continued, with many opposition movements once again readjusting to the new political world.

Three key events between 1988 and 1990 caused the most significant reorientation in the country's political landscape in three decades. Firstly, in September 1988 a new generation of military officers assumed power as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC; from 1997 State Peace and Development Council or SPDC). Secondly, ethnic mutinies during 1989 saw the dramatic collapse of the CPB's People's Army and the emergence of new Kokang, Wa and other minority forces in the northeast of the country. Finally, the newly-formed National League for Democracy (NLD) won an overwhelming victory in the May 1990 election, in which 19 new ethnic parties also won seats.

After such volatility had subsided, the former three-cornered struggle between the BSPP, CPB and NDF was transformed into a new triangular equation between the military regime, the NLD and Burma's diverse ethnic minority groups. Indeed during the 1990s this triangular configuration came to be recognized by the UN and other international bodies as the formula by which 'tripartite dialogue' should take place to try and resolve

Burma's long-standing political crises.[59] Such a reconciliation, however, has yet to take place. Once again, as in 1948 and 1962, a period of change in national government has been followed by years of labyrinthine political fall-out in the rest of the country.

At first, buoyed by the collapse of Ne Win's BSPP, insurgent movements appeared to make major gains, when thousands of students and pro-democracy activists fled from urban areas into the sanctuary of the borderlands where they received armed training from the KNU, KIO, NMSP and other ethnic forces. A new cycle of insurgencies coalesced, which appeared cemented by the formation of two new united fronts: the 1988 Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) which brought the NDF together with the All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) and other pro-democracy movements formed that year; and the 1992 National Council Union of Burma (NCUB), which expanded the DAB to include the exiled National Coalition Government Union of Burma (NCGUB). Consisting of a dozen MPs-elect who had escaped to the Thai border following a government crackdown, the NCGUB was headed by Dr Sein Win, the cousin of NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi. As Josef Silverstein wrote, there were now 'two centres of politics' in Burma, and it was to the KNU–NDF's 'border area capital' at Mannerplaw that he believed the centre was moving.[60]

There was, however, a counter-trend which, although less noticed at first, came to dominate the strategies of many ethnic movements during the SLORC–SPDC era. Initially, the CPB mutinies appeared to portend an even greater spread of fighting against the military government. Instead, in a surprise move initiated by the Military Intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt, ceasefires were offered to all the CPB mutineers in 1989. These were accepted with some alacrity. On all sides, there was a genuine war-weariness. As the newly-formed United Wa State Army (UWSA) announced on its radio station shortly before its ceasefire: 'Every year the burden of the people has become heavier . . . At such a time, what can the people of all nationalities do?'[61] Equally important, the ceasefire terms offered by the government were very simple: the ethnic opposition forces would be allowed to continue holding their arms and territory until a new constitution was introduced.

Since this time, critics have argued that the regime's ceasefire strategy has simply been a 'divide-and-rule' attempt to break up countrywide opposition. Many of the accusations have concerned the illicit narcotics trade in Shan state, which resurrected memories of the Ka Kwe Ye militia in the 1960s and 1970s.[62] Indeed, in the decade following the 1989 ceasefires, opium production in Burma escalated to become the world's largest (a position from which it has since declined).[63] Such suspicions were further fuelled in 1996 when the opium kingpin Khun Sa made a ceasefire by

virtually surrendering his MTA to the Tatmadaw. Nevertheless, following the initial 1989 agreements, ceasefires spread steadily to other ethnic forces around the country, including such important members of the NDF as the SSA (1989), Palaung State Liberation Party (1991), Pao National Organization (1991), KIO (1994) and NMSP (1995), which have anti-narcotic policies. By the turn of the century, over a dozen of the main ethnic forces had ceasefires with the government (see Table 15.1).

Inevitably, such a dramatic shift in the insurgent balance soon had serious implications in the military field. Between 1988 and 1992, the borderlands had initially resonated to some of the fiercest fighting in more than a decade. Over 1000 fatalities were estimated in early 1992 alone during the failed Tatmadaw attempt to capture Mannerplaw.[64] But as the ceasefires spread, many ethnic forces began to fracture in the front line. Khun Sa's MTA surrender, for example, was preceded by the breakaway of the new Shan State National Army (SSNA) in 1995, which agreed its own ceasefire with the regime. Subsequently, Shan nationalists who rejected the MTA surrender established the Shan State Army – South (SSA-S) which, with around 2000 troops under arms, resumed fighting against the government in the Thai borderlands. However, such resurgence in opposition strength was against the general trends of the 1990s.

Equally significant, in another crucial change in the geopolitical environment, during the 1990s all of Burma's neighbours switched from policies of support or toleration for insurgent groups along their borders to close engagement with the SLORC–SPDC. This was most clearly highlighted by Burma joining ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) in 1997. In contrast, most Western governments continued to advocate trade boycotts and support for the NLD. China, in particular, became the leading international economic and political player in Burma, while Thailand, despite lingering sympathies for the ethnic Shan (Tai) cause,[65] became a key business partner with the new regime, especially through Prime Ministers General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and Thaksin Shinawatra. Multinational gas pipelines in the southern Tenasserim division and massive logging deals along the Thai and Chinese borders were only the most visible face of these new trans-Asian initiatives that had an immediate impact on ethnic minority regions and politics.[66] Less noticed, India and Bangladesh also began to increase trading relations, with similar plans for expansive infrastructure and energy projects during the twenty-first century.[67]

Squeezed between such international and internal forces, pressures were steadily mounting on all the remaining non-ceasefire forces. Eventually, the KNU (1995–96 and 2003–2006) and the KNPP (1995) came to have unsuccessful peace talks with the SLORC–SPDC. But although both groups continued their armed struggles, they were both greatly

weakened by defections, notably by the breakaway of the 1500-strong Democratic Karen Buddhist Army from the KNU in 1994–95. As a result, such long-standing forces began to lose large tracts of permanent base areas as government troops steadily advanced into previously inaccessible border regions. Reflecting the trend in the fighting, official refugee numbers in Thailand soared towards the 150000 mark, while the number of illegal migrants passed 1 million.[68]

Similar population displacements also occurred on the Bangladeshi and Indian borders where a less publicized generation of ethnic movements were also attempting to build up their military forces after 1988. The main ethnic parties in northwest Burma are the Chin National Front (CNF, formed 1987), the National United Party of Arakan (formed 1988 from the CPA, AIO and other ethnic forces), and the Arakan Rohingya National Organization and Rohingya Solidarity Organization, which are factional off-shoots from the former RPF. On the Rakhine state border, especially, there was a massive dislocation of civilians for the second time in 15 years after some 260000 Muslims fled into Bangladesh in 1991–92 in the wake of constant Tatmadaw operations.[69] Most refugees eventually returned under UNHCR auspices, but the border situation did not quickly settle down, even though both the Indian and Bangladesh governments attempted to prevent anti-SPDC movements from operating along their frontiers.[70]

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, therefore, the political map of Burma remained one of deep complexity. Indeed, while Aung San Suu Kyi and many members of the NLD that had won the 1990 general election were kept in detention, Senior General Than Shwe and fellow SPDC officers openly feted such insurgent veterans as Hso Ten (SSA), Nai Shwe Kyin (NMSP) and Zau Mai (KIO) in Rangoon to discuss economic projects that would open up some of the country's most remote border regions. It was a turnabout in political fortunes that few analysts would have predicted in 1988, providing a striking illustration of David Keen's maxim 'war and peace: what's the difference?'[71] For as studies of other wars in the post-colonial world have demonstrated, the economics and management of internal conflicts can be very structured between the different stakeholders and actors – rather than chaotic or reflecting societal breakdown.[72] Such has long been the case in Burma.

The contemporary landscape

Despite the divided landscape, there were many common concerns among the different ethnic parties in Burma at the turn of the century. In general, ethnic politics in the SLORC–SPDC era came to be represented by three main groupings: the ceasefire, non-ceasefire and the new electoral parties that had stood in the 1990 general election. But behind the scenes there

were many contacts and understandings. The only major difference was over strategies to achieve change. In this respect, a distinction could be made between the ceasefire groups, spearheaded by the KIO, NMSP and SSA which believed in a process of 'peace through development', and those parties that espoused the primacy of 'politics-first' solutions. In the latter camp were the KNU, KNPP and CNF as well as such new electoral parties as the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), which had won most seats in the Shan state in the 1990 election.

Further underpinning these differences was also continued belief in 'united front' strategies by the KNU which wanted to continue working with the NCUB, NCGUB and other anti-SPDC allies. In contrast, many ceasefire groups were sceptical about working with any of the Burman majority parties that had sprung up in the post-1988 borderland world. Indeed many ABSDF and other democracy activists had swiftly gone on into political exile in third countries abroad. Thus, mindful of past failures in insurgent alliances with both the CPB and U Nu's PDP, many ethnic veterans were adamant that, if the political landscape was changing in Burma, they wanted to be on the inside of the discussions in Rangoon, not isolated out in the borderlands once again. Insurgent leaders, such as the KIO's president Brang Seng, said that they had been ignored too many times during periods of change in the past, notably in 1948 and 1962.[73] They were also acutely aware of the importance of the NLD's victory in the 1990 election, which they welcomed, and they were thus anticipating the eventual agreement of a reform process that would bring all the different parties together. Indeed a popular refrain at the turn of the century was the need for a 'new Panglong' where all sides could be represented.

Such a joint process, however, never occurred, despite interventions by Razali Ismail, the special envoy of the UN Secretary General, who was mandated by the UN General Assembly to try and facilitate reconciliation in the country.[74] For a brief moment, there were hopes in early 2004 that all ethnic groupings – electoral, ceasefire and non-ceasefire – could be represented at a resumption of the National Convention, which had first been convened by the SLORC–SPDC to draw up a new constitution as long before as 1993. But from May 2004, events seriously regressed once again. Aung San Suu Kyi was not released and the NLD did not rejoin the National Convention; allied electoral parties such as the SNLD were also not involved; further peace talks with the KNU and KNPP were put on hold by the SPDC; and, finally, in October the ceasefire architect General Khin Nyunt was himself arrested in a mini-purge of government by Senior General Than Shwe which saw key ministers dismissed and many military officers imprisoned.

Against this backdrop, international condemnation rose to a new crescendo. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described Burma as an

'outpost of tyranny' where freedom must be achieved.[75] Than Shwe and a new generation of SPDC leaders, however, appeared determined to continue on their own course with what they declared their seven-stage 'road-map' to reform.[76]

Given the exclusion of most pro-democracy parties, it was now the ceasefire groups that became the leading voice of political opposition in advocating ethnic rights at the resumed National Convention. Although many were small splinter factions, a remarkable 28 ethnic forces holding arms were represented (see Table 15.1). In general, two different views were put forward by the ceasefire delegates during 2004: one by a 13-party alliance organized by former NDF members, notably the KIO, NMSP and SSA, who continued to propose a federal-based system, and the other by three ex-CPB groups, including the UWSA, which preferred a new system of autonomous regions, similar to those in the adjoining Yunnan province.[77] While the National Convention was continuing, similar support for pro-federal goals was also expressed by the two other main ethnic coalitions in the country: the SNLD and fellow electoral parties in the nine-party United Nationalities Alliance, and the border-based Ethnic Nationalities Council, which included the KNU, KNPP and CNF.[78]

This, however, was as far as detailed discussions at the National Convention proceeded. In 2005 delegates from the ceasefire groups complained that they were not able to put forward all their views. A number of serious obstacles had been met. In particular, ethnic parties were calling for decentralization and a union system along federal lines, while military supporters rejected any language that they perceived akin to federalism; instead, they would accept only a unitary system.[79] Ne Win's anti-federal legacy appeared to live on, and by late 2005 all the evidence suggested that the regime was intent on imposing its own vision. The constitutional draft stated that not only would the Tatmadaw be granted the 'leading role' in national political life but that 25 per cent of all seats in the future parliament would have to be reserved for military candidates. Indeed, in terms of ethnic politics, there appeared to be only one major innovation. For while the seven existing divisions and seven states would be retained, there would also be new 'self-administered' territories for the Danu, Kokang, Lahu, Palaung, Pao and Wa in the Shan state and for the Naga in the Sagaing division, which would be decided on the basis of population numbers.

Beyond such ethnic redemarcations, few ethnic opposition groups believed that the new constitution indicated anything dramatically new. Indeed, with a national referendum and another general election still lying further ahead, there was widespread belief that the SPDC was, in the interim, rather more focused on keeping the country's opposition groups off-balance while preparing the way for reform structures that would ensure

continued military-based rule after Senior General Than Shwe's eventual retirement. In particular, there was long expectation that the regime was grooming a new military-backed organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Association, to emerge as a new patriotic party to take the political place of the BSPP.[80]

Ethnic confidence was further undermined when the SSA's veteran leader Hso Ten and SNLD's President Khun Tun Oo were arrested in February 2005. Subsequently, the SPDC began to try and pressurize some of the ceasefire groups into giving up their arms even before a new constitution was introduced. In response, the bulk of the 2000-strong SSNA in central Shan state went underground and merged with the non-ceasefire SSA-S on the Thailand borders. Meanwhile in April Shan exiles headed by Sao Hkam Hpa, a son of the late Shan leader Sao Shwe Thaike, dramatically declared the 'independence' of the Shan state from Burma, a statement which the SPDC, NLD and many of the ceasefire groups all denounced on different grounds.[81] In fact, the new Shan group had no military strength to back up its words. Nevertheless news of the Shan declaration reverberated around the world.

For such reasons, towards the end of 2005 Burma's political future appeared increasingly uncertain. To a backdrop of worsening economic and humanitarian conditions, Paolo Pinheiro, the UN special rapporteur on human rights, told the UN General Assembly that 'serious human rights violations' continue to be perpetrated against 'ethnic minority communities'.[82] Shortly afterwards, the former Czech president Vaclav Havel and Nobel laureate Bishop Desmond Tutu issued a commissioned report, urging that the issue of reform in Burma be taken up by the UN Security Council. As justification, a grave litany of emergencies was listed, including 'renewed ethnic insurgency', 'abuse against ethnic minority groups', 'illicit drugs' and the use of 'child soldiers'.[83] Equally concerning, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria chose this moment to announce that it was pulling out of Burma because of security restrictions.[84]

In early 2005, the USA also indicted eight UWSA leaders for alleged drugs trafficking, raising serious questions about the continuance of anti-narcotic programmes in the country.[85] The link between ethnic conflict and illicit drug production has not been broken. But perhaps most ominous of all, on 7 May three bombs, planted by unknown assailants, exploded in different locations in downtown Rangoon, killing over 20 bystanders.[86] The SPDC blamed the bombings on 'terrorist' conspiracies involving groups as diverse as the KNU, KNPP, SSA, NCGUB and the CIA.[87] But few observers were convinced. As in previous eras of change, there were many conflicting agendas as well as groups holding arms, making accurate

predictions about any aspect of military or political activity extremely difficult. Into 2006, many of the same uncertainties continued, with the SPDC dramatically relocating the long-time capital from Rangoon to the new site of Nay Pyi Taw in the remote and more defendable heart of the country. Whatever the eventual reforms, military-dominated government seemed set to continue.

In conclusion, ethnic insurgent politics have continued in Burma in many forms in the decades since independence. Despite this legacy of state failure, there were still stakeholders and community leaders in the early twenty-first century who believed that the prospects were better for peaceful resolution than ever before, if only a process and spirit of inclusive reconciliation can really take root.[88] The ethnic ceasefires, the victory of pro-democracy parties in the 1990 general election and the growing efforts by the UN and other international bodies to support conflict resolution all mark major changes in one of the most tightly restricted countries in Asia. On all sides, war-weariness undoubtedly runs deep, and over the decades the goals of the ethnic parties have largely transformed from those of separatism to federalism and national inclusion. The question remains, however, whether the next generation will truly be able to find peace. Precedent certainly suggests caution.

Notes

1. In 1989, the military government changed the official name from 'Burma' to 'Myanmar'. The term is recognized by the United Nations, but is not common English language usage. It is also rejected by many opposition parties. In the Burmese language, the names can be considered alternatives. In this chapter, 'Burma' will be maintained for history and consistency. In English, 'Burman' is mostly used for the majority ethnic group and 'Burmese' as an adjective for the country and its peoples.
2. See for example Smith, M. (2002a), *Burma/Myanmar: the Time for Change*, London: Minority Rights Group, pp. 21–8; Global IDP Project, 'Burma: displacement continues unabated in one of the world's worst IDP situations', 27 June 2005; Thailand Burma Border Consortium (2005), *Relief Programme: July to December 2004*, Bangkok: TBBC, pp. 1–8.
3. See for example Leach, E. (1954), *Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure*, London: G. Bell & Son.
4. Smith, M. (1999a), *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*, London: Zed Books, pp. 41–4. By 1931, the Indian population had passed 1 million out of a total population of 14 650 000.
5. Smith (1999a), pp. 62–4. An estimated 500 000 Indians were also forced to flee Burma during the war. For a wartime account of the Karens, see Morrison, I. (1947), *Grandfather Longlegs: The Life and Gallant Death of Maj. H.P. Seagrim*, London: Faber & Faber; for the Kachins, see Fellowes-Gordon, I. (1957), *Amiable Assassins, The Story of the Kachin Guerrillas of North Burma*, London: Robert Hale.
6. For a discussion of the 1947 constitution, see Silverstein, J. (1980), *Burmese Politics: the Dilemma of National Unity*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, pp. 185–205.
7. Reuters, 3 June 1947.
8. Smith (1999a), pp. 80–82, 87.
9. Smith (1999a), p. 87.

10. Po Chit, Saw (1947), *Karens and Karen State*, Rangoon: KNU, Thathanahita Press, pp. 1–8.
11. It can be argued that the ethno-political identity of the Shans, the other large minority group in Burma, is reflected through the existence of Thailand.
12. Shan State Independence Army (1959), *Communiqué of the Revolutionary Council*.
13. For a discussion, see Smith (1999a), pp. 29–38.
14. Brown, D. (1994), *The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia*, London: Routledge, pp. 1, 33–65.
15. Callahan, M. (2003), *Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 36–40.
16. Smith, M. (2002b), 'Army politics as a historical legacy: the experience of Burma', in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds), *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, London: Zed Books, pp. 270–96. For detailed histories of the Tatmadaw, see Callahan, M. (2003); and Selth, A. (2002), *Burma's Armed Forces: Power without Glory*, Norwalk, CT: Eastbridge.
17. For example, of the surviving 'Thirty Comrades' who formed the BIA with Aung San and Ne Win, eight later joined insurgent movements after independence: with the CPB, PVO or U Nu's Parliamentary Democracy Party. Key leaders of the contemporary National League for Democracy are also Tatmadaw veterans.
18. Buzan, B. (1983), *People, States and Fear, The National Security Problem in International Relations*, Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, pp. 66–7. For a discussion of Burma, see for example Smith, M. (1999b), 'Ethnic conflict and the challenge of civil society in Burma', in Burma Center Netherlands (ed.), *Strengthening Civil Society in Burma: Possibilities and Dilemmas for International NGOs*, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, pp. 20–25.
19. Keen, D. (2001), 'War and peace: what's the difference?' in Adebajo, A. and C.L. Sriram (eds), *Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, pp. 7–8.
20. For accounts of these events, see Smith (1999a), pp. 102–21; Callahan (2003), pp. 114–44.
21. McCoy, A. (1972), *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, New York: Harper Torchbacks, pp. 128–35.
22. See for example McCoy, A. (1972); Jelsma, M., T. Kramer and P. Vervest (eds) (2005), *Trouble in the Triangle: Opium and Conflict in Burma*, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.
23. Smith (1999a), pp. 150–52.
24. Smith (1999a), pp. 150–52.
25. Smith (1999a), pp. 185, 286, 298, 326.
26. Smith (1999a), pp. 150–52, 170–74. A particular problem for insurgent leaders was that, after the initial outbreak of hostilities, they found that many of the most educated supporters of their causes were among the first to surrender or give up. At the same time, warlordism was often commonplace in the poor rural communities where insurgent movements had largely become based. Thus, although rejecting much communist ideology, veteran ethnic leaders said that they found Mao Zedong's strategies for organizing rural-based warfare extremely helpful for their own revolutionary needs and conditions.
27. A small British-based conspiracy involving Second World War officers was uncovered in 1948, while tacit US support for both the KMT and later U Nu never led to aid to ethnic forces directly. Similarly, anti-government aid from China had to be channelled through the CPB. In general, international support has been strategic or moral rather than military.
28. Smith (1999a), pp. 168–9.
29. The ethnic definition of the Muslim population in Arakan is controversial. Buddhist Rakhine and government officials argue that Muslim numbers have increased due to the immigration of settlers from the Chittagong region since British days. They thus reject the classification of a 'Rohingya' identity.
30. Callahan (2003), pp. 146, 154–9, 172–206.
31. Callahan (2003), pp. 169–71.
32. For a discussion of 'the ethnocratic state and ethnic separatism in Burma', see Brown (1994), pp. 33–65.

33. Callahan (2003), pp. 184–96.
34. Government of the Union of Burma (1960), *Is Trust Vindicated?* Rangoon: Ministry of Information, p. 31.
35. In 1951, the AFPFL government renamed the territory Kayah (after the name of the largest ethnic sub-group) in an apparent bid to separate the Karennis from other Karens and remove a title with historic connotations of independence.
36. *The Times*, 3 March 1962.
37. Smith (1999a), pp. 198–206, 219–23; for a detailed analysis of the BSPP era, see Silverstein, J. (1977), *Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
38. Smith (1999a), pp. 206–12.
39. Smith (1999a), p. 210.
40. Smith (1999a), pp. 213–18.
41. Commander Thaung Tin, quoted in *Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook 1968*, p. 121.
42. Smith (1999a), pp. 258–62.
43. Thompson, Sir R. (1966), *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam*, London: Chatto & Windus.
44. Brigadier-General San Yu, quoted in *Forward*, 1 May 1969.
45. Smith (1999a), pp. 262–8.
46. For descriptions of different insurgent movements, see for example Fall, J. (1991), *True Love and Bartholomew: Rebels on the Burmese Border*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lintner, B. (1990), *Land of Jade: A Journey Through Insurgent Burma*, Edinburgh: Kiscadale Publications; South, A. (2003), *Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake*, London: RoutledgeCurzon; Yawnghwe, Chao Tzang (1987), *The Shan of Burma: Memoirs of a Shan Exile*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
47. Smith (1999a), pp. 252–8.
48. *Voice of the People of Burma*, 25 August 1974.
49. See for example McCoy (1972), pp. 333–6.
50. Patriotic Youth Front Radio, 27 June 1970.
51. Smith (1999a), pp. 287–93.
52. See for example Sudha Ramachandran (2005), 'Indian troops poised to enter Myanmar', *Asia Times*, 21 July.
53. Smith (1999a), pp. 237–46, 307–10.
54. See for example McCoy (1972), pp. 336–7; Smith (1999a), pp. 97–100, 283, 394–6.
55. *Weekend Telegraph* (London), 10 March 1967.
56. Yawnghwe (1987), pp. 189–90, 204–5.
57. *Shan Proposals to Terminate the Opium Trade in Shan State*, as reproduced in Yawnghwe (1987), pp. 261–3. In 1971, the SSA also formed a political wing, the Shan State Progress Party.
58. NDF members have since changed over the years. For past or present NDF members, see Table 15.1.
59. See for example United Nations General Assembly (2004), *Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar: Report of the Secretary-General*, New York: UNGA 59th session, 16 August, p. 2.
60. Silverstein, J. (1997), 'The Civil War, the Minorities and Burma's New Politics', in P. Carey (ed.), *Burma: The Challenge of Change in a Divided Society*, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, p. 129. The SLORC–SPDC later accused various actors, from CPB or PDP veterans to the international media and Western interests, of instigating the 1988 protests. Certainly, there were different influences in the background. However in many parts of the country the student-led movement among the Burman majority was genuinely spontaneous. Invoking the radicalism of earlier campus generations, student activists in different towns networked with Buddhist monks, government employees and other worker groups in taking the protests to the streets. The movement later factionalized, including the insurgent ABSDF. But in 2005 veteran leaders from these years began

to use the collective name '88 Generation Students' to try and establish a clearer focus for both their legacy and future activism.
61. Quoted in, British Broadcasting Corporation (1989), *Survey of World Broadcasts*, 2 May.
62. See for example Lintner, B. (2000), 'Drugs and economic growth in Burma today', in M. Pedersen, E. Rudland and R. May (eds), *Burma/Myanmar: Strong Regime Weak State?* Adelaide: Crawford House, pp. 164–93.
63. A new trade in illicit methamphetamine production has also arisen. For a discussion, see Jelsma, M., 'Burma in the Global Drug Market', in Jelsma et al. (2005), pp. 147–74.
64. Smith (1999a), p. 425.
65. Into the twenty-first century, the Thai Third Army, especially, preferred the buffer of SSA forces on the border to the UWSA.
66. See for example EarthRights International (2000), *Total Denial Continues: Earth Rights Abuses along the Yadana and Yetagun Pipelines in Burma*, Washington, DC: EarthRights International; Global Witness (2003), *A Conflict of Interests: The Uncertain Future of Burma's Forests*, London: Global Witness.
67. See for example EarthRights International (2004), *Another Yadana: The Shwe Natural Gas Pipeline Project (Burma-Bangladesh-India)*, Washington, DC: EarthRights International.
68. See note 2.
69. See for example Human Rights Watch (2000), 'Burmese refugees in Bangladesh: still no durable solution', May, 12 (3C).
70. In 2005, the India army raided CNF camps on its border, while the Bangladesh security services seized weapons and attempted to arrest leaders of insurgent Rakhine and Rohingya groups.
71. Keen (2001), p. 1.
72. See for example Keen (2001), pp. 1–22.
73. See for example Smith, M. and L. Jagan (1995), 'Maran Brang Seng: in his own words', *Burma Debate*, **1** (3), pp. 17–22.
74. See for example United Nations General Assembly (2004), *Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar: Report of the Secretary-General*.
75. *Washington Times*, 19 January 2005.
76. 'Myanmar pursues democracy "road map" despite UN pressure', AFP, 6 October 2005.
77. The UWSA, the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the National Democratic Alliance Army, based around Mongla. For a fuller discussion, see Smith, M. (2006), 'Ethnic participation and national reconciliation in Myanmar: challenges in a transitional landscape', in T. Wilson (ed.), *Myanmar's Long Road to National Reconciliation*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 60–67.
78. For example 'Ceasefire groups must insist on equal rights say Burmese ethnic leaders', *Democratic Voice of Burma*, 1 November 2004; 'Burma's Ethnic Nationalities Council held meeting', *Democratic Voice of Burma*, 31 October 2004.
79. Interview with Dr Tu Ja, KIO National Convention delegate, 23 April 2005.
80. See for example Steinberg, D. (1997), 'The USDA: mobilization and orthodoxy in Myanmar', *Burma Debate*, **4** (1), pp. 4–11. By 2005, the USDA claimed 21 million members; *New Light of Myanmar*, 21 April 2005. Another party, the National Unity Party, had originally taken the BSPP's place, but it performed weakly in the 1990 general election.
81. *New Light of Myanmar*, 24 April 2005; 'NLD opposes Shan State independence', *Irrawaddy*, 19 April 2005.
82. United Nations General Assembly (2005), *Situation of human rights in Myanmar: Note by the Secretary-General*, 60th session, 12 August 2005, p. 3.
83. Havel, V. and Bishop D. Tutu (2005), *Threat to the Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma*, Washington: DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary, pp. 14–34.
84. 'Global AIDS fund quits Myanmar, cites restrictions', Reuters, 19 August 2005.
85. *Washington File*, 25 January 2005; Milsom, J. (2005), 'The Long Hard Road out of Drugs; The Case of the Wa', in Jelsma et al. (2005), pp. 61–93.

86. See for example 'Thailand says Myanmar stable, but ethnic group warns of more unrest', *AFP*, 9 May 2005.
87. See for example *New Light of Myanmar*, 16 May 2005 and 5 October 2005.
88. See for example Seng Raw (2004), 'The role of minorities in the transitional process', in Badgley, J. (ed.), *Reconciling Burma/Myanmar: Essays on US Relations with Burma*, Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, *NBR Analysis*, **15** (1), pp. 67–72.

PART IV

STATE TERRORISM

16 State terrorism in Arakan

Syed Serajul Islam

The prevalent general understanding about terrorism is that acts of terrorism are committed by nongovernmental actors like crazy individuals. But, today it is apparent from the activities of many governments that a state itself could be a terrorist. In fact, state terrorism is not a new phenomenon. In the past, it existed in various forms and ideologies. It is only in recent years that those past regimes as well as many contemporary governments have been analyzed under the cover of 'state terrorism'. State terrorist regimes use the tactics of intimidation, coerced conversion and selective or auto-genocide. Contemporary Myanmar (Burma) is one of the greatest examples of this. The military regime has brought the reign of terror in the whole of Burma by adopting the ideology of 'Burma's Road to Socialism'.[1] Within the limited scope of this chapter it focuses only on the analysis of Burma's state terrorism in one of its provinces, Rakhine State, where the minority Muslims, generally known as Rohingyas, continues to suffer from several forms of persecution.

The propagated media view right now is that we are living in a very dangerous time and the danger is primarily coming from the terror threat from bin Laden and his network. There is no doubt about terrorism initiated by crazy individuals. However, one needs to understand that while Bin Laden's network, al-Qaeda, is a 'retail' terror network, large-scale killing and torture to terrorize, 'wholesale' terrorism, has been implemented by states, not by non-state actors. The reason is that states define terrorism and identify the terrorists, and they naturally exempt themselves as always 'retaliating' and engaging in 'counter-terror' even when their own actions are an exact fit to their own definitions.[2] The 'war against terrorism' has given a freer hand to many terrorist governments that are 'with us'. Burma is one such country which is expected to use the international war against terror for a new crackdown on the minorities as well as on those who are anti-regime. This is categorized by many as 'state terrorism'.[3]

State terrorism is defined by some as violence upon a national population committed by national governments or their proxies. A state can terrorize its people directly by using its national military or security forces, or indirectly, through the use of state-sponsored terrorist organizations. The objective of state terrorism is to suppress any dissent and to support favoured or destabilize unfavoured foreign governments. Thus, Sluka defines

state terrorism as 'the use or threat of violence by the state or its agents or supporters, particularly against civilian individuals and populations, as a means of political intimidation and control'.[4] The primary methods of state terrorism are the following:

1. Unfair trials;
2. Torture;
3. Extrajudicial execution;
4. Intimidation and fear; and
5. Information control.

The above are the common practices of state terror, often used to terrorize domestic populations by sovereign or proxy regimes. A terrorist state permits and/or imposes a clandestine, unpredictable and diffuse application even upon innocent people. Extrajudicial execution, or political murder, is the practice of states or their proxies to assassinate citizens because they are viewed as political threats, and/or to intimidate communities. Such death squads often unpredictably attack the socially disadvantaged, religious or ethnic minorities, or citizens deemed to be subversive. Their targets typically include the homeless, street children, union leaders, indigenous peoples, clergy, activists, journalists and academics. Death squads conveniently shield their sponsors from liability, the illusion of spontaneous criminal violence providing 'plausible deniability'. Often, the bodies of victims are secretly disposed of, typically in mass graves, leaving no evidence of a crime and increasing the trauma to families and communities. These cases are known as 'disappearances'. Let us see now whether these are applied by the Burmese regime in Arakan.

Why state terrorism in Arakan

Arakan, a geographically isolated area in western Myanmar, consisting of coastal plains, a network of streams and rivers, and a mountain range separating it from central Myanmar, had been an independent kingdom until 1784. It is named by the present regime as the Rakhine State. Two major ethnic races, the Rohingyas (Muslims) and Rakhines (Buddhists), inhabit Arakan. The unofficial total population of Arakan is more than 5 million including about 1.5 million Rohingyas. At present Rohingyas and the Rakhines (Maghs) stand at almost equal proportions inside Arakan. In addition, there are about 200000 tribal and 200000 Burman people in Arakan. Rohingyas have been living in Arakan from time immemorial. They are a people with a distinct culture and civilization of their own. They trace their ancestry to Arabs, Moors, Pathans, Moghuls, Bengalis and some

Indo-Mongoloid people. Early Muslim settlements in Arakan date back to the seventh century AD.[5]

The Naaf River marks part of the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar. The Arab traders had been in contact with Arakan since the third century and they had introduced Islam to Arakan around 788 CE. During that time a dynasty, Chandra, was ruling the kingdom of Arakan. The Arab merchants carried out missionary activities by spreading Islam side by side with their trade. In the process, a large number of people were converted to Islam. Many of the early Arabs married local women and settled there permanently. Due to conversion, intermarriage and immigration, the Muslim population grew to large numbers during the subsequent centuries. These Muslims came to be known as Rohingyas, a term derived from the Arabic term *Raham* (God's blessing)[6] Perhaps the Arabs called those Muslims 'God's blessed people', Rohingyas. Until the fifteenth century, the country was ruled by a non-Muslim king, Narameikhla, who himself embraced Islam in 1404 and adopted the Muslim name of Solaiman Shah.[7] After the conversion of the Arakanese king to Islam, Arakan became a Muslim-majority kingdom since a large number of people had accepted Islam as their religion. Arakan remained an independent Muslim kingdom for more than three and a half centuries. With the death of Salim Shah II, the last Muslim king, in a palace intrigue, the kingdom became politically and militarily weak. By then, Buddhism had arrived in the region from Tibet–Mongolia. By the middle of the tenth century, 'the Mongolian race Burmans, mostly Buddhists, had established their seat of power in Burma proper'.[8] Buddhists were still immigrating to Arakan at that time. During the decaying years of Muslim rule in Arakan, a Burman king of Ava, Bodaw Phaya, invaded Arakan and gained complete control of it in 1784. Thus came the end of independent Arakan.[9] In 1824, the British East India Company invaded Burma and through the Anglo-Burmese war, Arakan came under the sway of the British. The whole of Burma, including Arakan, was brought under the Indian system of administration.[10]

During the colonial rule the British were not interested in the national integration of diverse communities in Burma. On the contrary, those divisions were used for prolonging colonial rule, with its policy of 'divide and rule'. All attachments or loyalties to sub-national groups in different regions of Burma were carefully subdued. Once the decolonization process began, Burma started facing the problem of possible alienation of one or more groups in the country's political system. There are more than 100 ethnic groups in Myanmar. The Burmans are, numerically, the largest group and the ruling elite. Fearful of the Burman majority, all ethnic groups, particularly from Shan, Kachin, Karen and Arakan, demanded

from the nationalist party – the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League – an assurance of regional autonomy for the provinces in an independent Myanmar.[11] The nationalist leader, General Aung San, convened a conference of all ethnic groups at Panglong in 1947. It was agreed that all states would be given regional autonomy with the provision of seceding after ten years of independence.[12] Soon after independence, however, the constitution which was adopted after Aung San's death declared that the new state, called Burma, would be unitary in character, with no autonomy for the provinces. The constitution caused immediate ethnic insurrection which became worse after 1958, even though Prime Minister U Nu had declared Buddhism the state religion of the country to appease the ethnic groups, as a great majority of them were Buddhists.[13] However, this further alienated the Muslims in Arakan who felt more insecure in independent Burma.

Although the Burmese government declared Buddhism the state religion, the Arakanese Muslims did not protest. However, immediately after declaring Buddhism the state religion of Burma the government took a number of specific measures to dismiss a great many Muslim officers and replace them with Buddhists. An all-out effort was made to transmigrate Buddhists from Burma proper to Arakan in order to diminish the Muslim majority.[14] After Myanmar gained independence from Britain in 1948 civil war broke out when many ethnic nationalities and the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) took up arms against the central government headed by U Nu. In Rakhine State both Rakhine and Muslim groups formed armed opposition groups who fought against the government. The Burmese government denied the citizenship to any Muslim in Burma. In the late 1950s when the government started discriminating against the Muslims, a Japanese-trained Rohingya, Jafar Kamal, organized people, calling them Mujahids. However, against the trained Burmese soldiers, the Mujahids could not last long. Jafar was assassinated. Many of his supporters were captured and killed by the soldiers. By 1962 the civilian government had also collapsed and the army took over. The military regime abolished the constitution, dissolved the parliament and banned the activities of all organizations. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) inflicted heavy casualties on the Rohingya masses. The Burmese military regime exercised tyranny over the Rohingyas. General Ne Win launched a major offensive under the code name of 'King Dragon Offensive' against the Rohingya liberation force.[15]

The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), supreme body of the regime, rejects the existence of a separate ethnic group called 'Rohingya'. The vast majority of Rohingyas are not believed to possess Myanmar citizenship. Moreover they are not recognized as one of the 135 'national races' by the Myanmar government.[16] In a statement, the government said:

> In actual fact, although there are (135) national races living in Myanmar today, the so-called Rohingya people is not one of them. Historically, there has never been a 'Rohingya' race in Myanmar. The very name Rohingya is a creation of a group of insurgents in the Rakhine State. Since the First Anglo-Myanmar War in 1824, people of Muslim Faith from the adjacent country illegally entered Myanmar, particularly Rakhine State. Being illegal immigrants they do not hold immigration papers like other nationals of the country.[17]

In other words, Rohingyas are not considered to be the 'sons of the soil' or indigenous people by the government of Myanmar, and consequently they have no right to hold the citizenship of Myanmar.

However, whatever the past of the Rohingyas, the UN was asking the government of Myanmar to accommodate these people as citizens of Myanmar. Finally, in April 2004, in a response to questions by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, the Myanmar government authority – the SPDC – stated: 'The Government renders full and equal treatment to these people, as with other races, in matters relating to birth and death registration, education, health and social affairs. In the official records, they are listed as a Bengali racial group of the Bengali race and are recognized as permanent residents within Myanmar.'[18] Despite this stated declaration, in practice the rights of the Rohingya population of northern Rakhine State are greatly restricted. All these have left no choice to the Rohingya but to be stateless and homeless in their own homeland, Arakan.

Tactics of state terrorism

The military junta in Myanmar has used several tactics of state terrorism in different regions of the country. In particular, in Arakan, it has used the following tactics: (1) denial of citizenship; (2) restriction of movement; (3) forced labour; (4) model villages; (5) registration of births and deaths in families; (6) marriage permission; and (7) other violations of human rights.

Denial of citizenship

The military regime has declared the Rohingyas non-national. While the 1948 Citizenship Act conferred equal rights to all citizens, the current 1982 Burma Citizenship Law[19] creates three classes of citizens: full citizens, associate citizens and naturalized citizens.[20] A special central body has been established by the government which has the absolute power to determine specific citizenship issues. This body is free to determine rights of associate and naturalized citizens (Sec. 53). It also has wide discretion to revoke such citizenship on the grounds of disaffection or disloyalty to the state by any act or speech or otherwise (Sec. 35(d), 58(d)) or moral turpitude (Sec. 35(f), 58 (f)). Under such circumstances an individual whose citizenship is

revoked may appeal[21] to the Council of Ministers (Sec.71). There is no independent appellate body.

Although the SPDC has stated repeatedly that the Rohingyas 'are recognized as permanent residents within Myanmar' in the government's official records, the vast majority of Rohingyas fail to satisfy the authority for obtaining any of the above three categories of citizenship for the following reasons. First, as per the rules stated in Section 3 of the 1982 Citizenship Law, the Rohingya are not considered to be a national ethnic group and therefore, they are not qualified to obtain full citizenship. Second, a great many of the Rohingyas applied neither for full citizenship nor for associate citizenship after the passage of the 1982 Act because they were reportedly unaware of the Act or did not understand its importance at the time. Third, in order to be eligible for naturalized citizenship, Rohingyas are required to submit necessary documents that would provide 'conclusive evidence' of entry and residence prior to 4 January 1948 or could establish the necessary bloodlines. Only a very few of the Rohingyas are in the possession of these kind of documents. In proving their residence the Rohingyas can use their family list, their ancestor's names which includes the names of each member of the household, past and present. However, the family list only indicates names of family members and date of birth. It may not indicate place of birth, which in effect prevents people from 'furnishing conclusive evidence' of birth in Myanmar as required by the 1982 law.

Thus, the theoretical entitlement to citizenship for Rohingyas becomes meaningless in practice. In fact, this 1982 Act was specifically designed effectively to deny Rohingyas the right to a nationality, because the promulgation of this law took place soon after the Rohingyas who fled to Bangladesh during 1978 had been repatriated. The 1982 Citizenship Law has had the effect of rendering the vast majority of Rohingyas ineligible to be Myanmar citizens. Also, the 1982 law is silent about stateless persons. According to the 1982 Citizenship Law, in order to receive full citizenship an individual is required to submit evidence of membership of a particular 'ethnic group'. While this may be true for other ethnic groups, a Rohingya cannot qualify for full citizenship even if they can prove that his/her family has permanently resided in Myanmar since independence in 1948, or even since 1823. According to a report by Amnesty International, this law is certainly discriminatory and is in clear violation of Myanmar's obligation as a state and a member of the United Nations to protect and respect human rights without distinction, such as 'race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status'.[22]

In order to identify the bearer's citizenship status, three types of colour-coded identity cards have been issued since 1989. Pink cards are for full

citizens, blue for associate citizens and green for naturalized citizens. These new cards also mention ethnicity and religion. In addition to these three colour-coded cards, yellow colour cards are also issued to those Rohingyas who were repatriated from Bangladesh to Myanmar with the assistance of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) after 1991–92. These yellow cards do not give them citizenship in Myanmar, and were only provided to those Rohingyas who were repatriated from Bangladesh, meaning that the holder has returned from Bangladesh. The UNHCR objected to this and finally in 1995 it was able to convince the Burmese government that the authority must issue some form of residency identification. The Myanmar Immigration and Population Department (IPD) started issuing Rohingyas with a temporary stay permit, the Temporary Registration Card (TRC), which is also known as the 'white card'. However, it is explicitly stated that the card does not give the holder any evidence of citizenship.[23] More importantly, not all Rohingyas have received such a card.

It is important to mention here that during the May 1990 general elections Rohingyas were reportedly not only able to vote, but were also allowed to contest for membership of parliament. The National Democratic Party for Human Rights (NDPHR), a Rohingya-supported party, won four seats. However, subsequently the NDPHR was, like many other political parties which won seats in the 1990 election, deregistered by the Myanmar authorities. The inclusion on a family list is crucial to the Rohingya's ability to prove residency. Many of the Rohingyas were dropped from the family list if they were not present during a population check by the local authorities. If someone was not present at the time of making the list the authorities deleted him or her from the family list. Sometimes those individuals were able to prevent the deletion of their names from family lists by paying a 'fine', or bribes. Population counts are carried out at random by NaSaKa[24] (the name of NaSaKa changed to *NaKaPa* after the sacking of Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt in 2003). Usually authorities take a photograph of the family and then one photograph of each family member separately. People must pay for these photographs.

The Burma Citizenship Law of 1982 clearly represents an example of discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity. It makes distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences based on ethnic origin. According to a report by Amnesty International, this is done with the purpose and/or effect of nullifying or impairing the Rohingyas' recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the people of Myanmar.[25] This law is clearly not in accordance with international legal standards relating to citizenship or the reduction of statelessness. These

laws and practices make distinctions which are not permissible: distinctions relating to nationality, citizenship or naturalization in international law.

Restriction on mobility

The military regime has prohibited the Rohingyas their right to freedom of movement and selection of their places of residence within the state. According to the law, Rohingyas in northern Rakhine State must routinely apply for permission before travelling to other villages or towns. However, this law does not apply to the Rakhine population in the same Rakhine State. Rohingyas' freedom of movement, therefore, is considerably more limited than that of other residents of the Rakhine State. The travel permit is not that simple either. It has a lot of restrictions. If a Rohingya wants to travel to a village in the same township he or she needs a local travel pass; for travelling to another township, he or she needs to apply for a different kind of travel permit at the Immigration Department at the NaSaKa camp, the so-called 'Form 4'. If they do then they must have official permission and obtain a pass which they must pay for. Most Rohingyas cannot afford to pay for such permits on a regular basis. Since more than half of the Rohingyas are poor daily labourers, they are unable to pay for permits. Households who receive visitors from other townships must also reportedly register their guests if they are spending the night. Failure to do so can result in fines or other reprisals. Travel restrictions have further increased following the outbreak of communal violence in Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine State, in February 2001.

Consequently, Rohingyas are often unable to seek employment outside their village, or trade goods and produce. Their inability to travel freely greatly inhibits the Rohingyas' ability to earn a living and obtain proper health care. Freedom of movement is a fundamental human right, upon which other human rights are contingent. Article 13 of the UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights) states: 'Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including their own, and to return to their country.' Restrictions on the right to freedom of movement and the right to work may only be imposed if they are based on law, pursue a legitimate objective, such as protecting public order, and are strictly necessary. Although there is very little armed opposition, there is a large military presence in the Rakhine State.[26] Amnesty International reports: 'the sweeping restrictions on the movement of Rohingyas are disproportionate and discriminatory; they are imposed on all Rohingyas *because* they are Rohingyas, and not on members of other ethnic nationalities in Rakhine State. They are broad and indiscriminate in their application and as such are unlawful.'[27]

Forced unpaid labour

The security forces take Rohingyas for forced labour duties in Myanmar. They have to build, without wages, military establishments, roads, bridges, embankments, pagodas, schools, dispensaries and ponds. Extensive forced labour in particular, and other human rights violations, were the main reasons for the 1991–92 exodus of Rohingyas to Bangladesh. The International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (No. 29) prohibits any kind of forced labour, whether paid or unpaid. The Myanmar government acceded to this Convention in 1955. Also according to Article 23 (3) of the UDHR, 'just and favourable remuneration' must be paid. The ILO has raised its concerns with the Myanmar government about this practice for many years.

Consequently, in 1999 and 2000 the SPDC issued two orders which outlawed the practice of forced labour of civilians by both civilian and military authorities, making it a punishable offence. Eventually during September–October of 2001 the ILO sent a High Level Team (HLT) to Myanmar to assess the effectiveness of the SPDC attempts to eradicate forced labour. Ironically, forced labour of civilians was continuing in some regions, particularly in highly militarized areas, and the team reported accordingly.[28]Then the ILO appointed a liaison officer in Yangon in May 2002 in order to assist the authorities in eliminating the practice of forced labour. In May 2003 agreement was reached on a joint Plan of Action on forced labour, including the establishment of an independent facilitator who could receive complaints from victims of forced labour or their representatives. The function of a facilitator is to conduct an initial assessment of such cases and report those cases to the appropriate authorities, so that judicial or informal remedies could be obtained. The implementation of this Plan of Action, however, including the facilitator, has not occurred. On the contrary, in 2004 many persons appeared to have been sentenced to death for high treason after having been in contact with the ILO or on matters of ILO concern.[29]

In 2003 the ILO stated that while forced labour had recently decreased in central Myanmar it had continued in northern Rakhine State. It reported: 'While there is probably less use of forced labour in central parts of Myanmar, the situation in areas near the Thai border where there is continuing insecurity and a heavy presence of the army, as well as in northern Rakhine State (which also has a heavy presence of security forces), is particularly serious and appears to have changed little.'[30] The NaSaKa, the military and the police continue to demand forced labour from the Rohingya population. People are forced to maintain camps, build and repair roads, work on plantations belonging to NaSaKa, provide firewood to camps, fetch water, bake bricks, and to perform sentry duty at night in

their own village. Rohingyas are sometimes paid for their forced labour, but the amount is well below market rates.[31]

The kind of forced labour and its frequency, however, differs from place to place, and appears to be related to the attitude of local officials and number of soldiers or NaSaKa camps near the village. Forced labour on infrastructure projects, mainly roads, is one of the most common forms of the practice in Myanmar, as the military forces civilians to construct new roads or repair existing ones. Another common type of forced labour is sentry duty, often in addition to other types of forced labour.[32] Those who can pay can often avoid forced labour. It is often the poorest who must undertake forced labour, as those who are usually able to pay a bribe to the authorities can be excused from forced labour.[33] The practice of forced labour prevents the poorer Rohingyas from having sufficient time to earn cash income to sustain them and achieve food security for their families.[34]

Model villages for non-Rohingyas

The creation of model villages is a unique way of terrorizing the Rohingyas in the Rakhine state. Many Rakhine Buddhists and other non-Rohingyas are relocated to especially established 'model villages' in Northern Rakhine State. The idea is to make the Rohingyas the minority in those villages in the long run. The majority people of model villages are poor Rakhines from other parts of Rakhine State. Others include poor *Bama* from the central plains, retired civil servants, former prisoners, former insurgents (Communist Party of Burma and Rakhine armed groups) and ethnic minorities such as the Kamein, Daingnet, Mro and Thet, who live in the highlands near the border with Bangladesh and Chin State. Before 1992 several model villages were built in Rakhine State, mainly in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships. After the formation of the NaSaKa in 1992, the building of model villages reportedly intensified in other areas of Arakan. There are 26 model villages in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships. In practice the NaSaKa is responsible for implementing the model village programme in Rakhine State. However, officially the programme is under the supervision of the Ministry for Development of Border Areas and National Races, better known under its Myanmar acronym 'NaTaLa'.[35] Therefore model villages in Rakhine State are locally known as 'NaTaLa villages.'

In every model village there are nearly 100 families. Each family reportedly receives 1 to 4 acres of land, a pair of oxen and a house. The majority of these model villages are built on the confiscated land of the Rohingyas. Houses and other facilities such as schools and health centres in the model villages are often built by forced labour by the Rohingya population. The newly settled residents in model villages do not cultivate the land allocated

to them. Instead they rent out those lands to Rohingya farmers. Often these farmers are the same people from whom the land was originally confiscated. Although the official decree of 1997 prohibits the renting of land by inhabitants of model villages, the practice still continues.[36]

The policy of building model villages has created much hardship for the Rohingyas. The confiscation of land from Rohingyas to build model villages deprives them of opportunities to sustain their livelihood, as these are in almost all cases grazing grounds for their cattle, rice fields or shrimp farms. The Rohingya population of nearby villages are often forced to build the houses and other facilities of the model villages. They are not only forced to offer their services but also to work without pay. In some cases they also had to provide some of the building materials. All of these factors have greatly contributed to increasing poverty and food insecurity for the Rohingya population.

Rohingyas' land confiscation and evictions

In addition to confiscating lands for migrated residents in model villages, the building and the extension of military camps, mainly for the NaSaKa, have also led to land confiscation. Furthermore, lands have been confiscated for commercial purposes, mainly to establish shrimp farms but also rice fields for NaSaKa members. Rohingyas reportedly receive no compensation. In 2002 the NaSaKa reportedly began to implement land use policies strictly which led to a number of evictions of Rohingyas.[37] Due to the growth in population over the years, some families had built their houses on land registered as paddy fields. The government has issued expulsion orders to dismantle their homes on those lands. On the other hand, many local shrimp farms were ordered to be destroyed or to be planted with paddy because they were established on land registered for other purposes.[38]

The right to housing is a fundamental right for an adequate standard of living and for the enjoyment of other human rights. As stated in the UN-HABITAT, the UN Human Settlements Programme: 'the requisite imperative of housing for personal security, privacy, health, safety, protection from the elements and many other attributes of a shared humanity, has led the international community to recognize adequate housing as a basic and fundamental human right'.[39] This right is enshrined in Article 25 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Every child has the right to adequate housing which is enshrined in Principle 4 of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959). Under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC, 1989), each state is obliged, in cases of need, to provide material assistance and support programmes to families and children, particularly with regard to housing (Article 27(3)). Also, according to

Article 14(2)(h) of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1981) every state is obliged to eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas so that they enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing The Myanmar government has signed both the CRC and CEDAW conventions. In its resolution on Forced Evictions in 1993, the UN Human Rights Commission stated that: 'the practice of forced eviction constitutes a gross violation of human rights, in particular the right to adequate housing' and urged governments to 'confer legal security of tenure on all persons currently threatened with forced eviction and to adopt all necessary measures giving full protection against forced eviction, based upon effective participation, consultation and negotiation with affected persons or groups'.[40] However, the Burmese government has violated all the international conventions.

Extortion and arbitrary taxation

Rohingyas in Rakhine State are subjected to extortion and arbitrary taxation. These taxes vary from collecting firewood and bamboo to fees for the registration of deaths and births in the family lists,[41] on livestock and fruit-bearing trees, and even on football matches. The amount of taxes that they have to pay is imposed in an arbitrary fashion by the local authorities. In addition to taxation on the food grains and on various agricultural produce of the Rohingya, shrimp tax, vegetables tax, tree tax, animal or bird tax (for cow, buffalos, goats, fowl), roof tax, house building or repair taxes and so on are collected by force. Every Rohingya who breeds cattle or other domestic livestock has to pay a certain amount for each and every item they possess. Every newborn or death of the above has to be reported, paying a fee. On 1 July 2006 the NaSaKa summoned five people, namely, Ali Ullah (35) son of Hossain, Nazu Meah (25) son of Hossain Ali, Kafiyat Ullah (45) son of Kamal, Amin Ullah (27) son of Karim Ullah and Nur Zahan (22) daughter of Faruk. At the camp, they were told by NaSaKa officials that they would have to hand over one head of cattle and 1000 kyat each within a day. If they did not comply with the order the villagers would be punished. The NaSaKa did not explain to the villagers why they had to provide the cattle and money. The NaSaKa simply stated that they needed it urgently. Out of fear they provided one head of cattle and 1000 kyat each to the NaSaKa on 2 July 2006.[42]

The worst form of taxation that has been the heaviest burden for rice paddy farmers in Rakhine State, and in Myanmar as a whole, is the government 'rice tax'. Under this system farmers were required to sell a portion of their harvest at fixed prices to the state Myanmar Agricultural Products Trade (MAPT). These prices are well below the market rate, varying from

half to one-eighth of the market price. As in other areas of Myanmar, the amount of rice tax people have had to pay is based on the size of cultivated land area instead of on the actual yield of the rice harvest. Although the rice tax was abolished in April 2003 by the Myanmar government,[43] many Rohingyas reported to an Amnesty International official that instead the authorities have imposed several other new taxes and have increased existing ones. They even had to pay football taxes during 2003 and early 2004. There have been several reports of Rohingyas being arrested and accused of breaking various regulations.[44]

Registration of births and deaths

By law, every Rohingya has to report to the local authority any changes in the family list. In other words, any birth or death must be reported to the authorities. For the registration of births and deaths in families, Rohingyas have to pay fees to the Village Peace and Development Council (VPDC)[45] or the NaSaKa, depending on which of them is responsible for keeping the family lists.[46] Otherwise, the authority will not register the birth of a new baby and consequently that baby will never be considered to be a citizen of Myanmar. The amounts people have to pay to register births are different from place to place, and vary from 1000 to 8000 kyat.[47] If they are unable to pay they have to work for the authorities with no wage instead of paying the fee. There have also been reports that since mid-2002 some pregnant women have had to register themselves in person at the nearest NaSaKa camp, which may be some hours walk away from their village. According to some testimonies women were asked to show their faces and their abdomens and then they were raped.[48]

Since 1 May 2005, some committees comprising of Nasaka, police, army and immigration, in the pretext of checking family lists of Rohingya had gone to different villages of Buthidaung and Maungdaw. The authorities detained Rohingya women at the nearby NaSaKa camps, where they have been forcibly raped by NaSaKa personnel after drinking alcohol at night, while they have no option either to escape or to get help by any means. Victims are forced to pay bribes to NaSaKa nurses to check whether they are pregnant or not. But, if they failed to pay a bribe, the nurse would report their pregnancies. Victims would however be exempted from such accusation, after paying Kyat 10000 to 12000 per head to the nurses. Family members of the victims also have to send food and other necessities to the NaSaKa detention center for the detainees. But, some detainees refused to have food from their relatives, in protest at the sexual harassment against them in the camp.

All these are gross violations of international law. States may only impose taxes to the extent and in a manner that will not violate fundamental

human rights. According to Amnesty International, the above taxation on the Rohingya population does not meet this criterion: taxation is often imposed arbitrarily, sometimes even at the momentary whim of local officials, in violation of the freedom from arbitrary deprivation of property (Art. 17(2) of the UDHR). Taxation is often excessive, driving people to destitution, in violation of the right to an adequate standard of living (Article 25[1]) of the UDHR. Imposing heavy taxes on registration of births and deaths in families also interferes arbitrarily with family life, in violation of the right to be free from such interference (Article 12 of the UDHR).

Restriction on marriage

Since 1992, the regime has introduced a regulation that everyone in Northern Rakhine State is required to ask for prior permission of the authority before getting married. However, this restriction applies only to the Muslim population in this area, and not on the Buddhist Rakhine population, nor on any of the other smaller ethnic minority groups living in the region. Rohingyas and Muslims living in other parts of Myanmar are also not affected by this policy. However, prior permission itself may not be a problem, but what is problematic is that the authorities demand large amounts in taxes from people who ask for permission to get married. In some cases people have had to wait for two to three years to get permission, even after paying large sums of money, and they have had to go to the NaSaKa camp several times for it. According to the UDHR (Article 16): 'Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.' The excessive and arbitrary fees and taxes imposed on Rohingya couples wishing to marry inhibits their ability to exercise this right. In general, most Rohingya couples must pay a substantial amount of money to the NaSaKa, varying from 50 000 to 300 000 kyat. Usually both the bride and groom each pay the same amount of money. Even after payment, sometimes permission is not given by the authority. This restriction especially affects poor people, who are unable to obtain such large amounts of money. Consequently, in some villages there have been no marriages at all since the late 1990s. There are also consistent reports of young couples fleeing to Bangladesh because this is the only way for them to get married. Once in Bangladesh it is very difficult for them to return, as their names have often been removed from their family list by the authorities.

All these restrictions on marriages have a strong negative impact on poor families. The majority of the parents cannot afford to pay for the high permission fees, and are left to take care of their unmarried youth in their homes. Some people have also gone into serious debt to pay for marriage permission. When they are unable to reimburse their debts, they have fled

to Bangladesh.[49] However, when they are in Bangladesh they are merely branded as economic migrants without realizing their unbearable plights. The new arrivals face arrests and deportation by the security forces. Sometimes, tense situations have existed in the refugee camps between the camp authorities and the refugees. Many refugees were detained and punished by the Bangladesh authorities.[50] In fact, the presence of the UNHCR and other UN agencies and NGOs do not provide the necessary safeguard to the refugees. They cannot fulfil the social, economic, political and spiritual needs of the Rohingya refugees. The new arrivals that entered into Bangladesh after September 1992 are not recognized as UN refugees and are not accepted in refugee camps. Nearly 350 000 undocumented Rohingya refugees have entered into Bangladesh. In a report on the plight of Rohingya people to Bangladesh, the International Federation of Human Rights League (FIDH) pointed out that the UNHCR is 'entrapped in an insane policy, in complete contradiction to its mandate'.[51]

Other human rights violations

The Rohingyas have, no doubt, been subjected to the worst kinds of human rights violations. Besides the above tortures there are many other peculiar ways of violation of human rights in the Rakhine state. They are: (1) Extrajudicial killings, summary executions, arbitrary arrests and torture, destruction of mosques, cemeteries and religious schools. (2) Abuse of Women: The authorities are collecting Rohingya girls from the villages under the pretext of 'women development'. There are reports of sexual violations on these girls. For example, on 27 April 2004 Shajeeda, a 12-year old daughter of Noor Kalam of Kyikan Pyin (Kawarbil) village under Maungdaw township of Arakan, was raped and strangled by a Nasaka troop from headquarters situated at the same place.[52] (3) Deprivation of Right to Education: Since the promulgation of the new Burma Citizenship Law in 1982 the Rohingya students are denied the right to education. It becomes a highly problematic matter to pursue higher studies while professional courses are barred to them. All professional institutes are situated outside Arakan and so the Rohingya students are unable to study in them due to travel prohibition. Rohingya students, who stood in selection tests and won formal admission to various seats of learning located in Rangoon and Burma proper, are unable to pursue their studies as they are not allowed to travel. Rohingya students have to stop their further studies.

The dynamics of state terrorism

In response to the above situation, several Rohingya armed groups have been organized during recent decades. These include the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), and the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front

(ARIF), both of which in 1996 jointly formed the Rohingya National Alliance (RNA).[53] In 1998 two RSO factions and the ARIF merged into the Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO).[54] After the arrival of Rohingya Muslim refugees during 1991–92 in Bangladesh, some of the Rohingya armed groups became active in the refugee camps there, where they reportedly attempted to recruit people. Since then these groups have split into several small factions. They are reportedly operating from small bases in the Bangladesh–Myanmar border area, and do not appear to have a large number of troops. There are also a number of other armed groups which remain active in the Bangladesh–Myanmar border areas. These include the National Unity Party of Arakan (NUPA) and the Arakan Army.

Following the 'Nagamin' ('Dragon King') operation of the Myanmar army in Arakan, more than 200000 Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh in 1978.[55] This campaign was officially aimed at 'scrutinising each individual living in the state, designating citizens and foreigners in accordance with the law and taking actions against foreigners who have filtered into the country illegally'. Consequently, widespread killings, rape and destruction of mosques and further religious persecution took place. Of course, due to the international pressure the Myanmar government allowed most of the Rohingyas who had fled to Bangladesh to return. However, though the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had a presence in the refugee camps in Bangladesh, it does not have any representative in the Rakhine State, nor was it involved in the repatriation process.

After the creation of the NaSaKa in 1992 the restriction on the freedom of movement and other abuses such as arbitrary taxation has increased significantly. Consequently, in 1992 a new wave of over a quarter of a million Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh. They reported widespread forced labour, as well as summary executions, torture and rape.[56] From the end of 1992 until early 1994 the Bangladeshi authorities, after an understanding had been reached with the Myanmar government, forcibly repatriated some 50000 Rohingyas across the border. After a formal Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the UNHCR and the Myanmar government in November 1993, the UNHCR established a presence on the ground in Rakhine State to implement the reintegration programme and to provide protection for the returnees. The UNHCR initiated a voluntary mass repatriation and reintegration programme for the Rohingyas in April 1994. At the time international aid agencies expressed concerns about whether this repatriation process was in fact voluntary.[57]

Despite the presence of the UNHCR, Rohingyas continue to suffer from discrimination on the basis of their ethnicity, and various restrictions and

abuses at the hands of the local Myanmar authorities. Consequently, Rohingyas have continued to flee to Bangladesh. The exact number of new arrivals since 1996 is not clear, but according to a report by Amnesty International they are believed to be in the tens of thousands. The government of Bangladesh has been unable to handle the massive exodus of these refugees, and has denied these new arrivals access to the refugee camps. It has also not permitted the UNHCR to extend protection to them, claiming that they are 'economic migrants'. The mass repatriation of Rohingyas to Myanmar by the UNHCR took place from April 1994 to December 1995. Almost 20 000 Rohingyas are still in the two remaining refugee camps in Cox's Bazaar of Bangladesh.[58] The mass exodus has resulted in the weakening of resistance, despite the existence of seven Arakanese resistance groups including the Arakan Communist Party. Of all the nationalist movements, it is only the Arakan Liberation Party that has a military force, but its means are very limited.[59]

Effects of state terrorism

The state terrorist tactics of the Burmese regime on the Rohingyas have twofold implications: political and humanitarian. They are political because they constitute violations of human rights and flagrant denial of elementary liberty and freedom, particularly the liberty to continue living in their own homeland and in the homes of their ancestors. In a nutshell, the effects of state terrorism are the following.

Identity crisis

Absolute rejection of the citizenship of Rohingyas has made them homeless in their own homes. They have become stateless within the state.[60] The military regime has put up two options before the Rohingya people: either to accept a Burman melting pot and become Buddhist, or migration to alien lands. None of the Rohingyas could agree to an arrangement or system that compromises or jeopardizes their religious identity. Their historical homeland of Arakan is dear and sacred to them. There is no place for them which can accommodate and give them that moral, material, spiritual relief and need. Deliberate and persistent attempts have been made to impose the Burman culture on the Rohingyas, and this effort has become more vigorous in recent years under the military regime. The Rohingyas are to adopt and entertain no ideas but those of glorification of Burman race and culture and Buddhism. They have been told to discard Islamic names and adopt Burman names. Muslim place names have been changed and are being replaced with names attributed to the Buddhists or Buddhism. Hundreds of mosques have been demolished, including the historic Sandikhan mosque built in 1430 by an Arakan king.[61] The Muslim

students are brainwashed in schools and are allegedly told that Islam is alien to Burma. Their slogan is 'To be a Burmese is to be a Buddhist'. Islam and Islamic culture is always projected in distorted forms through the media.[62] Rohingyas are thus gradually losing their identity.

Socio-economic degradation

Myanmar has been categorized by the UN in 2004 as the least developed country in the world, but within Burma Arakan is the poorest of all regions. By any statistical indicator Rohingyas are the worst sufferers. They have sunk deep into the morass of poverty and hunger. Serious unemployment, deprivation from basic vocations like trade and commerce, prejudicial and racist laws or directives and extreme poverty have conspired to see them die of starvation or live a life of abject poverty and servitude. In every respect they are lagging behind others and remain stagnant and backward.

Elimination of the Rohingyas

Nearly 50 percent of the Rohingyas have been displaced from their homeland and are living in subhuman conditions, wandering from place to place in many countries of the world, as illegal immigrants or unofficial refugees with an uncertain future. Now and again planned expulsion operations have been carried out by the military regime, resulting in the expulsion of the Rohingyas from their ancestral homeland. In addition, non-Rohingyas are being brought in to the Rohingya homeland in waves to replace them. All these are designed to eliminate the existence of the Rohingyas.

Conclusions

The state terrorism in Myanmar is so deep-rooted that is beyond comprehension. It is a problem of religious and political persecution and is a systematic elimination of an ethnic community from their own homeland of Arakan. Rohingyas are being killed, tortured, raped, incarcerated and expelled from their homeland. The vast majority of Rohingyas are effectively denied Myanmar citizenship, and subjected to severe restrictions on freedom of movement, forced labour, forced evictions, and extortion and arbitrary taxation. Other ethnic nationalities in the Northern Rakhine State are not subjected to the same extent to such restrictions and human rights violations. The combination of all these practices makes it almost impossible for Rohingyas to enjoy their right to an adequate standard of living.

The international community and peace-loving people of the world should come forward to investigate the real situation being faced by the Rohingyas and to take appropriate measures against the Burmese military regime and perpetrators of these crimes against humanity. The Rohingya problem needs an immediate, permanent and viable solution. In order to

ensure that the fundamental rights of Rohingyas are respected, the Myanmar government must put an end to all kinds of torture and exploitation. The government should fully cooperate with the International Labour Office's recommendations and technical assistance with regard to the total elimination of forced labour. The Myanmar government should amend or repeal its citizenship laws in order to bring them into line with international standards. Amnesty International has strongly recommended that the Myanmar government must implement the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 1969 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and its Optional Protocol.[63] No cause for hope seems imminent for the Rohingyas in Burma. The Rohingyas are still the victims of arbitrary arrest, killing, torture and rape. The new form of persecution is increasing everyday. It is only the return of democracy that is likely to break the age-old repressive rule of the Burmans over the Rohingyas of Myanmar.

Notes

1. Islam, Syed Serajul (1996), 'Myanmar's (Burma) Road to Socialism and Indonesia's New Order: A Comparative Analysis', *Asian and African Studies*, **5** (2), pp. 183–96.
2. Chomsky, Noam and Edward S. Herman (1979), *The Political Economy of Human Rights*, Vol. 1, Boston, MA: South End Press.
3. Sluka, Jeffrey A. (ed.) (2000), *Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
4. Sluka, Jeffrey A. (2000).
5. Some historians suggest that Arabs brought Islam into this area even before this date. For details see al-Ahsan, Abdullah (1994), 'Spread of Islam in pre-Mughal Bengal', *Intellectual Discourse*, **2** (2), p. 46.
6. Yunus, Mohammad (1994), *A History of Arakan*, Chittagong: Magenta Colour, p. 7.
7. Yunus, Mohammad (1994), p. 34.
8. See Yunus, Mohammad (1994). See also Sardesi, D.R. (2000), *Southeast Asia: Past and Present*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, p. 105.
9. Thaib, Lukman (1999), *Politics and Government in Southeast Asia*, Bangi: National University of Malaysia.
10. Tinker, Hugh (1967), *The Union of Burma*, London: Oxford University Press. See also Hall, D.G.E. (1988), *A History of Southeast Asia*, (4th edn), London: MacMillan, p. 151.
11. Thaib, Lukman (1999), *Politics and Government in Southeast Asia*. See also Smith, Martin (2002), *Burma (Myanmar): The Time for Change*, London: Minority Rights Group International, p. 18.
12. Shwe, Lu Maung (1989), *Burma: Nationalism and Ideology*, Dhaka: University Press, p. 23. He wrote: 'The British government asked for a sound proof of their willingness to form an independent state together, [Thus] all nations conference was held at Panglong in Shan state.'
13. Shwe, Lu Maung (1989), p. 39. This bill gave birth to protests and riots, especially in Kachin State where Christians were in the majority. The Muslim community also put up a strong protest.

14. *Wall Street Journal*, 8 April 1992.
15. *Wall Street Journal*, 8 April 1992.
16. The Myanmar Government has published a list of them. According to this list, the Rakhine comprise seven ethnic groups – Rakhine and six smaller ethnic minority groups of Northern Rakhine State: Kamein, Kwe Myi, Daingnet, Maramagyi, Mro and Thet – but it does not recognize the Rohingyas. See Colonel Hla Min (2001), 'Political situation of Myanmar and its role in the region', Office of Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, Union of Myanmar, February, p. 95–9.
17. Amnesty International, AI Index ASA 16/005/2004.
18. Amnesty International, AI Index ASA 16/005/2004.
19. Burma Citizenship Law, Pyithu Hlittaw Law No. 4 of 1982, entered into force on 15 October 1982.
20. Under Sec. 67 of the law, the Central Body is to be formed by the government and comprised of the Ministers of Home Affairs, Defence and Foreign Affairs.
21. See the SPDC's reply to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 'List of issues to be taken up in connection with the consideration of the second periodic report of Myanmar', CRC/C/Q/MMR/2, 6 February 2004. The reply was submitted to the committee in April 2004.
22. Amnesty International, AI Index ASA 16/005/2004. See also Human Rights Watch/Asia (1996), 'Burma: the Rohingya Muslims; ending a cycle of exodus?' New York, September, pp. 22–7.
23. Article 2, *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.
24. The NaSaKa are the security forces most frequently cited by the Rohingyas as committing human rights violations against them. NaSaKa is the Bama acronym for 'Nay-Sat Kut-kwey Ye'. It is a border task force, consisting of the police, Military Intelligence (MI), the Lon Htein (internal security or riot police), customs officials, and the Immigration and Manpower Department (IMPD). The NaSaKa was established in 1992, initially only in Northern Rakhine State, and is believed to be under the direct command of the SPDC, in this case the Western Military Command with its headquarters in Sittwe. According to credible sources, there are nine NaSaKa Sectors, eight in Maungdaw Township and one in Buthidaung Township, starting with Sector 1 in northern Maungdaw, to the south all along the border to Sector 9 in Buthidaung. The latter sector also covers parts of Rathedaung Township. There are several NaSaKa camps within each sector.
25. Amnesty International, AI Index ASA 16/005/2004.
26. For example, a 30-year-old Rohingya woman from southern Maungdaw township faced severe consequences for travelling without a permit to Bangladesh in December 2003 to find her husband, who had fled to avoid arrest for overstaying his travel permit. Shortly after she returned to her village in Myanmar, the VPDC Chairman discovered that she had been to Bangladesh without a permit. She gave him a bribe of 5000 kyat but the chairman informed the NaSaKa anyway. The woman explained what happened to her then: 'The NaSaKa and the MI called me to their office and asked me why I had travelled to Bangladesh without permission. I denied it and I was so afraid. The NaSaKa beat me with a bamboo stick and they also detained me for 24 hours in their camp. Because of their threats, I offered to work for them in their camp and I cooked for them for seven days.' It is more difficult to move within Arakan. After the communal violence of February 2001 in Sittwe, it has become almost impossible for Rohingyas to visit Sittwe. If Rohingyas from Sittwe manage to travel to Northern Rakhine State, it is extremely difficult for them to return to Sittwe, let alone travel to Yangon.

    A 28-year-old Rohingya man from northern Maungdaw explained the situation in his area: 'Over the last year [2003], the NaSaKa have imposed strict restrictions on our movement. We used to travel almost everywhere in Maungdaw with a [local travel pass] from the Chairman. But now, we cannot leave our village without permission of the NaSaKa. Each NaSaKa sector has its own laws. It all depends on their respective commanders. It is easier for us to visit Bangladesh then Maungdaw.'

A 40-year-old Rohingya man from northern Maungdaw explained the drastic consequences of his inability to travel: 'Six months ago [mid-2003] my elder son aged 18 died from a gall bladder infection. I took him to the village health centre where a Burmese doctor examined him and told me to take him immediately to Sittwe hospital or to a hospital in Bangladesh. I took my son to the NaSaKa camp, showed them the doctor's referral and begged them to give me immediate permission to go to Sittwe hospital or to Bangladesh. But they told me to go to Maungdaw hospital. In Maungdaw the doctor said he could do nothing for him. So, I returned to my village and again I applied for travel permission. By then it was too late and my son died without any treatment.' See Amnesty International, ASA 16/001/2004, London, 1 April 2004, pp. 17–21.

27. See 'Union of Myanmar (Burma): human rights abuses against Muslims in the Rakhine (Arakan), State', Amnesty International, May 1992, AI Index 16/06/92; and 'Myanmar/Bangladesh: Rohingyas – the search for safety', Amnesty International, September 1997, AI Index ASA 13/07/97.
28. International Labour Office, Governing Body, 'Report of the High Level Team', GB. 282/4, 282 Session, Geneva, November 2001.
29. For more information on this, see: 'Myanmar: the administration of justice: grave and abiding concerns', Amnesty International, ASA 16/001/2004, London, 1 April 2004, pp. 17–21.
30. International Labour Office, Governing Body, Sixth Item on the Agenda, 'Development concerning the question of the observance by the government of Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930' (No. 29), GB.286/6, 286th Session, Geneva, March 2003.
31. A 23-year-old Rohingya man from southern Buthidaung provided details about his experience of forced labour: 'In our village, I have to be a sentry four nights a month. There are four sentry posts and four people must guard in each post every night . . . This is common. When the NaSaKa of Buthidaung or the police from nearby villages need any labour, they send an order to our VPDC Chairman and he collects the labourers and sends them to Buthidaung. In my view, the use of labour has increased . . . Every time they had new jobs for us: digging mud, repairing a road, collecting wood and bamboo from the jungle, etc. [In February 2004] I worked to consolidate the jetty and put stones to repair the embankment of the river. There is also an MI camp close to our village and they also requested labour. I must work two or three times a month. The last time was about 20 days ago [January 2004] . . . We are never paid for this work and do not even receive any food. Five or six months ago [second half of 2003], I also had to work at a new model village . . . The people from our village are poor and cannot pay to avoid labour or to hire someone else to do it.'

    Another Rohingya man from southern Buthidaung explained what happened to him: 'There is a NaSaKa camp inside our village and there is a brick baking yard inside their camp area . . . To build their camp they confiscated 64 kani [About 25 acres. One acre is approximately 2.5 kani] of land from the villagers and they now have their own vegetable garden, paddy fields, brick-baking yard and about 20 houses. This entire area is fenced with bamboo and wooden poles. We have to maintain all their things [garden, rice fields, and houses] and repair the fence every year. I had to work in this camp, sometimes twice a month, sometimes five times a month. [January 2004] was the worst. I had to work two days inside the camps and to supply 15 logs for firewood. Altogether I had to work 17 days for the NaSaKa.' See Amnesty International, AI Index ASA 16/005/2004.
32. A 28-year-old Rohingya man from northern Maungdaw reported his experience of sentry duty and other types of forced labour: 'In my own hamlet, the NaSaKa sent 12 men every night to perform sentry duty, which means a total of 36 men for the village tract . . . Every day the NaSaKa recruits some people from our village to extract the mud from the moat. They also demand labour to carry drinking water from the stream at the bottom of the hill to their camp on the top of the hill. They need at least 10 labourers from our village on a daily basis. This is the average but sometimes they need a large number of labourers, especially just after the monsoon when they need to build a new fence around the hill and clear the bushes on the hillsides. Last month I worked once inside the NaSaKa camp and twice I sent someone else to replace me.'

A 25-year-old Rohingya man from southern Maungdaw stated: 'Sentry duty is ongoing in my village. For the last 10 years it has never stopped even for one night. I used to do sentry duty in my village four to five nights a month. Sometimes the rate of these duty increases, either when many people pay to avoid it or when the NaSaKa received any news of security problems.' Amnesty International, AI Index ASA 16/005/2004.

33. A 56-year-old Rohingya man from northern Maungdaw provided the following information: 'They are now building a road from NaSaKa Sector 2 HQ to NaSaKa Sector 3 HQ. There was a road before but they are making it wider. There are nine Village Tracts under the NaSaKa Sector 2, and all the people, even the women and children, have to work. In my Village Tract alone there are 700 houses. They ordered to start the work on the 1st day of February [2004] and the work is still going on. Some people are collecting pebbles from the river. Each family has been ordered to supply 100 baskets of pebbles. They have now completed three miles and they are putting stones on it. I was also asked to supply pebbles and to work on the road. But my son and my wife suggested that we sell some chickens and goods. It is better to pay some money. I discussed the matter with our [VPDC] Chairman and he asked me for 10 000 kyat. This is really a minimum. I was lucky and paid this, because this time no one is spared. Everyone must go, even the imam, madrassah teachers and the government schoolteachers. But of course only the Muslims, not the [Rakhines]! Each family from our village received 600 kyat to build this road.'

    A 23-year-old Rohingya man from northern Maungdaw stated in February 2004: 'After the harvest was completed [in late 2003 / early 2004], the NaSaKa started a big road construction project. They have begun to widen and elevate the road from Maungdaw to Taung Pyo. There are 1200 houses in my village. Over the last ten days, they ordered landless people to work on road construction and they demanded 50 000 to 250 000 kyat from those who possess land. They also collect this money to build the road. I saw with my own eyes 50 people from my hamlet working on the road. In my hamlet there are 200 houses and 50 people are recruited for one day. I have never worked as a forced labourer and I used to pay 1500 kyat every month to cover my sentry duty and other labour work. At the moment, they are using labourers for the road, but usually they recruit them to repair their houses, to make fences around their camps, to collect firewood for them, to carry their belongings, etc. This is done by the NaSaKa.' Amnesty International, AI Index ASA 16/005/2004.

34. A 50-year-old Rohingya man from southern Maungdaw reported his inability to earn a living because of forced labour duties: 'Sometimes I had to work three times a week . . . Our NaSaKa camp is large with 80 NaSaKa men and 20 of them live in it with their families. There are a lot of houses in it and almost everyday they need labour. Poor people are always suffering in our village. The rich men can pay to avoid it and those connected to the authorities do not have to go. So the poor have to perform double duty. This is why I had to work up to three times a week. I also used to work as a sentry four times a month. So I did not have much time to work for my family. I could work for myself for about 15 days a month. I do not have any land and it was very difficult to survive.'

    The same man was mistreated because he was ill and unable to perform forced labour: 'About one and a half years ago [mid–2002], [the leader of a group of houses reporting to the VPDC] recruited me for forced labour. I was sick and asked him to replace me but he refused because I could not pay him any money. During the same morning he called me to the VPDC office. The Chairman told me: "if you cannot pay, then you must go, even with your fever!" . . . I went home but the next day the NaSaKa called me to their camp and beat me up severely with their boots and with a stick. They fined me two big chickens for disobeying the Chairman's order.' See Amnesty International, AI Index ASA 16/005/2004.

35. The Central Committee for the Development of Border Areas and National Races was formed in May 1989, soon after the Myanmar government signed the first ceasefire agreements with armed groups in northern Shan State who formerly belonged to the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). In September 1992 this committee was upgraded to a Ministry. See 'Concise of Master Plan for Development of Border Areas and

National Races', Ministry for Progress of Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs, Yangon, Myanmar, 23 June 1994.

36. A 45-year-old Rohingya man from Rathedaung explained the impact of the establishment of model villages near him: 'Five years ago, they established a NaTaLa village near [a village]. Last year, they set up another one close to [another village]. It has about 100 houses and I had to work on that. It is about seven kilometers from my village. The Chairman instructed us that the people from our village had to build seven houses and we did it. If 10 people work together, it takes five days to build one house. I built one house and other villagers built the other houses. I also had to make fences around the houses. The new settlers arrived during the last rainy season [mid-2003]. They were Burmese, not [Rakhine].'

    A 22-year-old Rohingya man from southern Maungdaw had his land confiscated when a model village was constructed: 'My family had 5 kanis [2½ kani is 1 acre] of land. But these fields were confiscated by the NaSaKa about two years ago [early 2002]. There is a NaTaLa village in our area, which was established in 1995 or 1996, shortly after the NaSaKa was formed. Since then, every year, the NaSaKa is extending this village by bringing in five to six new families a year. Two years ago, the NaSaKa brought a few Burmese families in this NaTaLa village and confiscated our land, my family's land as well as others' land too. I remember that, the time we lost our land, they brought in 30 new families from Upper Myanmar. Moreover, we had to build houses for them with forced labour in late 2001 and early 2002. Our life became much harder after we lost our land. We were a farming family and suddenly we became a labour family.' Amnesty International, AI Index ASA 16/005/2004.
37. Andersen, Lisbeth Garly (1997), 'Analysis of the livelihood situation of the Muslim population in Northern Rakhine State', UNHCR Report, 31 July, p. 11.
38. A 27-year-old Rohingya man from central Maungdaw reported in early 2004: 'The eviction process started about two years ago. First they evicted 40 houses in [a village] near Maungdaw. Eighteen families protested and refused to dismantle their houses. They were arrested and sent to Buthidaung jail. They are still there. They detained mostly the head of the family but they also jailed some women, even one pregnant woman. She gave birth inside the jail. 18 people are still in jail about this case. After that, they evicted 15 houses in [another village], also near Maungdaw. Then they evicted 60 houses in my village. My house was among them. This happened one year ago [2003]. I did not receive any written order from the NaSaKa, but the NaSaKa called our Chairman and provided him with a list of houses with the name of each family head. The Chairman summoned all the people mentioned in the list. He ordered us to vacate the land and explained: "The land where your houses stand is registered as paddy land. So, you must leave." Nobody dared to protest after what happened in the other villages. I was given five days time to leave my house and dismantle it. We were not given any other place to go.'

    A 35-year-old Rohingya man from northern Maungdaw reported extreme impoverishment as a result of land confiscation: 'I had a house and one kani of paddy field. But in 1995, my land was confiscated together with other people's land. After I lost my land, I started renting a plot to do cultivation but I did not have any oxen, so I had to hire oxen to plough. Because of this, I could not make any profit. Then I decided to work as a labourer on other people's land in order to make ends meet. But now jobs have become very scarce and I felt compelled to leave my village and come to Bangladesh . . . Apart from forced labour there was no work in my village. My family spent many days without even one meal a day. My children became sick due to malnutrition and I also became ill. I had nothing to sell except my utensils and a few chickens.' Amnesty International, AI Index ASA 16/005/2004.
39. *Housing Rights Legislation, Review of International and National Legal Instruments*, United Nations Housing Rights Programme, Report No. 1, UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 2002, p. 1.
40. UN Human Rights Commission Resolution 1993/77: Forced Evictions, paragraphs 1 and 3.

41. Maungdaw, 20 June 2005: 'Nasaka authority has been extracting money from villagers of Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships of Arakan State, since June 19, 2005. After forming some committees comprising with Nasaka, Immigration, Army, Military Intelligent (MI), police, Village Peace and Development Council (VPDC) members are extracting money showing legal projects such as taking photographs and checking family lists of villagers' money, said a trader from Maungdaw. When asked a villager of Naqakura village of Maungdaw, he said, "On June 3, 2005 an inquiry committee comes to my home and all the family members have to get out and have a queue in front of the home while the authorities take a group picture of my family excluding my younger child. My child is neither enlisted in my family list nor enrolled in their list. For this reason, when I asked one of the officials, he says, if you give Kyat 12 000, your child will be enlisted." According to previous order of Nasaka, to enlist new-born children in government office, the parents of the children went to the concerned Nasaka and immigration office before. But, the concerned authorities deliberately delayed to register them. As a result, most of the new-born children were not enlisted appropriately in concerned departments, said a village elder that refused to mention his name. Occasionally, while the concerned authorities checked the family lists and met some new-born children have not been properly registered in their family lists. Accordingly, the concerned authorities blame to the head of the family and have to pay money to enlist the new born children in their books, he further added. The authorities collect Kyat 500 to 2000 for photographs per family according to their family status and to enlist a new born child they have to pay Kyat 1200 to the concerned authority. Besides, the villagers have to pay Kyat 20 000 to 30 000 per head whose family has a member left for foreign countries for works. But, they were exempted from the family list, said a family member whose son left for foreign country for supporting of his family.' Source: www.kaladanpress.org/ www.bnionline.net.
42. See www.kaladanpress.org /www.kaladanpress.com.
43. *New Light of Myanmar*, the SPDC official newspaper, 24 April 2003.
44. A 55-year-old Rohingya man from southern Maungdaw reported on taxation in his village: 'The government did not collect any paddy tax this year [2003]. We were hoping for this for a long time and we were very happy about that. But it creates other problems for us as other taxes have significantly increased. The VPDC and our Chairman are constantly asking for taxes for the NaSaKa, the military, the police and the MI camp. Our Chairman told us that it is our responsibility to provide this money because they are all providing security for us.'

    A 62-year old Rohingya man from Rathedaung reported discriminatory taxation of Rohingyas: 'This year [2003], the rice tax has been abolished. But, last November, our VPDC Chairman demanded money from us instead . . . Even those who have no paddy fields and only a yard around the house also had to pay 10 000 kyat. Only widows were spared. I am landless now but I still had to pay 8000. These taxes were collected only from the Muslims, not from the 24 [Rakhine] villages around our village.' Amnesty International, AI Index ASA 16/005/2004.
45. The SPDC is represented at the local level by the Village Peace and Development Council (VPDC). The VPDC is locally known by its Myanmar acronym. Each village tract, usually a group of several villages or hamlets, has a VPDC Chairman. The NaSaKa routinely send their orders through the VPDC Chairman, who is a Rohingya if the whole population of the village tract is Rohingya. In other cases the VPDC Chairman is more likely to be a Rakhine.
46. A 45-year-old Rohingya man from Rathedaung reported death registration taxes: 'My mother died during the last Ramadan [November 2003]. When I went to the Immigration officer of the NaSaKa to register her death, they charged me 1500 kyat. It is very hard to live in Myanmar, especially for people like me who are poor. Rich men have to pay taxes but it is nominal for them, and the [Rakhines] who are living nearby do not need to pay such taxes at all.'

    A 26-year-old Rohingya man from northern Maungdaw explained the situation in his area: 'Now there is a new law for couples in our area. The husband must inform the

NaSaKa within three months of his wife's pregnancy. After she delivers the baby, the husband must obtain a delivery certificate from a midwife or a nurse and then go to the NaSaKa with it to register the child's name in the family book. He can then get the baby registered for 7000 or 8000 kyat. But if the father is late in informing the NaSaKa, he has to supply two bags of cement and two to 10 gallons of kerosene.'

A 27-year-old Rohingya man from central Maungdaw reported his family's experience: 'I have three children. I registered their names in my family list and each time I had to pay 6000 kyat. Our NaSaKa camp demands that all pregnant women go to their camp to have their picture taken. The pregnant women must show her belly and her face to the cameraman. This practice stopped two years ago, but over the last four months it started again in our area.' Amnesty International, AI Index ASA 16/005/2004.

47. The kyat is the Myanmar official currency. Officially 6 kyat is worth US$1; unofficially the rate fluctuates between 800–1000 kyats to US$1.
48. Buthidaung, 25 June 2005: 'Nasaka authorities are continuously committed rape to Rohingya women and extract money in northern Arakan, Burma. Rabia Khatun, 30, daughter of Abdul Amin, hailed from Nasir Village of Buthidaung Township was arrested and brought to the Nasaka camp of No. 21 of Nasaka area No. 9 on June 2, 2005, accusing her of illegal pregnancy. During her arrest she was gang raped by the Nasaka. Actually, she was not pregnant and her husband is in Saudi Arabia, said a village elder of Buthidaung township on condition of anonymity. Abdul Monaf, the victim's husband went to Saudi Arabia in 1989, after democracy uprising in Burma for supporting his family. During his stay in Middle East, he has been sending money regularly and that helped his wife healthy and economically sound. Nasaka has been attracted by her while checking her family list, and was brought to the camp, accusing of illegal pregnancy. But, she was gang raped by Nasaka even though the nurses did not check up her to prove pregnancy, said a villager who has close relation to the Nasaka. On hearing the news about Rabia Khatun, her husband sent money for her release and she was set free from the Nasaka custody on 3rd June 2005, after giving bribe Kyat 100 000 to the commander of camp No 21, said a relative of a victim. Some Rohingya couples married without taking any permission from the concerned authorities such as Fariza D/o Maulvi Meher Ali, 26, mother of 2 children, Afiya Khatun, D/o Fazal Karim, 20, mother of one child and Rahima Khatun, D/o Hasan Ali 28, mother of 2 children, were also arrested by the said committee on June 1, 2005 for their illegal marriage, as the authority deliberately hesitated to give permission to the applicants. All of them are hailed from the U Hla Pe Village of Buthidaung Township at Arakan state, Burma, said another elder of U Hla Pe village.' Source: www.kaladanpress.org/ www.bnionline.net.
49. A 56-year-old Rohingya man from northern Maungdaw reported his family's experience: 'In order to marry, the girl should be 18 and the boy 25. We have to fill in eight different forms and get two stamps. On each stamp there should be a picture of the boy and the girl, as well as a picture of the couple. If the age is okay, it will costs 50000 kyat for the couple to get marriage permission, but if there is any problem, it may cost at least 200000 kyat. There are some families who want to marry their very young daughter and they can only do this by paying a huge bribe . . . I selected a girl for my son. I had to pay 50000 kyat because my son is almost 25 and the girl is now over 18.'

    A 23-year-old Rohingya man from southern Buthidaung also experienced problems getting married: 'Two years ago I got engaged with a girl of my village. But I have no money to obtain permission to marry her. The fee is too high. The VPDC office asked for 10 000 to 15 000 kyat for the application and you must then bring this form to the NaSaKa office in Buthidaung. The NaSaKa then demanded 100 000 kyat. There has been no wedding in my village for more then five years. But if you cannot pay immediately, it is wasted because most officers are transferred within a year. So it is better to gather all the money first and then pay.'

    A 23-year-old Rohingya male from northern Maungdaw reported restrictions in his area: 'In my village, one must pay a large amount of money to get permission to marry. About three years ago, my elder brother got married and in order to obtain permission, my family had to pay 200000 kyat to the Chairman and to the NaSaKa while my

sister-in-law's family also had to pay 130000 to them. About two months ago, two of my close friends fled to Bangladesh with their fiancées because they could not obtain permission without paying a bribe, which they could not afford.' Amnesty International, AI Index ASA 16/005/2004.

50. Bangladesh, June 15, 2005**:** 'A teenage refugee girl was severely tortured by her employer in Teknaf upazila of Cox's Bazaar District, said Shifi Ullah from Dhumdumia makeshift camp. The victim is identified as Khalada Begum, 15, daughter of Noor Mohammad of Dumdumia makeshift camp of Teknaf police station under Cox's Bazaar District. On May 25, 2005, Khalada Begum has been employed as a servant of Abdul Gaffar, a shopkeeper of Teknaf upazila (sub-district) as her father was facing acute poverty. After three days later, on May 28, at about 11:00 pm, Noor Mohamed, the employer entered secretly Khaleda's bed room and attempted to rape while she was sleeping like a dog. But, he failed to rape her. And she was crying for help, the wife of the culprit run to Khaleda's bed room and he was caught with red-handed, according to the victim's mother.After the incident, there was some altercation between wife and husband. But, doing nothing to her husband, she reduced her anger by beating severely to the victim while she got many injuries, said the victim Khaleda. However, the next morning, on May 29, 2005, the victim was sent to her parents by the wife of the culprit. Being not satisfied, the culprit went to the makeshift camp of the victim in the evening of the day. After arrival, he beat up the victim again in front of her parents, accusing her of watch stolen from the culprit's. Seeing the incident, nearby refugees rushed to the spot and rescued the victim, said the father of the victim. The matter was reported to the concerned authorities but no action is taken against the culprit till writing of the report because of he is an influential person in this area. "This kind of torture on a girl in refugee camp is unthinkable in civilized country" said a local people who declined to mention his name. Noor Mohamed and his family fled to Bangladesh after the relocation of their village for military establishment in 1990. But his family has been staying out of the refugee camp after crossing Burma–Bangladesh border. He maintains his family doing various works such as selling vegetables, pulling rickshaw and day laborer in Teknaf area.' Source: www.kaladanpress.org/ www.bnionline.net.
51. See Human Rights Watch/Asia (1996), 'Burma: the Rohingya Muslims; ending a cycle of exodus?' New York, September, p. 6.
52. The other examples are the following: 'On 19th April 2003, Rohima Khatun, 23, daughter of Momtaz Meah of Yaung Chaung village of Buthidaung township, Arakan State, was gang raped by police while she was returning home, with her maternal uncle Moniruz Zaman, 62, son of Khalasan of the same village, after visiting her relatives at Razar Bill village of Rathedaung Township. A patrol team of three policemen halted them in a bushy place near Khadir Para village of Buthidaung Township. Two of the policemen separated Moniruz Zaman from his niece and was fastened with a rope to a tree. Then she was gang raped by all three policemen one after another. Then the policemen allowed them to go after forcibly taking signatures on blank paper. Although the case was reported to the Military Intelligence (MI-18) no action was taken against the culprits. On July 01, 2003 Nasima Khatoon (nicknamed), 25, a mother of a 2-year-old child, of Zee Bin Chaung (Zee Ban Khali) village in Maungdaw Township, Arakan State, was raped by a captain for two days in the headquarters of Nasaka (Border Security Force) Sector No.4 at Laikra village. On that day, the said captain summoned her to his camp and charged her to have received Kyat 2000000 (Kyat two millions) from her husband, who has been working in Malaysia for two years, and demanded an amount of Kyat 700000. When she denied the charge and rejected the demand the captain held her in the camp continually for two days committing rape on her.' See Press Statement of Arakan Rohingya National Organisations, 20 October 2004.
53. Press Statement by the Rohingya National Alliance (RNA), 28 September 1996.
54. Declaration of the Arakan Rohingya National Organizations (ARNO), 13 December 1998.
55. Boucaud, Andre and Louis Boucaud (1992), *Burma's Golden Triangle*, Bangkok: Asia Books.

56. Boucaud, Andre and Louis Boucaud (1992).
57. Médecins Sans Frontieres (1994), '*The Rohingyas: forcibly repatriated to Burma*', Paris, 22 September 1994: and MSF Holland Press Release, '*Awareness Survey: Rohingya Refugee Camps, Cox's Bazaar District, Bangladesh*', 15 March 1995.
58. 'Rohingyas subject to intimidation, threats and violence; Bangladesh puts heavy pressure on Rohingyas to return', MSF Holland Press Release, Dhaka/Amsterdam, 19 September 2003.
59. Boucaud, Andre and Louis Boucaud (1992).
60. Brown, David (1988), 'From peripheral communities to ethnic nations: separatism in Southeast Asia', *Pacific Affairs*, **61**, p. 200. Also see Brown, David (1994), *The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia*, London: Routledge.
61. Islam, Nurul (1999), *The Rohingya Problem*, Arakan: Arakan Rohingya National Organisation.
62. Islam, Nurul (1999).
63. Amnesty International, AI Index ASA 16/005/2004.

17 The Hmong rebellion in Laos: victims or terrorists?*

Gary Yia Lee

On 4 June 2005, a group of 171 people (20 Hmong and 9 Khmu families with 83 adults and 88 children) emerged from the forest and put themselves in the hands of a police officer in the Saisomboun Special Zone, north of Vientiane province, Laos. Their arrival had been well publicized as one of the few rebel groups that voluntarily surrendered. Officials of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) were soon on the scene, including four US citizens from the Fact Finding Commission on Laos (FFCL), a lobby group based in Oroville, California, USA. The US visitors were there to ensure that the group was given all the necessary help after its members had spent 30 years in the jungle refusing to be part of the Lao communist regime. The Americans were promptly arrested for 'liaising illegally' with the Hmong, but were released and deported a few days later after diplomatic pressure from the USA.[1]

The new arrivals were taken a few hours later by military trucks to Ban Chomthua in Phu Kout district, Xieng Khouang province, where they were allocated 50 hectares of farmland and other forms of aid. A team of officials is said to have welcomed them in 'appreciation for their support to [sic] the government's policy of alleviating poverty'.[2] For the Lao authorities, these Hmong were no more than villagers on the move in search of new farming land. There was no question of resistance or rebellion.

On the other side of the globe in New York, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan welcomed reports on 7 June 2005 on the humane treatment extended to 'Hmong, coming out of remote areas of Laos' and urged the Vientiane government to continue providing the necessary assistance in case a larger number decided to follow. The Secretary General said the UN was ready to provide every kind of humanitarian assistance to such groups if the Lao requested.[3] This was the first time the UN had acknowledged the existence of Hmong dissidents in Laos.

Ever since 1975 when the communist Pathet Lao (PL) gained control of Laos, reports have continued to circulate about the exploits and suffering of many thousands of Hmong resistance fighters in the remote jungles of that country. Initially the dissidents were part of a national liberation movement to bring back democracy and non-communist rule to Laos.

After many years with little progress, this mission changed since the 1990s to one where the few small groups which remain are simply fighting for survival as remnants of the so-called 'secret army' which the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recruited and supported during the Lao civil war from 1961 to 1973.[4] They now see their plight as the legacy of their involvement in this army and have thus been targeted by the new Pathet Lao regime for extermination.

This chapter will focus on this Hmong armed resistance in Laos, a case-study of a resistance that is the remnant of the Cold War between the US and China following the French withdrawal from Indochina in 1954, and the subsequent Vietnam War from 1961 to 1975. In a sense, the Hmong cannot be said to be rebels against the Lao PDR government, as they never joined the new regime to rise up later against it from within its own ranks. Rather, they have chosen to resist the new communist rule by being fiercely anti-communist and by isolating themselves in their mountain fortresses, refusing steadfastly to be under its political control.

Who are the Hmong?

The Hmong form one of the many tribal minorities scattered in the border regions of China, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Myanmar. They speak a language that belongs to the Miao-Yao branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family. Their social organization is based on the clan system through the sharing of specific surnames similar to those of the Chinese. As a diaspora, the Hmong have myths that foretell their eventual reunion one day by a messiah or king who will give them back their country, a country that was believed to have been lost somewhere in the distant past.

The Hmong have no historical records to show where they originated from. Claims have been made that they left Mesopotamia after the fall of the Tower of Babel, then gradually migrated north through Russia, Siberia and Mongolia before ending in their present location in southern China.[5] Other writers have refuted these claims, stating that the Hmong's original home has always been southern China before it was slowly conquered over the centuries by the Han Chinese, judging by the religious, language and cultural assimilation between the two groups.[6]

Although exact figures are not available, it is estimated that the Hmong number about 4 million worldwide today with 2.5 million in China, 787 000 in Vietnam, 315 000 in Laos, 120 000 in Thailand and 2000–3000 in Burma. The end of the civil war in Laos in 1975 also displaced more than 200 000 to the USA, 15 000 to France, 1800 to Australia, 1400 to Canada and 500 to Argentina.[7]

In Laos, the population census of 1995 shows the Hmong to number almost 7 per cent or 315 465 of the total population of 4 574 848 – being the

fourth-largest of more than 47 ethnic groups in the country.[8] They are found in all of northern Laos from Phongsaly down to Bolikhamxay, predominantly in the highlands. In general, the Hmong still carry on with subsistence dry swidden farming, supplemented by some hunting, fishing and gathering.[9]

Why the Hmong?

The Hmong began migrating from southern China to Laos during the last half of the nineteenth century, partly pushed by the Chinese Taiping Rebellions but largely in search of new farming lands. They settled in increasing numbers in Samneua, Phongsaly, Luang Prabang and Xieng Khouang provinces. After Laos became a French colony in 1893, they became subjected to heavy taxes. This official tax burden soon led Hmong leaders to organize an ambush against tax collectors in 1896 at Ban Khang Phanieng in Muong Kham, Xieng Khouang province.[10] The French were concerned enough to agree to negotiate with the recalcitrant Hmong, resulting in the establishment of Hmong Tasseng (or canton chief) positions that were accountable directly to the French authorities, by-passing local Lao administrators.

From this and other later dissident experiences, the Hmong gravitated to full participation in the Lao struggle for independence from France (1945–53) and the subsequent Lao civil war (1953–73), while other ethnic minorities remained in the background due to their smaller numbers. For the Hmong, political rivalry in Nong Het, Xieng Khouang, for the position of the local Tasseng chief made the local Lo and Ly clans into bitter enemies when the French gave it to Touby Lyfoung in 1939.[11] Touby and his followers thereafter remained faithful to the French and the right-wing Royal Lao Government (RLG) until his death in 1978.

After the French left Indochina in 1954, the USA stepped in to counter the spread of communism.[12] Like the French, the Americans saw the Hmong as a trustworthy source of military support. Among the Hmong recruits in the RLG army was a young officer named Vang Pao who later became a general and the commander of the RLG Second Military Region in northeastern Laos, the seat of many major battles during the war. In 1961, Vang Pao was offered support from the American CIA to set up the so-called 'secret army' to combat the advances of communist Vietnamese and PL troops.

According to Prados, 'in 1964 the Hmong secret army stood at 19 000 troops, building toward a strength of 23 000 . . . The Hmong not only increased in number, but they also benefited from [being] sent to Thailand for advanced training . . . [and] given heavier US weapons.'[13] This CIA military assistance was to last until the Paris ceasefire agreement on Indochina in 1973. When the Pathet Lao finally took over Laos in 1975, the

Hmong under General Vang Pao found themselves under the communist regime they had been fighting against since 1961. More than 200 000 Hmong sought refuge in Thailand, and most were later resettled in the West. The majority who could not escape to Thailand quickly adapted themselves to life in the new Lao People's Democratic Republic.

Rebellion suppression or human rights abuses?

Today, a casual visitor to urban areas inhabited by the Hmong in northern Laos would gain the impression that life is normal and peaceful, with everyone busy trying to make ends meet. Many Hmong under the new Lao government may live in dire poverty like the majority of the farming population in that country, but at least there is no war. If one tries to venture into more remote rural parts, however, one is quickly told that they are unsafe and have many '*Chao Fa*' (rebels) – even 30 years after the communist Pathet Lao took power in that country.

Outside of Laos, anyone who follows the political affairs of the tiny nation is often treated to long media reports and heated Internet group discussion on human rights abuses against minorities like the Hmong and Christians. It would seem that racism is rampant there when bus attacks and highway robberies are conveniently blamed on the '*Chao Fa*' Hmong, although they may be committed by poorly paid Lao and Khmu government soldiers. Readers are exposed to heart-rending photos of starving children with swollen bellies, dismembered bodies purported to be Hmong victims of atrocities committed by government soldiers, grown men in rags crying for help and living under foliage with their malnourished families deep in the jungles of the Saisomboun Special Zone.

Government officials often explain these events as inventions by the international media, or see these media reports as the work of Hmong overseas political groups and other trouble-makers who want to bring shame and discredit to the Lao nation. Often, the incidents are said never to occur. Anti-government groups, however, see the Hmong rebels as people being singled out for blatant official human rights abuses, as victims of a regime that rejects them for their past alliance with its former enemy, the USA. Thus, it has been alleged that Hmong resistance fighters

> who are captured are dismembered. Their penises are cut off and placed in their mouths. Women when captured are raped, then killed. Some are tied to stakes and left to die from exposure. Others have a sharp bamboo stick shoved through their vagina up into their chest cavity, the stick is rolled, and they are left to bleed to death . . . Children who are captured because they are unable to keep up with the fleeing adults have their throats cut or are killed by being swung around and having their heads bashed against trees. There was one report of three children being skewered together on a bamboo pole.[14]

The Lao government has also been accused by Amnesty International of using starvation as a weapon to bring the Hmong resistance to its knees. The accusation is based on the reported

> deaths of scores of civilians, mainly children, from starvation and injuries sustained during the conflict. It is known that several of approximately 20 rebel groups with their families are surrounded by Lao military and prevented from foraging for food that they traditionally rely on to survive. Amnesty International has protested to the Lao authorities at what it believes is the use of starvation as a weapon of war against civilians.[15]

The Lao government, however, has vigorously denied these allegations.[16]

It is difficult to confirm the veracity of claims by both sides of the conflict. When FFCL video images of disembowelled, murdered and gang-raped Hmong young girls in the rebel area were distributed around the world in September 2004, they again drew accusation of war crimes against the Lao government from Amnesty International.[17] This has further prompted the Lao government to call the video tape 'a groundless fabrication' to harm 'the good image of the Lao People's Democratic Republic by ill-intentioned groups'.[18] Yong Chanthalansy, spokesman for the Lao Foreign Affairs Ministry, said that: '[Amnesty] and the media have been used to serve a small group of bad people to cause public disorder and accuse our government . . . With modern technology these days you could do [fabricate] this anywhere.'[19] Nevertheless, Hmong political groups outside Laos have directed worldwide media publicity against the Lao authorities by focusing on these human rights abuses, insisting that the Hmong situation in Laos does not involve resistance to communist rule but self-defence against ethnic cleansing and mass atrocities based on racial and political prejudice.

What are the factors that have brought the Hmong and the Lao communist government into this political quagmire? To answer this question, let us examine the reasons for the Hmong resistance and the parties who are involved.

The principal players

Immediately after the communist victory in Indochina in May 1975, about 16 000 of Vang Pao's followers, distrustful of the new Pathet Lao authorities and their forced political 'seminars', went into hiding deep in the jungles of Phu Bia, the highest mountain of Laos, and adjacent areas from where they have continued to wage a constricted war of resistance against the Lao PDR government.[20] It was estimated that by mid-1980, however, their number had been reduced to 3500 compared to 150 000 other Hmong living peacefully in the country at the time.[21]

The FFCL, on the other hand, states in February 2002 that there are today 20 Hmong resistance groups consisting of 17 177 people still hiding in Saisomboun and defending themselves with 3334 soldiers, and that 'their military actions are not offensive, but are to protect themselves and their families in the jungles from Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops'.[22] A journalist, Andrew Perrin, visited such a group in 2003 and was informed that it now had only 800 members left from an initial 7000.[23]

Messianic freedom fighters

In 1976, the two major groups of Hmong resistance fighters in Phu Bia were under Yong Youa Her (Ntxoov Zuag Hawj), a former sergeant in Vang Pao's secret army, and Xai Shua Yang, a former Tasseng (canton chief) at Pha Khao, east of Long Cheng that used to be Vang Pao's military headquarters. Before 1975, Yong Youa was also part of a Hmong revivalist movement which was advocating the formation of a 'true' Hmong society, in anticipation of the return of the legendary Hmong king who would rescue believers from oppression. Under Yong Youa's military guidance and messianic leadership, the resistance movement soon became known as Chao Fa (a Lao term meaning 'Lord of the Sky' or God).

Yong Yua attracted many Hmong who were unwilling to submit to the Pathet Lao government.[24] At one stage his messianic army was said to have 400 or 500 men who firmly believed that they were invulnerable and had God's protection. They only had old rifles but used them sparingly in order to preserve scarce ammunition. By 1979, Xai Shua Yang's followers, who were more conventional in their military approach, had to split into small bands after they ran out of food and could no longer withstand the shelling and gassing of their strongholds by enemy troops. A few months later, most reached Thailand with their families, leaving only Yong Youa and his Chao Fa supporters to roam the thickets of Phu Bia.

In the refugee camps in Thailand, the Chao Fa movement was taken up by former adherents who escaped from Laos, headed by Pa Kao Her. He named his group the Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos. The organization gained support from a Chinese military commander based in southwestern China near the Lao border, and was given arms and military training from 1979 to 1980. The reason for this support is not clear: probably as a way to compete against Vietnamese influence in Laos since China and Vietnam were involved in a border dispute with each other at the time, with China no longer having any diplomatic representation in Laos. The Thailand Chao Fa 'freedom fighters' established their base in Nan, near the border of Laos, launching armed operations into Sayabouri province as well as Phu Bia. After 1980, China no longer supplied aid to the Chao Fa

in Thailand, so the group was forced to depend on donations from Hmong refugees living in the West.

The group had to dissolve into small scattered elements, due to a crackdown by the Thai government acting on border security agreements it signed with the Lao PDR government in 1994. By 1998, Yong Youa seemed also to have pinned his hopes on General Vang Pao's return to the jungles of Laos to help him with the resistance, declaring in a video message that: 'I am continuing the fight for you and we are all suffering from your dirty legacy [of cooperating with the American CIA].' After Yong Youa's death, he was replaced by Moua Toua Ter as shown in a video made in September 2002 by the FFCL.

In 2002, Pa Kao Her's group changed its name to the Democratic Chao Fa Party of Laos with Nhia Long Moua as vice-president.[25] Pa Kao Her moved to Chiangrai with his family while many of his followers were living among the 16 000 remnants of Hmong refugees from Laos at Tham Krabok, north of Bangkok. In October 2002, he was assassinated as he was standing outside his house, an act attributed by his wife to 'Lao people'.[26] On 3 July 2005, Nhia Long Moua also passed away. The leadership of the Chao Fa in Thailand thus appears to have been decimated, although its diehard followers claim that they still have a network of supporters in the diaspora and have been able to maintain direct contacts with those inside Laos to keep the fighting going in the Saisomboun Special Zone.

Exiled politicians

After coming to the US, Vang Pao established the United Lao National Liberation Front (ULNLF) in 1981. The Front was supported by prominent former RLG figures such as Sisouk Na Champassak (the former RLG Minister for Defence), General Phoumi Nosavanh, General Thonglit Chokbengboun, Outhong Souvannavong (a former minister of the first Lao cabinet after independence from France in 1954), and other refugee Lao politicians. They formed a government in exile with Souvannavong as Prime Minister and Vang Pao as Minister for Defence.[27]

Following its establishment, members of the Front travelled regularly to different countries with Lao émigré communities to promote their organization. They were able to increase its membership and financial donations greatly between 1982 and 1992. They set up a base in Thailand in Ban Vinai refugee camp in Loei. With the covert assistance of the Thai border military, Vang Pao's ULNLF had penetrated deep inside Laos by 1984 with many support groups established in the jungles of his former RLG Second Military Command area. However, Vang Pao received little cooperation from other Lao liberation groups based overseas in France, America or Australia.

Like the Chao Fa movement and other Lao resistance groups in Thailand, the ULNLF fell victim to the Thai–Lao rapprochement in 1993. The Lao PDR government, mindful of the use of Lao refugee camps for resistance activities, made overtures to Thailand to bring the two countries closer together and to stamp out these dissident operations. Vang Pao, who used to be able to spend time in Thailand, was barred from the country, no longer able to make contacts with his supporters in Laos who were left to fend for themselves ever since. Despite this, many thousands of Hmong living in Western countries are still regular donors to his political organization.

Support bases

Although the Hmong resistance in Laos was initiated by isolated groups who used to serve in the CIA 'secret army' or in the Royal Lao Army and who could not escape to Thailand, some of them, through former members in Thai refugee camps, later established contacts with Vang Pao's ULNLF and other support networks that spanned not only Laos and Thailand, but also the United States and other resettlement countries. The resistance in Laos thus became linked globally, although the support it received was very ad hoc and often exaggerated.

Thailand

Between 1975 and 1994, Thailand was the refuge for more than 300 000 refugees from Laos. It thus inadvertently became the base for many of the resistance groups which operated inside the refugee camps. Vang Pao's ULNLF was able to operate with the covert cooperation from Thai Army border intelligence units which were using Hmong resistance fighters to collect military information inside Laos for Thailand. At the time, the Thai still treated the new Lao regime with suspicion, depending on refugees from Laos for border military intelligence. From 1983 to 1991, the Thai informally provided radio communications and training to freedom fighters operating under the Chao Fa and the ULNLF, sending small teams of them into Laos and waiting at the border to accompany them back into the refugee camps on their return to Thailand.

It was alleged that Thai army officials had an arrangement with the Chao Fa, known as 'Special Operation 3091', in which Hmong freedom fighters were trained to fight to regain control of Laos or to obtain Thai citizenship in the event that Laos could not be taken back. Two training camps were established in Northern Thailand, one from 1985 to 1988, and the other in 1988. Although Chao Fa leaders produced photographs and videos purporting to support their allegations, the Thai government today denies any involvement.[28]

When the Thai and Lao PDR governments set up a joint Thai–Lao Border Commission in 1993, with a formal agreement signed in August 1996, the resistance support networks in Thai refugee camps were quickly dismantled. By then, Thailand also had new government leaders with new attitudes towards a communist Laos that was opening up its markets to Thailand. The older, die-hard right-wing elite of Vang Pao's generation were gone. Many of the younger Thai army commanders did not even know who Vang Pao was, although he used to be admired as one of Thailand's best anti-communist allies during the Lao civil war.

Chao Fa leaders claimed that the Thai–Lao border security agreement included revealing the locations of Hmong freedom fighters in Laos who were then attacked by Lao troops. In Thailand, the authorities began arresting Lao and Hmong refugees suspected of supporting resistance activities, and those from America were stopped and turned back at the airport in Bangkok. After 1991, Thai troops would chase 'Cha Fa soldiers in Thailand into Laos where the Lao military was waiting'.[29] Many died or were maimed by land mines in this way.

By 1992, all three Hmong refugee camps (Nam Yao, Chiang Kham and Ban Vinai) were closed, and more than 20 000 of their residents repatriated 'voluntarily' to Laos where they were assisted to reintegrate into the local communities. The remaining Hmong refugees who had not been repatriated or accepted for resettlement in Western countries ran away to live at Tham Krabok, a large Thai drug rehabilitation centre and temple in Saraburi, north of Bangkok. Others dispersed into various parts of Northern Thailand, or were relocated to Ban Napho in Nakhorn Phanom, the last camp that was closed by the UNHCR in December 1999.

After the death of the Abbot of the Tham Krabok Temple in 1999, the Thai government became concerned that the Hmong refugees would continue to remain there permanently and asked the Lao government to accept them back to Laos, but the latter did not agree.[30] Instead, it put political pressure on Thailand to stop providing a safe haven for the Hmong at the temple complex. Thailand then successfully lobbied the US government to agree to accept its 15 000 residents for resettlement in September 2003. On 26 May 2005, this unofficial refugee camp in Thailand was finally closed, marking a final end to Hmong support on Thai soil for the resistance in Laos.[31]

United States of America

Because of its support for the Indochina War, the United States of America became recipient to the biggest number of Indochinese refugees after their exodus from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in 1975. The number of refugees from Laos who resettled in America is estimated at more than

350 000 with two-thirds being Hmong – mostly families of former CIA secret army recruits or Royal Lao Government soldiers and public servants.

As mentioned before, Vang Pao set up the United Lao National Liberation Front (ULNLF) in 1981 with overseas affiliates among Lao refugees in France and Australia. The Front and other exile political groups lobbied the US government for support and for political or economic sanctions against the new Lao government. It formed branches in many American states, and collected large amounts of money from local and overseas supporters to run its activities. Vang Pao and his ULNLF leaders were able to hold public meetings to discuss their political agendas and to report on their progress. Pa Kao Her's Chao Fa liberation group also set up its own competing support base in the US to seek donations and recruit supporters. Other 'armchair' liberation movements have followed over the years, and appear to be operating freely without any intervention from the American authorities. Some have even been running propaganda radio broadcasts against the Lao government until now, despite former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, stating in 2000 that the US government 'does not support Laos Resistance Movement'.[32]

Regardless of the official American stand, much of the current support for resistance groups in Laos still emanates from the US, largely because of the large number of expatriates from Laos in that country who act as a source of financial donations, and the presence of Vang Pao, Laos's major enemy. Sentenced to death *in absentia* by the new Lao government in 1975, he continued to represent a threat to the Pathet Lao regime. Judging from public statements made by Lao officials, there was no doubt that Vang Pao still commanded deep concern among the Lao authorities, although he vehemently denied being involved in any resistance activities in Laos in the spate of bomb explosions in the Lao capital of Vientiane in 2000.[33]

Nevertheless, the Lao government has often accused the Hmong in the USA of continuing to send arms and money to resistance groups in the Lao PDR. It claims that six Hmong Americans were caught doing this at Nong Khai province in Thailand just across the border from Vientiane in January 2000.[34] Two Hmong men from the USA visiting northern Laos had also disappeared in 1999, suspected of working for the resistance. Also, many Hmong in the USA still have relatives in Laos and send them large sums of money – an activity regarded with suspicion by Lao officials. Many Hmong from the USA visit Laos each year as tourists, again making the Lao authorities suspect that some of them use these visits as a front for politically subversive activities.

More importantly, the US continues to be home to many exiled political activists and pressure groups working for democracy in Laos. Among the most active are: the Center for Public Policy Analysis, the Lao

Representatives Abroad Council, Lao Progressive, the General Assembly of Delegates of Laotians Abroad, the United Lao Congress for Democracy, the Montagnard Human Rights Organization, the Lao Students Movement For Democracy, the Lao Nationalist Reform Party, the Lao Democracy Institute, the Hmong International Human Rights Watch, the United League for Democracy in Laos, the Lao Veterans of America, the Lao Human Rights Council, the Hmong United Liberation Front and the Lan Xang Foundation.

Public forums and mass demonstrations are regularly organized to bring political issues of pertinence from the homeland to the attention of the American media and politicians in the US capital. The Center for Public Policy Analysis and the Lao Democracy Institute are most active in issuing press releases on human rights abuses by the Lao PDR government. In August 2004, a group of concerned Hmong in Minnesota organized the Long March to Freedom campaign in which volunteers walked from Minnesota to Washington DC to bring alleged atrocities committed by the Lao military on the Hmong in Laos to the attention of the American public. There are also frequent debates among Hmong discussion groups on the Internet about allegations of abuses suffered by the Hmong in the hands of the Lao authorities.

The Hmong Lao Radio (www.hmonglaoradio.org) spends much airtime on pro-democracy political commentaries against the Lao government, and concentrates on resistance news from Laos. Clandestine Radio Watch 118 reports that the station is operated by the United Lao Movement for Democracy, General Vang Pao's new political group.[35] Its programmes are recorded in Minnesota and broadcast via commercial transmitters in Uzbekistan and was first established in May 2002. The station today broadcasts on-air to Hmong communities in Laos and in America three times a week, as well as on the Internet, although the latter has suffered from frequent jamming.

A major US connection to the Hmong resistance in Laos is the human rights organizations that specifically lobby against Laos with the UN and the US government. Before his sudden death in August 2005, Dr Vang Pobzeb, the director of the Lao Human Rights Council based in Wisconsin, USA, spoke to the 23rd UN Meeting on Indigenous Affairs in Geneva on 18–22 July 2005 before 1000 participants to whom he made an appeal for the Lao government to stop its ethnic cleansing against the Hmong in Laos. He was later featured on Radio Free Asia on 25 July 2005.[36]

In a similar vein, the Hmong International Human Rights Watch has been no less vocal, as is a new Hmong international political group based in Fresno, California. Although it does not yet wish to be identified officially, it claims to have already made an impact on the Hmong resistance

problem in Laos by being accepted to address the UN International Forum on Indigenous People (16–24 May 2005) in the UN General Assembly hall in New York, with '51 representatives dressed in Hmong costumes being present among 180 other indigenous groups world-wide'.[37] The group met with UN officials again in October 2005 and discussed Hmong human rights issues in Laos.

Another US-based organization which has had most impact on the exile global Hmong community and the international media is the quaintly named Fact Finding Commission on Laos (FFCL), referred to previously, a lobby group whose aim is 'to bring the plight of veterans of the US Secret War in Laos to the attention of the US Congress and the American People'.[38] Since September 2002, it has brought out a number of video tapes on the struggles and suffering of the Hmong in the Saisomboun Special Zone. For the first time, graphic depictions of starving children and sick women, crying grown men on the run from enemy soldiers, can clearly be seen in the living rooms of the Hmong living in the West and the international community.

China

At the peak of the Chao Fa resistance in Phu Bia in 1979, rumours were circulating of Hmong armed bands harassing Lao troops near the border of China and Laos. Pa Kao Her, the Chao Fa Hmong leader in Thailand, was known to have sent 100 young Hmong for military training in southern China and to have received military aid. On their return to Thailand, however, most of their Chinese arms were confiscated by the Thai border patrol police. Vang Pao also allegedly made contact with Chinese leaders in August 1978.[39] Following the capture of a few dissidents bearing Chinese weapons, one prominent Lao official commented that 'the Chinese have mobilised some Hmong and Lu minority people for a movement against our government'.[40]

However, there is no conclusive evidence on the extent or effectiveness of China's direct use of tribal people to interfere in Lao internal affairs, despite later visits made to China by Vang Pao in 1988 and by the vice-president of the Democratic Chao Fa Party of Laos, Nhia Long Moua, as recently as 2004. The Chinese seem to have shied away from giving aid to Hmong resistance groups in Laos after learning that one of the Chao Fao Hmong's intentions was to recruit large numbers of Hmong in China to fight for Laos and make it a Hmong country.

Vietnam

Between 1954 and 1973, the Pathet Lao relied heavily on North Vietnamese military troops to gain control of Laos. Since 1975, it continued to depend

on Vietnamese military interventions against Hmong resistance fighters. In July 1977, Laos signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Vietnam whose Article 2 includes, among other things, the provision for 'the realisation of a close cooperation with a view to reinforcing the defence capacities [of the two parties] . . . in the struggle against . . . foreign reactionary forces'.[41] This latter reference is clearly addressed to Lao and Vietnamese liberation groups operating in other countries.

This Friendship Treaty and other links with Vietnam reinforced the claim by the Hmong resistance that Laos is but a colony of communist Vietnam. To avoid being seen in this light, Vietnam has denied any involvement by repeatedly stating that Laos is a country capable of looking after its own security. Yet, in June 2000, Vietnamese Communist Party chief, Le Kha Phieu, told a visiting Lao army delegation that he wanted the two countries' armies 'to cooperate in the struggle against hostile forces'.[42] Before this, resistance sources claim that two battalions of Vietnamese troops were sent to Laos since October 1999.[43] This was confirmed by foreign diplomats in Vientiane, one of whom was quoted by Agence France Presse as saying that: 'in the past few months there have been frequent clashes in Xieng Khouang province which are getting bigger, causing mounting casualties for the Lao army'.[44] The diplomat went on to say that: 'the Vietnamese army has sent soldiers and military equipment to bolster the Lao army which is struggling to control the situation. We have seen military vehicles carrying Vietnamese troops on the streets of the capital.'

The FFCL alleged that Vietnamese troops, in conjunction with the Pathet Lao forces, have used MI-6, MI-8, and MI-17 helicopter gunships to bomb the positions of the Hmong involved in the resistance in the jungles of northern Laos.[45] Since 1 December 1999, the Lao government is alleged to have received more military assistance from Vietnam. Many of the 17 military bases, some with Vietnamese soldiers, are said to be strategically located near the mountain locations where the Hmong veterans of the American secret war in Laos and their families are hiding. These military bases are shown in Table 17.1.

Altogether, figures from Table 17.1 add up to 135000 combined Lao and Vietnamese troops in Laos. According to Tim Laard of BBC News, the relationship between Vietnam and Laos is seen 'by Vietnam as closer than lips and teeth – and by Laos as deeper than the waters of the Mekong River'.[46] The Hmong International Human Rights Watch stated in a submission to the UN Commission on Human Rights that evidence of Lao and Vietnamese government joint involvement in the planning of military actions against Hmong insurgents in Laos 'surfaced over two years ago when, on 25 May 1998, a Russian-made YAK-40 military jet flying over

Table 17.1 Lao military bases with Vietnamese troops

Location	Province	Estimated troop strength*
1. Baben	Louang Namtha	15 000 (Regiment #442)
2. Muang Na	Louang Phrabang	15 000
3. Muang Soie	Xieng Khouang	7 500
4. Ban Ban	Xieng Khouang	7 500
5. Sai Som Boun Special Zone	Xieng Khouang	15 000 (Regiment #335)
6. Na Mouang/Vangviang	Vientiane	7 500
7. Pakha/Mouang Fouang	Vientiane	7 500 (Battalion #614)
8. Vientiane	Vientiane	15 000
9. Muang Paksan	Bolikhamxay	7 500
10. Ban Nam	Bolikhamxay	2 500
11. Ban Lakxao	Bolikhamxay	2 500
12. Cong Thong	Bolikhamxay	2 500
13. Saravanh	Saravanh	5 000
14. Xekong	Xekong	10 000
15. Pakse	Champasak	8 000 (Regiment #5)
16. Muang Moon	Champasak	3 000 (Battalion #11)
17. Attapu	Attapu	4 000

Note:
* Troop strength includes both Vietnamese and Lao.

Source: Lao Human Rights Council, USA (2003), 'Submission to the US House Committee on Ways and Means', 9 April.

Saisomboun . . . was shot down'. Among those killed in the crash were said to be 14 of Vietnam's most senior military officers (including Lieutenant General Dao Trong Lich, the Chief of Staff and Deputy Defence Minister, another lieutenant general, three major generals, and nine colonels and lieutenant colonels) together with 12 Laotian top army personnel.[47]

After a spate of bombings in Vientiane in 2000, exchanges of official visits between Vietnam and Laos increased markedly. For example, on 16 July 2000, the Vietnam News Agency reports a six-day visit to Laos by a high-level Vietnamese military delegation which was headed by the Vietnamese Deputy Defence Minister, Lieutenant General Le Van Dzung, member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee and Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People's Army. The delegation held talks with their Lao counterparts and also discussed activities to promote mutual assistance and set the orientation for further friendship and cooperation.[48]

A provincial delegation from Xieng Khouang, the seat of most of the Hmong resistance activities, also visited Hanoi on 13 June 2000,

headed by the province's Communist Party Deputy Secretary, Mr Sivongya Yangyongyia. The group met with the powerful external relations commission of the Vietnamese Communist Party with the aim to 'strengthen relations between the two parties'.[49] Hmong Voice Radio, however, sees the visit as a punishment for the Pathet Lao Hmong leadership in Xieng Khouang for failing to prevent Hmong dissidents from operating there.[50]

In April 2003, after an attack on a bus killing a few tourists in Vang Vieng, the Lao Army Chief of Staff, Major General Khenekham Senglathone, went to Hanoi to meet his Vietnamese counterpart, the Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and the Vietnamese Minister for Defence 'for talks aimed to strengthen relations'.[51] Since then, there have been reports of Vietnamese border troops killing Hmong insurgents who strayed from Laos in search of food in Vietnamese territories.[52]

These foreign connections play a crucial part in maintaining the ongoing struggles between the Hmong resistance and the Lao government. This is especially true of the relationship between resistance fighters and expatriate Hmong communities in the USA, with the latter's concerted representations to their US congressmen, the international media and the UN. For the Lao government, its political and military relations with Vietnam have been important in keeping a lid firmly on an awkward issue that it refuses to acknowledge openly. So long as these foreign connections remain strong, Hmong resistance in Laos is likely to continue.

Government responses

At the beginning, the new Lao government tried to talk the Hmong into joining in the new political life and socialist economy of the country through political 'seminars', leaflet drops and radio propaganda broadcasts. However, after many failed attempts, it resorted to armed suppression following increasing ambushes of Lao army convoys and troops by the Hmong along Route 13 and the road linking Vangvieng and Vientiane in 1976. The Hmong reportedly used arms and ammunition left hidden by Vang Pao in the Phu Bia region, and later captured weapons from their enemy or took them from dead government soldiers.

Military suppression

As ambushes by Hmong dissidents became more widespread and government troops proved ineffective to stop them, four regiments of Vietnamese soldiers were sent into the Phu Bia area in 1977 to crush the rebellion, causing thousands of Hmong to flee to Thailand with 2500 arriving in December 1977 alone. Aerial chemical poisoning was also alleged to be used on the rebels by the Lao government,[53] but this has proved difficult to confirm.[54] The 1977–78 campaign by government troops aided by 50 000

Vietnamese regulars dealt a severe blow to the resistance, from which it has never really been able to recover.[55]

Although the resistance suffered many setbacks, casualties on the government side have also been heavy – some military units were reported to be nearly wiped out in ambushes by the Hmong. In December 1997, the Chao Fa were said to have eradicated all but one member of a company of government troops near Khang Khai south of the Plain of Jars. Hmong civilians were also targeted, and many died from attacks on villages or ambushes by both sides. Without Vietnamese military assistance, Lao government initiatives became ineffective, resulting in the Hmong resistance claiming in 1998 that they had captured the following areas: (1) Muong Mai, Thasi, Pa Na, Nam Hia, Na Kong, Phu Makthao, Chomthong and Muong Sa in Borikhamsay province; (2) Khang Khai, Tha Papang, Nam Tao Samseng, Phu Bia, Muong Mork, Phu Nanon and Samthong in Xieng Khouang province; and (3) Phu Kongkhao and Phu Nhay in Luang Prabang province.[56]

It has been alleged that because of these insurgent activities, the Lao government has retaliated and killed many innocent Hmong civilians. The FFCL, for instance, claims that from February to May 2003 alone, 739 Hmong had been killed, 615 injured and 414 captured in skirmishes north of Bolikhamxay province, and another 216 Hmong killed in October 2002 in Saisomboun.[57] The Hmong International Human Rights Watch also alleged in a submission on 22 July 2000 to the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva that the Lao government and the Vietnamese military 'are carrying out heavy military attacks against Hmong civilians living in the Saisomboun Special Region and in Bolikhamxay province – killing thousands of Hmong people'.[58] The Lao PDR government is said to have put Brigadier General Myka Sivongsa in charge of the campaign against Hmong resistance fighters across Laos with the aim to 'exterminate them' by the years 2001–2002, although the target date has obviously now passed.

Resettlement and economic aid

Apart from military suppression, the Lao government has also tried various development projects, chiefly in the 'Saisomboun Special Zone' which was established in 1994 north of Vientiane in a location formerly known as Muong Cha under the old RLG. This is the area closest to Phu Bia, the base of most of the Chao Fa groups. It hopes to make Saisomboun the centre for political and economic development to attract resistance Hmong into the folds of the Lao PDR authorities, by withdrawing lowland ethnic Lao personnel from the area and putting General Bounchanh (a Khmu who successfully suppressed many Chao Fa Hmong in the 1977–78 campaign) as the local military commander, with Colonel Lo Lu Yang

(a Pathet Lao Hmong) as deputy commander. Another Hmong who was formerly the district governor of Moung Hom, Mr Siatou Yang, became the unification coordinator. The Special Zone covers the districts of Muong Phoun, Muong Hom, Muong Cha and Long San.

Outside of the Saisomboun Special Zone, Tong Yer Thao, who is now the Provincial Governor of Samneua, was for many years responsible for negotiating with resistance leaders and assisting with the resettlement of their followers into the Muong Kao area, Borikamsay province. Under the programme, each family which rallies to the government is given lowland wet rice farming land along with other forms of assistance such as food and housing materials during the first year of settlement. Families are settled together in new villages. On the whole, the largest number of Hmong who now live peacefully as Lao citizens have joined under this programme, despite reports of the occasional family returning to join the resistance in the jungle.

The government has also made prominent reference in the country's Constitution to ethnic minorities as inseparable groups in the make-up of the Lao nation's unity who are accorded equal rights and obligations. It has stressed that there are now Hmong district and provincial governors, Hmong deputies in the National Assembly and even two Hmong ministers in the current Lao government. Many Hmong are also in middle management in the Lao public service, more than under the old right-wing RLG. A group of Lao soldiers who arrested and killed a number of Hmong civilians in 2002 in Saisomboun were reportedly executed by their local commander in front of survivors as an example of what is not allowed by the Lao authorities.

Denial of the problem

Despite these notable efforts, the Lao government has tried to hide the problem from the outside world and the international media during the past 30 years by stating that it has no dissident groups. It has dismissed Hmong resistance activities as being merely the work of armed 'bandits' and 'highway robbers'. For example, an ambush on 21 May 1994 which killed an Australian hydrologist and five Lao civilians north of Vientiane was blamed on 'Chao Fa bandits'.[59] A similar official response was used when two bus attacks occurred on Route 13 linking Vientiane and Luang Prabang in 2003 – the first killing ten persons and the second 13. Although survivors claimed that the attackers 'looked Hmong and spoke the Hmong language', the Lao Deputy Prime Minister Somsavat Lengsavad said that 'both incidents involved robberies of armed bandits' and dismissed 'suggestions that they were carried out by antigovernment Hmong rebels'.[60]

With this official policy of denying the Hmong resistance, the Lao government has refused to be forthright with inquiries or explanations of the disappearance or mysterious deaths of former Hmong resistance leaders who have 'come out' to live under its control. Some of those who left the jungle to negotiate for the safe return of the resistance fighters into normal life under the new authorities were said to have been arrested, tortured and imprisoned.[61] A number of Hmong leaders who voluntarily repatriated from the refugee camps in Thailand after their closure in 1992 had also disappeared, were allegedly murdered or put in prison, including Vue Mai, the camp leader at Ban Vinai, the largest Hmong refugee camp in Thailand and a former strong support base for resistance groups inside Laos.

This secretive stand on the part of Lao officials has deterred many of the rebels from finally laying down their arms, reinforced by a strong belief that the government is intent on exterminating those involved in the resistance rather than having a real desire to make peace with them. This fear is grounded not only in these unexplained cases over the years, but also by propaganda from overseas Hmong groups, conveyed through Radio Free Asia, the Hmong Lao Radio, and other means of contact.

Denying the existence of the rebels allows the government to deal with them in any ways it sees fit, and also to let Vietnamese troops into Laos without fear of international criticism. Thus, in 2000, the Lao government has allegedly permitted Vietnamese troops, Battalion No. 213, to cross the Mekong river into Sayabouri province near the Thai–Lao border, supposedly to help fight drug trafficking along the border rather than to defend it against 'freedom fighters', because a Lao government spokesman states that there are 'no freedom fighters in the area' in spite of claims by Chao Fa insurgents that they operate there.

Until the publication of the *Time Asia Magazine* report 'Welcome to the Jungle' and its photo-essay on 5 May 2003, the plight of the Hmong rebels in Laos was known mainly to the Hmong. The international community became further informed on the issue following the arrest of two other Western journalists (one Belgian and one French) in June 2003 when they tried to follow the footsteps of the *Time Asia* reporter into the jungles of northern Laos. Their well-publicized imprisonment and subsequent release finally put the Hmong resistance in Laos firmly in the international spotlight.[62]

This media publicity has been followed by another televised report from the BBC in 2004 and by the most recent broadcast on France Channel 2 on 16 June 2005 entitled *The Secret War in Laos*[63] which shows a strong counter-insurgency campaign conducted for the last three decades by the Lao PDR against thousands of Hmong in the jungle of Saisomboun and Bolikhamxay province.[64]

The Lao Foreign Ministry, through its spokesman Yong Chanthalansy, however dismissed the French televised account as an attempt to 'make something out of nothing', stating that there were no rebels in Laos and that the two French reporters had been mislead by 'bad people' (*khaun-bordi*) to invent the story.[65]

Current situation

Until 1997, Vang Pao's group did not seem to slow down its pace, with a new name, the United Lao Movement for Democracy (for more information, see http://members.nbci.com/XMCM). Apart from its own website, it now has a radio station (see www.hmonglaoradio.org). It organized an international conference and the proceedings and resolutions were featured in detail on the website, with participation and support from members of the exiled Lao royal family. Among other things, Vang Pao wanted the overthrow of the current communist Lao authorities and their replacement by a monarchy with a democratically elected government.

These hopes, however, appear to have come crashing down when many of Vang Pao's faithful supporters deserted him after his peace overture to the Vietnamese authorities with a secret meeting in Amsterdam in November 2003. Many now see Vang Pao as having 'self-destructed'.[66] Regardless of this, the FFCL still claimed in 2003 that 'ethnic Hmong groups have united with other disaffected Laotian including army defectors and local militia, to carry out an organised rebellion' across 11 of the 17 provinces of Laos.[67]

Grant Evans, an academic specialist on Laos, attributes the long survival of the Hmong resistance to the remoteness of their villages and the rugged terrain.[68] However, according to Dommen,[69] the Hmong involved have also demonstrated a dogged determination to survive, due to their perception of being marked for extermination by the communist authorities, for instance, as contained in a warning broadcast over Radio Pathet Lao entitled 'The US–Vang Pao Special Forces must be completely cleaned up' on 6 May 1975. The Hmong have also received much moral and financial support from diaspora Lao and Hmong communities in many countries.

In a way, the Hmong resistance now provides the only legitimate political ground which exile Lao political organizations can use to work for change against the Lao communist regime. Thus, in response to the TV broadcast on France Channel 2 on 16 June 2005, the Lao Movement for Human Rights (LMHR) organized an online petition-signing against the Lao government: (1) to demand that it put an immediate end to its campaign of repression against the Hmong population and to recognize publicly the existence of the dissidents; and (2) to demand that it allow, without conditions and delay, international agencies to have access to this population in

distress in order to provide them with urgent humanitarian aid.[70] So far, it claims to have collected 4043 signatures.

The LMHR also organized a public protest on 25 June 2005 in Paris, which gathered nearly 600 people. It invited Lao exiles around the world and friends of democracy and freedom to keep on signing its online petition, 'and to pursue efforts in approaching the political authorities of your country, your elected Member of Parliament and the international institutions on this critical issue. *Restons mobilisés!*'[71] In keeping with this call to stay ready for action, it again organized a public demonstration in Paris on 24 September 2005, and urged Lao communities in the US, Canada and Australia to organize simultaneous public events in their countries to protest against Lao government atrocities on the Hmong in Laos.

Conclusion

The Lao PDR government has tried hard to blame the political instability in Laos on overseas Hmong, not local Hmong inside Laos where dissidents continue to be officially labelled as 'bandits'. It has tried to suppress the Hmong resistance in the backwaters of the remote jungles of northern Laos whilst denying that such resistance groups exist. The causes of the Hmong rebellion are complex. Apart from political differences, there are other equally important grievances involved, including perceived racial discrimination of ethnic minorities by private Lao citizens, poverty and high inflation, corruption, and lack of economic and employment opportunities, leading people to be easily susceptible to alternative political propaganda.

These factors, together with free-for-all political propaganda and continued support from the diaspora Hmong outside Laos, will make it difficult for the Hmong resistance fighters to stop their activities. International human rights organizations are also now keeping a close watch on the Hmong resistance and alleged human rights abuses by the Lao government. It is estimated that only about 3000 of the 460 000 Hmong in Laos are involved in the ongoing conflict. Although the number is small, the Lao authorities need to resolve the underlying causes of this resistance. The problem is real and cannot be ignored or simply stamped out by force.

Notes

* Information for this chapter came from various sources both in and outside Laos, including the Internet. I would like to thank all those informants who generously shared with me their information, resources and time.

1. *BBC News World Edition*, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4616621.stm, 7 June 2005.
2. *Vientiane Times*, vientianetimes.org.la/Contents/2005–107/Phou.htm, 10 July 2005.
3. *News Updated*, news.webindia123.com/news/, 12 July 2005.
4. Conboy, Kenneth (1995), *Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War In Laos*, Boulder, co: Paladin Press. See also Warner, R. (1998), *Shooting at the Moon: The Story of America's Clandestine War in Laos*, New Hampshire: Steerforth Press.

5. Savina, F.M.(1924), *Histoire des Miaos*, Hong Kong: Societe des Missions-Étrangères. See also Quincy, K. (1988), *Hmong: History of a People*, Cheney: East Washington University Press, pp. 16–17.
6. Ch'eh, Tsu-Ying (1947), *The Miao Frontier in Hunan: A Historical Study*, MA Thesis, Far Eastern Department, University of Washington. See also Yang, N. (1995), 'History and origin of the Hmong', St Paul, MN: Hmong Cultural Centre, at www.hmongcenter.org/hmonbib.html, accessed 21 May 2005.
7. For a discussion on problems in enumerating the Hmong global population, see Lemoine, J. (2005), 'What is the actual number of the Hmong in the world?' *Journal of Hmong Studies*, hmongstudies.org/LemoineHSJ6.pdf, vol. 6.
8. The Lao 2005 population census has been completed but not yet fully tabulated as at end of 2006.
9. Lee, G. (2004), 'Transnational adaptation: an overview of the Hmong of Laos', in N. Tapp, J. Michaud, C. Culas and G. Lee (eds), *Hmong / Miao in Asia*, Chiangmai: Silkworm Books, pp. 442–3.
10. Yang Dao (1975), *Les Hmong du Laos Face au Developpement*, Vientiane: Editions Siaosavath, p. 46
11. Chongtoua, L. (1998), 'Touby Lyfoung ou l'Integration des Hmong dans la Nation Laotienne', *Lao Studies Review*, **3**, p. 54.
12. Freedman, L. (2002), *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam*, New York: Oxford University Press.
13. Prados, J. (2003), *Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby*, New York: Oxford University Press, p.165.
14. Lao Human Rights Council, USA (2003), 'Submission to the US House Committee on Ways and Means', 9 April.
15. Amnesty International (2004), 'Laos: atrocities against children are war crimes', press release, 14 September.
16. 'New video shows murdered, starved children in Laos', *Nation* (Bangkok), 14 September 2004.
17. Amnesty International (2004), 'Laos: atrocities against children are war crimes', press release, 14 September.
18. 'New video shows murdered, starved children in Laos', *Nation* (Bangkok), 14 September 2004.
19. *BBC News World Edition*, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3654390.stm, 14 September 2004.
20. Lee, G. (1982), 'Minority policies and the Hmong in Laos', in Stuart-Fox, M. (ed.), *Contemporary Laos: Studies in the Politics and Society of the Lao People's Democratic Republic*, New York: St Martin Press, pp. 212–14.
21. *US News and World Report*, usnews.com/usnews/home.htm, 2 June 1980.
22. Lao Human Rights Council (2003), 'Statement for the Record: Submission to the US House Committee on Ways and Means', 9 April.
23. *Time Asia Magazine*, time.com, 5 May 2003.
24. Lee, G. (1982), p. 213.
25. Vang, H. (2004a), 'As refugees leave, former soldiers fear for their lives', *WisInfo.com Report*, wisinfo.com/thailand/thai_17542503.shtml, 28 August.
26. Vang, H. (2004b), 'Wife of slain CIA fighter fears retribution', *WisInfo.com Report*, wisinfo.com/thailand/thai_17542503.shtml, 28 August.
27. Chan, S. (1994), *Hmong Means Free: Life in Laos and America*, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, p. 47
28. Vang, H. (2004a).
29. Vang, H. (2004a).
30. Ranard, R. (2004), *The Hmong: Introduction to their History and Culture*, Washington, DC: Center for Applied Linguistics, p. 23.
31. *Washington Post.com*, washingtonpost.com, 27 May 2005, p. A20.
32. *Business Day*, businessdaily.com, 31 July 2000.
33. *Asia.dailynews.yahoo.com*, 29 July 2000.

34. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, feer.com, 6 May 2000.
35. *Clandestine Radio Watch 122*, schoechi.de/crw/crw122.html, December 15, 2002.
36. Radio Free Asia, rfa.org/lao/feature/miscellaneous/2005/07/25/, 25 July 2005.
37. Telephone interview with Xia Yao Yang, 18 August 2005.
38. Fact Finding Commission on Laos, factfinding.org/main.html, 'Mission statement'.
39. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, feer.com, 1 September 1979.
40. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, feer.com, 8 December 1979.
41. *Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation: Vietnam–Laos (18 July 1977*), available in French at the website of the Movement Lao for Human Rights, mldh-lao.org.
42. egroups.com/message/archive-laonews/1298.
43. Hmong Voice Radio, suabhmongradio.com, 22 July 2000.
44. Agence France Press, afp.com/english/home, 2 June 2000.
45. Lao Human Rights Council, USA (2003), 'Submission to the US House Committee on Ways and Means', 9 April.
46. *BBC News*, news.bbc.co.uk, 27 August 2001.
47. Hmong International Human Rights Watch (HIHRW) (2000), 'Deteriorating human rights conditions for the Hmong living in Laos', press release, July.
48. Vietnam Newsagency, vietnamnews.vnagency.com.vn, 16 July 2000.
49. Agence-France Presse, afp.com/english/home, 14 June 2000.
50. Hmong Voice Radio, suabhmongradio.com, 22 July 2000.
51. Rand, N. (2003), 'Laos: hotbed of unrest', *Asia Time Online*, atimes.com, 17 May.
52. Associated Press, perso.wanado.fr/patrick.guenin/cantho/vnnews/erupt.htm, 16 September 2004.
53. Yang Dao (1978), 'Guerre de Gaz: Solution Communiste des Problèmes des Minorites du Laos', *Temps Modernes*, **402**, Janvier.
54. Evans, G. (1983), *The Yellow Rainmakers*, London: Verso Editions.
55. Evans, G. (2003), 'Laos is getting a bad rap from the world's media', *Bangkok Post*, 8 July.
56. Interview with a Chao Fa representative, Eau Claire, Wisconsin, USA, 22 September 1998.
57. Rand, N. (2003), 'Laos: hotbed of unrest', *Asia Time Online*, atimes.com, 17 May.
58. Hmong International Human Rights Watch (HIHRW (2000)), 'Statement submitted to the Lao PDR Ambassador to Washington DC', 31 March.
59. *BBC News*, news.bbc.co.uk, 5 December 1994.
60. *Asia Times Online*, atimes.com, 17 May 2003.
61. Hmong International Human Rights Watch (HIHRW) (2000), 'Statement submitted to the Lao PDR Ambassador to Washington DC', 31 March.
62. *Time Asia Magazine*, time.com, 5 May 2003.
63. France Channel 2, info.france2.fr/emissions/73095-fr.php, 16 June 2005.
64. Lao Movement for Human Rights, 'Petition to Save the Hmong in Saisomboun', www.mldh-lao.org/petition_online/petition1.php.
65. *Radio Free Asia Lao Language Program*, rfa.org/lao/, 26 June 2005.
66. Kennedy, T. and p. McEnroe (2005), 'Ex-guerrilla's gamble for peace backfires', *Star Tribune*, 5 July.
67. ABC Radio, abc.net.au/asiapacific/location/asia/, 17 July 2003.
68. Evans, G.(2003).
69. Dommen, A. (2001), *The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam*, Bloomington, In: Indiana University Press, p. 934.
70. Lao Movement for Human Rights (LMHR), at www.mldh-lao.org/petition_online/petition1.php
71. Lao Movement for Human Rights (LMHR, at www.mldh-lao.org/petition_ online/petition1.php.

18 East Timor under Indonesian occupation, 1975–99

Peter Carey

The new nation

On 20 May 2002, East Timor became the world's youngest sovereign state. This tiny country, which at the first national census in July 2004 numbered 924 000 souls, had only gained its independence after 24 years of brutal occupation by its vast neighbour Indonesia (2004 population 235 million). This had been brought to an end in extreme violence following the UN-supervised popular consultation of 30 August 1999 when 78.5 per cent of the population voted for independence. Only the timely arrival of the Australian-led UN-mandated International Force in East Timor (InterFET) had saved the territory from complete destruction, forced population displacement and further killings of pro-independence supporters at the hands of the Indonesian army-orchestrated pro-autonomy militias.[1]

This chapter documents the course of events in the East Timor conflict since the mid-1970s, highlights the abusive nature of the 24-year Indonesian military occupation, and concludes that East Timor's fate was intimately bound up with the international politics of the Cold War.

Historical background

Linked to Portugal since the early sixteenth century, first through trade in its famed sandalwood and the proselytizing activities of its Dominican friars – and subsequently (post-1701) through the more formal colonial presence of a Crown-appointed governor – East Timor had eventually been constituted as a territory of the Portuguese overseas empire (*ultramar*) following the formal demarcation of its land boundary with Dutch-occupied West Timor in 1913.[2] This seemingly arbitrary divide, which was further complicated by the inclusion of the tiny enclave (2004 population 15 000) of Oecussi (seat of the first Portuguese governors between 1701 and 1769) in West Timor, does have some ethno-linguistic justification, however. Amidst the myriad of smaller ethnic groups (at least 27 languages are spoken in East Timor), two principal populations can be discerned: the Atoni – or 'people of the dry lands' – estimated at just over 400 000 in 1975, who inhabit the central mountains of what is now Indonesian West Timor, and the Belu, subsequent invaders, who arrived between the third and late

first millennium BC possibly from the island of Ceram or South Sulawesi (Celebes), hence the origin myth of the island as a wandering crocodile later turned to stone who carried the first human inhabitant to Timor. After vanquishing the less warlike Atoni, the Belu settled in the eastern part of the island, and soon gained a reputation for vigour and enterprise, particularly as traders, slash-and-burn (swidden) cultivators and as warriors (many Timorese would later serve as auxiliaries in the armies of both the Dutch East India Company and the Portuguese). More racially mixed than the Atoni, the Belu have long shared Tetum as a lingua franca, a language now designated (along with Portuguese) as one of the two 'national' languages of East Timor, with English and Indonesian (*Bahasa*) as the two 'working languages'.

The distinctiveness of the two peoples of Timor becomes even more salient when the historical experience of the two halves of the island is included. Unlike in West Timor, where the Dutch ruled through their colonial bureaucracy and early on broke the power of the local chiefs, the Portuguese exercised what influence they could through the local clan heads and petty 'kings' (*liurai*). In fact, for most of their four-and-a-half century colonial presence in Timor, the Portuguese were represented not by crown-appointed officials, but by the Dominican friars and powerful *mestiço* (part Portuguese, part Timorese). The successors of these influential mixed-blood seventeenth- and eighteenth-century families continued to exercise authority on behalf of the Portuguese until the late colonial period (1890s to 1975); and right up to the time of the Indonesian invasion in December 1975, traditional social and political structures remained virtually intact, a key consideration when trying to understand the strength and resilience of the East Timorese resistance to the 24 years of Indonesian rule.[3]

Political awakening and civil war (1974–75)

The army-led 'Carnation Revolution' (25 April 1974) in Portugal, which toppled the authoritarian regime of Marcelo Caetano, successor to the 40-year-old dictatorship of Dr António Salazar (1928–68), took the world unawares, nowhere more so than in distant East Timor. The April events pitched Portugal into two years of political turmoil when the country had two presidents, six provisional governments and two coup attempts.[4] Although Article 297 of the new post-revolution democratic constitution committed the Portuguese government 'to promote and safeguard the right to self-determination and independence in accordance with international law' and mandated the Portuguese president 'to take all steps necessary to enable this right to be exercised', Portugal was in no position to honour this obligation.[5] Even after the transition to democracy had been

completed following the September 1976 general elections which brought Mário Soares's Social Democrats to power, Lisbon's capacity to manage an orderly decolonization process in East Timor, or to insist on the rights of its people under international law, was vitiated by continuing political instability. Only when the economic and domestic situation began to stabilize between 1982 and 1986, when Portugal joined the EU (then European Community – EC), did East Timor once again emerge as an important issue for Lisbon's foreign policy agenda.[6] But by then, it was too late. The Indonesians had invaded (7 December 1975), between a quarter and a third of the territory's pre-1975 population (690 000) had been killed,[7] and Jakarta had embarked on its second decade of occupation complete with official transmigration programmes,[8] Indonesianization policies (particularly of the school system),[9] and a military presence more intense (by the 1990s, one in every 38 people was a soldier) than in any occupied country since the end of the Second World War.[10] In the official parlance of Suharto's 'New Order' (1966–98), East Timor had been 'integrated'.

In the bright dawn of the post-25 April 1974 era in East Timor, as political parties began to establish themselves in Dili for the first time and unprecedented discussions were initiated to consider the territory's future, an Indonesian invasion seemed but a remote possibility. True, the Portuguese had long warned of the disasters which would befall the colony should they be forced to depart. The traumas of the mid-1960s in Indonesia, in particular the bloody aftermath of the 30 September 1965 'communist' coup which had left over half a million dead, were still fresh. It was also no secret that the people of neighbouring Indonesian West Timor resented Jakarta's military overlordship and lack of economic development, leading most Timorese, in particular the tiny Portuguese-educated minority,[11] to draw the conclusion that Indonesian rule would involve not 'decolonization' but 'recolonization' under the Javanese.[12]

It was thus no surprise that the two largest of the new parties, the right-of-centre UDT (União Democrática Timorense – Timorese Democratic Union), and the more radical ASDT (Associacão Social Democrática Timorense – Timorese Social Democratic Association; post-September 1974, Fretilin), were adamantly opposed to any notion of integration with Indonesia, the first looking to 'progressive autonomy' under the Portuguese flag, and the latter for 'the [immediate] right to independence'. Only the tiny Apodeti (Associacão Popular Democrática Timorense; Timorese Popular Democratic Association) party was prepared to consider a merger with Indonesia, but even this was conditional on a large measure of local autonomy and a lengthy transition period in which both sides would get to know each other better.

Developments in Díli, however, were being watched with increasing alarm in Jakarta. Political parties, the end of censorship, the disbandment of the Salazarist secret police,[13] open debate, free elections, social democracy, even the prospect of eventual independence, were all deeply unsettling for the Indonesian military. After the struggles in the 1950s and 1960s to preserve the unity of the Indonesian Republic against secessionist (Ambon, 1950–51), conservative nationalist (Sumatra – PRRI, Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, 1956–61, North Sulawesi – Permesta, 1957–61), Islamicist (Darul Islam/'House of Islam') (West Java, 1949–62, South Sulawesi, 1952–65, Aceh, 1953–57), and Communist (Madiun, 1948, Java and Bali, 1965–66, Blitar, 1968) insurgencies, what sort of precedent would an independent East Timor set, especially for the desperately underdeveloped provinces of eastern Indonesia? Might it not serve as an example for other Indonesian regions seeking to break away from Jakarta and establish their own mini-states? Worse, might it not act as a magnet for communist insurgency thus jeopardizing everything that had been achieved by the bloody annihilation of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia – PKI) in the mid-1960s? The Indonesian generals knew that such arguments would play well with Washington and Canberra. This was after all the zenith of the Cold War when the whole of Indochina was rapidly being 'lost' to the communists. So they sought to portray an independent East Timor as a potential Southeast Asian 'Cuba', a security threat for the entire region.

In September 1974, this picture seemed to be confirmed when radical – Maoist-influenced – East Timorese students started returning to Díli from Lisbon, and the ASDT party, which had hitherto espoused a European-style social democratic agenda, took a sharp turn to the left, changing its name to Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente – Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) and embarking on a radical social and economic reform programme which targeted the expropriation of large landholdings (especially coffee plantations), inclusion of unused fertile land in a system of peasant cooperatives, participation of non-elite Timorese in local decision-making, and adult literacy and education policies which owed much to the successful liberation movements in the former Portuguese colonies in Africa and to Fr Paulo Freire's rural literacy and adult education programmes in Brazil.

In the same month that ASDT was transforming itself into Fretilin, Suharto met with the Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam (in office, 1972–75), in the resort town of Wonosobo in Central Java and received an important endorsement for his integrationist Timor policy. 'An independent East Timor would be an unviable state and a potential [security] threat to the area', Whitlam is reported to have told his host.[14] Assured of

Australia's 'understanding' and the support of key Western countries such as the United States and Japan – the first concerned to protect its strategic interests in the region, especially the vital deepwater nuclear submarine passage through the 3000-metre Ombai-Wetar straits off East Timor's north coast, the latter to ensure its supply of Indonesian oil – the generals laid plans for the Portuguese colony's 'incorporation'.

Initially, they hoped that this might be finessed through a covert operation masterminded by President Suharto's long-serving intelligence 'whiz', Ali Moertopo (1924–84). His brain-child, Operasi Komodo (Operation Komodo), named after the eponymous eastern Indonesian dragon, was designed to manipulate the domestic political situation in Timor in such a way that a subsequent Indonesian invasion could be presented to the world as an 'invitation' from the Timorese leaders to 'restore order' and ensure the territory's 'integration'. Indeed, right up to the present (September 2005), official versions of Indonesian national history taught in government schools still portray Jakarta's intervention as equivalent to that of a concerned citizen entering his neighbour's house to put out a serious fire in his kitchen. Nowhere is any reference made to either a military invasion of a foreign territory or the fundamental breach of international law which such an action entailed.[15]

Moertopo's scheme involved plunging East Timor into civil war by encouraging a UDT coup and precipitating a situation in which Jakarta's intervention could be given spurious international legitimacy. Initially dismissive of both the main Timorese parties, which had entered an uneasy coalition between January and May 1975, Moertopo's black propaganda beamed from Operation Komodo's radio station in Kupang soon began to single out 'Communist Fretilin' as the main threat. False reports were placed in the Indonesian press alleging communist Chinese – and later North Vietnamese – infiltration into the territory and political violence against pro-UDT chiefs.[16] At the same time, Moertopo sought to influence the UDT leadership during their late July to early August 1975 visit to Jakarta by warning them of an imminent Fretilin seizure of power, supposedly planned for 15 August.

While such briefings were clearly misleading, political developments in Portugal and Timor in July had put pressure on Jakarta to take speedy action: on 17 July, Constitutional Law 7/75 had been approved by the Portuguese Council of the Revolution, setting October 1978 as the date for the final Portuguese withdrawal. Meanwhile, in local elections to select *liurai* to form an executive council to prepare for general elections for a Constitutional Assembly between March and July 1975 – the only free ballot ever held in East Timor until the UN-supervised independence referendum of 30 August 1999 – Fretilin candidates were reported to have

gained 55 per cent of the popular vote.[17] Unless Jakarta acted with dispatch, it might find that Fretilin had swept the board.

On the morning of 11 August 1975, UDT leaders – with the backing of the Díli Police Chief – launched a 'show of force' (they still reject the term 'coup') to arrest Fretilin militants and expel them from the territory. Their ultimate goal was the establishment of an anti-communist coalition capable of staving off an Indonesian invasion. Unfortunately, this strategy almost completely backfired. Few Timorese switched allegiance to Fretilin, and UDT attempts to round up Fretilin militants, which led to a number of excesses, strengthened opposition to the coup. Although the Portuguese military administration tried to observe strict neutrality following the official policy of keeping the armed forces out of politics (*apartidarismo*), at least 2000 East Timorese soldiers in the colonial army in Timor – which numbered some 2500 front-line and 7000 second-line troops equipped with NATO weaponry – came out of their barracks (19–20 August) to join the embattled Fretilin fighters. Within a week Díli had been retaken and the Portuguese military administration had withdrawn (27 August) to the neighbouring island of Ataúro from whence it would eventually depart for Darwin following the 7 December Indonesian invasion, a pitiful end to the once extensive Portuguese empire.

Just under a month later (24 September), as the last UDT troops crossed the border into Indonesian West Timor, Fretilin consolidated its de facto administration over the whole of the territory with the exception of Oecussi and Ataúro where the Portuguese flag still flew. The combination of trained troops and modern equipment provided Fretilin with the military capacity not only to secure the territory following the UDT defeat, but also to mount a highly effective defence against the Indonesian cross-border incursions in mid-September to November 1975. The backbone of the armed resistance to the Indonesians in the highland areas, what had now been restyled Falintil (Forças Armadas de Libertação de Timor-Leste), the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (present-day Defence Force of East Timor; Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste/F-FDTL), brought to the fore gifted military leaders: men such as Nicolau Lobato (1950–78), East Timor's Fretilin's second president (1977–78), David Alex Daitula (1950–97), the charismatic commander of the Second Falintil Military district (Baucau-Viqueque),[18] Nino Konis Santana (1956–98), who brought the war back to the western districts and lived for nearly six years in a secret hiding place under a specially constructed oratory in his in-laws' house in Ermera,[19] and José Alexandre ('Xanana') Gusmão (born 1947), Falintil's second commander (1979–92), now the first elected President of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (April 2002 to date).

While the military benefits of the civil war were clear for Fretilin, the political legacy was quite otherwise. Brief and limited though it was (not more than 1500 are thought to have perished during the six weeks of fighting),[20] the August–September 1975 events were to have profound consequences for Timor's future. To this day (September 2005), the civil war continues to define the main fault lines in Timorese politics. The fratricidal conflict which pitted families and brothers against each other, and involved pockets of intense violence, especially in the Mambai 'tribal' triangle between the Aíleu, Same and Laclubar, has yet to be fully acknowledged.[21] The fact that Timorese could visit such horrors on each other – at least 150 political prisoners (both UDT and Apodeti), for example, were murdered by Fretilin commanders in Aíleu following the Indonesian invasion on 7 December 1975[22] – still gives rise to intense emotion. It is almost easier for Timorese to come to terms with the terrible legacy of the Indonesian occupation and its 200 000 dead – at least there they were confronting a 'foreign' (Tetum: *Malae*) enemy – than to forgive their fellow countrymen and women for the violence visited on them in the 1975 civil war and its aftermath, which included purges conducted by Fretilin within its own ranks as the tide of war turned against them in the late 1970s. The subsequent Indonesian tactic of 'Timorizing' their occupation by recruiting locals into regionally raised battalions after 1976,[23] and the paramilitary and auxiliary units and militias in the mid- to late 1990s,[24] added a further layer to this divisive history, one which pitted Fretilin 'nationalists' against UDT – Apodeti 'traitors', and pro-independence 'revolutionaries' against pro-integration and autonomy 'reactionaries'.[25]

For the Indonesians, although the civil war produced the very worst outcome – a total Fretilin victory – it still proved useful politically, especially when inconvenient questions began to be asked at the United Nations following their 7 December invasion. First, Jakarta could pretend that far from ending in the rout of the UDT in late September, the war had dragged on for months, years even. In this view, the Indonesian army did not 'invade' East Timor, but helped to 'liberate' it from the 'Fretilin regime of terror' by permitting 'hundreds' of Indonesian 'volunteers' to 'respond the call' of the resurgent forces of the gallant UDT–Apodeti 'coalition'.[26] The resultant deaths – even the Indonesians admitted to a high death toll (50 000–80 000 by April 1977 according to Foreign Minister Adam Malik)[27] – were thus not the responsibility of the Indonesian army, but the 'tragic consequence of the fratricidal struggle between the Timorese belligerents themselves'.[28] Second, Jakarta could claim that the Portuguese had 'abandoned their responsibilities' during the civil war when the last Portuguese governor, Colonel Mário Lemos Pires (in office, November 1974 – December 1975), and his entire staff evacuated to Ataúro,[29] conveniently

passing over the Indonesian role in helping to foment the civil war and the colony's wider destabilization, which from mid-September 1975 involved cross-border operations, initially by Indonesian special forces supported by units of the Strategic Army Reserve (Kostrad).

The reluctance of respective Western governments to lodge any serious protest about these cross-border operations was graphically illustrated on 16 October 1975 when two Australian-based camera crews (two Australians, two Britons and a New Zealander) were murdered by Indonesian forces at the border fortress town of Balíbo. With only the mildest of reactions from the West – the Indonesian special force/paratroop commander who led the operation, Major (later Lieutenant General) Yunus Yosfiah, was later (1989–90) given a scholarship by the British government to study at the prestigious Royal College of Defence Studies in London – Suharto correctly concluded that a full-scale invasion would not be opposed, especially after Fretilin declared East Timor's unilateral independence as the 'Democratic Republic of East Timor' on 28 November.[30]

The Indonesian invasion and its aftermath (1975)

While most East Timorese knew by late 1975 that the Indonesians were planning a major operation, few could have guessed at its scale, savagery and incompetence. The attack was launched at 5 a.m. on Sunday, 7 December, exactly 34 years to the day after the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (1941), the operation having been delayed for 24 hours so as not to embarrass US President Gerald Ford (in office, 1974–77) and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, during their two-day official visit to Jakarta (5–6 December).

From the start, the invasion was marred by poor coordination. Apparently the largest amphibious and airborne operation ever attempted in Indonesia's post-war history, it cruelly exposed the deficiencies in discipline, training and equipment of Indonesia's supposedly elite units. Here was an army trained principally for territorial garrison duties and internal counter-insurgency – the killing of unarmed civilians suspected of Communist sympathies in 1965–66 and the crushing of small-scale outer island revolts – being thrown into battle against a determined foe, one intimately acquainted with their home territory and deeply imbued with the justice of their cause. As the Japanese found to their cost in the Second World War, Timor with its rugged and inaccessible mountains was superb guerrilla country, a death trap for conventional armies.[31]

Indonesian losses ran into the thousands – the official TNI figure from the list of the fallen on the monument to the East Timor ('Seroja') campaign in the Armed Forces Headquarters in Jakarta has over 3600 names, with many more wounded.[32] The early losses were

especially high: circumstantial evidence from the first East Timor Operational Commander, General Dading Kalbuadi (in post, 1975–78), can be found in an interview he gave in July 1993 soon after his retirement, when he reflected bitterly:

> I felt most hurt, because of all the [East Timor] commanders, the losses amongst my men were the highest. So many [Indonesian] women were widowed . . . You know the Taman Seroja ['Lotus Garden' – called after the Indonesian army's code name for the invasion '*Operasi Seroja*'] orphanage in Jakarta [where many children of soldiers killed in the invasion were sent] . . . I can't go there because I feel so ashamed . . .[33]

The Indonesian authorities did everything possible to hide the scale of the carnage from the Indonesian public, refusing to allow wives to visit their husbands in the casualty wards of the main military hospitals in Java,[34] forbidding the return of corpses of dead military personnel from East Timor to inner island Indonesia (they were buried instead in the 'heroes' cemetery, Taman Pahlawan – Seroja, in Díli and other military graveyards), and insisting publicly that the only Indonesians in East Timor were 'volunteers' supporting anti-Fretilin forces, a fiction sustained by removing the insignia indicating rank and unit from the uniforms of the invading troops at the time of the first cross-border attacks.[35] As John Taylor has pointed out, the Indonesian invasion of East Timor thus became a 'hidden war'.[36]

Hidden perhaps to the Indonesian public and to the world at large, but not for the East Timorese themselves. Some 2000 inhabitants of Díli (700 of them Chinese), or 8 per cent of the pre-invasion population, are thought to have died in the first days of the invasion when the Indonesian troops went on an orgy of violence and looting.[37] In one of the first of many massacres of civilians, 150 people, many of them women (including Nicolau Lobato's wife, Isobel), were shot on the wharf at Díli by troops from Battalion 502 of the East Javanese Brawijaya Division, the terrified onlookers assembled at gunpoint by the Indonesians being forced to count as the bodies of the victims fell into the sea. Amongst these victims was a sixth foreign journalist, the Australian Roger East, who had come to Díli from Darwin the previous month to set up an East Timorese news agency and tell the world what was really happening in Timor.

As cargo ships arrived from Java to take away the contents of looted houses and public buildings,[38] a different type of plunder began – the raiding of the bodies of young women and girls. Female relatives of Fretilin fighters, and members of Fretilin-affiliated women's and students' organizations – for example the Popular Organization of Timorese Women (Organização Popular de Mulher de Timor – OPMT) – were especially at

risk. Many were arrested and imprisoned, some in a section of the Hotel Tropical in the centre of Díli where they were physically abused (a favourite Indonesian method was the use of fierce-burning *krétèk* – clove cigarettes – on breasts, face and buttocks). Most were also raped repeatedly by their guards. Six months after the invasion over half were pregnant.[39] The same pattern was repeated in the towns and villages taken over by the Indonesian troops where young women and girls (some barely in their teens) were demanded to gratify their sexual lusts.[40] This pattern of sexual abuse continued throughout the occupation,[41] in part driven by the deep psychological need experienced by a violent and insecure occupation force to prove their 'potency' in the face of widespread local resistance and the fighting capacity of the male population.[42]

Abuse of power by the Indonesian military also took on more horrific forms. Torture was used from the start and the dreaded BAKIN (Indonesian State Intelligence Agency) and Special Force (Kopassandha/Kopassus)[43] interrogation rooms in the Hotel Tropical in Díli and the Hotel Flamboyan in Baucau were always full. Starting with beatings, cigarette burnings and sexual abuse, the torturers proceeded rapidly to electric shock treatment (attaching electrodes to genitalia, tongue or ears, or forcing prisoners to stand in a metal barrel which then had a powerful electric current put through it), the systematic cutting of skin with razor blades, extraction of finger and toenails, water immersion, or the crushing of limbs (a favourite Indonesian method was to force a prisoner to place a hand or foot under a chair which was then sat upon by a heavy interrogator). One former prisoner interviewed by the present writer was so badly electrocuted that he was rendered impotent for several years afterwards.[44] Sometimes, these proceedings were watched by senior officers. One of these was Colonel (later Major General) Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk, East Timor's first Military Sub-area (Korem) Commander (March 1979 – late 1982). A graduate of the British Army Staff College at Camberley, he drew up a manual detailing techniques for the extraction of information from prisoners, and the precautions to be observed when taking photographs of torture victims and having these photographs processed in civilian photo studios.[45]

The international community fails to take action

Despite the proud boast of the Indonesian generals that they would 'breakfast in Díli, lunch in Baucau and dine in Lospalos', thus wrapping up the Timor campaign in a single day, it took them until Christmas (that is, nearly three full weeks after their invasion) before they had complete control of Díli, by which point Fretilin had completed their withdrawal to the mountains. Meanwhile, Portugal had requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council (UNSC) which adopted a resolution on 22 December 1975

(repeated by the UNSC with slightly milder wording on 22 April), recognizing 'the inalienable right of the people of Portuguese Timor to self-determination and independence' and calling upon Indonesia 'to withdraw without delay all its forces from the Territory'.[46] But although a UN Special Representative was sent to Díli to open up contact with 'all parties' (18 January 1976), the Indonesians prevented him from visiting the Fretilin-held areas (then most of the country).[47]

The UN diplomat's useless peregrinations mirrored the almost total ineffectiveness of the Security Council with regard to the East Timor issue. This was a direct result of the reluctance of any of Indonesia's key Western backers to bring any meaningful pressure to bear on Jakarta. As Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the US Representative to the UN during the Jimmy Carter administration (1977–81), later boasted in his memoirs, the US government, which continued to supply Jakarta with military equipment in defiance of congressional laws barring the provision of US weaponry to belligerent states, had 'wished things to turn out as they did . . . The Department of State desired the UN prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. The task was given to me, and I carried it out with no inconsiderable success'.[48] Faced with this situation, Portugal alone could do little. As the last Portuguese governor, Colonel Lemos Pires, bitterly recalled, '[of] all the countries in the world that asked Portugal to decolonise [in the 1960s and early 1970s] – when the time came – [none] attempted to help and support us'.[49]

By the time the UN Special Representative presented his final report on 22 June 1976 concluding that 'under the circumstances . . . it was not possible to assess accurately the prevailing situation in East Timor, particularly as regards the implementation of [the Security Council Resolutions]',[50] an Indonesian-sponsored 'Provisional Government' in East Timor had established a 'People's Assembly' which had 'resolved' on 31 May that East Timor should be integrated with Indonesia. On 7 June, a petition expressing that decision was presented to the President and Parliament of Indonesia who responded by sending a mission for the express purpose of 'making an on-the-spot assessment of the wishes of the people of East Timor, as formally expressed in the integration petition'. While this charade was taking place in East Timor, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim (in office, 1971–81) confided to a member of the British Labour government that 'he could envisage some kind of act of self-determination under UN auspices, but it was not clear what form it would take. The Indonesians clearly wish to legalise their *Anschluss* . . . a process similar to that employed in West Irian [in August 1969] could be considered if the Indonesians would accept it.'[51]

East Timor's 'representative' at the UN at this time, José Ramos Horta, was scathing about the role of the world body, stating that the Special

Representative's mission 'was an utter failure – for him personally, for Waldheim, and for the UN [as a whole]'.[52] He subsequently challenged the Secretary General for his failure to implement SC Res.389, but came to the conclusion that neither Waldheim nor the major powers (that is, the Permanent 5 Members of the Security Council) had any interest in pursuing the East Timor issue. He later wrote in his memoirs of his UN mission: 'It was obvious that . . . they all wished the issue would simply fade away'.[53]

Military stalemate and Fretilin's resistance strategy, 1976–77

Vital though this diplomatic support was for Jakarta, it could not overcome the gross incompetence of the Indonesian military in the face of stiff Fretilin resistance. Pinned down on a narrow coastal strip along Timor's northern shore, it took them over two years (January 1976 – May 1978) before they could start moving against the principal Fretilin bases in the mountains. The fact that many of the Indonesian troops were not paid for weeks on end, lacked adequate food supplies, were prey to intense inter-unit rivalries (sometimes involving firefights between different battalions),[54] and served under commanders who were prepared to make their own ceasefire arrangements with local Fretilin units often to further their own business deals (the bartering of foodstuffs for high-quality Timorese coffee from Fretilin-held areas was especially popular) – all militated against a zealous prosecution of the war.[55]

During this time, in the zones under their control, where an estimated 450 000 Timorese civilians (two-thirds of the pre-invasion population) lived, the Fretilin administration continued much as it had done during its three-month interregnum following the August–September civil war. The decision was now taken to fight a protracted 'people's war', any compromise with the Indonesians being ruled out. Falintil was reshaped into a regular army, and small units known as 'shock brigades' were mustered to launch lightning attacks on the Indonesian positions. In this way, the Portuguese NATO arsenal was regularly supplemented with captured (or clandestinely purchased) Indonesian weaponry. Gunpowder and medicines were also manufactured locally using indigenous resources.

The welfare of ordinary Timorese – referred to by Fretilin as the *maubere,* originally a Mambai word for 'brother' – which in the colonial period summed up everything which was contemptible in the eyes of town-dwelling Timorese with regard to the ignorant and impoverished highland peasantry,[56] now lay at the heart of the party's struggle for an independent East Timor. This aimed above all at transforming the *maubere* into the true 'sons' and 'daughters' of Timor, citizens of an independent state, whose inhabitants would be emancipated from the thrall of servitude and

debt-bondage to the traditional chiefs, and from tribalism, superstition and illiteracy (hence the Fretilin stress on adult education).

This transformation in social and political attitudes was mirrored in the remarkable evolution in that most quintessentially colonial of institutions, the Timorese Catholic Church. Long a symbol of Portuguese authority, especially in rural areas where the Church ran nearly all the colony's educational institutions (most Fretilin leaders were graduates of its high schools and colleges, in particular the Catholic seminary at Dare just above Díli), it was viewed as a foreign body by most non-elite Timorese, who remained attached to their animist traditions. This foreignness was especially evident in the Church's use of Latin and Portuguese in the liturgy, and by the fact that at times of crisis Church personnel had sought refuge in Portugal or Australia.[57]

All this changed with the Indonesian invasion. The remaining priests (over half of whom were Timorese) and religious were not able to leave and many went with the local populations into the mountains to escape the Indonesian army. Their links with Portugal severed and influenced by the rise of Fretilin-defined Timorese nationalism, they began to reconstruct their Church amidst the carnage of war and occupation. The Church's ministry became increasingly orientated towards the needs of ordinary Timorese, a change reflected in the Vatican's decision to appoint a Timorese – Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes – as Apostolic Administrator (May 1977 – May 1983) following the departure of his Portuguese predecessor, and the adoption of Tetum in the liturgy rather than Indonesian (*Bahasa*) when Jakarta forbade the use of Portuguese in 1981. This last was vital both for the growth of a Timorese Church and for the subsequent development of Tetum as a national language.[58] By the time the Indonesians left East Timor in late October 1999, over 80 per cent (700 000 out of 830 000) of the local population were registered communicants, a remarkable transformation from the situation pre-1975 when a bare 30 per cent had been church-goers.[59]

Operation annihilation circle (1977–79)

In September 1977, the Indonesian army launched a new campaign – Operation Annihilation Circle. Involving three massive offensives, which lasted till March 1979, this was designed first to undermine Fretilin resistance by destroying its base areas, and then to overwhelm and annihilate Falintil. The nearly two years of stalemate which had followed its December 1975 invasion had proven increasingly embarrassing for Jakarta, exposing as it did the corruption and ineptitude of its armed forces, and the ineffectiveness of its civil administration in what Jakarta now termed its '27th Province'.[60] Criticism of Indonesia's actions had been growing in Western Europe, Australia and the United States, fanned by reports which

had reached the West from Church sources and the clandestine Fretilin radio link with Australia's Northern Territory. The unanimous condemnation of Indonesia at the Conference of Non-Aligned Movement Countries in Colombo in 1976 had also rankled, Jakarta priding itself on its founding role in the movement.[61]

For Jakarta's campaign to be a success, however, it had first to obtain new weapons for its armed forces. Money was not a problem – the December 1973 OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil price 'shock' had quadrupled Indonesia's government revenues almost overnight – but unless sophisticated weapons systems could be purchased, particularly counter-insurgency aircraft, the military stalemate in Timor looked set to continue. It is here that Western responsibility for the East Timor tragedy becomes most evident. The willingness of Western governments to sell Indonesia the required equipment not only sealed the fate of the pre-1979 Fretilin-led resistance, but also ensured that Jakarta's victory would be bought at the price of maximum civilian casualties.[62]

The United States was pivotal, for it was at this time Jakarta's principal arms supplier and provider of military training for its officers.[63] Less than a month after President Jimmy Carter and his 'human rights' administration had taken office (January 1977), 13 OV-10F 'Bronco' counter-insurgency aircraft manufactured by Rockwell International Corporation were delivered to Indonesia courtesy of an official military sales credit. A low-flying, slow-moving and highly manoeuvrable aircraft, it was capable of pinpointing resistance positions in difficult terrain and under varying climatic conditions. It also carried a payload which included biological and chemical weapons, and high-explosive (1000-pound) bunker-busting bombs capable of blowing craters in rock.[64] These aircraft – soon joined by 16 A-4E Skyhawk bombers (built by the American McDonnell-Douglas company but subsequently modified for counter-insurgency operations in Israel) – were immediately in action over the skies of East Timor. Flying from the newly converted airbase at Baucau, they made daily sorties over the Fretilin-held areas in the mountains while naval guns pounded villages near the coast. With the Indonesian army now reinforced by 15 new battalions, 'search-and-destroy' operations were pushed into the interior, systematically wiping out populations suspected of Fretilin sympathies, and creating what became known as 'dead-earth' regions, regions once inhabited and cultivated before the Indonesian invasion, but now transformed into free-fire zones where Fretilin 'insurgents' could be hunted down at will.[65]

As the Indonesian noose tightened around Fretilin towards the end of 1977, and more and more food-producing areas came under attack from

the air, Fretilin President Xavier do Amaral, the 40-year-old former Jesuit-educated seminarian who had argued for compromise with the Indonesians to save civilian lives, was arrested (7 September), and a year later (30 August 1978), fell into Indonesian hands. His place was taken by Nicolau Lobato whose qualities of leadership and military prowess had been amply demonstrated in the fighting against the Indonesians since 1975.[66] But time was now running out for organized Fretilin resistance in the two remaining redoubt areas of Mount Matebian in the centre-east and the Natabora plain near the south coast. Those who tried to surrender to the Indonesians found little mercy. An eyewitness, Domingos Sarmento Alves, whose family was forced down from the mountains in 1979, described how:

> There were constant killings. The Indonesians showed a smiling face to try and speed up the surrender process, but once formal resistance on Matebian was at an end . . . the killings began in earnest. The Indonesians killed off the remaining Fretilin soldiers one by one. They just disappeared . . . every night there were killings. One could say that the Indonesians had now begun to flaunt the fact that they could torture people with impunity. Realizing that formal Fretilin resistance was now defeated, and with no journalists or outsiders filing reports, they began to flaunt their cruelty openly. I remember the public castration of a first cousin of President Nicolau Lobato. He was brought out before the entire community of Viqueque who were forced to witness the mutilation – he was castrated in public and then killed. Some of the locals had to take him and bury him – at least what was left of him – in a grave which they had dug close to the [Viqueque] river.'[67]

While the Matebian tragedy was unfolding, Lobato himself was being relentlessly pursued by helicopter-borne special forces. Eventually on 31 December 1978, he was cornered in the Maubisse mountains near Turiscai and was captured after a six-hour gun battle. He later died of his stomach wounds on the military helicopter bringing him to Díli. It seemed as though the war in East Timor had been won.

Famine, resettlement and the rebirth of the Timorese resistance (1979–88)

'If Indonesia thinks that by exterminating Falintil the war will end, they are wrong!' These words spoken by Lobato's successor as leader of the Timorese resistance, Xanana Gusmão, in September 1990 encapsulated Indonesia's problem.[68] It might have destroyed Fretilin's capacity to fighting using Falintil as a conventional army, but it had not blunted the Timorese will to survive an independent nation. The more terrible the repression, the more determined the Timorese were to win through. '*Pátria ou morte*' ('Fatherland or Death!') remained the cry in every heart.

Seen from the dark days of January 1979, that determination might have seemed futile. With the Indonesians mopping up the remaining resistance

on Mt Matebian, and the surviving populations in the highland areas (250 000–350 000) being herded into resettlement camps, it was death by famine rather than independence which stared most Timorese in the face. A whole way of life, that of the shifting 'slash-and-burn' (swidden) cultivators of the mountain regions with their small scattered hamlets (*povoação*) was now being destroyed by the Indonesian tactic of 'separating the people from the terrorists'. Death rates in the resettlement camps may have reached 2500 a month (1 per cent of the total camp population) throughout most of 1979, a situation exacerbated by the delays imposed by the Indonesian authorities in allowing Western food aid to reach East Timor.[69] Some observers spoke of conditions as bad as Biafra and Cambodia.[70]

This situation continued in some places right through into the 1981–82 planting season, when the drafting of the population into the infamous 'Fence of Legs' (*Operasi Keamanan*) operation to flush out remaining Fretilin fighters by forcing locals to act as human 'beaters', again put pressure on food supplies. The problem was compounded when Jakarta awarded thousands of hectares of 'abandoned' or 'underutilized' ricefields, particularly in the Maliana plain (the rice bowl of East Timor) close to the Indonesian border, to Balinese or Javanese transmigrants, without any compensation to the original owners who were either dead or languishing in resettlement camps.[71]

In 1981, an Indonesian military census estimated that 567 000 people remained in the territory. It is not known whether this figure included Indonesian civilians (bureaucrats, transmigrants and so on), but it is significant that Church estimates put the surviving Timorese population at just 425 000 at this time. Prior to the Indonesian invasion, there had been slightly under 700 000 inhabitants in the territory, and the population was growing at 2 per cent a year. Even if we assume that the growth rate was halved due to the intensity of the conflict, there should still have been around 732 000 people in the province by 1981. Where had the missing 170 000 got to? Since only a modest number of Timorese refugees (4000+) had made it to Portugal and Australia by this time, the only conclusion is that they were dead. This means that since their December 1975 invasion, the Indonesians were responsible for the deaths of around a quarter of the population, one of the worst mortality levels of any society in post-war history.[72]

While the Indonesians were assessing the demographic consequences of their conquest, and the surviving civilian populations were struggling to survive in the resettlement camps, the Fretilin leadership were coming to terms with the crippling losses sustained in the 1977–79 'Annihilation Circle' campaign: 85 per cent of the members of the Supreme Command were dead, 80 per cent of Falintil troops killed and 90 per cent of their

weapons lost.[73] Of the members of the Fretilin Central Committee who had remained in the territory after 7 December 1975, only two had survived and both were subsequently captured by the Indonesians.[74] All Fretilin support bases had been destroyed and Indonesian troops were in control of the surviving population. All lines of communication between the remaining resistance fighters under Xanana Gusmão in the extreme east (Ponta Leste) and those in the central and western districts had been severed. Contact with the outside world had also been cut, making it impossible to channel information to supporters overseas.

The first task of the Fretilin leadership was to restore links between the scattered Falintil units still capable of mounting attacks on Indonesian positions. Once these had been established, pre-1979 military and political strategies were completely revised – the policy of maintaining fixed bases was abandoned and Falintil units were now instructed to function as highly mobile columns, constantly moving from place to place. At the same time, a network of clandestine organizations was set up behind enemy lines in the resettlement camps and population centres under Indonesian control. The vital links between the armed resistance in the bush and the clandestine organizations in the camps and towns were henceforth maintained through the 'population resistance centres' (*nucleos de resistência popular* – nurep), which had a presence in most inhabited areas.[75]

The new strategy adopted at the March 1981 First National Conference for the Reorganization of the Country (held near Lacluta in the central highlands) was remarkably successful: just two years later (March 1983), on the initiative of local Indonesian commanders, a whole series of local ceasefires had been arranged which later resulted in a four-and-a-half month general ceasefire (23 March – 8 August 1983).[76] The fact that Fretilin had been able to make a comeback from near total defeat in under four years was a measure of Xanana's exceptional political skills and the continued support of the local Timorese population for the resistance cause. Just how astute a leader Xanana was at this time can be seen in his capacity to rethink the whole direction of the resistance struggle in the aftermath of the 1978–79 disasters. Walking from village to village through enemy strongholds in 1979–80, he undertook an extensive grass-roots consultation with local people to ascertain their views on whether to continue or end the war, and to make contact with the surviving resistance forces.[77] This resulted in a process, begun at the March 1981 conference, which greatly broadened the base of the independence struggle. Over the next seven years, the rigid Marxist-Leninist ideology of the original Fretilin party was gradually abandoned. Pluralism, multi-party government, and Fretilin's new role as a broad-based national movement encompassing differing ideologies began to be stressed. 'What is important is that everyone is moved by

a common feeling – that of national identity', Xanana stated in a 1984 mid-year message.[78]

In December 1987, Xanana resigned from Fretilin and declared that the Timorese National Liberation Army, Falintil, was aligned with no political party. Instead, he established CNRM, the National Council of Maubere Resistance (post-April 1998, National Council of Timorese Resistance – CNRT) as an umbrella organization for all the various nationalist groups fighting for Timorese independence.[79] Encompassing all political ideologies, it included those inside East Timor (that is, the military and clandestine fronts) and outside, in particular the diplomatic front.[80] These changes became official in December 1988 when Fretilin hardliners abroad were expelled from the leadership.[81]

The Timorese 'perestroika' and the international community, 1989–99

This process of 'perestroika' in the Timorese resistance leadership opened many doors for the independence struggle both at home and abroad. Abroad, the previous perceptions of Fretilin as a communist organization were increasingly replaced by a new understanding of its nationalist credentials. Nowhere was this change more important than in Portugal where the incoming Portuguese President, Dr Mário Soares (in office, 1986–96), threw the weight of Portuguese diplomacy behind the Timorese right to self-determination, a campaign greatly enhanced by Lisbon's 1 January 1986 entry into the European Union (then the European Community – EC).[82]

At home, the mid- to late 1980s saw the emergence of a student-led – mainly urban-based – resistance movement. A form of Timorese 'intifada', this coordinated civil resistance to the Indonesians in the main towns and helped to run the CNRM Clandestine Resistance Front. It also developed – through the groups of Timorese students studying in inner-island Indonesia – an Indonesia-wide network which became increasingly important as the process of democratization and reform began to undermine Suharto's 'New Order' government from within during the 1990s. Domingos Sarmento Alves (Acting Secretary General of Renetil, Resistência Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor-Leste – the East Timorese Students' National Resistance organization], 1992–94), who moved to Díli from Viqueque in July 1981, was centrally involved in this process:

> In 1984, there was an announcement from the Indonesian Government in Díli that every student who got through their senior high school graduation exams would get a guaranteed place in an inner-island Indonesian university . . . It was then that I developed a sort of plan. I was aware that the Indonesians wanted to send the brightest and the best East Timorese out to Java and Bali for tertiary education. [In their view] this would facilitate integration and

> inculcate in us a sense of [Indonesian] identity. We saw straight through this but decided to turn the Indonesian strategy on its head by actually engaging with younger generation Indonesians. While the Indonesian Government hoped that we would return from our studies feeling like Indonesians, we decided we would educate our fellow Indonesians about what was really going on in East Timor. It was partly because of this that we founded Renetil in 1988. We [employed] the facilities the Indonesians gave us to support the struggle in East Timor. Ten per cent of our scholarship money was put into a Renetil fund and we used this to buy food, clothes, medicine and other necessities for the resistance and to send information about the struggle out of the country.'[83]

The Indonesian attempt to win over the younger generation of Timorese in the mid- to late 1980s had effects very different from those intended – both in Timor itself and in Indonesia. The changing international climate was also crucial. The end of the Cold War and the new-found Western concern for human rights post-First Gulf War (1991) meant that repressive 'security states' like Suharto's Indonesia could now no longer rely on unquestioning Western support. With the fight against communism 'won', an independent East Timor was no longer seen as a potential Southeast Asian 'Cuba'. In fact, Indonesia found itself especially vulnerable once it took the decision to 'open' East Timor in early 1989 and allow access to foreign visitors.

In the space of a bare two years, this decision had rebounded. Militarily, the decision immediately undermined the Indonesian army's strategy of separating Falintil from their local support base by interdicting popular contacts with the Timorese guerrilla forces, thus closing off vital supplies of food and medicine, a strategy which had led to the near collapse of Falintil outside the eastern districts.[84] Internationally, it led to unprecedented foreign media interest in what had long been a forgotten conflict. The publicity surrounding Pope John-Paul II's visit on 12 October 1989, and the infamous Santa Cruz massacre (12 November 1991) when hundreds of protesters were gunned down in front of Western reporters and cameramen at Díli's main civilian cemetery,[85] put East Timor under the spotlight as never before. In Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas's (in office, 1987–99) words, Santa Cruz became 'a turning point in our diplomacy over the East Timor issue'.[86]

More searching investigations now began to be undertaken into Jakarta's human rights record. Eventually, in December 1994, when the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions was released, it amounted to a devastating attack on the Indonesian government, calling for an entirely new investigation into Santa Cruz and making many other recommendations for the improvement of the human rights situation in East Timor.[87] The decision by the Clinton

administration (1993–2001) to back the original UN Human Rights Commission's resolution (10 March 1993) was critical to its success and signalled a toughening of Washington's stance on East Timor. This toughening would eventually result in Clinton's post-Kosovo (April–June 1999) humanitarian 'doctrine': 'Whether you live in Africa, in Central Europe or anywhere else, if someone intends to commit massive crimes against innocent civilians, he should know that, to the limit of our capacities, we will prevent it.'[88]

Although the Clinton administration did not make good on its promise of preventing 'massive crimes against innocent civilians' in East Timor – Indonesia's eventual exit (September–October 1999) would be marked by wide-scale destruction of property (75 per cent of all private dwellings and infrastructure burnt to the ground), population displacement (four-fifths of the inhabitants forced from their homes, half transported to Indonesian West Timor, the other half internally displaced) and at least 1500 killed – in a sense East Timor was 'lucky'. Lucky in that Suharto had agreed back in December 1988 to 'open' East Timor and allow access to the outside world. Would the international spotlight have fixed so firmly on the territory in the 1990s if it had remained closed? Indeed, would the armed Timorese resistance have even survived another decade of Indonesian military operations?[89] Lucky in that there was a 'weather window' for it to seize its independence through a UN-sponsored popular consultation (30 August 1999). Would East Timor have been given this opportunity if Kosovo had not happened or if al-Qaeda had attacked New York and Washington three years earlier? Lucky, in that John Howard's Conservative Government in Australia (in office, 1996 to present) had signalled a major shift in Australian policy on East Timor in December 1998[90] and was prepared to lead the International Force in East Timor (InterFET) mandated by the 15 September 1999 Security Council Resolution.[91] Would Australia have acted in the way it did if a Keating Labor Government had still been in power?[92] Indeed, would an international force have even been deployed if the United States, New Zealand or ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) (for example Malaysia or Thailand) been asked to lead it? Lucky in that Indonesia – not a model of authoritarian efficiency to start with – was itself fatally weakened by the Asian Financial Crisis of July 1997, suffering a 13 per cent collapse of its GDP between 1997 and 1998, the largest contraction of any open economy since the Second World War. Would Timor have been given this opportunity if, like Tibet, it had been occupied by a regional superpower like China? Lucky in that it was a Christian 'outpost' occupied by the state with the largest Muslim majority in the world. Would the West – in particular the Nobel Committee who awarded José Ramos Horta and Bishop Belo the 1996 Peace Prize[93] – and

East Timor's many human rights activists and pro-independence supporters around the world have been so zealous in its cause if the roles had been reversed and Timor had been a Muslim enclave overrun by a majority Christian country? One only has to contemplate here the West's comparative indifference to the plight of Muslims in the southern Philippines, in pre-tsunami Aceh, or more recently in Southern Thailand, to understand the selective nature of the 'causes' taken up by the Western human rights lobby.[94]

Conclusions

East Timor was a victim of the Cold War. Together with Cambodia in the period 1969–89, it was that conflict's most tragic victim – in Asia at least.[95] Its tragedy lay in its proximity to Indonesia, a key Western ally in the period between Suharto's accession to power in 1966 and the early 1990s.[96] Given its strategic importance athwart three of the world's most important sea lanes (that is, the Melaka, Sunda and Lombok straits), it was always going to be favoured over tiny East Timor, however egregious Jakarta's human rights record. Portugal's position as the territory's former colonial master also did Timor no favours. Washington's very different reaction to the Argentinian invasion of the Malvinas (April 1982) seven years after Jakarta's December 1975 onslaught indicates what Timor's fate might have been if it had been colonized by a major European power. It is unlikely that Suharto's New Order government would have even contemplated a move against a British-ruled Timor in the light of his predecessor, Sukarno's, disastrous *konfrontasi* (confrontation) with former British-ruled Malaysia in 1963–66. True, Lisbon never abandoned Timor's constitutionally mandated right to a legitimate act of self-determination, as Spain would do with the Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara after 1975, but this adherence to principle availed Timor little until the political changes in Portugal in the early 1980s brought a greater stability and focus on the plight of the former colony. Meanwhile, Timor's other major neighbour, Australia, effectively sold the pass to Jakarta from the time of Whitlam's first meeting with Suharto in September 1974. As the only Western country to recognize *de jure* Indonesia's annexation in 1985 – recognition which paved the way for substantive negotiations on the hydrocarbon-rich Timor Gap[97] – Canberra played a deeply compromised role in the Timor tragedy right up to John Howard's December 1998 (eleventh-hour) policy reversal.

Clearly the bravery and skill of the Timorese people themselves was crucial to the eventual outcome. The ability of the resistance leadership to come up time and again with new ways of waging the independence struggle, and the ingenuity of ordinary Timorese in implementing those strategies, resulted in a miracle. One of the smallest territories in the world

succeeded in resisting an occupying power at least 200 times its size, eventually winning through to sovereign statehood. And this, despite the fact that until the very end Indonesia enjoyed the full diplomatic and military backing of the West. Today the consequences of that struggle are still being played out, both in Timor itself and in Indonesia where there has been no substantive settling of accounts with the military: not one of the senior Indonesian officers implicated in the 1999 events has been found guilty by the special ad hoc tribunal in Jakarta charged with trying those responsible. At the end of the day, however, Timor's fate was and remains inextricably bound up with international politics. As Timothy Mo put it so eloquently in his novel *The Redundancy of Courage* (1991):

> We were correct to think that we had no control over our destinies: to consider resistance was futile and bravery superfluous. From the start, our fate was determined not by ourselves, not locally or by the invader even, but abroad in Canberra and Washington.[98]

Notes

1. For a brief personal memoir of this terrible time, see Robinson, Geoffrey (2001), 'With UNAMET in East Timor: an historian's personal view', in Richard Tanter, Mark Selden and Stephen R. Shalom (eds), *Bitter Flowers. Sweet Flowers. East Timor, Indonesia and the International Community*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 55–72. See also Martinkus, John (2001), *A Dirty Little War*, Sydney: Random House.
2. For a detailed consideration of the terms of this boundary agreement brokered by the International Court of Justice in The Hague under the terms of the 1913 Sentença Arbitral (Arbitration Judgement), which had involved complex transfers of territory in Timor, Flores and other islands in the eastern Indonesian archipelago with an earlier Portuguese colonial presence, between 1847 and 1916, see Pélissier, R. (1996), *Timor en Guerre: Le Crocodile et les Portugais (1847–1913)*, Orgeval: Pélissier, pp. 27–8, 33–9, 180–85, 208–9, 238–9, 301–2.
3. For a succinct summary of this unique Portuguese colonial legacy, see Taylor, John G. (1991), *Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor*, London: Zed Books, Chapter 1. See also Taylor, John G. (1995), 'The emergence of a nationalist movement in East Timor', in Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley (eds), *East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation*, London: Cassell, pp. 21–32.
4. Ward, Eilís and Peter Carey (2001), 'The East Timor issue in the context of EU–Indonesian relations, 1975–99', *Indonesia and the Malay World*, **29** (83), p. 56.
5. Defert, Gabriel (1992), *Timor Est. Le Génocide Oublié. Droit d'un Peuple et Raisons d'État*, Paris: l'Harmattan, p. 224. See also Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, Milton, Qld: Jacaranda Press, p. 335 who gives the number of the relevant clause in the Portuguese Constitution as 307 as of 1982.
6. Defert, Gabriel (1992), *Le Génocide Oublié*, p. 225. See also Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, p. 337, and Horta, José Ramos (1987), *Funu. The Unfinished Saga of East Timor*, Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, p. 129.
7. For a careful discussion on the demographic impact of the Indonesian occupation, see Kiernan, Ben (2003), 'The demography of genocide in Southeast Asia: the death tolls in Cambodia, 1975–79, and East Timor, 1975–1980', *Critical Asian Studies*, **35** (4), pp. 590–94.
8. For details, see Soewartoyo (1997), 'Migrasi Internal di Timor Timur: Kajian di Daerah Tujuan Pasca Integrasi', *Analisis* CSIS, **26** (3), pp. 265–75. For a review of the

statistics, which indicate that there were 33 618 'lifetime' migrants from inner island Indonesia by 1990, see Carey, Peter (2003), 'Third World colonialism, the *Geração Foun*, and the birth of a new nation: Indonesia through East Timorese eyes, 1975–99', *Indonesia*, **76**, p. 53 n. 30.

9. Carey, Peter (2003), 'Third World colonialism', pp. 41–53.
10. Moore, Samuel (pseud.) (2001), 'The Indonesian military's last years in East Timor: an analysis of its secret documents', *Indonesia*, **72**, p. 25.
11. For an estimate that only 0.25 per cent (that is, just over 2000) of the pre-1975 population had passed through Portuguese-language schools and been officially recognized by the colonial state as *assimilados* (assimilated) or *civilizados* (civilized), see Weatherbee, Donald (1966), 'Portuguese Timor: an Indonesian dilemma', *Asian Survey*, **6** (12), p. 684.
12. Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, p. 36.
13. This was the Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado or PIDE, the International Police for the Defence of the State, instituted during the Salazarist dictatorship to keep an eye on political undesirables.
14. Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, p. 126, quoting Hastings, Peter (1974), 'Report on Wonosobo meeting', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 September. See also Way, Wendy (ed.) (2000), *Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 1974–1976*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, pp. 95–6.
15. Testimony of Dr Asvi Adam, Indonesian Academy of Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia/LIPI), to the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (Comissão Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação; CAVR), Díli, East Timor, Public Hearing on Self-Determination, 15–17 March 2004. Dr Adam called on Indonesian and East Timorese historians to undertake an urgent rewriting of the history of the Indonesian invasion and occupation to correct the biases which still remain in the official histories. See also Krieger, Heike (ed.) (1997), *East Timor and the International Community. Basic Documents*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 64, where the slightly different analogy of a fire in a neighbour's apartment was used by the Indonesian Ambassador to the UN, Anwar Sani, during the debate on the 22 December 1975 Security Council Resolution on East Timor (SCOR 384).
16. Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, pp. 69–70, p. 146.
17. Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, p. 86. See also Niner, Sarah (2001), 'A long journey of resistance: the origins and struggle of CNRT', in Richard Tanter et al. (eds), *Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers. East Timor, Indonesia and the World Community*, p. 17, p. 27 n.7; and Paulino Gama (Mauk Muruk) (1995), 'The war in the hills: a Fretilin commander remembers', in Carey, Peter and G. Carter-Bentley, *East Timor at the Crossroads*, p. 105 n. 1.
18. See Carey, Peter (2003), 'Third World colonialism', p. 57 n. 32.
19. On Konis's hiding place in Ermera where he was based from 1991 until his death from natural causes on 11 March 1998, see Carey, Peter (2005), 'Writing on human skin', *Oxford Historian*, **3**, p. 21.
20. Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, pp. 184–5.
21. The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) has begun to facilitate this process by taking testimonies from those involved in the civil war, especially former (and present-day) UDT and Fretilin political leaders. Its Public Hearing on Internal Political Conflict, 15–18 December 2003, held at its headquarters in the former Comarca political prison in Díli was an important milestone here; see the report by Gomes, Adelino (2004), 'A lesson in humanity', Lisbon, 7 January, at www.easttimor-reconciliation.org/adelinoGomesOnCAVRHearing.html.
22. See Dunn, James (1983), *A People* Betrayed, pp. 269–70. According to the testimony of former Fretilin President Xavier do Amaral (in office, 1975–77), to the Public Hearing on Internal Political Conflict. CAVR, Díli, 15–18 December 2003, these prisoners were executed in late December 1975 because of the difficulties involved in feeding and transporting them during the Fretilin withdrawal from Aíleu. Such an explanation does not excuse what amounts to a war crime.

23. On the establishment of the two regionally (eastern Indonesian and Timor – East and West) recruited battalions, 744 (Díli) and 745 (Baucau) from 1976 onwards, see Budiardjo, Carmel and Liem Soei Liong (1984), *The War Against East Timor*, London: Zed Books, p. 40. See also Carey, Peter (2003), 'Third World colonialism', p. 35 n. 20.
24. On these paramilitary units (Team Alpha [Lospalos], Team Saka [Baucau], Team Sera [Viqueque]) and pro-integration/autonomy militias (Gadapaksi [Integration Youth Guards], Aitarak ['Thorn'], Besi Merah Putih 'Red-and-White Iron', Mahidi ['Life-or-Death with Indonesia'] and so on), see Bartu, Peter (2001), 'The militia, the military and the people of Bobonaro', in Richard Tanter et al. (eds), *Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers*, pp. 73–90. See also Martinkus, John (2001), *A Dirty Little War*.
25. For a good discussion of this Manichean view of Timorese history, see Kammen, Douglas (2003), 'Master–slave, traitor–nationalist, opportunist–oppressed: political metaphors in East Timor', *Indonesia*, **76**, pp. 78–83.
26. Krieger, Heike (ed.) (1997), *East Timor and the International Community*, p. 63.
27. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 May 1977, cited in Budiardjo, Carmel and Liem Soei Liong (1984), *War Against East Timor*, p. 49.
28. Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, p. 284, p. 325; Krieger, Heike (ed.), *East Timor and the International Community*, p. 277.
29. Ali Alatas (1992), 'East Timor: debunking the myths around a process of decolonisation', remarks to the members of the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 20 February, originally published in *Indonesian News*, Information Department, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, London, **20** (28), 20 March 1992, pp. 4–6, reprinted Krieger, Heike (ed.) (1997), *East Timor and the International Community*, pp. 275–8.
30. Dunn, James (1995), *Timor: The Balibo Incident in Perspective*, London: Parliamentary Human Rights Group, 16 October. See also O'Shaughnessy, Hugh, Christopher Bellamy and Matthew Brace (1995), 'Indonesian officer linked to murder of Britons in East Timor trained in UK', *Independent on Sunday*, 5 November; and The Editors (1993), 'Current data on the Indonesian military elite', *Indonesia*, **55**, p. 195 n. 21. Subsequent to his military career, Lieutenant-General Yunus Yosfiah became the last Indonesian Information Minister (the post was subsequently abolished by President Wahid, in office, 1999–2001) in the Habibie government (1998–99), and is now a political pundit on Indonesian TV chat-shows.
31. On the Japanese occupation of East Timor in the Second World War, which cost the lives of an estimated 60 000 people out of a pre-war population of 472 221, see Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, pp. 19–23; and Callinan, Bernard J. (1984), *Independent Company: The Australian Army in Portuguese Timor, 1941–43*, Melbourne: Heinemann.
32. Van Klinken, Gerry (2005), 'Indonesian casualties in East Timor, 1975–1999: analysis of an official list', *Indonesia*, **80** (October), pp. 109–22, gives a figure of 3600 confirmed battlefield dead and 2400 wounded, the last a figure which seems decidedly on the low side given that the wounded-to-dead ratio in battlefield conditions is usually at least 2:1. East Timorese estimates are much higher, but are not substantiated: Fr Domingos Soares (Fr Maubere), currently (2005) parish priest of Ermera, gave a figure of 16 000+ in a conversation with the present author, Balíbo, 31 October 2003. The majority of the losses occurred in the first four years of fighting (1975–79).
33. Interview with General Dading Kalbuadi, Jakarta, July 1993, cited in *Jakarta-Jakarta*, 24–30 July 1993, p. 30. See also Santoso, Aboeprijadi (1996), *Jejak-Jejak Darah. Tragedi & Pengkhianatan di Timor Timur*, Yogyakarta: Pijar, pp. viii–ix.
34. Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, pp. 259–60.
35. On the removal of insignia, see Ball, Desmond and Hamish McDonald (2000), *Death in Balibo, Lies in Canberra*, St Leonards NSW: Allen & Unwin, pp. 48–9; and Toohey, Brian and Marian Wilkinson (1987), 'The Timor Papers' (entry for 11 October 1975), *Book of Leaks: Exposés in the Defence of the Public Right to Know*, North Ryde, NSW, and London: Angus & Robertson. See also Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, pp. 259–60, 325.
36. See Taylor, John (1991), *Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor*, p. ix.

37. Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, p. 253.
38. Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, pp. 251–3.
39. Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, p. 253.
40. See the testimony of Domingos Sarmento cited in Carey, Peter (2003), 'Third World colonialism', p. 35.
41. For a full discussion, see Carey, Peter (2001),'Dimensions of domination: institutionalised violence against women during the Indonesian occupation of East Timor (1975–99)', in Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhoefer (eds), *Violence in Indonesia*, Hamburg: Abera Verlag, pp. 185–209.
42. See Aditjondro, George (1994), *East Timor: An Indonesian Intellectual Speaks Out*, eds Herb Feith, Emma Baulch and Pat Walsh, Canberra: Australian Council for Overseas Aid, pp. 12–13, p. 23 n.8.
43. Kopassandha: Komando Pasukan Sandhi Yuda, Covert Warfare Forces Command; post-December 1986, Kopassus: Komando Pasukan Khusus, Special Forces Command.
44. Interview with Captain Kay Keri (Domingos d'Oliveira), Quarter-Master General of F-FDTL (Metinaro, East Timor), 26 February 2004, cited in Carey, Peter (2005), 'Writing on human skin', pp. 20–21.
45. Budiardjo, Carmel and Liem Soei Liong (1984), *War Against East Timor*, pp. 233–7. On Rajagukguk, see The Editors (1985), 'Current data on the Indonesian military elite', *Indonesia*, **40**, p. 143 n. 38, p. 159; and The Editors (1993), 'Current data on the Indonesian military elite', *Indonesia*, **55**, p. 189 n. 12.
46. For the text of these UNSC Resolutions (384 and 389), see Gunn, Geoffrey C. (1997), *East Timor and the United Nations. The Case for Intervention*, Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, pp. 109–11; and Krieger, Heike (ed.) (1997), *East Timor and the International Community*, p. 53, p. 93.
47. Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, pp. 325–6.
48. Moynihan, Daniel P. with Suzanne Weaver (1978), *A Dangerous Place*, Boston: Little, Brown & Company, p. 247
49. Lemos Pires, Colonel Mário (2004), videotaped presentation to Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), Public Hearing on Self-Determination, Díli, 15–17 March.
50. Krieger, Heike (ed.) (1997), *East Timor and the International Community*, p. 51.
51. Confidential FCO Record of comments over dinner at the Excelsior Hotel, Heathrow Airport, 15 May 1976, between UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and the Right Honourable Evan Luard MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign & Commonweath Office, from CAVR Archive, Díli, East Timor, Dowson File (original document in FCO Archive, Public Record Office, Kew, London). On the August 1969 'Act of Free Choice' in West Papua (then West Irian), see Saltford, John (2003), *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962–1969. The Anatomy of Betrayal*, London: RoutledgeCurzon. The '*Anschluss*' (forced union/annexation) referred to by Waldheim was the Nazi takeover of Austria on 9 March 1938.
52. Horta, José Ramos (1987), *Funu*, p. 117.
53. Horta, José Ramos (1987), *Funu*, pp. 122–3.
54. For examples, see Carey, Peter (2003), 'Third World colonialism', pp. 36–7, p. 40.
55. Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, p. 301; Santoso, Aboeprijadi (1996), *Jejak-Jejak Darah*, p. 38.
56. The term was originally coined by José Ramos-Horta; see Horta, José Ramos (1987), *Funu*, p. 37. See also Niner, Sarah (2001), p. 28 n. 30; Taylor, John (1991), *Indonesia's Forgotten War*, p. 42; and Budiardjo, Carmel and Liem Soei Liong (1984), *War Against East Timor*, pp. 59–60.
57. Archer, Robert (1995), 'The Catholic Church in East Timor', in Carey, Peter and George Carter-Bentley (eds), *East Timor at the Crossroads*, p. 121. See also Carey, Peter (1999), 'The Catholic Church, religious revival and the nationalist movement in East Timor, 1975–98', *Indonesia and the Malay World*, **27** (78), pp. 79–80.
58. Anderson, Benedict R.O'G. (1993), 'Imagining "East Timor"', *Arena Magazine* (April–May), p. 27; and Carey, Peter (1999), 'The Catholic Church', pp. 85–6.

59. Carey, Peter (1999), 'The Catholic Church', p. 86.
60. In August 1990, the former Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, famously remarked after his invasion of Kuwait that if Indonesia could acquire East Timor as its 27th Province, then the world should acquiesce in allowing him to keep Kuwait as his 13th Province.
61. Horta, José Ramos (1987), *Funu*, pp. 160–61.
62. For overviews of British and European arms supplies to the Suharto regime (1966–98), see Phythian, Mark (2000), *The Politics of British Arms Sales since 1964*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 294–8; and ENAAT (European Network Against the Arms Trade) (1997), *Indonesia: Arms Trade to a Military Regime*, Amsterdam: ENAAT (June). On US arms supplies, see next note.
63. On US military and logistical support for Indonesia's invasion, see Leichty, C. Philip (1992), 'How Indonesia engulfed East Timor', *Washington Post*, 6 January. Leichty was CIA station chief at the US Embassy in Jakarta at the time. On the International Military Educational Training (IMET), the Pentagon programme for training foreign military officers in the US at this time, which had provided courses for an estimated 4000 Indonesian army officers (half the total officer corps including one-third of the general staff) by the late 1970s, see Nairn, Allan (2001), 'US support for the Indonesian military: congressional testimony', in Richard Tanter et al. (eds), *Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers*, p. 165–6; Toohey, Brian and William Pinwill (1980), *Oyster*, Port Melbourne: Heinemann, p. 93; and Chomsky, Noam (2001), 'East Timor, the United States, and international responsibility: "green light" for war crimes', in Richard Tanter et al. (eds), *Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers*, pp. 133–6.
64. Taylor, John (1991), *Indonesia's Forgotten War*, pp. 84–6.
65. Lewis, Norman (1993), *An Empire of the East: Travels in Indonesia*, London: Jonathan Cape, p. 122; Dunn, James (1983), *Timor. A People Betrayed*, p. 336.
66. Budiardjo, Carmel and Liem Soei Liong (1984), *War Against East Timor*, pp. 33–6; Defert, Gabriel (1992), *Génocide Oublié*, pp. 107–9.
67. Domingos Sarmento Alves, interview, Lisbon, Portugal, 13 November 1999, quoted in Carey, Peter (2003), 'Third World colonialism', pp. 33–4.
68. Domm, Robert (1990), 'Timor rebels fight on with unshakeable morale', *Age* (Melbourne), 25 October, quoting transcript of Domm's interview in Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ABC Radio National, 'Official Transcript Briefing – 28, 29, 30 October 1990: Report from the Mountains of East Timor: Interview with Resistance Guerrilla Commander, Shanana [*sic*] Gusmão'.
69. Kohen, Arnold and R. Quance (1980), 'The politics of starvation', *Inquiry* (New York), 18 February; Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, pp. 290–91. See also the summary of the report by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on its March–April 1979 visit to East Timor in East Timor News Agency (Sydney) (1979), *East Timor News*, **61** (2), November.
70. Kondracke, Morton (1980), 'Another Cambodia', *New Republic* (Boston), 3 November; Defert, Gabriel (1992), *Génocide Oublié*, pp. 116–22; Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, pp. 290–91.
71. On the effects of the 'fence of legs', see Costa, Cristiano (1988), 'Timorese refugee on Indonesian operations', *Tapol Bulletin*, **87** (June 1988), p. 10; Defert, Gabriel (1992), *Génocide Oublié*, pp. 193–4. On transmigration, see Taylor, John, *Indonesia's Forgotten War* (1991), pp. 124–5; Defert, Gabriel (1992), *Génocide Oublié*, pp. 181–2; Aditjondro, George, *East Timor*, pp. 17–20. See also above n. 8.
72. Kiernan, Ben (2003), 'Demography of genocide', pp. 593–4; Defert, Gabriel (1992), *Génocide Oublié* (1992), pp. 147–50; Dunn, James (1983), *A People Betrayed*, pp. 283–5; Budiardjo, Carmel and Liem Soei Liong (1984), *War Against East Timor*, pp. 49–51. The 2005 report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliacão – CAVR), which investigated the killings and human rights abuses in Timor-Leste between 1974 and 1999, estimated the number of 'conflict-related' deaths at between 102 800 and 183 000, a figure which includes both killings and deaths due to privation. CAVR Press Release, Díli, 4 January 2006.

73. Budiardjo, Carmel and Liem Soei Liong (1984), *War Against East Timor*, p. 67.
74. These were Xanana Gusmão (captured 20 November 1992) and Mau Hunu (Third Falintil Commander, 1992–93) (captured 3 April 1993).
75. Budiardjo, Carmel, and Liem Soei Liong, *War Against East Timor*, p. 69, p. 82.
76. On this ceasefire process, see Carey, Peter (2003), 'Third World colonialism', p. 39 n. 23.
77. Niner, Sarah (2001), 'Long journey of resistance', pp. 19–20.
78. Niner, Sarah (2001), 'Long journey of resistance', p. 20.
79. Niner, Sarah (2001), 'Long journey of resistance', pp. 21–2.
80. José Ramos Horta, previously in charge of Fretilin's External Affairs office, was nominated CNRM Special Representative abroad.
81. Niner, Sarah (2001), 'Long journey of resistance', p. 22.
82. See Ward, Eilís and Peter Carey (2001), 'East Timor issue', pp. 56–7. Soares's campaign built on the important initiatives undertaken by his predecessor, General Ramalho Eanes (in office, 1976–86), in the early 1980s. A crucial exchange had apparently taken place between Mgr Carlos Belo (Bishop of East Timor; post-Dec 1995, Díli, 1988–2002) and Mário Soares at the Papal Nunciature (Embassy) in Lisbon in June 1985 when Belo had been invited by the Papal Legate to meet the candidates in that year's Portuguese presidential election. In response to Soares's question over lunch as to whether Fretilin was 'communist', Belo had replied that he thought the organization was at that time primarily 'nationalist'. This had helped convince the future Portuguese President that the Fretilin-led Timorese resistance was worth supporting diplomatically. Personal Communication, Roque Rodrigues, TL Defense Minister, Dare, Timor-Leste, 4 September 2005.
83. Domingos Sarmento Alves, interview, Lisbon, 13 November 1999, quoted in Carey, Peter (2003), 'Third World colonialism', p. 58.
84. José Augustinho Sequeira ('Somotxo'), interview, Lisbon, 15 April 2000. Somotxo, who had joined Falintil in his native Lospalos in September 1976 at the age of 16, served as adjutant to Falintil Chief of Staff Taur Matan Ruak (1990–94), and the fourth Falintil Commander, Nino Konis Santana (1994–98), in the central and western military districts (Regions 2, 3 and 4) in the 1990s. In his interview, he testified to the vital importance of the Indonesian decision to 'open' the territory in January 1989, stating that the Indonesian army could have defeated the Timorese armed resistance if it had stuck to its pre-January 1989 policy of food interdiction which had brought several Falintil units close to collapse at that time.
85. According to the Lisbon-based ecumenical organisation A Paz é Possivel em Timor-Leste (Peace is Possible in East Timor) (1992), *East Timor: The Santa Cruz Massacre/Timor Oriental: Massacre de Santa Cruz*, Lisbon: A Paz é Possivel em Timor-Leste, February, p. 3, there were 271 killed, 250 'missing' and 382 wounded, but the numbers of dead were certainly higher because the Paz é Possivel report does not take account of the 'second massacre' when Santa Cruz survivors were murdered by Indonesian army medical authorities at the main military hospital (Wira Husada no. 4) in Dili, see Max Stahl (1994), 'Indonesians fed "death pills" to wounded', *Sunday Times*, 13 February, p. 17. The two most important eyewitness photographers and film makers present, Max Stahl and Steve Cox, published their photos and film- footage in Gordon, Peter (1992), *In Cold Blood: The Massacre of East Timor*, Yorkshire TV, 7 January; and Cox, Steve and Peter Carey (1995), *Generations of Resistance: East Timor*, London: Cassell.
86. Alatas, Ali (2000), 'Santa Cruz incident a turning point in our diplomacy', *Tempo Magazine* (Jakarta), 18–24 September.
87. UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 51st Session (1994), Agenda Item 12, 'Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions Addendum: Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr Bacre Waly Ndiaye, on his Mission to Indonesia and East Timor from 3 to 13 July 1994', E/CN.4/1995/61/Add.1, 1 November 1994, reprinted in Krieger, Heike (ed.) (1997), *East Timor and the International Community*, pp. 261–73.
88. Quoted in Klinken, Gerry van (2001), 'Big states and little independence movements', in Richard Tanter et al. (eds), *Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers*, p. 222.

89. According to José Augustinho Sequeira (Somotxo), who served as Nino Konis Santana's (C-in-C Falintil, 1993–98) Military Secretary/Chief of Staff in the mid-1990s, Falintil came close to destruction in the late 1980s because of the effectiveness of the Indonesian military tactic of destroying the civilian support base of the armed resistance. The December 1988 'opening' of the territory had allowed these civilian support networks to be rebuilt. José Augustinho Sequeira (Somotxo), Interview, Lisbon, 15 April 1999.
90. See Huntley, Wade and Peter Hayes (2001), 'East Timor and Asian security', in Richard Tanter et al. (eds), *Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers*, pp. 179–83. Canberra's policy shift was signalled to Jakarta in a letter written by Howard to Habibie on 19 December 1998 suggesting the possibility of an act of self-determination (that is, independence vote) after 5–10 years. According to Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, this letter had a crucial impact in persuading Habibie to allow an immediate independence option, see Alatas, Ali, 'Santa Cruz incident a turning point in our diplomacy'.
91. See United Nations (1999), *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1999*, New York: Security Council Official Records, 54th Year, Resolution 1264 (1999), 15 September, pp. 128–30. This SC Resolution was quite unusually mandated under Chapter VII (Peace Enforcement) of the UN Charter, rather than the more normal Chapter VI (Peace Keeping).
92. On the pro-Indonesia policies adopted by the Bob Hawke and Paul Keating governments in Australia between 1983 and 1996, policies which included building closer ties with the Indonesian military and negotiating a secret Canberra–Jakarta security pact (December 1995), see Huntley, Wade and Peter Hayes (2001), 'East Timor and Asian security', p. 179.
93. See De Ferro, Fernando Mão (ed.) (1997), *East Timor – Nobel Peace Prize. Lectures Delivered at the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize Awarding Ceremony*, Lisbon: Ediçoes Colibri.
94. Interestingly, Osama bin Laden himself underscored this point when on two separate occasions in video and audio broadcasts statements aired on al-Jazeera Satellite Television on 3 November 2001 and 12 November 2002 he blamed the West – in particular Australia (target of the 12 October 2002 Bali bombings in which 202 died, many of them Australians) and the United Nations – for the forcible removal of East Timor from 'the largest country in the Islamic world' Indonesia; see Carey, Peter (2002), 'Dark side of paradise', *World Today* (London), December, p. 20. For Bin Laden's statements, see (2001) users.skynet.be/terrorism/html/laden_statement_3.htm, and (2002) news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2455845.stm.
95. For a comparison of the deaths in Cambodia and East Timor, see Kiernan, Ben (2003), 'Demography of genocide', pp. 585–97.
96. The other key regional allies of the West during the Cold War were: (1) Latin America Brazil which was ruled by a succession of right-wing military governments between 1964 and 1985; (2) Africa General Mobutu Sese-Seko's Zaire (1965–97); and (3) The Middle East; Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi's Iran (r. 1941–79).
97. This resulted in the 11 December 1989 Timor Gap Treaty, which shared out the substantial assets (8 trillion cubic feet of gas [LNG] and 300 million barrels of condensate in the Greater Sunrise fields alone – collectively one of the 25 largest gas fields in the world) between Canberra and Jakarta, see Brennan, Frank (2004), *The Timor Sea's Oil and Gas: What's Fair?* Sydney: Australian Catholic Social Justice Council, p. 12, pp. 25–6.
98. Mo, Timothy (1991), *The Redundancy of Courage*, London: Chatto & Windus, p. 110.

PART V

COMMUNIST INSURGENCY

19 The communist insurgency in the Philippines

Miriam Coronel Ferrer

The Philippine state has been battling for almost 40 years a persistent communist insurgency led by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), its armed wing the New People's Army (NPA), and underground alliance called the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP, or NDF). According to military estimates, at least 43 000 people have been killed in armed confrontations.[1] Several hundred thousands more have been displaced, arrested or tortured.

President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law and suspended regular political institutions in 1972. CPP-NPA forces grew tremendously during the Marcos regime. After a peaceful 'people power' revolution ousted Marcos in 1986, peace talks have taken place between the NDF and the Corazon Aquino (1986–92), Fidel Ramos (1992–98), Joseph Estrada (1998–2001) and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001–to date) administrations.

Formal democracy was restored and there was general consensus on the need for a comprehensive approach that addresses poverty and injustice. However, dominance of traditional politics, factionalism among the political elites, and a weak bureaucracy impeded national reforms. Incoherent or contradictory policy of the different administrations and conflictive issues on the process and substance of the talks between the two parties have undermined political negotiations. The CPP continues to seek seizure of political power through armed revolution. In 2002, the NPA and CPP leader Jose Ma Sison were declared terrorists by the United States government and the Council of the European Union. This chapter examines the historical background of the insurgency, the growth and decline of the CPP and the NPA, the status of political negotiations, and concludes with some observations on the continued salience of the insurgency as well as assesses its problems and prospects.

Historical background

The revolutionary Katipunan ('Brotherhood') declared an independent Philippine Republic on 12 June 1898. However, 300 years of Spanish colonial rule only ended in December 1898 with the signing of the Treaty of Paris between the US and Spain. For $20 million, ownership of the

'Philippine Islands' was transferred to the US. Filipino revolutionaries and Muslim sultans in the south resisted the American takeover. The US succeeded in quelling resistance within a decade of occupation. It subsequently instituted the system of political parties, an elected legislature and a unitary and presidential form of government that were carried over to independence in 1946.

The US supported presidential aspirants whom it deemed supportive of its economic designs and Cold War geopolitics. The 1946 Republic of the Philippines–US Military Bases Agreement (as amended in 1966) allowed US military bases in various parts of Luzon enjoying extraterritorial rights to stay until 1991. These bases were widely used during the Cold War period in conflict areas in Asia. The US gave the Philippines US$1 billion in military aid from 1950 to 1986. Three-quarters were granted during the Marcos dictatorship (1972–86).[2] The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) expanded from 57 100 regular troops in 1971 to 158 300 in 1985.[3] The US feared that the anti-dictatorship resistance would end in communist victory that, in turn, would endanger its military bases in the country.

The US expanded the plantation economy begun in the eighteenth century under Spanish rule. Sugar quotas enjoyed by the Philippines in the US market sustained sugar as the top export product until the 1970s. Sugar industry leaders were a powerful lobby group in government. They and other landed provincial oligarchies dominated top national and local government positions and perpetuated a political class of elite clans or dynasties. However, the shift to the export-oriented industrialization model in the mid-1970s, the entry of other foreign and multilateral capital and the emergence of government cronies have allowed the entry of other families into the political class in more recent decades.

The titling of farm and forest lands under new registration and cadastral laws led to loss of land ownership and impoverishment of the rural majority. US interference in the country's political and economic affairs even after independence also sustained an intelligentsia-backed nationalist, anti-US discourse. This and wide-scale tenancy and social inequity historically generated radical dissent in the Philippines. In 1938, the Marxist-Leninist Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) was formed from the merger of the Socialist Party founded by Pedro Abad Santos in 1929, and of the Communist Party established by brothers Jesus and Jose Lava in 1930. Tenants in the rural farmlands of the Central Luzon region and some workers in Manila made up the PKP membership. The PKP joined forces with the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (or 'Huks', People's Army Against the Japanese) during the Second World War and continued to oppose US intervention in the country after the war. It abandoned its military organization in 1945 and focused on organizing workers and

peasants, and the legal political struggle. It successfully fielded candidates in the first post-independence Congress in 1946. However, the Democratic Alliance candidates were denied their seats in Congress. The PKP returned to a short-lived armed struggle in 1948.[4] A US-supported containment strategy and the 1957 anti-subversion law closed in on the Huks and the PKP.

The Marcos regime's limited agrarian reform dismantled mostly smaller landholdings planted to rice and corn. Poverty, the $24.6 billion foreign debt, and the agrarian question continued to beset the immediate post-Marcos administrations. A 1987 UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) study found that 52 per cent of low-income families did not own the land they tilled while 35 per cent farmed lands smaller than 1 hectare. A 1988 World Development Report showed that the bottom 20 per cent of Philippine households held only a 5.2 per cent share of income while the highest 10 per cent enjoyed a 36.4 per cent share in 1985.[5]

The peaceful 'people power revolution' in 1986 paved the way for the restoration of formal democratic institutions. But the return of traditional politics and elite class interests limited the reform potential of the democratic transition. Poor governance, dependency and poverty persisted.

The CPP and the National Democratic Revolution

In December 1968, young stalwarts of the PKP broke from the ranks and formed the new CPP's Central Committee in Pangasinan, Northern Luzon. Jose Maria Sison became the chair of about 75 youthful party members. Sison was a member of the PKP Executive Committee since 1963 and also head of its youth section until he left the organization in 1967 and formed an alternative provisional Political Bureau. He was also an English instructor at the University of the Philippines, and the founder-leader of activist youth and civic organizations like the Kabataang Makabayan (KM, or Nationalist Youth) and the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism. As in other parts of the world, student activism saw an upswing in the late 1960s. University students protested on issues like the US war on Vietnam, US interference in domestic politics, rising prices of oil, government corruption and the rigging of the 1969 election by re-electionist President Ferdinand Marcos. The so-called First Quarter Storm of 1970 paralyzed universities in Metro Manila and elsewhere. Students demonstrating in front of the Malacanang Palace, the seat of government, were routinely beaten by police.

The CPP derived its ideology from 'Marxist-Leninist-Mao Tse Tung Thought'. Its party orientation and organization is Leninist, but its class analysis and adopted strategy is overtly Maoist. Founding papers of the CPP include the 'Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party', the 'CPP Constitution',

the 'Program for People's Democratic Revolution', and the 'Main Tasks of the Party'.

The CPP advocates a national democratic revolution to overthrow the 'semi-colonial and semi-feudal' system. The national democratic revolution is seen as a necessary transition to attain socialism and full economic and political sovereignty. In this 'nationalist' transition phase, the patriotic national bourgeoisie is considered an ally against the dominant comprador-bourgeoisie and foreign monopoly capitalists. Meanwhile, agrarian reform is the core of its democratic, anti-feudal programme. Its minimum agrarian reform programme includes reducing land rents, eliminating usury, raising agricultural productivity through labour exchanges and mutual aid, forming peasant associations, ensuring fair prices and opposing landgrabbing. The maximum goal is to partition and redistribute large landholdings but this shall be achieved only after the seizure of state power.[6] Its draft 1988 NDF Program, however, claimed that due to rapid growth, the revolutionary movement has gone beyond the minimum to include the confiscation and redistribution of lands to the peasants.

Unlike the PKP which reverted to the legal struggle in the 1950s, the CPP adopted Mao's 'protracted people's war' (PPW) strategy. The PPW preached encirclement by the people's army of the cities from the countryside. The workers are the leading force of this revolution. The CPP is the vanguard party, while the peasants, who constituted the majority of the population, are the main force.

In 1970, Sison published his major opus, *Philippine Society and Revolution* (*PSR*) under the name of Amado Guerrero.[7] The *PSR* provided a class analysis of Philippine society beset by three ills: US imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. The 1974 document, *Specific Characteristics of Our People's War* (*SCPW*), built on the analysis and laid out a revolutionary strategy described as the 'national democratic revolution of a new type'. It pointed to the mountainous terrain and archipelagic nature of the country (in contrast to the huge China mainland) as the conditions for guerilla warfare. Two weapons, armed struggle and national united front, shall be wielded like the sword and shield. Primacy was given to armed struggle to destroy enemy rule. Organizing was aimed at the gradual enlargement of guerilla fronts and organs of political power in the rural areas, and building an underground party and united front infrastructure nationwide under centralized party leadership but decentralized, self-reliant operations.

Our Urgent Tasks (1976) further particularized the revolutionary strategy under the repressive conditions of martial rule. Solid grass-roots work, especially in peasant areas and among workers, was emphasized. The main tasks of revolutionaries were the armed struggle, the urban mass movement

(among the workers, urban poor, youth), united front and international solidarity. The strengthening of the party committee system and party expansion, already set out in the *Strengthen the Party Committee System*, a document prepared for the third party Plenum in December 1975, were reiterated. A gradualist expansion methodology starting with the formation of a barrio liaison group and the conduct of social investigation became the standard practice. Given favourable conditions and effective entry, a People's Organizing Group (POG) and eventually a People's Organizing Committee (POC) charged with organizing, education, defence, health and the economy will be constituted. The underground structure will be responsible for putting up a local mass organization and a Barrio Revolutionary Committee (BRC) charged with instituting minimum agrarian reform, forming local militias, and other community projects. The BRC is the basic organ of political power of the provisional revolutionary government.

The New People's Army

The CPP leadership linked up with disgruntled Huk commanders. Together, they formed the NPA in May 1969 in the province of Pampanga, Central Luzon, at the first Plenum of the Central Committee (CC). An NPA constitution, bylaws and 'Basic Rules' were adopted. The CC was also expanded to 22 members. New members included former Huk commander Bernabe 'Dante' Buscayno and seven other ex-PKP commanders and peasant leaders. Buscayno was elected NPA chief, and member of the CPP's Political Bureau and Executive Committee (EC).[8]

The NPA started with 60 peasant-guerillas and 35 firearms, of which only nine were automatic rifles.[9] From Tarlac in Central Luzon, it expanded to Northern Luzon and then southward to Southern Luzon and the Visayas islands. In 1974, the *SCPW* document claimed that the CPP had established 20 guerilla fronts in seven regions outside of Metro Manila, including Mindanao.

The NPA secures its arms domestically, from armoury raids, attacks on police and military quarters, and ambushes of government forces, including the paramilitary Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF). Two attempts to land a shipment of arms from China in the early 1970s failed. China dissociated itself from the CPP in the mid-1970s and supported the Marcos government. Subsequent attempts in the 1980s and early 1990s to land arms bought overseas were, for the most part, unsuccessful. The NPA has no air and naval capacity.

CPP-NPA operations are financed by revolutionary taxation collected from businesses operating in their areas of control, and from peasants who have benefited from its agrarian reform. CPP units and supporters contribute dues or raise funds. In the first half of 2004, the NPA reportedly

collected US$740 000 in revolutionary taxes.[10] The peasantry provides various other forms of assistance. Funds raised by CPP-allied organizations from local and international 'solidarity work' help finance guerilla warfare. Regardless of party affiliation, the CPP-NPA collects 'permit to campaign' fees from electoral candidates who wish to campaign unhampered in NPA-influenced or controlled areas. In the January 1988 local election, a rebel leader in Southern Luzon said they were collecting $1200–$1800 in local money per candidate, and expected a total collection of $142 000 in cash and arms.[11] In the 2004 election, the NPA reportedly raked in P13 million (approximately $300 000) in fees.[12] An attempt to engage in the trading of fake US dollars in the late 1980s was aborted.

The Central Committee and Military Commission of the CPP oversee the General Command of the NPA. Party organs supervise military work at their respective territorial levels to ensure compliance with the party line and directives.[13] The people's war has three stages: the strategic defensive, strategic stalemate and strategic offensive. In 1981, the party considered itself in the 'advance substage of the strategic defensive'.[14] In the 1981 CC plenum, steps to advance to the 'strategic counter-offensive' (SCO) were set. The SCO, the third 'substage' of the strategic defensive, sought to combine regular and guerilla warfare with rural and urban mass uprisings and broad mass actions to produce a leap to the strategic stalemate and even victory.[15]

Consequently, in 1983, the guerillas were regularized into five company-sized formations. Fourteen standing companies were reported by 1985,[16] and one battalion each in Samar and Northern Luzon by the end of 1986.[17] The move exacted huge financial costs and politico-military losses. A return to the basics took place after the 1992 CC plenum. The document adopted at the plenum, 'Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors' (drafted by Armando Liwanag, Sison's other pseudonym), stated that the prematurely enlarged NPA units lacked extensive and deep mass base. Army regularization was blamed for pulling cadres and resources away from mass work.

Currently, the national democratic revolution considers itself in the 'early phase of the strategic defensive' characterized by tactical offensives, and dispersal and shifting of forces. In contrast to the army regularization in the late 1980s, the NPA reported in 2004 that it is in the process of developing mobile, flexible but relatively concentrated armed units at the regional level. The task of these regional forces is to secure the regional CPP leaderships and regional army commands. They also function as a strike force supporting the guerilla fronts in seizing weapons from government forces. Guerilla fronts are dispersed bases of the NPA in a particular region. The NPA undertakes decentralized offensives in a guerilla front,

utilizing the platoon as the main guerilla unit in a guerilla base, and the guerilla squads as secondary guerilla units based in guerilla zones.[18] From zones, to bases, to fronts and now the regional forces, the NPA envisions moving forward to the maturation of the middle phase of the 'strategic defensive' stage.

Indiscriminate bombing and other openly 'terrorist' methods are not part of CPP-NPA strategy where guerilla warfare and political organizing are at the core. A striking exemption may be the 1971 bombing of Plaza Miranda, which killed civilians and hurt opposition figures from the Liberal Party who were staging a political rally. The bombing was widely blamed on Marcos but more recent revelations point to Sison as the mastermind of the plot.[19] Sison has denied the allegation.

The CPP–NPA–NDF have committed to observing human rights and international humanitarian law in various statements and agreements.[20] Home-made, command-detonated landmines are used largely for offensive operations (such as ambushes) and only minimally for defence purposes. No large tracts of areas are mined.[21] In response to the insurrectionary approach advocated by some units of the CPP in the early 1990s, the CCP leadership stated that 'the unnecessary and putschist burning of buildings are impermissible, these being properties of the people and future facilities of the revolutionary government'.[22] However, NPA forces have intermittently attacked and destroyed civilian targets such as telecommunication towers, power transmissions, public buses, mining and logging equipment, and bridges. These were done largely to show strength, exact compliance with its demands, or in some cases, to prevent enemy pursuit. Big and small businesses and propertied persons have complained of coercive collection of revolutionary taxes by the NPA.[23] Its collection of fees from politicians during elections has been criticized for distorting the electoral process and effectively supporting the electoral victory of 'anti-people' but moneyed politicians. Members of the police force have become indiscriminate targets of attack by armed city partisans called 'sparrows'. Civilians have been killed in NPA-initiated ambushes, raids, or punishments imposed by the CPP-NPA's 'revolutionary courts'. NPA presence in interior communities has invited military deployment, retaliatory military attacks and consequent displacement of communities. Children have also been recruited, armed, or made to perform supportive roles in its military operations.

The National Democratic Front

The NDF was formed to gather the widest political, diplomatic and financial support for the revolution. In its 1971 Plenum, the CPP directed the establishment of an NDF Preparatory Committee in Metro Manila tasked with organizing national democratic (ND or 'natdem') cells among

the middle class, especially among religious workers, the youth and professionals. In April 1973, the NDF was formally established with a former government official, Horacio Morales, Jr, as leading figure. It issued a ten-point programme outlining its policy positions on the economy, foreign affairs, society and culture. The programme, detailed and refined in 1977, subscribed to the ouster of the 'US–Marcos regime' and the victory of the ND revolution. Acceptance of the primacy of armed struggle and support for the revolution was a basic requirement to be considered a 'natdem'.

Organizations forced underground by martial law, such as the KM, the Makabayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan (MAKIBAKA, Patriotic Movement of New Women), and the Christians for National Liberation (CNL) were revived and put under the NDF organizing framework. Given the importance of the Church institutions in the Philippines with its 90 per cent Christian population, the CNL network contributed significantly to providing the resources and infrastructure for institution-building, organizing and campaigns at the national level down to the remotest villages or parishes. Many priests and nuns left their vocation to work fulltime in underground organizations, including the NPA.

The CPP astutely saw human rights violation as the raging issue with which to organize and mobilize the middle forces and draw international support. By 1977, some 70 000 Filipinos had been arrested for their political beliefs and annual averages of 30 disappearances and 50 summary executions were reported between 1976 and 1978.[24] All units were instructed to give full support to the human rights movement.[25] Work in Europe to draw in support for the NDF and the human rights campaign began the same year. By 1987, the NDF allegedly had support networks in more than 25 countries.[26] To this extent, the ND movement produced the widest pool of courageous and resourceful human rights activists and institutions recognized internationally for their work.

The NDF membership includes two ethno-regional organizations, the Cordillera People's Democratic Front in Northern Luzon, and a Muslim group called the Moro Revolutionary Organization (MORO). The NDF organizations served as the backbone of both the underground revolutionary structure and the open mass movement that surfaced under different organizational forms beginning in the late 1970s. (See Table 19.1.)

The NDF is led by its founder-member, the CPP. It complements the work of the CPP's National United Front Commission (NUFC). The NUFC defined the policy on the formation of broad fronts that worked with other political forces outside of the ND ambit, a project that gained more importance after the assassination of Marcos's political nemesis, former senator Benigno 'Ninoy' Aquino, in 1983. The attempts at forming

*Table 19.1 Revolutionary member-organizations of the NDF (2003)**

Communist Party of the Philippines
New People's Army
Revolutionary Council of Trade Unions
Pambansang Katipunan ng Mga Magbubukid (National Association of Peasants)
Kabataang Makabayan (Patriotic Youth)
Makabayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan (MAKIBAKA, Patriotic Movement of New Women)
Cordillera People's Democratic Front (CPDF)
Christians for National Liberation (CNL)
Katipunan ng mga Gurong Makabayan (KAGUMA, Association of Patriotic Teachers)
Katipunan ng mga Samahang Manggagawa (Federation of Labor Unions)
Lupon ng mga Manananggol para sa Bayan (LUMABAN, Council of Lawyers for the People)
Artista at Manunulat ng Sambayanan (ARMAS, Artists and Writers of the People)
Makabayang Kawaning Pilipino (Patriotic Government Employees)
Makabayang Samahang Pangkalusugan (Patriotic Health Association)
Liga ng Agham para sa Sambayanan (LAB, League of Science for the People)
Moro Revolutionary Organizations (MORO)
Revolutionary Organization of Lumads (indigenous peoples)

Note: * From the NDF website, www.philippinerevolution.org/, accessed 18 August 2005.

open political coalitions against Marcos as well as a broader revolutionary front with the NDF as one member, were beset by unresolved issues between the natdems and other political forces like the social democrats, the socialists, liberal democrats, the traditional opposition politicians (called the 'anti-Marcos reactionaries'), and other unorganized 'middle forces'. Disagreements on representation, power-sharing and decision-making processes, analysis, calls and positions (notably on the disposition of the US military bases in the country, and participation in elections) made these alliances tenuous. No broader revolutionary front beyond the NDF materialized.

The NDF negotiating panel led by Luis Jalandoni, and Sison who officially serves as chief NDF political consultant, are based in Utrecht,

The Netherlands. Sison and several other leading CPP personalities left the country after talks broke down in 1987.

The original 1973 NDF 10-Point Program was revised in 1984 and 1988. The 1988 draft took account of the end of the Marcos regime and incorporated the newer language of women's and minority rights, and environmentalism. In July 1990, the first NDF Congress was convened. The 15-point 1988 draft submitted to the body was reduced to the present 12-point version.[27] The programme called for unity of the Filipino people to overthrow the semi-colonial and semi-feudal system, to complete the national democratic revolution, and establish the democratic coalition government and a People's Democratic Republic. It also laid its vision for a self-reliant national democratic economy and social justice; agrarian reform and rural industrialization; national industrialization and the development of science and technology; pro-people development of the national patrimony; a patriotic, scientific and popular culture; a comprehensive and progressive social policy; the revolutionary emancipation of women; the termination of unequal treaties with the US and other foreign states or entities, and an active, non-aligned foreign policy; and elimination of all forms of national oppression, and unity in the struggle for self-determination of the Bangsamoro (Moro nation) in Mindanao, the Cordillera and other indigenous peoples. In general, it espoused democratic pluralism and a mixed economy, in contrast to the party and proletarian-led government and socialist economy outlined in the CPP's Program for a People's Democratic Revolution. As has been pointed out, however, when the transition from the national democratic programme to the CPP programme takes place is problematic. The CPP's 1988 and 1991 anniversary statements have qualified that the national democratic revolution is completed upon the seizure of political power,[28] effectively leaving little room for a transition.

The notion of a federative NDF autonomous from the CPP was tested by the NDF National Council put in place in the 1990 Congress. The Liwanag/Sison-led Executive Committee-Central Committee (EC-CC) immediately aborted this direction. An EC-CC decision said that if the CPP is only an ordinary member of the federation, then proletarian leadership cannot be guaranteed. The NDF should thus remain dominated by the party, with members having consultative, consensual and coordinative relations. The 10th CC Plenum further banned the 1990 NDF Council from functioning. An 'NDF Constitution' upholding the CPP's EC-CC policy was released in 1992. This longstanding tension between being an inclusive and autonomous front and an exclusive revolutionary front under party hegemony has seriously weakened the NDF as a broad 'united front' mechanism.[29]

CPP-NPA growth and decline

The imposition of martial rule abruptly but only temporarily shut down the open political arena. National democrats who escaped the waves of arrest resorted to clandestine work. CPP cadres and youthful activists moved to various regions to build revolutionary bases. The AFP launched major military operations against communist insurgents but, from 1972 to 1977, the bulk of the AFP was stationed in conflict areas of Mindanao, battling the Moro National Liberation Front.

The CPP claims that in 1982–83, guerilla fronts covered nearly entire provinces and huge parts of regions. In Mindanao, Samar, Negros and Bicol, these 'red areas' stretched all the way to areas of dense populations like towns and highways, giving rebel forces many lines of communication and supply and extending their political influence to whole municipalities and provinces.[30] The bulk of the expansion in the first half of the 1980s took place in Mindanao.[31]

Many reasons have been cited for the growth of the CPP–NPA–NDF during martial law. These include the turn to radicalism of many youth, workers and professionals who were politicized in the protest movements of the 1960s and early 1970s and went underground when legal avenues were closed. Militarization in the rural areas, political repression and lack of justice abetted rebel recruitment. As former NPA commander Buscayno said, fascist repression was the biggest recruiter of the NPA.[32] Economic difficulties in the late 1970s due to the oil crisis, the concentration of power in the Marcoses, the deterioration of governance and the regime's legitimacy due to corruption and cronyism eroded the confidence of the middle and business classes in the regime.[33] Development projects were awarded to cronies and disregarded community interests. In the Cordillera highlands, inhabitants opposed the World Bank-funded Chico River dam project and the forest concessions given to the crony-owned Cellophil Resources Corporation. CPP-NPA forces operating in the region effectively harnessed this unrest.[34]

The brunt of the AFP's efforts was directed at the communist insurgency in the second half of the Marcos period. In 1985 alone, 1311 civilians reportedly died in the crossfire while 1100 AFP soldiers and 2134 NPA guerillas were killed in action.[35] However, the AFP strategy of copying 'search and destroy' methods used dismally by the US in Vietnam and lack of knowledge of CPP strategy and tactics have made the AFP ineffective. Its organization and equipment were principally geared at conventional warfare; its campaigns were sporadic, piecemeal, and not coordinated nationwide. According to the same critique, its scattered detachments made its presence weak and vulnerable; it lacked maneuverability, equipment, discipline and a 'mass approach'; and suffered from a top-heavy, politicized

organization.[36] Only about one-third of troops were engaged in actual combat, and 90 per cent of officers in the field came from reserved officers training and thus lacked rigorous training.[37]

An AFP Assessment in 1989 acknowledged the CPP's adaptability to circumstances and increasing sophistication.[38] Good guidance in the first decade of martial rule, the clearly defined strategy and tactics as laid out in its basic documents, and the relative autonomy given by the leadership to regional party committees were all seen as positive factors.[39] Among the opposition forces, it most readily anticipated 'fascist repression' and already had structures for underground operations when martial law was declared.[40] Other endogenous factors are the CPP's good organizational skills, thrusts, volunteerism and commitment.[41] The camaraderie of collective life and an intellectual and moral commitment to the mythical 'people' or *masa* (masses) bolstered the determination of student activists.[42]

The CPP also compensated for the weakness of the Philippine state. Its willingness and ability to respond to the needs of the poor through its enforced land rent reduction, health and other social services in far-flung communities, the protection it gives peasants from landlords and abusive soldiers, the fast and inexpensive punishment it is capable of inflicting on criminals and other offenders under its system of revolutionary justice, are also credited for CPP's growth.[43]

Alongside NPA's growth, path-breaking open mass protests were launched, beginning in 1974. More than 100 workers' strikes in Metro Manila were recorded in 1975 and 1976. Some 4000 workers and religious workers protested against the state visit of President Gerald Ford in December 1975. Secret cells working in factories and unions led this expansion of the militant workers' movement carrying workers' welfare issues and protesting against the regime. Legal programmes, especially those attached to church institutions, provided protection and support to organized workers, and civil libertarians questioned the constitutionality of presidential decrees curtailing workers' rights.[44] The youth and students' movement organized school-based protests by the mid-1970s, and public and private schoolteachers' strikes took place in the early 1980s. Marcos and school administrators were forced to concede the return of student councils and publications, limit tuition fee increases and raise teachers' wages. Coordinated mass actions organized by CPP-NDF-led organizations across sectors and in different parts of the country took place. Several *welgang bayan* (peoples' strikes) and provincial, regional and national marches made evident the organized strength of the CPP-led mass movement.

Despite its strength, the CPP lost political advantage when Marcos was overthrown in February 1986. It was sidelined in the spontaneous

burgeoning of street protests that followed the 1983 assassination of former senator Ninoy Aquino. In 1985, Marcos was pressured by the US to hold an election to prove support for his continued rule. The CPP called for a boycott of what it considered a 'bourgeois' process. It was left out in the broad front that coalesced around the electoral campaign and the post-election protests. Massive cheating in the electoral count, the coup of military officers, people massing up around the military camps where coup leaders stationed themselves, and US withdrawal of support forced Marcos to go into exile. The government was taken over by Ninoy's widow, Corazon Aquino, opposition leaders from the military, and the anti-Marcos politicians.

The CPP admitted it committed a 'tactical error' in advocating for a boycott of the election. Then Chairman Rodolfo Salas and Secretary General Rafael Baylosis were blamed for the mistake and demoted. Benito Tiamzon and later Sison assumed the post of CPP chair.

However, other analysts and cadres saw the mistake not only as a 'tactical error' but also as a strategic loss resulting from dogmatic adherence to the orthodox strategy. By building its united front on this narrow basis, the CPP failed to sustain and lead the broader anti-dictatorship resistance. It did not anticipate US withdrawal of support for Marcos, the insurrectionary potential of the anti-Marcos upheaval, and the need for a more astute combination of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary struggle given the mass mobilizations and elite factionalism unleashed by the assassination and the snap election.[45]

When the regime changed, the CPP was uncertain how to chart its course. One analyst claimed that the internalized and fundamentally unchallenged dogma and untheorized adjustments in practice hampered efforts to redefine the party's place in post-dictatorship politics.[46] The boycott error demoralized the ranks, and the lack of democratic internal discussions made tactics incoherent and cadres unable to transcend pre-established frames of reference.[47] Other critiques more fundamentally challenged the class analysis that founded revolutionary strategy. The CPP, it was argued, did not recognize capitalist and spatial changes in the class structure and correspondingly missed out on the more central areas of political action. Its privileging of the peasantry over the urban population and the industrial workers resulted in a fragmented urban–rural national democratic movement.[48] Buscayno criticized the emphasis on the anti-feudal struggle and urged a review of the changing mode and relations of production in agrarian communities. He argued that tenancy had declined while commodity production, use of hired labour and mechanization, and the number of farm workers, leaseholders, amortizers, small and medium-sized capitalist farmers had grown. The NPA is unable to act on market

prices that determine the income levels of these farmers.[49] In the sugar plantation economy of Negros Occidental, dissenting cadres wrote that contrary to CPP official formulation, the province's economy is not 'semi-colonial nor semi-feudal' but capitalist.[50] The CPP's traditional bias against the middle class was also blamed for the 'boycott error'.[51] Its Maoist thinking supposedly did not allow for Marxist rootedness and sophistication.[52]

CPP-NDF forces exposed in the peace negotiations with the Aquino administration returned underground when talks collapsed in January 1987. Aquino's conservative drift and threats posed by right-wing forces inside and outside of government made talks untenable. Destructive mobilization of paramilitary groups beginning in 1987, and a more sophisticated counter-insurgency, intensified political violence and destroyed CPP-NPA bases. From 1986 to the early 1990s, the insurgency reportedly cost P21 million per rebel and created 1.3 million internal refugees. In 1988, more than 100 leading national and regional cadres, including CC members, were arrested.[53]

The AFP's combined economic, political, psychological and military strategy, the CPP-NPA's failed shift to the 'strategic counter-offensive', heightened urban partisan warfare which the general public viewed negatively, internal debates, factionalism and purges of suspected enemy spies weakened the organizational integrity of the CPP in the late 1980s. The CPP reported serious decline in armed combatants (by 28 per cent), controlled barrios (by 16 per cent), CPP membership (by 15 per cent), and its rural mass base (by 60 per cent), from 1987 to 1990.[54] (See Table 19.2.)

*Table 19.2 Estimates of CPP-NPA forces based on CPP and AFP figures, Martial Law and post-Martial Law periods**

	1970s estimates	1980s estimates	1994	2001	2004
Party cadres	2000 *(1974)* 4000 *(1976)*	30 000 *(1983/84)* 35 000 *(1986)*			
Guerilla fighters/ rebels	300 *(1970)*	5600 *(1981, AFP)* 12 000/20 000 (full/part-time) *(1985)* 25 000 *(1986)* 23 000 *(1988, AFP)*	7670 *(AFP)*	10 238 *(AFP)*	

Table 19.2 (continued)

	1970s estimates	1980s estimates	1994	2001	2004
High-powered firearms	1000 *(1976)*	10 000 *(1984)* 15 500 *(1987, AFP)*	6910 *(AFP)*	6409 *(AFP)*	
Guerilla fronts	20 (1974)	17 *(1981, AFP)* 59 *(1984)* *57 (1985)* 61 *(1988, AFP)*	46 *(AFP)*	100 *(AFP)*	128
Affected provinces		59 *(1984)*			70
Affected towns					800
Affected barangays		3320 *(1981, AFP)* 10 000 *(1985)* 8196 *(1986, AFP)* 8059 *(1988, AFP)*	773 *(AFP)*	1969 *(AFP)*	10 000

Note: * AFP figures are identified in brackets.

Sources: 1970 data – Chapman, W. (1987), *Inside the Philippine Revolution*, New York: W.W. Norton; 1974 data – cited in Caouette, D. (2004), 'Preserving Revolutionaries; Armed struggle in the 21st Century – Exploring the Revolution of the Communist Party of the Philippines', PhD Dissertation, Cornell University; 1976 data – Sison, Jose Maria with Reiner Werning (1989), *The Philippine Revolution: The Leader's View*, New York: Crane Russek, p. 92; 1981 and 1988 data – Corpus, Victor N. (1989), *Silent War*, Quezon City: VNC Enterprises, p. 108; 1983/84 data – 'From small and weak, to big and strong', *Ang Bayan*, 26 December 1984; 1985 data – 'Extending the frontiers of struggle, NPA celebrates its 16th anniversary as armed struggle spreads its reach to urban areas', *Liberation*, **13**, p. 2, March–April 1985, pp. 3–7; 1986, CPP data – Rocamora (1994), p. 9; also Sison with Werning (1989, pp. 104–6); 1986, 1994 AFP data – AFP Confidential Report, 'Update on the terrorist movement', 22 August 1994; 2001, AFP data – Military intelligence report cited in Marfil, Martin (2002), 'Red fighters expand bases', *Philippine Daily Inquirer* (www.inq7.net), 5 August, p. A3; 2004, CPP data – 'Avail of the worsening crisis and intensify the guerilla offensives to advance the New Democratic Revolution', *Ang Bayan*, December 2004, Message from the CPP Central Committee, on the CPP's 36th Anniversary Statement.

A Second Great Rectification Movement was launched in June 1992, at the 10th Central Committee Plenum where documents drafted by CPP chair Liwanag/Sison were adopted. It reproduced a single line of march among remaining cadres who worked to recover lost areas or open up new ones where enemy control is weak and local conditions provided entry

points and sanctuary. The 1992 Central Committee document, '*Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors*', blamed party losses on petty bourgeois impetuosity and subjectiveness resulting in deviations from the strategy. Ultrademocracy, liberalism, populism, social democracy and Gorbachevism were the other tendencies castigated by the document. The move to regularize company- and battalion-sized formations in the 1980s was condemned. Those who rallied behind the Sison-led reorganization were collectively called the 'reaffirmists' (RAs), and those who opposed it, the 'rejectionists' (RJs).

In the late 1990s, the CPP-led national democratic forces partially recovered armed strength. The CPP remained highly visible in the open political arena through its allied political organizations. Ironically, while its Maoist orthodoxy caused some of the fallouts in leading cadres and members, organizational recovery can be substantially credited to the reassertion of its old strategic line. One study credits the combined use of coercion, conviction and seduction of the 'reaffirmed' national democratic discourse for recovery of the CPP-NPA in the Cordillera.[55]

The debates and fallout in the 1980s–1990s

The internal dissent in the 1980s and 1990s led to expulsions, resignations, redeployment and eventual splits in the middle and high-level ranks of the CPP and allied organizations. The nature of disagreements varied. Some cadres advocated even more extreme radical action, and others veered towards moderation. Distinguishing lines of analysis solidified only in the 1990s. Some of the leading cadres who expelled or redeployed cadres in the 1980s were among those who resigned or were themselves expelled in the 1990s.

On tactics, the boycott of the 1986 'snap election' and positions taken by the CPP in the immediate post-Marcos period such as the rejection of the 1987 Constitution were criticized. The coup attempts against the Aquino administration and the overall political instability were interpreted in several ways. On the one hand, some cadres advocated a cautious alliance with the political centre against the greater threat from the US and the 'fascist right' represented by the military and Marcos loyalist elements.[56] On the other hand, others read the instability as conditions that were either ripe for insurrection in the urban areas, or proof of the rightness of armed struggle in the countryside. Those who advocated 'insurrection' launched anti-government demonstrations combined with killings and burning of public buses to exacerbate the situation. The urban guerilla unit under the CPP's Manila-Rizal Regional Party Committee known as the Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB) claimed responsibility for more than 100 policemen who lost their lives to the *agaw-armas* ('seize arms') campaign in 1987.

The 'insurrectionary line' raised strategic questions on the correctness of the protracted people's war strategy. It was first articulated in the mid-1980s by Mindanao-based cadres inspired by the success of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.[57] In 1987, the Southern Luzon Commission likewise proposed an insurrectionary approach.[58] In 1990, the Manila-Rizal Party Committee elaborated a 'politico-military' (pol-mil) orientation as a distinct method to be applied at the central base of state power, Metro Manila. While not questioning the primacy of building revolutionary bases in the rural areas, it argued that the urban mass movement and armed partisan warfare in the national capital region had reached an advanced stage. The military component needed to be more integrated into the legal, political struggle towards the direction of insurrection and eventual armed seizure of political power. It asked that the mass movement be directed to service the intelligence, logistics and recruitment needs of partisan warfare, and that all forces adopt a 'pol-mil' consciousness.[59] The Central Luzon regional committee also adopted the insurrectionary tack in 1991. The CPP leadership, however, rejected the 'pol-mil', insurrectionary line, arguing it would unduly endanger the open mass movement and militarize the conflict in the urban areas. The proposal was also not suited to the mood of the masses and the present conditions, and could not be sustained in the long run. The case of Davao City, which in the 1980s saw intensified urban partisan operations resulting in severe crackdowns, was cited. The primacy of armed struggle in the countryside was thus reiterated.[60]

Along the same lines of the militant mass movement taking centre stage, members of the CPP Peasant Commission advocated tactics such as land occupations and peasant uprisings in lieu of the slow build-up of rural bases for the guerilla warfare. The CPP leadership also shot down this proposal. It argued that confiscating and freely distributing land would unite the whole landlord class against the revolutionary movement, defeat its united front policy with the so-called enlightened gentry, exhaust the forces in the work of administering the process, and raise false hopes among the peasantry.[61]

Another strand in the internal debate on strategy sought to give higher strategic importance to political negotiations. In 1987, cadres in the Visayas and Metro Manila disagreed on the policy to close the door to political negotiations.[62] One paper proposed a two-track approach which combined the insurrectionary line advocated by other CPP units and the more strategic view of peace negotiations.[63] It asked the CPP to envision a negotiated political settlement, rather than a military march to victory, as the end game. It criticized the CPP's 'tactical' or utilitarian view of negotiations as merely facilitative of gains for the armed struggle.

Other cadres working on the united front and organizing among the middle forces advocated greater emphasis on the urban and parliamentary

struggle. Broad coalition-building and political pluralism were elaborated post-1986 in alternative frameworks such as 'popular democracy'.[64] The social democrats of the Pandayan, the socialists of Bisig, and the popular democrats operationalized 'coalition politics' in the formation of the party list group called Akbayan (Citizens' Action Party). Akbayan has won seats in Congress since 1998. Alternative developmental strategies such as the building of biodistricts and people's councils for grass-roots empowerment were advocated by former leading cadres who joined the fast-growing NGO sector.[65] Sison criticized the NGO movement, which he derisively called 'NGOism', as reformist.

The theoretical and organizational schisms were carried over to squabbles over control of organizations, federations and NGOs. National democratic human rights workers eventually split between those who advocated a universal application of human rights that holds both state and non-state actors accountable for human rights violations, and those who argued for a class-based application or bias.[66] The Task Force Detainees, the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates and the Balay Rehabilitation Center opted for the former, while the newly formed Karapatan became the main ND human rights organization.

Demand for greater organizational autonomy and charges of ethnic discrimination led to the first major split in the CPP-NPA. Cordillera commanders of the Lumbaya company led by Mailed Molina, an ethnic Tingguian from Abra in Northern Luzon, formed a nine-man military commission in November 1985 in Tinglayan, Kalinga province. Joined by some 60 combatants, the group formally broke away from the CPP-NPA in March 1986 and formed the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA). Conrado Balweg, the Tingguian and former priest who led the opposition to the Cellophil Resources Corporation in the 1970s, served as the group's political officer and key negotiator. The Cordillera Bodong Administration (CBA, formerly the Cordillera Bodong Association) joined forces with the CPLA and left the ND-led Cordillera People's Democratic Front and the Cordillera People's Alliance.

The CPLA asserted autonomy of the Cordillera struggle for land, development and self-determination, from the CPP national struggle. In the post-Marcos period, it saw the peaceful, negotiated route to the creation of regional autonomy as the appropriate strategy to advance its self-determination claims. In September 1986, the CPLA forged a peace agreement with the Aquino government. Its forces were integrated in the newly created regional administrative authority. The CPLA divided into several factions but two main factions reportedly reunited in 2002.

Many individuals quietly left the CPP from 1986 onwards for various reasons, but the major chunks of fallouts followed the controversial 1992

CC Plenum. The plenum was criticized as surreptitious, and lacking in quorum; the outcome, a manipulative one-person summation of the party's experience. The highest military command of the Visayas Commission and the General Command and General Staff of the NPA in separate documents objected to the pinning down of losses to the army regularization. In 1993, the Manila-Rizal and Central Mindanao regional commissions and the Negros Island party committee separately declared autonomy from the CPP leadership. The Negros Island Party committee claimed the support of 1800 CPP members, four NPA companies, a mass base of 36 000, and 570 high-powered rifles. The Manila-Rizal breakaway group included the 5000-strong ABB urban partisan group.

The United Front Commission, National Peasant Secretariat, former cadres of the Visayas Commission, party units in the Mindanao Commission and the International Department formed in December 1993 the 'Democratic Bloc'. The Bloc advocated the 'insurrection' line, and put a premium on autonomous people's organizations, the legal mass movement and the parliamentary arena. In the late 1990s, the 'rejectionists' clustered into two major blocs: Sanlakas and Siglaya (with a subgroup called Padayon),[67] The 'popular democrats' can be said to constitute another bloc that helped found the party list Akbayan, although some of its founding leaders eventually joined former President Estrada's Partido ng Masang Pilipino (Party of the Filipino Masses).

Several of these new groups retained their socialist (Marxist-Leninist) orientation and emphasized the mass movement but kept their arms. These are the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Pilipinas (RPM-P), Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Mindanao (RPM-M), Partido ng Manggagawang Pilipino (PMP), and Marxista-Leninistang Partido ng Pilipinas (see Table 19.3). The first two have concluded peace agreements with the government. Except for the mainly urban-based PMP, all have been engaged in skirmishes with NPA forces operating in the same areas.

The CPP also faced the tragedy of violent internal purges. Thousands of comrades suspected as government spies were tortured and killed in the 1980s in a series of cleansing operations in Southern Tagalog, Mindanao, the Cordillera and lastly, in Metro Manila-Rizal.[68] The CPP conducted investigations in Mindanao and issued apologies to relatives of those who died, but many victims remain unacknowledged. Among those in leadership positions during these purges were those who left the CPP in the 1990s due to strategy and policy disagreements. However, several key participants in the investigation and torture remain with the CPP. Victims of the CPP's cleansing operations and their supporters seeking information and accountability formed the Peace Advocates for Truth, Justice and Healing (PATH). The group also provides healing and other support to survivors.

Table 19.3 Other Marxist-Leninist armed groups (from the 1990s splits in the CPP)

Party	Armed wing	Main CCP origins	Main areas of operation	Allied political parties, organizations and founders
Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Pilipinas (RPM-P) (Revolutionary Proletarian Party of the Philippines)	Revolutionary Proletarian Army – Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB)	Manila-Rizal and Mindanao Party Committees, Visayas Commission	Western Visayas and Manila, with Negros Island as main bailiwick	Alab Katipunan (party list) Arturo Tabara Nilo dela Cruz
Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Mindanao (RPM-M) (Revolutionary Proletarian Party of Mindanao)	Revolutionary Proletarian Army	Manila-Rizal and Mindanao Party Committees, Visayas Commission	Central and other parts of Mindanao	Anak Mindanao (party list) Ike delos Reyes
Partido ng Manggagawa ng Pilipino (Party of the Filipino Workers)	Armadong Partisanong Panglungsod (Armed Urban Partisans)	National United Front and Visayas Commissions, National Peasant Secretariat, International	Manila-Rizal; parts of Luzon and Visayas	Partidong Manggagawa & Sanlakas (party list) Sonny Melencio Filemon “Popoy”

		department-Home Bureau; Manila-Rizal and Mindanao Party Committees; also CPLA and old PKP		Lagman
Marxisa-Leninistang Partido ng Pilipinas (Marxist-Leninist Party of the Philippines)	Rebolusyonaryong Hukbong Bayan (Revolutionary People's Army)	Central Luzon Regional Party Committee, National Peasant Secretariat	Central Luzon and Manila	Tito dela Cruz Caridad Pascual

Sources: Caouette, D. (2004), 'Preserving revolutionaries: armed struggle in the 21st century – exploring the revolution of the communist party of the Philippines', PhD dissertation, Cornell University; Santos, M. Soliman (2005), 'Evolution of the armed conflict of the communist front', Background paper' for the Philippine Human Development Report 2005, www.hdn.org.ph.; CPP (2004), 'Links of counterrevolutionary groups with Trotskyites and Social Democrats', *Ang Bayan*, 7 December, at www.philippinerevolution.org/angbayan/images/041207/konmatrixe.gif/, accessed 17 August 2005; CPP Central Committee, General Review of Significant Events and Decisions (1980–1991), *Philippine Left Review*, August 1993.

A number of leading party cadres suffered violent deaths after leaving the movement. Filemon Lagman, formerly of the Manila-Rizal Party Committee, was killed by unknown assailants. Former NPA chief of staff Romulo Kintanar and Arturo Tabara were killed by the CPP for alleged counter-revolutionary crimes. In the provinces, many rebels who returned to the fold of the law suffered harassments from both the AFP and their former comrades. Party list Akbayan accused the CPP-NPA of killing and harassing its campaigners. Hostility also marks the relationship between the CPLA and the CPP-NPA forces in the region. Some 30 CPLA members, including Balweg, were reportedly killed by the NPA from 1986 to 1995. CPP supporters have in turn been attacked by the breakaway groups – for example, Cordillera People's Alliance leader Daniel Ngayaan was killed by the CPLA, and Bayan Muna leader in Northern Luzon, Romeo Sanchez, by the RPM-P. Some former CPP-NPA forces were believed involved in criminal gangs, notably Leopoldo Mabilangan who was suspected of harbouring the notorious Red Scorpion Gang.[69] He was subsequently killed by the CPP.

Political negotiations

Political negotiations between the government and the NDF have taken place since 1986. Policy inconsistencies in government have not provided a sustained momentum to pursue a peace policy to fruition. The post-Marcos administrations differed in the respective importance they gave to the peace process or were overwhelmed by threats to their own political survival and compromised on the needed reforms and approaches. Ramos, who more decidedly pursued negotiations, finished his six-year term with agreements forged with the military and Moro rebels, but not with the communists. Estrada's move to localize talks with insurgents was viewed by the CPP as a divide-and-rule ploy. Before and after the 2001 elections, alarmed by the good electoral showing of the Bayan Muna party list in the 1998 polls, Macapagal-Arroyo acquiesced to intensified attacks on rebel strongholds across the country. In 2000 onwards, human rights violations were reported in Mindoro, several Visayan islands, and Mindanao provinces. Hundreds of leaders of ND organizations like Bayan have been assassinated.

The AFP and Defence Department still have to abandon fully the orthodox national security framework and temper their ingrained militarist orientation. Military corporate interests naturally flourish best under war conditions. Conflict justifies increased military budget and foreign military assistance from the United States, gives the defence and military establishments more say in national policies, and provides opportunities for promotion in the ranks. Given these interests, the heightened political role of

the military in the post-martial law period, and the instability that plagued the irregularly installed administrations of Aquino and Macapagal-Arroyo, military preponderance for a militarist approach has prevailed. In addition, the military suffers from the weight of its own corrupt institutions, making it weak as a fighting force. It also has to contend with adventurism and criminality in its own ranks.

For its part, the CPP–NPA–NDF remains oriented to its programme of people's war. The public perceives it as using the talks to score propaganda points, bolster its presence and legitimacy in the public sphere, or gain other tactical advantages that will support its politico-military agenda of the moment. On several occasions, it made talks contingent on particular demands like the release of an arrested cadre, the termination of the Visiting Forces Agreement with the US and, recently, the lifting of the 'terrorist' tag.

President Aquino released political prisoners (among them Sison and Buscayno), opened talks with the NDF in May 1986, and forged the first ceasefire agreement between the government and the CPP-NDF in December. No other ceasefire agreement has been forged hence, only declarations of unilateral ceasefires without any monitoring or compliance mechanism, usually during the Christmas–New Year holidays and during major natural disasters such as the 1990 earthquake in Northern Luzon and the 1991 Mt Pinatubo volcanic eruptions.

The US and the AFP did not support Aquino's reconciliatory moves with the CPP-NDF. The short-lived talks collapsed in January 1987 after 18 farmers demonstrating near the Malacanang Palace were shot dead. The 60-day ceasefire lapsed in February 1987. During this period, the Aquino administration was further destabilized by various coup attempts from rebellious military factions. The US remained on the side of Aquino, providing military assistance at the height of the worst coup bid in December 1989. The CPP offered a unilateral ceasefire in exchange for non-renewal of the lease on American military facilities in the country, but Aquino advocated retaining the bases. The Senate, however, voted against renewing the bases lease agreement, which expired in September 1991.

In 1992, the USA withdrew from their bases and the Philippines' strategic value to the US declined, especially in the context of the thawing of the Cold War. However, in the aftermath of the September 2001 bombing of New York and the focus on suppressing Islamic extremism, US interest in and support for the Philippine military were revived and welcomed by the Macapagal-Arroyo administration.

A nationwide consultation process led by the National Unification Commission from 1992 to 1993 produced the government's comprehensive peace agenda called the 'Six Paths to Peace'. The NUC paper advocated social, economic and political reforms, negotiations with rebel groups,

national reconciliation and building a culture of peace, among others. Political negotiations during the Ramos administration went full swing. After several meetings, government and NDF negotiators agreed on four substantive agendas for negotiations: human rights and international humanitarian law; social and economic reforms; political and constitutional reforms; and cessation of hostilities and disposition of forces. Four separate agreements on each of the substantive agendas shall be arrived at sequentially over a period of three years ending in 1997. Each agreement shall take effect upon mutual approval. A Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) secured rebel negotiators' safety. The creation of joint Reciprocal Working Committees (RWCs) for each of the four agendas was provided for in another agreement.[70]

The first and so far only substantive agreement, the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL), was signed by the two parties in March 1998. However, no agreement on its mode of implementation was reached. The government rejected the NDF's position to implement the agreement under the latter's own constitutional and judicial processes while the government tightly guarded its sovereign authority. The government also wanted to defer the CARHRIHL's implementation, pending agreements on the other agendas. Ramos's term ended without a workable compromise on the fundamental issue of sovereignty and political authority.

On 7 August 1998, former President Estrada approved the CARHRIHL's implementation. However, Estrada suspended talks and the JASIG after the NPA abducted an AFP soldier and a police officer. The hostages were later released, and the government offered to resume talks. The NDF terminated the talks in protest of the ratification of the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States.

Estrada reverted to a policy of localizing talks. Talks with the RPM-P led to an agreement signed in December 2000 shortly before the administration's collapse. The agreement allowed the RPM-P members to be deputized as members of the local security force and provided them with a large development fund.

President Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the presidency in January 2001 after 'People Power 2' and revived talks with the NDF. The RWCs began work on the Social and Economic Reforms agenda. But the auspicious start abruptly ended in June 2001. Government suspended talks to protest against the NPA's assassination of Cagayan provincial governor Rodolfo Aguinaldo, a retired colonel accused of torturing political detainees during the Marcos regime.

After the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center in New York, Macapagal-Arroyo took a tough anti-terrorist stance. The US

put the CPP-NPA in its active list of foreign terrorist organizations. Government lobbying also succeeded in getting the Council of the European Union to include the NPA and Sison in the terrorist blacklist. The Dutch government foreclosed Sison's bank account. The military establishment, notably through Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes, played a big role in charting the fate of the political negotiations. Government insisted on a single comprehensive agreement that will simultaneously put into effect the reforms, cessation of hostilities, and disarming of NPA rebels. It produced a comprehensive draft, but this and the proposed single agreement were rejected by the NDF. The NDF claims the terrorist listing has prejudiced the negotiations.

Several fresh rounds of formal talks facilitated by the government of Norway produced two Oslo Joint Statements dated February and April 2004. The statements recommitted the parties to uphold previous agreements, address the roots of the conflict, undertake joint and separate initiatives of the two parties to resolve the outstanding issues of the 'terrorist' listing, resume work on the other substantive agendas, take steps toward indemnifying victims of human rights violations of the Marcos regime, and undertake confidence-building measures such as the release of political prisoners and detainees. Norway was officially acknowledged as a 'Third Party Facilitator'. The formation of the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) provided for in the CARHRIHL was stipulated, thus putting in motion the long-delayed implementation of the agreement. A GRP–NDF JMC office with their respective monitoring committees and secretariats were set up. However, the JMC has not been convened and outstanding issues like the 'terrorist' label and the government proposal for a ceasefire continue to stall negotiations.

Conclusion

Despite the problematic negotiations and reaffirmation of the protracted people's war strategy, the CPP has invested heavily in the parliamentary arena and the open mass movement. In 2001, the ND party list organization Bayan Muna won three seats in Congress. In 2004, three ND party list groups (Bayan Muna, Gabriela and Anakpawis) won a total of six seats. In contrast, the Partido ng Bayan (People's Party), which fielded senatorial candidates, failed to secure seats in 1987. The orthodoxy also did not preclude the participation of CPP-NDF allied groups in the second 'people power' upheaval against the Estrada administration in 2001, and in the campaign to impeach Macapagal-Arroyo in 2005. The latter campaign saw it pragmatically joining forces with those of deposed president Estrada, supporters of presidential contender Fernando Poe, Jr, politicians associated with the Marcos regime, and other groups with whom it remains

hostile. While remaining committed to the intensification of the 'people's war', the CPP in practice has been very pragmatic and flexible in maximizing all open political arenas and political alliances to advance its clout. Local cadres can also be expected to make adjustments in tactics and policies based on local conditions.

The CPP assiduously builds armed strength to enable it to seize power. Its ability to recruit and consolidate its armed presence in rural communities has been attributed to the fact that it has been able to function as a separate state, imposing its own brand of peace, order and social justice in areas where governance remains weak.[71] Its cadres who practice the 'mass line' also stand in contrast to the AFP's many abusive soldiers. In effect, continuing governance problems, human rights violations committed by state forces, economic difficulties and social inequities have continued to support NPA recruitment. Its post-debate, consolidated underground infrastructure built over the decades remains a formidable base for mobilization in both the political and military arenas. Its armed component allows it to employ coercive means to punish 'enemies of the people' and extract resources and compliance. Its ideology offers a simple and potent explanation and alternative to societal ills.

Whether it will ever turn the military balance in its favour can be seriously doubted, however. Among the conditions for the improbability of a military victory are: the changing social demography of the country (urbanization, new social and class formations) which does not combine well with its agrarian bias; uneven development of insurgent base areas and fragmentation of forces on separate islands;[72] the general preference of the populace for elections and the parliamentary arena;[73] and, as some would contend, a conservative political culture with a strong anti-communist strain.[74] Moreover, an unfavourable international environment (end of the Cold War, global anti-terrorism campaign) has severely constricted its sources of support. Diminishing resources for war, war fatigue, and unpopularity of irregular means to capture state power can contribute to the pragmatic considerations to de-emphasize the military option. On the other hand, these constraints can engender the recourse to criminality to sustain war efforts, or the disregard of human rights to hasten results. Such excesses, in turn, would alienate it from the victims and the fear-stricken communities. Thus, human rights and international humanitarian law campaigns accompany the peace advocacy of civil society groups.

In the end, the institutionalization of political and economic reforms will provide the lasting foundation for addressing the roots of the conflict, equalize opportunities and avenues for political and economic participation of disgruntled citizens, and enhance conditions for a peaceful setlement of the conflict. Such reforms span the whole gamut of societal

concerns, from electoral and security sector reforms to land security of poor farmers and indigenous peoples, and a fair and efficient justice system.

Notes

1. From 1971 to 2002, government casualties (soldiers, militiamen and policemen) totalled 9867, while 22 799 guerillas were killed. Civilians killed were estimated at 1672 from 1969 to 2002. Data were culled by the military intelligence service from official fatality figures from gunfights between AFP and NPA and are minimum estimates. They do not include people abducted and/or summarily executed by suspected military/police agents, nor the suspected government spies executed by the CPP These data were cited in Cabreza, Vincent, '43 000 killed in 34 years of communist rebellion-AFP', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 29 January 2003, pp. A1, A17.
2. See Coronel, Sheila S. (1991), 'Dateline Philippines: the lost revolution', *Foreign Policy*, Fall, pp. 166–85.
3. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1971–72*, cited in Bello, Walden (1987), *Creating the Third Force*: *US Sponsored Low Intensity Conflict in the Philippines,* San Francisco, CA: Institute for Food and Development Policy, p. 32.
4. See Pomeroy, William (1964), 'Struggle for full freedom in the Philippines', *Progressive Review*, pp. 41–56; Saulo, Alfredo B. (1969), *Communism in the Philippines, An Introduction*, Manila: Ateneo de Manila University; and Allen, James S. (1985), *The Radical Left on the Eve of War*, Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, Inc.
5. UNICEF (1987), *Adjustment with a Human Face*, Oxford: Oxford University Press; and *1988 World Development Report*, cited in Pineda-Ofroneo, Rosalinda (1991), *The Philippines*, *Debt and Poverty*, Oxford: Oxfam, pp. 13–14.
6. CPP Central Committee, 'Revolutionary Guide for Land Reform' 20 April 1977, cited in Padilla, Sabino, Jr. (1988), 'The Agrarian Reform Program of the National Democratic Front', *Philippine Development Forum*, **4** (4), pp. 29–36.
7. Guerrero, Amado (1979) *Philippine Society and Revolution. 3rd Edition*, Oakland, CA: International Association of Filipino Patriots. For a review of critiques of Sison's class analysis of Philippine society, see Weekley, Kathleen (2001), *The Communist Party of the Philippines 1968–1993, A Story of Its Theory and Practice*, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
8. Caouette, Dominique (2004), *Persevering Revolutionaries: Armed Struggle in the 21st Century, Exploring the Revolution of the Communist Party of the Philippines*, PhD dissertation presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University, p. 120.
9. Weekley, Kathleen (2001), p. 27.
10. AFP report cited in Morada, Noel (2005), 'Metro Manila-Rizal case study', background paper for the *Philippine Human Development Report 2005*, Quezon City: Human Development Network, available at www.hdn.org.ph.
11. *Manila Chronicle*, 18 January 1988, cited in Timberman, David G. (1991), *Changeless Land, Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p. 297.
12. AFP report cited in Morada, Noel (2005), 'Metro Manila-Rizal case study'.
13. Interview with Julian Banaag (psued., CPP Political Bureau member), *Ang Bayan*, January 1988, reprinted in *The Filipino People Will Triumph: Conversations with Filipino Revolutionary Leaders* (1988), Manila: Central Publishing House.
14. CPP Central Committee (1993), 'General review of significant events and decisions (1980–1991)', *Debate, Philippine Left Review*, August, pp. 35–36, 44 (henceforth CPP-CC General Review).The document was dated July 1992 but was finalized by the CC Executive Committee in November 1992.
15. CPP-CC General Review, pp. 44–5.
16. 'Extending the frontiers of struggle, NPA celebrates its 16th anniversary as armed struggle spreads its reach to urban areas', *Liberation*, March–April 1985, **13** (2), pp. 3–7.

17. CPP-CC General Review, 71.
18. CPP Central Committee (2004), 'Fight for national liberation, democracy and peace through protracted people's war', message of the Communist Party of the Philippines Central Committee on the 35th anniversary of the NPA, *Ang Bayan*, 20 March, Special Issue.
19. See, for example, Jones, Greg (1989), *Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerilla Movement*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
20. In December 1986, both the Aquino government and the NDF committed themselves to observe Protocol 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which applies to domestic conflicts. The NDF subsequently expressed to the ICRC in Geneva its desire to submit a formal instrument of accession to Protocol II – see Dulce Obrero (pseud.) (1991), 'Negotiations not a tactical ploy', *Debate, Philippine Left Review*, September, p. 84. In July 1996, the NDF reiterated its adherence to the 1949 Geneva Conventions but this time, to Protocol 1 of the 1977 Additional Protocols before the Swiss Federal government. The CPP based its adherence to Protocol 1 on the argument that the armed conflict is an internationalized internal conflict due to the subservience of the Philippine government to US domination, and government's dependence on US military and other forms of intervention and assistance in the armed conflict. See 'NDFP National Council Declaration of Undertaking to Apply the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol 1 of 1977', 5 July 1996. The government and the NDF also signed the 'Comprehensive Agreement to Respect Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law' (CARHRIHL) in 1998.
21. Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines, which writes the annual Philippine country report for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines' *Landmine Monitor Report* (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004), Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch.
22. Editorial Board (1991), 'Fulfill the requirements of the current stage', *Rebolusyon*, April–June, reprinted in *Debate, Philippine Left Review*, September 1991, pp. 71–81.
23. According to the NDF, 'businesses, enterprises and industries that engage in a certain degree of exploitation but are still necessary and useful to the people and the country' are subject to revolutionary taxes. It supposedly does not allow in its areas of control or influence, harmful industries or businesses 'such as commercial logging for export that causes denudation of the forests and results in disastrous landslides and flooding'. Taxation is carried out generally 'through negotiation and dialogue, whereby the facts and figures of the business are brought out as the basis for the negotiation regarding the tax to be agreed upon. The revolutionary movement seeks to achieve an understanding with the ones to be taxed. Confidentiality is observed . . . When coercive force is exercised, the safety of persons is ensured and explanations are made to the public especially if some inconvenience results.' The NDF also claims its collections are used for programmes that benefit the people as well as its administrative needs. Collections are reportedly accounted for and reports given to the people. See Luis Jalandoni, Member, NDFP National Executive Committee (2004), 'Response to the open letter of Andres H. Hagad, Anne Ledesma et al.,' 20 September, at www.philippinerevolution.org/, accessed 18 August 2005.
24. Wurfel, David (1988), *Filipino Politics, Development and Decay*, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, pp. 124, 126.
25. Cited in Caouette, Dominique (2004).
26. Cited in Timberman, David G. (1991), p. 303.
27. For an analysis of the changes in the drafts, see Rocamora, Joel (1994), *Breaking Through, the Struggle within the Communist Party of the Philippines*, Metro Manila: Anvil Publishing, Inc., pp. 139–69. See 'Program of the National Democratic Front (NDF) 1988 draft', in *Philippine Development Forum*, **5** (1&2) (1989), pp. 28–66.
28. Rocamora, Joel (1994), pp. 147–53.
29. Rocamora, Joel (1994), p. 169.
30. CPP-CC General Review, pp. 40–41.
31. CPP-CC General Review, pp. 49–50. Most of these areas were in Christian-dominated areas of Mindanao.

32. Diliman Review Staff (1987), 'Panayam kay Dante Hinggil sa Taktika', *Diliman Review*, **35** (3), p. 22.
33. Caoutte refers to these – deteriorating political situation, alienation of the people, the development of the Marcos regime into a patrimonial regime – as exogenous factors.
34. For an account on adjustments in approaches and strategies in the Cordillera communist movement, see Castro, Nestor (1994), 'Ang Kilusan Komunista sa Kordilyera: Partatagpo ng ideolohiya at taal na katutubong kutlura', [The Communist Movement in the Cordillera: The Meeting of Ideology and Indigenous Culture], *Philippine Social Science Review*, January–December, pp. 191–238.
35. Cabreza, Vincent (2003), '43 000 killed in 34 years of communist rebellion – AFP', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 29 January, A1, A17.
36. Corpus, Victor N. (1989), *Silent War*, Quezon City: VNC Enterprises, pp. 20, 77, 107–35; Timberman, David G. (1991), pp. 306–8.
37. Corpus, Victor N. (1989), *Silent War*, Quezon City: VNC Enterprises, pp. 20, 77, 107–35.
38. Cited in Caouette, Dominique (2004), 'Preserving revolutionaries: armed struggle in the 21st century – exploring the revolution of the Communist Party of the Philippines', PhD dissertation; Cornell University, p. 120.
39. Caouette, Dominique (2004), 'Preserving revolutionaries: armed struggle in the 21st century – exploring the revolution of the Communist Party of the Philippines', PhD dissertation; Cornell University, p. 120.
40. Weekley, Kathleen (2001), p. 37.
41. Santos, Soliman, Jr (2005), 'Evolution of the armed conflict on the communist front', background paper written for the *Philippine Human Development Report 2005*.
42. Weekley, Kathleen (2001), p. 41.
43. Timberman, David G. (1991), pp. 290, 298–303.
44. See Ambrosio, Dante (1994), 'Militanteng Kilusang Manggagawa sa Kamaynilaan: 1972–1982 paghupa, pag-ahon, pag-agos' [The Militant Workers' Movement in Greater Manila: 1972–1982, fall, revival and upsurge], *Philippine Social Science Review*, January–December, pp. 147–90.
45. For accounts on this period of debate, see Porter, Gareth (1989), 'Strategic debates and dilemmas in the Philippine communist movement', in Dorr, Steven R. and Deborah J. Mitchell (eds), *The Philippines in a changing Southeast Asia*, Washington: Defense Academic Research Support Program. See also W. Chapman (1987), *Inside the Philippine Revolution*, London: L.B. Tauris.
46. Weekley, Kathleen (2001), p. 10.
47. Rocamora, Joel (1994), p. 169.
48. Reid, Ben (2000), *Philippine Left: Political Crisis and Social Change*, Manila: Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, cited in Caouette, Dominique (2004), pp. 182–3.
49. Diliman Review Staff (1987), pp. 19–23.
50. 'The Negros left: the decline continues', *Viewpoints*, June 1998; also, 'The Negros enigma', *Viewpoints*, November 1987 (published in Negros Occidental).
51. 'The decline of the Left', *Viewpoints*, August 1987.
52. Abinales, Patricio N. Abinales (ed.) (1996), *The Revolution Falters, the Left in Philippine Politics After 1986*, Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.
53. CCP-CC General Review, pp. 90–91.
54. CCP-CC General Review, p. 78.
55. Hilhorst, Dorothea (2003), *The Real World of NGOs, Discourses, Diversity and Development*, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
56. Raquiza, Ma. Antoinette and Miriam Coronel Ferrer (1987), 'Constitutional democracy under siege', *Diliman Review*, **35** (4), pp. 1, 15–20. See also Timberman, David G. (1991), pp. 293–7, 310–17; and Wurfel, David (1988), pp. 305–24.
57. Villalobos, Marty, 'On the insurrectional strategy', 30 March 1986, photocopy.
58. CPP-CC General Review, p. 66.
59. National Democratic Front (Metro Manila-Rizal) (1991), 'Politico-military struggle in the main urban center', *Debate, Philippine Left Review*, March, pp. 65–71.

60. CPP Central Committee-Executive Committee (1991), 'On the concept of Pol-Mil struggle' (translated from Filipino), *Debate, Philippine Left Review*, September, pp. 71–3.
61. Editorial Board (1991), 'Fulfill the requirements of the current stage', *Rebolusyon* (theoretical journal of the CPP), April–June, reprinted in *Debate, Philippine Left Review*, September 1991, pp. 71–81. The document was a response to the paper 'Tasks of the revolutionary peasant movement for advancing in the 1990s', prepared by the Party's National Peasant Commission.
62. 'The Negros left: the split worsens', *Viewpoints*, July–August 1998, **3** (8). It said the resignations of branch and regional committee-levels cadres in July 1987 had its roots in the failed 1986 ceasefire negotiations.
63. Omar Tupaz (pseud.) (1991), 'Toward a strategic view of peace negotiations', *Philippine Left Review*, March, pp. 6–34. An earlier paper in the *Philippine Left Review* by Pepe Manalo (psued.) (1987), 'Political strategy and political negotiations' (1 January) called on the CPP to shift abruptly to a peaceful form of political struggle while maintaining the capacity to revert to non-peaceful means.
64. See early issues of the *Conjuncture* and monographs, published by the Institute for Popular Democracy which were founded by former National United Front cadres Edicio dela Torre and Horacio 'Boy' Morales.
65. See papers written by Isagani Serrano, former Central Committee member, published by the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement.
66. See Cristobal, Milabel (1996), 'The split in the National Democratic Movement and its effects on human rights organizations', and Evelyn Balais-Serrano, 'Are human rights universal?' both in Contreras, Mercedes V. et al., *We Did Not Learn Human Rights from the Books, The Philippines and human rights in the period 1986 to 1996*, Quezon City: Claretian Publications.
67. Caouette, Dominique (2004), p. 610.
68. For a survivor's account, see Garcia, Robert Francis (2001), *To Suffer Thy Comrades*, Manila: Anvil Publishing. See also Abinales, Patricio N. (2001), *Fellow Traveler, Essays on Filipino Communism*, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, pp. 153–92.
69. Fidel V. Agcaoili (2005), 'Rejoinder to slander article of French Trotskyite Pierre Rousset', *Ang Bayan*, 10 August, at www.philippinerevolution.org/cgi-bib/abshow/abshow.pl?year+2–5 ,accessed 17 August 2005.
70. See Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) (n.d.), *Major Agreement Reached in the Peace Negotiations Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the National Democratic Front (NDF)* (pamphlet with primer on the peace talks); also its official website, www.opapp.gov.ph/.
71. Santos, M. Solimon (2005), 'Evolution of the armed conflict of the communist front', Background paper for the Philippine Human Development Report 2005., citing various informants.
72. Corpus, Victor N. (1989), *Silent War*, Quezon City: VNC Enterprises, pp. 30–42.
73. For an insightful analysis of Philippine elections, see Kerkvliet, Ben (1996), 'Contested meanings of elections in the Philippines', in R.H. Taylor (ed.), *The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia*, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press. A survey made by the Pulse Asia in 2002 point to preference for political negotiations (alongside distrust of the CPP-NPA), the constitutional process and an elected civilian government.
74. Timberman, David G. (1991), pp. 291–2. Similarly, Weekley noted that during the dictatorship, the CPP was undermined by the relatively strong elite and popular association of the political process with the parliamentary arena. See Weekley, Kathleen (2001), p. 6.

PART VI

COUNTER-TERRORISM

20 Terrorism in Southeast Asia: threat and response

Rohan Gunaratna

In the post-9/11 world the Southeast Asian terrorism landscape has undergone profound change. Following the US-led coalition intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001 and invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the dispersal of al-Qaeda worldwide into less centralized nodes has dictated the dramatically altered security environment in Southeast Asia. To carry on a campaign of international terror, a weakened al-Qaeda has relied on regional and local Islamist groups worldwide to include its Southeast Asian counterparts. This is reflected in a marked increase since 9/11 of plans to attack and successful attacks conducted by Jemaah Islamiah (JI) on targets of the West, and/or its perceived allies. Its latest attack was on 1 October 2005 when three suicide bombers for a second time struck two seafood cafés in Jimbaran beach resort and a three-storey noodle and steakhouse in downtown Kuta, Bali, Indonesia's most popular tourist destination.[1] Although JI's fundamental objective is to create an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia, this most recent attack underlines the continued threat to economic and Western targets in Southeast Asia.

Al-Qaeda background

In the late 1980s, Afghanistan and Pakistan became the international centre for ideological and physical war training of Islamist guerrilla and terrorist groups. Following the defeat of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda continued to provide trained recruits and funds to local Islamist groups fighting in conflict zones where Muslims were suffering including Tajikistan, Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya, Dagestan, Mindanao and Xingjiang. As an organization with a global membership, al-Qaeda had diverse capabilities as well as access to unprecedented resources from its bases in Asia and the Sudan throughout the 1990s. The organization effectively armed, trained, financed and theologically indoctrinated three-dozen Islamist groups from Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. Throughout the 1990s, al-Qaeda and Taliban training camps in Afghanistan trained 70 000–120 000 Muslim youth to fight in the Philippines (Mindanao), Indonesia (Maluku and Poso), Myanmar, China (Xingjiang), Kashmir, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Dagestan, Nagoʻno Karabakh, Algeria, Egypt,

Jordan, Yemen, and in other regional conflicts.[2] Al-Qaeda provided ideological, financial, training and operational support to groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines; Laskar Jundullah in Indonesia; Kampulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM); Jemaah Salafiah (JS) in Thailand; Arakan Rohingya Nationalist Organization (ARNO) and Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) in Myanmar and Bangladesh; and JI, a regional group, with a presence in Australia.[3] In addition to its own training camps in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda dispatched its own trainers to establish or serve in the training camps of other groups in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus. Presently the smaller and mobile camps in regional conflict zones of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caucasus, compensating partially for the loss of Afghanistan, is likely to produce a third generation of mujahideen.

Shared ideology and tactics

Through al-Qaeda's continual contact with regional separatist-religious groups in Southeast Asia it has effectively penetrated these regional and local groups fighting territorial struggles to alter their ultimate vision in favour of a universal jihad. For instance, the Singaporean chief of JI, Ma Salam-at Kastari, was planning to hijack and crash an Aeroflot aircraft from Bangkok, Thailand, onto the Changi International Airport, Singapore. According to Kastari, the choice of a Russian aircraft was to teach Moscow a lesson for what it was doing to the Muslim brothers in Chechnya.[4] Similarly, Bali and the Jakarta Marriott Hotel were mass fatality, mass casualty attacks and incorporated two suicide terrorists. The tactic of suicide and inflicting mass death and injury – hitherto alien to Southeast Asian groups – is clearly an al-Qaeda concept. Al-Qaeda's most enduring impact on Southeast Asian groups has been to instill in them a sense of duty to fight near enemies, but also the distant enemy, as Osama Bin Laden himself identifies the 'head of the snake' – the United States of America. As clear proof of this overarching objective, according to Imam Samudra during his interrogation and confession, Australia was specifically targeted in the Bali attacks in large part for its direct support of the US.[5]

Since al-Qaeda's creation of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders in February 1998, it became an umbrella organization successfully consolidating its training and financial assistance to Islamist groups worldwide.[6] The Asian, Middle Eastern, African and Caucasian groups that fell within al-Qaeda's ideological orbit of global jihad now emulate al-Qaeda. The marked increase in the unifying ideology is reflected by the creation of al-Qaeda's regional umbrella, Rabitat-ul Mujahideen (Legion of the Fighters of God), by Hambali in 1999, which

attempted to unite its Southeast Asian groups. Some groups such as the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia resisted attempts by Hambali to absorb them.[7] Driven by the ideals of Muslim brotherhood, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a group that inherited the 500-year Moro Struggle for Independence from the Christian-dominated Philippines, continue to provide critical assistance to al-Qaeda and to Southeast Asian Islamist groups.

Conducting coordinated, simultaneous mass fatality bombings including suicide attacks are some of the hallmarks of al-Qaeda strategy. For example, the coordinated simultaneous bombing of Bali and the US consulate in Denpasar in October 2002 remains the world's second most deadly terrorist attack since 9/11.[8] Furthermore, the bombing of *Superferry 14* in Manila remains the most lethal maritime attack to date. As the intentions and capabilities of Southeast Asian groups to target regional governments and Western interests have not diminished, and in fact are substantially more deadly, the region is likely to witness more incidents of terrorism in the immediate future.

Operations

Since the late 1980s, there have been clear indications that al-Qaeda (AQ) has established a base of operations and ideologically penetrated Southeast Asia. In 1988, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, the brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden, established the Manila branch of the International Islamic Relief Organization, a respectable Saudi charity, to provide assistance to Islamist groups in the region, and as a regional hub for AQ. Additionally, 1993 World Trade Centre bomber Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammad travelled to Southeast Asia in 1994 to plan an elaborate operation which included bombing 12 US airliners over the Pacific.[9] Similarly, within the MILF Camp Abu Bakar complex, the Kuwaiti trainer Omar al-Farooq established Camp Vietnam to train Southeast Asian groups in guerrilla warfare and terrorism.[10] The aim was to build a core of fighters that will alleviate the suffering of the Muslims at the hands of the oppressive and repressive regimes and rulers supported by the United States.

Emerging threat

There are three major evolutions in the threat posed by jihadist terrorism post-9/11: the restructuring of the al-Qaeda organization into an ideological movement strengthened by effective dissemination of propaganda, the new generation of mujahideen fighters, and the dispersal of jihadist training.

Traditionally, the established hierarchy and centralization of all operations through the various counsels within AQ made the organization

capable of taking years to plan and conduct deliberate methodical attacks on carefully selected strategic, high-profile and symbolic targets. As such, al-Qaeda conducted fewer attacks but those carried out were all high impact. By its actions al-Qaeda aimed to inspire, instigate and influence the regional groups and the wider Muslim community on the world stage to wage war against the US, its allies and its friends. By co-opting leaders, al-Qaeda influenced regional groups by arming, training and financing them to acquire tactical targets. With al-Qaeda weakened post-9/11, its leadership is urging its regional associates to hit both strategic and tactical targets at their own discretion.

Rather than one single entity, the post-9/11 al-Qaeda is a conglomerate of organizations. Al-Qaeda proper – estimated at 4000 members in October 2001 – has been replaced by al-Qaeda plus two-dozen associated groups armed, trained and financed by al-Qaeda.

As the acknowledged 'spearhead of Islam,' al-Qaeda continues to provide both ideological and strategic direction as the pioneering vanguard of the worldwide movement. In an October 2004 message from Ayman al-Zawahiri, he encourages groups to attack Western targets at any opportunity, and stresses the importance of 'carrying on the fight' even if the leadership of al-Qaeda is killed or captured. [11]

In effect, al-Qaeda's new role includes advancing its traditional mission by non-military means using the mass media, especially the new communication technologies. The surge of regular pronouncements by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri communicated by audio, video and print media since the US-led coalition intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001 have found resonance in the Muslim world, especially after US intervention in Iraq in April 2003. By continuing to politicize and radicalize the Muslims (including both migrant and diaspora communities) through the dissemination of propaganda, al-Qaeda intends to increase the pool of recruits and support, critical for the continuity of jihad.

Prior to 9/11, al-Qaeda invested in propaganda, but to a lesser degree as the organization's primary mission was to train as many Muslims as possible and to provide specialist assistance to Islamist groups worldwide. Pre-9/11 virulent propaganda was primarily the responsibility of a number of Islamist parties and groups based in Europe and North America. With a number of these parties and groups coming under close scrutiny from Western governments, al-Qaeda and its associated parties and groups have taken over the role of information dissemination. In comparison to the pre-9/11 propaganda dominated by non al-Qaeda groups, the al-Qaeda brand of propaganda is extremely violent, directly calling on Muslims to kill. Al-Qaeda's greatest success in Southeast Asia is being able to successfully instill its ideology in JI and several other smaller groups.

With al-Qaeda having suffered significantly in its operational capability, it is trying to compensate its losses by turning to groups and members it had trained in Afghanistan and elsewhere to join the fight. Despite being aggressively hunted worldwide, al-Qaeda's greatest success has been to provide ideological direction. Despite the targeting of JI, the group has relocated to Mindanao and continues to operate its training and base camps. In March 2005, 20 JI members graduated, demonstrating the continuing threat. Today, the threat is more diverse, dispersed and diffused. Thanks to the continued success of training camps, three generations of distinct but interlocking mujahideen feature in conflicts today. The experience in Afghanistan was pivotal. A few hundred Southeast Asians that fought in the anti-Soviet multinational Afghan jihad (December 1979 – February 1989) joined several Islamist groups, including the core of JI. The creation of new, regional training camps with a global agenda is an indication that a new threat is emerging in the form of new jihadist fighters willing to carry on the global struggle. Post-9/11, Islamist camps active in Southeast Asia include Hodeibia, Palestine and Vietnam in Mindanao, Philippines; Poso, Sulawesi and Balikpapan, Kalimanthan, in Indonesia; and Rohingiya camps on the Myanmar–Bangladesh border. While ideological training is imparted in a few Islamic schools (*madrasahs*), military training is imparted in makeshift mobile and static camps that are difficult to detect from the air.

Despite an active US presence aimed at combating the ASG, the MILF works clandestinely with al-Qaeda, JI, ASG and the Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement (RSRM).[12] Since the detection of JI in Singapore, JI trainers and combat tacticians have steadfastly worked with Southeast Asian groups to attack Western and domestic targets in the Philippines. In June 2003, the Philippine authorities disrupted multiple attacks in Manila by arresting the MILF Special Operations Group leader Muklis Yunos and his Egyptian counterpart planning to attack the following: the Presidential Palace, with an oil tanker truck filled with ammonium nitrate mixed with sawdust and gasoline; the US embassy; ramming an explosives-laden speedboat on to a US ship docked at the Manila bay area; the Pandacan Oil Depot using a rocket-propelled grenade triggered by a mobile phone as a remote switch; the International Airport in Manila by ramming with an explosives-laden vehicle; and a major commercial shipping line plying Philippine waters by remote detonation of a car bomb inside the ship cargo.[13] The co-option and integration of al-Qaeda and JI elements into the MILF infrastructure has complicated peace talks between the MILF and the government of the Philippines.

Spearheaded by JI, ASG, RSRM and MILF formed Jayash al Madhi in November 14, 2004. At the meeting of the *majlis shura* (consultative

council) in Datu Piang, Mindanao, the constituent the leaders of these groups agreed to eliminate their differences and work together. Among the leaders present were Dul Matin, the most senior JI leader in the Philippines, and Omar Patek, a JI member involved in the Bali attack, and Gaddhafi Janjalani, the ASG leader. Janjalani, involved in criminality, has been reborn as an Islamist. At the meeting, it was decided that they would have a common doctrine, and conduct joint training and operations. Al-Qaeda sent an unequivocal message to the domestic Islamist groups that they must not only attack domestic, but also foreign targets. They all escaped the Philippine government bombing of the meeting venue.[14] A key outcome of the Datu Piang meeting was the Valentine's Day bombing in 2005 where JI-trained RSRM and ASG members in MILF territory attacked three targets in Manila. Although another operation to attack simultaneously targets in Jakarta, Manila and Mindanao was disrupted in April and May 2005, they are likely to succeed at some point in the future.

In summary, al-Qaeda has suffered gravely from both the loss of its operational leaders and the destruction of its traditional bases in Afghanistan, but its intention to attack the United States, its allies and friends has not diminished. With the difficulty of striking targets in North America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand, al-Qaeda and its associate groups are aggressively scouting for targets in lawless zones of Asia, Africa and the Middle East. When al-Qaeda–JI leaders deemed that US and Israeli targets in Manila were not suitable, they shifted to Singapore targets. When the Singapore operation was disrupted, they shifted to Taiwan, Seoul, Cambodia and Bangkok targets. As sharks rapidly move in search of fresh opportunities, so al-Qaeda–JI seeks new targets. As many Southeast Asian countries suffer from porous borders, availability of firearms and explosives, lack of law and order, complacency, and corruption, the region remains conducive for the operation of local, regional and extra-regional Islamist groups.

Crafting a response

The disruption of al-Qaeda–JI plans to bomb American, British, Australian and Israeli diplomatic targets in Singapore in December 2001 led Southeast Asian governments to uncover the links between al-Qaeda and JI.[15] Until the Bali bombings in October 2002, the government of Indonesia and, until the disruption of JI plans to bomb American, British, Australian, Israeli and Singaporean diplomatic targets in June 2003 in Bangkok, the government of Thailand publicly denied the existence of the JI terrorist network on its soil.[16] To meet the current and emerging threat, Southeast Asian governments – with US, Australian, European and Japanese support – are slowly but steadily strengthening their intelligence and force capabilities. As

there is lack of trust between ASEAN countries, cooperation is bilateral, at best trilateral. Elements of cooperation and coordination include: harmonizing legislation, rendition, exchange of personnel, sharing of information and experience, transfer of expertise, joint training and combined operations.

Governmental, non-governmental and international responses must be at three levels: global, regional and domestic. As the Islamist groups depend on each other for support, a concerted and coordinated approach is essential. Al-Qaeda has served as the unifier, coordinator and guide for the modern Islamic movement. Therefore, targeting al-Qaeda is paramount. Although al-Qaeda's capability has suffered, its intention to attack (and its sphere of influence over Southeast Asian groups) has not diminished. Although militarily weak, al-Qaeda remains ideologically resilient. Despite severe damage to the organization at multiple levels, al-Qaeda is still playing a significant role in setting the agenda. As the wave of attacks demonstrated in October 2002 (French oil supertanker *Limburg*, US personnel in Kuwait, and Bali) and May 2003 (Riyadh, two attacks in Chechnya, 21 gas stations in Karachi, and Casablanca), al-Qaeda still retains the ability to coordinate and provide strategic and tactical direction to groups in Asia, the Middle East, the Caucasus and in the Horn of Africa. From Pakistan, Hamza al-Rabiyya, the successor to Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, continues to communicate with groups in Southeast Asia, and from Saudi Arabia, funds continue to flow into Asian terrorist groups. Additionally, al-Qaeda has continued to use publicity sources, through websites and video releases, to remain relevant to ongoing conflicts and continue to spread the global jihad.

While terrorists in the 1970s and 1980s killed in tens, terrorists in the 1990s killed in hundreds. Today, the terrorists want to kill in thousands. Because of the increased capability of these groups through advancements in technology, weapons and training, a government cannot wait until a terrorist attack occurs to act. Therefore, responses must be largely preventive. But the traditional law enforcement mindset is to wait for an incident to occur in order to begin an investigation. Without preliminary evidence, the criminal justice system will not permit wire-tapping, surveillance, arrests, raids and searches of premises. Even today, law enforcement systems are designed to act efficiently after the event – investigate, collect evidence, arrest, charge and prosecute. Unless there is a lead, the average police officer will not expend time, energy and resources, and will not act. A sea change in law enforcement culture is essential to combat terrorism. Instead of case-building by gathering evidence to prosecute, law enforcement authorities must invest their assets to collect intelligence to detect and disrupt terrorist attacks. This involves confidential informants, undercover

officers and cultivation of other assets, and their effective management – a mind-intensive and resource-intensive process.

Waging a campaign based on 'winning hearts and minds' is a key strategy. To prevent terrorists from influencing the public, governments must co-opt ethnic and religious leaders from communities affected by terrorism. As it is communities that eventually defeat terrorism, governments must ensure that Muslims are not demonized. As no terrorist group can sustain itself without public support, it is critical to win over public support. Like a company, a terrorist group needs to grow in order to survive, and recruitment and flow of support – intelligence, funds, weapons and sanctuary – remain central to its success. To disrupt the public appeal of terrorist groups, it is essential legally to criminalize and then target the terrorist support networks. In Indonesia, JI is still a legal group. These networks disseminate virulent propaganda with the intention of indoctrinating supporters and potential supporters that join terrorist groups. Comprehensive legislation targeting terrorist propaganda, including through the World Wide Web, and fund raising by extremist groups, should be criminalized. Likewise, religious leaders who spread hatred in schools and elsewhere must be prosecuted.

Developing a zero-tolerance policy towards terrorism in Southeast Asia is essential. International measures must be developed to prevent terrorists from seeking sanctuary or support. When JI was targeted in Singapore and Malaysia in December 2001, the group moved to Thailand and to Indonesia. Terrorists are like sharks – they rapidly move in search of new opportunities. As postmodern terrorists are highly mobile, fighting postmodern terrorism will involve the universal adoption of measures and countermeasures. As a balloon bulges out in one place, when depressed in another place, terrorists will move to another hospitable or less hostile theatre. To be effective, counter-terrorist action should be coordinated. In the fight against terrorism, to prevent escaping terrorists from relocating their support and operational infrastructures when attacked, the development of governmental measures and countermeasures will have to be coordinated. History has shown that those governments that do not develop zero-tolerance policies against terrorism will eventually suffer. Bali is a classic example. The international community should develop a zero-tolerance terrorism code and those actors that defy the code should be punished.

An international fund against terrorism should be developed to assist poor countries or countries that lack capacity that suffer from terrorism. To sustain a counter-terrorism campaign requires substantial resources and expertise. Most terrorist-affected countries in the developing world lack both the trained manpower and the resources to fight a protracted campaign against terrorism. The rich and poor governments must develop

a shared response in the fight against terrorism. Over 90 per cent of the terrorist groups are born in the developing world, but they have established state-of-the-art terrorist support networks in the developed world. Until 9/11, the West tolerated the presence of these networks as they did not pose a direct and immediate threat to the host countries. Whenever governments in the South requested for the extradition of known terrorists from the West, the host governments spoke of the incompatibility of the criminal justice and prisons systems or of human rights violations by the requesting government. Until 9/11, terrorists raised significant funds in North America, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand that supported multiple terrorist operations in the global South. Even today, a number of Islamist and non-Islamist groups generate significant support from their diaspora and migrant communities as well as from charities, companies and other front, cover and sympathetic organizations. With persistent calls from the al-Qaeda leadership that it is the duty of every Muslim to wage jihad, the terrorist support networks in the West are mutating into terrorist operational networks. Furthermore, with increased Western assistance to governments in the South, the terrorist threat to Western governments and societies will increase. It must be understood that al-Qaeda's first wave of attacks were in Middle Eastern and Asian countries and it was the failure of those governments to degrade and destroy the groups that led a spillover of the threat to the West. A shared response, where the West works with the rest of the word, will reduce the threat at a global level. Western assistance to Southeast Asia to fight terrorism at home will eventually reduce the threat to the West.

The post-9/11 environment is steadily creating a standard which sends a clear message to terrorists: the use of terrorism as a political tool to spread an agenda will criminalize the associated groups. Increasingly, terrorism as a tactic will appeal less to most groups if governmental, non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations create institutions to address the grievances and aspirations of marginalized communities. By opening new avenues to vent their angers and frustrations, the threat of terrorism will remain but it will decrease substantially in the coming years.

Governments must be aware of the limitations of military or kinetic response. The military response is paramount to reduce the immediate threat, especially if the threat is high. Nonetheless, to end terrorism, it is essential to address the root causes and enact prophylactic measures. A multi-pronged and multidimensional response is essential to dissuade serving terrorists and prevent the production of new terrorists. Ideological response, where Muslim clerics condemn the preachers of hatred, is lacking in many countries.

It is critical to extend cooperation from the security and intelligence domain to law enforcement and judicial cooperation. Furthermore, governments

must graduate from cooperation to coordination and collaboration where joint and combined action is taken to erode terrorist capabilities. For instance, terrorism will persist in the south of Thailand as long as Bangkok does not work collaboratively with Malaysia.

As terrorists increasingly operate transnationally, future counter-terror initiatives rest on building common databases, exchange of personnel, joint training, combined operations, sharing of experience and transfer of expertise.

Considering the Southeast Asian environment

In crafting a response appropriate for the Southeast Asia threat, one must consider the unique challenges of the region. In comparison with other regions, the security threats confronting Southeast Asia are different in both nature and scale. Having lived under the shadow of large Buddhist, Christian and Hindu populations, the vast majority of the South Asian Muslims are tolerant and moderate. A minority of Southeast Asian Muslims, politicized and radicalized by extra-regional influences, notably ideology and finance, from the Middle East, is willing to use political violence, even terrorism, to create Islamic states. Today, the region hosts many Islamist and Muslim political parties, as well as guerrilla and terrorist groups' which campaign for the enforcement of Islamic law. Although these organizations represent a miniscule proportion of the Muslim population, power-hungry political leaders in religious garb have successfully (mis)used religion to mobilize significant support to achieve their political aims. As Southeast Asia hosts one of the world's largest Muslim populations, many Muslims perceive themselves as duty-bound to assist fellow Muslims suffering in conflict zones – such as Mindanao, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya – and now Iraq.

The governments of Southeast Asia have had a variety of responses to the spread of jihadist violence in their respective countries. While some have inflamed internal strife in their hardline approach, others have reacted weakly or too late, with dire consequences. Supporting strong leaders with political will and political capital to make change, appointing and promoting leaders to the security sector based on merit, ability and performance, and building partnerships with Western governments, is the gravest need of the hour. To end terrorism in Southeast Asia, there is no magic bullet. Over a period of time, the counter-terrorist and anti-terrorist measures developed will impact on terrorist groups and their support bases. Although policies and measures will be formulated to fight the Islamist brand of terrorism, it will reduce the threat posed by both Islamist and non-Islamist groups. Legislative and practical measures will also impact on ideological (left- and right-wing groups) and ethno-nationalist (separatist, irredentist

and autonomy) groups, eroding their operational and support capabilities. Some groups such as the MILF will agree to talks to escape the global counter-terrorism measures. As a result, the post-9/11 environment will force several terrorist groups to consider retaining their strike capabilities but consider the political option seriously at least even tactically. The threat of Islamist terrorism and extremism will persist, but it will decrease substantially in the coming years.

The future

The post-9/11 security environment in Southeast Asia presents new challenges and opportunities. With enhanced security in the West and Western targets in the global South, Asia and the Middle East will face the brunt of terrorist attacks. Southeast Asian governments are burdened with the task of preventing large-, medium- and small-scale attacks against domestic as well as Western targets on their soil. For supporting the West in the fight against terrorism, Asian and Middle Eastern countries will earn the wrath of domestic and foreign Islamist groups. Nonetheless, governments in the South have no option but to cooperate with the resource-rich and technologically advanced West to fight terrorist groups. Until governments worldwide, including in Southeast Asia, develop a common strategy and cooperative structures to fight terrorism at domestic, regional and global levels, terrorism will remain a significant threat. The burden of response must not be state-centric but must be shared by non-governmental organizations. To break the duality of some Muslim governments in the region and to reach out to Muslim populations subjected to anti-Western propaganda, public diplomacy, hitherto neglected by the West, is paramount.

As the situation is fluid and dynamic, there is no standard textbook for fighting al-Qaeda or its associated groups in Southeast Asia. The current threat can be reduced by maximizing the successes and minimizing the policy and operational failures against al-Qaeda and its associate groups in the region. With the destruction of its camps throughout Afghanistan and worldwide arrests, the Southeast Asian groups have established their own training camps in the region. Unlike before, these camps provide al-Qaeda-type terrorist training in suicide operations, assassination operations, bombing of aircraft and ships, and so on. As Western intelligence agencies assist Southeast Asian governments to interdict and target Southeast Asian groups, these groups are transforming their operational and support networks, including their modus operandi. In addition to relying on Gulf charities, they are also relying on local businesses and individual donors, with the interception of satellite and mobile phones; they are using encrypted e-mail communication and human couriers; and even shifting from targeting hard to soft targets. Therefore, flexibility and agility are keys

for front-line law enforcement and intelligence services engaged in fighting terrorism. The terrorist group must become the mentor of government operational agencies.

Conclusion

Since US-led coalition intervention in Afghanistan, the threat has moved beyond al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda has lost its pre-eminent status as the pioneering vanguard of the Islamic movements operationally, but not ideologically. It lacks the organizational structure and the resources to mount global operations but is able and willing to inspire, instigate and coordinate operations by other groups. As al-Qaeda diminishes in size and strength, it is increasingly trying to rebuild and regain its influence by relying on its associate groups in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the Caucuses to conduct operations. Unless and until the pressure on al-Qaeda diminishes, the group intends to survive by working together with its regional associates. The international, regional and domestic responses to the associate groups will determine whether the remaining al-Qaeda will survive or perish.

The nature of the threat is changing rapidly to adapt to security measures and countermeasures. In keeping with its mandate, pre-9/11 al-Qaeda focused only on conducting spectacular attacks. Although al-Qaeda and its associate groups are unable to mount coordinated multiple suicide attacks of the scale of 9/11 inside the US, they are still capable of mounting medium-sized and small attacks of the scale of Bali, Riyadh and Casablanca in the US. There are three reasons why al-Qaeda has failed to conduct another 9/11 inside the US: (1) increased human vigilance; (2) unprecedented international and domestic law enforcement, security and intelligence cooperation; (3) al-Qaeda is being hunted, denying the group time, space and resources to plan, prepare and mount theatrical or spectacular attacks. As long as Western governments can place relevant threat information in the public domain to keep the public alert, sustain sharing of information with Middle Eastern, Asian and other governments, and the US-led global coalition against terrorism can remain active, terrorist groups and their support bases will weaken.

To reduce the threat in Southeast Asia, partially compounded by external developments, it is essential to target both indigenous and foreign groups active in Southeast Asia. Severing the al-Qaeda operational and ideological link is paramount. Despite unprecedented security measures and countermeasures since 9/11, al-Qaeda remains a formidable threat to security of the region. Since 9/11, over 100 attacks worldwide by al-Qaeda and its associated groups, including a dozen attacks in the region, have been aborted or disrupted. Bali, Casablanca, Djerba, Chechnya, Minadanao

and Karachi bombings have demonstrated that the threat has moved beyond al-Qaeda. Its regional associates, such as the Southeast Asian groups, are as lethal as their parent group. They have learnt and will increasingly use al-Qaeda tactics as such hijacking and crashing aircraft, contact poisons, anti-aircraft weapons, and a range of other techniques to inflict mass fatalities on their enemies. As the East Africa bombings in August 1998, the attack on the *Cole* in October 2000, and 9/11 demonstrated, martyrdom operations – or suicide terrorism – will be their most effective tool.

The vigorous campaign in the war on terror has failed to crush the threat of al-Qaeda. Despite the arrest of al-Qaeda members and associate members in 102 countries, including in Southeast Asia, the response has been inadequate to shut down operationally the group or the network, and violent Islamic movements have been able to replenish its wastage in rank and file and continue the fight. The robust Islamist milieu is facilitating the continuation of the fight. As an organization nearing two decades in existence, al-Qaeda has proved a resilient and agile organization. It should not be taken for granted that the fight against the jihadist brand of terrorism will be long and hard. As terrorist groups enjoy an average lifespan of 13.5 years, it is essential to build the global counter-terrorist structures and trained personnel to meet both the current and the long-range threat. Furthermore, al-Qaeda threatens military, diplomatic and civilian targets; it uses conventional and unconventional weapons; and is capable of operating by air, land and sea. Therefore, a wide range of security measures and countermeasures are necessary to protect both civilian and infrastructure targets from attack. Al-Qaeda ideology appeals to a cross-section of society – the group recruits from the rich, the poor, the educated and the less educated. As such, governments need to enlist the support of educational and religious institutions, community and other influential leaders to build a norm and an ethic against the use, misuse and abuse of religion for political purposes. As the scale of threat is high, governments have no option but to work with a range of public and private sector partners in the fight against terrorism. To manage the threat posed by al-Qaeda and its associate groups, a multi-pronged, multidimensional, multi-agency and multinational effort is paramount.

Notes

1. 'Bali bombs were suicide attacks', *BBC News*, www.bbc.co.uk/news 24, 2 October 2005.
2. Gunaratna, Rohan (2002), *Inside Al Qaeda*, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 72.
3. Gunaratna, Rohan (2002), *Inside Al Qaeda*, p. 187.
4. Burke, Jason (2002), 'Al-Qaeda in plot to hijack British plane', *Guardian Sunday*, 14 April.
5. CRS Report for Congress, 'Terrorism in Southeast Asia', www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31672.pdf, 7 February 2005, p. 32.

6. Gunaratna, Rohan (2002), *Inside Al Qaeda*, p. 3.
7. Indonesia Backgrounder, 'How the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist network operates', Indonesian Backgrounder, www.unsil.net/indon/ji_1.htm, 11 December 2002.
8. Tan, Andrew (2003), 'The Singapore experience', in Gunaratna, Rohan (ed.), *Terrorism in the Asia Pacific: Threat and Response*, Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, p. 231.
9. Gunaratna, Rohan (2002), *Inside Al Qaeda*, p. 175.
10. Turnbull, Wayne (2003), 'A tangled web of Southeast Asian Islamic terrorism: the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist network', 31 July, www.terrorismcentral.com.
11. 'Voice seems to be Al Qaeda leader calling for an uprising', CNN, www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/01/zawahiri.transcript/, 1 October 2004.
12. Gunaratna, Rohan (2002), p. 175.
13. Abodoolcarim, Zoher (2003), 'The Philippines' terrorist refuge', *Time Asia Magazine*, 4 February.
14. Vargas, Anthony (2004), 'AFP checking reports Janjalani killed in air raid', *Manila Times*, 21 December.
15. Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs White Paper 2003, www2.mha.gov.sg/mha/detailed.jsp?artid=667&type=4&root=0&parent=0&cat=0&mode=arc, accessed 17 October 2005.
16. CRS Report for Congress, 18 November 2003 edition, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31672.pdf

21 The triad of twenty-first century counter-terrorism

Renato Cruz De Castro

This chapter discusses the possible ways of waging a counter-terrorism campaign. Methods to counter this type of non-state violence range from the application of calibrated organized violence to international cooperation or concerted global efforts to remove its underlying causes. This topic also raises the following questions: (1) As a form of war of the third kind, what are the particular characteristics of contemporary transnational terrorism? (2) How does terrorism threaten the security of individual states and the international community? (3) What is the origin and nature of the transnational Islamic terrorist network in Southeast Asia? and (4) What are the possible means of managing this kind of transnational security challenge? Clearly and simply, however, there are no cut-and-dried solutions to transnational terrorism, which is a very complex phenomenon. No single means can effectively deal with this security challenge. What works in one situation may fail in other cases. Moreover, certain measures may spell short-term success, but could sow the seeds of future discontent and grievances. Thus, what will be discussed are potential counter-terrorist approaches which states can adopt to address adequately this transnational security challenge.

Terrorism as a 'war of the third kind'

The 'war of the third kind' is a form of political violence waged by organizations other than the state against state actors.[1] It is a type of warfare fought in developing countries where it is waged either between a state and some other organization, or between two such organizations.[2] Instead of the politico-bureaucratic war-making institutions of the state, warfare is conducted by sub-state social groups formed and led along personal and charismatic lines.[3] The belligerents do not field armies that are clearly distinct from the people; the organizations in question thrive in the conflict precisely because their combatants cannot be held apart from the non-combatants by whom they are surrounded.[4] Thus, this type of strife involves adversaries that are asymmetric in capabilities, and the weaker side, the sub-state actor, attempts to bring about political change by organizing and fighting more effectively than its stronger adversary – the state.[5] From

Algeria to Somalia, and from Vietnam to Afghanistan, the almost embarrassing series of defeats suffered by state-owned and regular armies speak of the tenacity and durability of the sub-state actors involved in this form of contention in the third world.

Terrorism is a form of war of the third kind. As a form of asymmetric conflict, 'terrorism' refers to the use of force for political purposes such as to create fear, draw widespread attention to a political grievance, and/or provoke draconian or sustainable response from the targeted state.[6] Typical expressions of terrorist violence include indiscriminate violence, armed assaults on civilians, political assassinations, kidnappings for ransom, and hijacking. Terrorism differs from crimes or random violence in the sense that it is politically motivated. Terrorist groups generally challenge the state's monopoly of violence and ability to protect its citizens. Terrorist acts gain political significance even if their motive is not primarily political but religious, criminal or psychopathological.[7] Terrorism is also distinguished from irregular or guerrilla warfare in the manner the violent action is carried out. It seeks to bring awareness to a political issue but rarely, if ever, results in political change.[8] Regardless of their differences, however, both terrorism and irregular war aim at obtaining political power. In addition, some terrorist groups adopt parallel efforts for popular causes more commonly associated with insurgencies such as 'nation-building'.

Terrorism should be understood primarily in terms of its political objective: propaganda. By committing violence against their victims, the terrorists seek not only to coerce and kill but also, more importantly, to persuade others about the validity or rightness of their cause. The immediate victim of a terrorist violence is merely instrumental, designed to achieve a calculated impact on a wider audience.[9] Thus, terrorism has often been compared to a theatre because it is a form of political violence that is staged to get the attention of a wider audience. The very act of causing massive carnage and killing innocent bystanders is calculated to generate a social shock wave and sends a political message that the state is unable to protect its citizens and vital infrastructures. Terrorism's long-term goals are to weaken the social-political fabric of a society, to undermine a liberal-democratic regime, to provide a rationale for a government to clamp down on civil liberties, and to exacerbate tensions among states.

The emergence of international news networks and the information revolution have now transformed terrorism from a mere theatrical event into a global television spectacle. The various news networks around the world have made several acts of terrorism into breaking news that is watched by international audiences, and thus these acts transcend the confines of theatrical events.[10] Contemporary terrorism is now assured of wide publicity since modern media have opened their gates for reporting all kinds of

terrorist-related incidents. When terrorists now strike, the international media provide them instant attention, and, given the global nature of the contemporary communication system, they can also convey their political messages far beyond their immediate target national audience as well.[11] However, current terrorist acts seem to point at the possibility that the aim is not merely to propagate or advertise a cause, but simply to cause massive destruction in terms of human lives and properties. A noted American counter-terrorist expert, Walter Laqueur, maintains that contemporary religiously or ethnically motivated terrorist groups tend to be more indiscriminate in their violent acts because they consider the whole enemy society as a legitimate target and believe that the mass murder of (innocent) children, women, elderly people and other non-combatants would spread more fear and panic than attacks against soldiers and security forces (along with government personnel and infrastructures).[12] Thus, he notes: 'if terrorists can kill thousands of people and cause immense material damage, as the possibility to defeat the enemy by arms alone becomes more feasible, the psychological weapon is no longer that important.' [13] However, from the terrorists' point of view, the attacks on 9/11 were still directed at helping them achieve their media-centred publicity goals and in the process could also advance some, if not all, of their political objectives. These goals included catching the attention of their target audiences, generating a wide discussion of their motives, and achieving a global status of prominence for their leaders.[14] Thus, while 9/11 indeed caused massive destruction in lives and property and opened a new chapter in the annals of terrorism, it is still a form of propaganda, since it was a 'perfectly choreographed production' aimed at an American and international audience.[15]

Terrorist groups operate through a series of networks and relationships that link one terror group to another globally. Contemporary terrorist organizations are not simply single and coherent political entities like nation-states. Rather, they are systems with various elements, many of which are transnational in nature. An international terrorist group is an amalgam of merchants, suppliers, heads-of-state, population fragments, militants and religious leaders sympathetic to the terrorist cause. It epitomizes a security challenge whose root causes are traceable to the turmoil of a modern and globalizing international society. Because of globalization, national borders have become permeable while states have become more interdependent than ever. One response to globalization has been to revert inward, to save traditional industries, culture and religion, and to expel foreigners and other cultural artefacts of globalization.[16] Religion often becomes a powerful rallying point, providing some people with a way to define, restore and reinforce their personal and communal identity, which has been damaged by globalization and modernization.[17]

Contemporary Islamic terrorist groups symbolize this discontent against globalization and its adverse societal consequences. Along with other generally peaceful and reformist Muslims, radical Islamic terrorist groups refuse to accept and vehemently challenge the current trends and distribution of power in the international system.[18] They advocate a return to the pristine purity of the early years of Islam. They also cling to a romanticized notion of an Islamic golden age, to which they believe they could return if they were able – through terrorism – to transform their relationship with the West into one of equality instead of than subordination. Terrorism becomes transnational as radical Islamic extremists look for international symbols as targets, and when the desired politico-psychological impact of their violent acts goes beyond the confines of their national sanctuary. Many diverse terrorist groups and extremist movements regularly act 'in solidarity' as a global jihad or under the banner of anti-Americanism to pursue common objectives or interests. Usually, terrorist groups and movements travel abroad to train recruits, secure logistics or attack targets symbolizing their domestic cause or some broader global issue. Modern communication and technology have increased the ability of these local terrorist groups and religious movements to organize, coordinate, share ideas and mobilize on a global scale. Communication through the Internet, increased tourism, the emergence of an informal international financial network, refugee flows and labour migration all make the organization of religious diasporas much easier and faster. Thus, modernization and globalization facilitate the construction and consolidation of religiously motivated terrorist groups worldwide.[19]

Various radical Islamic groups are now linked by a complex web that enables them to cooperate with each other, making it extremely difficult for states to target each group individually, one at a time.[20] Terrorism might not be home-grown but imported by another state by a non-state actor to sow violence in a targeted state. In some cases, local terrorist groups are utilized as a war-by-proxy device by states unwilling or unable to engage directly in armed conflict with another state.[21] Some local terrorist groups have even expanded their networks and operations to other states or regions of the world. Al-Qaeda is a case in point. This terrorist group operates globally, like a venture capital firm, providing funding, contacts and expert advice to militant groups and individuals throughout the Islamic world.[22] Consequently, the links between radical Islamic groups in the twenty-first century are qualitatively different from the informal relations that existed among European terrorist groups in the 1970s and 1980s.[23] This matrix of relationships among terrorists belonging to different groups makes the threat of contemporary international terrorism more dangerous than ever.[24]

Prior to the 1990s, acts of terrorism in Southeast Asia, though rampant and endemic, were largely local or regional in scope. Traditionally, linkages between these various terrorist and insurgent groups were relatively weak, and most of these groups operated only in their own country or region, while focusing on domestic issues. Southeast Asia has been a hotbed of Muslim militants, but conventional wisdom held that they were parochial and local in nature, not transnational.[25] Through causing concern because of their use of chronic violence, domestic Muslim militants and their vision of establishing independent state seems to pose minimal threat to international order and security. Everything was changed in the 1990s as the region witnessed the emergence of internationally linked terrorists. Religion-inspired insurgents and terrorist groups began to replace their objective of overthrowing their secular governments with the advocacy of replacing Southeast Asian states with a supranational Islamic state ruled by sharia law.[26]

These militant groups have forged, or are in the process of forging, transnational links within the region and, significantly, with global terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. In addition, they have established ties with Islamic separatist and insurgent groups within the region. By the 1990s, these militant groups had begun to operate on an international scale, to strike from operational bases across state borders and often to move around from one country to another. Terrorism in Southeast Asia has assumed an essentially transnational or stateless form, in the sense that it either has no particular home country that it seeks to liberate; or there is no homeland to be used as its base; or it has been uprooted from the land it has been fighting for.[27] One important characteristic of Southeast Asia's terror networks is their ability to recruit across the board, irrespective of education or class. Many of the region's terrorist operatives are middle-class, Western-educated professionals such as faculty members, architects, engineers, geophysicists, chemists, robotics engineers, businessmen and even members of the armed forces.[28] They create security challenges that are transnational in character, their social origin resting with the turmoil of a modern and globalizing international society, and are defined more by fault-lines within societies than by territorial borders between them.[29]

Like other security issues in the twenty-first century, terrorism has evolved into a transnational form of violence. In addition, its development as a cross-border, non-state and network-based phenomenon has simply undermined the general percept in the 'realist' international relations view that the most significant threats to global security emanate from states rather than non-state actors.[30] Contemporary international terrorism represents a form of conflict of a non-state actor deliberately aimed at terrorizing its victims, usually innocent civilians. Terrorist groups design

networks and exhibit patterns of violence that do not resemble 'organized warfare' among states. Generally, the terrorists apply a quasi-random targeting of civilians rather than the military organization of a state. Their acts of violence are not directed against the armed forces of their opponents; rather, they target civilians, who normally, according to the rules of war, enjoy immunity from direct and deliberate attacks by combatants.[31] Terrorism, compared to organized war, disregards the principles of warfare as defined in the Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions. However, this is not new. Asymmetric warfare dates back to the Peninsular War and up to the late twentieth century when insurgents and irregulars defeated state-organized militaries. Contemporary terrorism attempts to shift the dominant form of violence away from inter-state wars to a type in which low-intensity conflicts will increasingly proliferate, predominate and become acceptable.[32] These sporadic acts of violence by non-state actors (or terrorists) are the collateral effect of a more open and closely connected globalizing world. Along with other security challenges like poverty, pandemic disease, biological and genetic dangers, and environmental degradation, international terrorism has a transnational character whose origin can be traced to the turmoil of a globalizing world. It is a national security threat in the new era that is defined more by the fault-lines within national societies than by the territorial borders between them.[33] Short of closing national borders and reversing the effects of globalization, violence from these non-state actors can never be comprehensively eradicated, and will likely increase as the world shrinks. As a security concern terrorism presents any state with the following challenges:

1. Terrorism represents a systemic form of a threat without threateners. This means that as an international phenomenon, terrorism is a result of numerous cumulative effects of actions taken for other reasons, not from an intent emanating from a purposive and hostile state.
2. Terrorism is a chronic and long-term security challenge. States are generally used to addressing acute and short-term security threats, such as war, not chronic security issues like terrorism whose causes exist today but whose consequences can be felt tomorrow or years after.
3. Addressing terrorism may be neither cheap nor as unifying as dealing with traditional security threats like war. As history has shown, societies generally coalesce if they are faced with war. The threat of a war or a military invasion is both stunning and unifying for a society. War would unite all the people against a clear and present danger. This is not the case in addressing new security challenges like terrorism. The people might be more concerned with other social problems, and addressing terrorism would entail something very difficult to do in a

society – changing the behaviour of people in some trivial matters and numerous ways.[34]

Southeast Asia's transnational terrorist network

The emergence of radical Islamic movements in Southeast Asia in the 1990s can be traced to a convergence of several international phenomena. Among these were the reaction to globalization – which has been particularly associated with the United States – frustrations with repression and corruption of secularist states, the desire to create a pan-Islamic Southeast Asia, and the arrival of terrorist veterans from the fighting in Afghanistan. Contemporary Southeast Asian terrorist movements operate across an international space that is a conseqence of globalization. These global events are the end of the Cold War, the formation of free trade areas in the developed world, the expansion of international trade, and the revolution in transportation and international telecommunications that allows for easy electronic transfer of money and facilitate the movement of people.

Transnational terrorism in Southeast Asia is also made possible by a vast array of communication and transport networks and by societal reactions to this seemingly unjust and overwhelming economic globalization and spread of a rampaging universal culture deemed threatening to local religions and ways of life. The shrinking of distance between states, and the disappearance of national borders through the information highway and the availability of global media, have threatened the very existence of a number of communities based on ethnicity and religion. This phenomenon has also threatened those who value their unique ethnic heritage and traditional religious beliefs. As globalization creates alienation and religious and cultural extinction, those who are alienated and marginalized may act out their discontent and grievances through terrorism. Faced by the overwhelming force of globalization, these Islamic militants began to recognize the threat to the very existence of their belief and community – globalization's assault against Islam from the outside of the Islamic community and also from inside the Muslim world. The assault from the outside is led by the United States and Zionism. The assault from the inside is waged by Muslim themselves – believers who have been corrupted by adopting polluting ideas and lifestyle from the infidels. But all is not lost. True Muslims should gather themselves together and let themselves be animated by the spirit of Mohammad and his Caliphates from the early years of Islam. This new band of devoted Muslims is going to undertake the renovation of Islam in the face of globalization, turn against the false Muslims and hypocrites, and resurrect the caliphate and form a new *umma* (Islamic community) all over the world, just as Muhammad had done in the seventh century AD.

Most of Southeast Asia's militants are middle-class converts who worked in the Middle East, or young, angry, anti-Western and technically savvy educated professionals who saw an anti-Western and militant Islam as a refuge from the crimes, corruption, chaos, dislocation and alienation created by globalization and secularization. A number of Muslims in Southeast Asia are becoming more pious, are becoming more receptive to the more literal and fundamentalist interpretations of Quran, and are being converted into the more militant sects of Islam such as Wahhabism and Salafism. A number of those militants are now espousing the use of violence to establish a pan-Islamic state and are calling their jihad a part of a worldwide global jihad against globalization and the United States. Southeast Asian Islamic militants now see Islam threatened by globalization and have taken the view of their co-religionists in the Middle East and South Asia that it should be defended at all costs. And these trends have become very apparent because of a group of individuals who have forged the connections between the global outreach of al-Qaeda and the diverse and scattered militant Islamic groups within Southeast Asian states.

The formation of a transnationally linked terrorist network in Southeast Asia region caught many observers, analysts and defence officials by surprise. Gone were the notions that Islam in Southeast Asia has been defined by tolerance, moderation and pluralism. Once regarded as a haven for moderate, pluralistic and tolerant brands of Islam, Southeast Asia is now a haven of a violent Islamic militant movement that advocates a sociopolitical system governed by sharia, and a jihad against the non-Muslim world. The emergence of a transnational terrorist network in the region can be traced to the activities of an Indonesian Muslim cleric, Abu Bakar Bashir. Abu Bakar Bashir is an Indonesian of Yemeni descent, who joined Darul Islam in 1970s and spent decades preaching a brand of Islam that advocates the need for Islamic communities to work for the transformation of the secular Indonesian state into an Islamic state. He is also fervently anti-Jewish, and is extremely vocal about his vision of creating an Islamic state made up of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the southern Philippine island of Mindanao. He played a pivotal role in providing the ideology for the Southeast Asian network of Islamic militants.

Along with other Indonesian Islamic militants, like Isamuddin or Hambali and the late Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, Bashir recruited Malaysian, Filipino and Indonesian students to study in Islamic religious schools in Pakistan to ensure that they would be under the influence of a militant brand of Islam. The trio also facilitated the deployment of hundreds of Southeast Asian Muslims who trained and fought in Afghanistan – first with the mujahideen or Muslim warriors against the Soviet occupation of 1979–89 and later with the Taliban militia against the

Kabul government and with other factions of the mujahideen in the mid-1990s. They recruited and organized these militants into small, secretive and financially autonomous cells all over the region. They established way stations, created front companies and forged liaison among these various cells. More importantly they saw to it that these cells would get financial support, organizational linkages, training and spiritual guidance from Osama bin Laden. These individuals are instrumental in making terrorism take root in Southeast Asia, ensuring that the security challenges emanating from terrorism remain resilient, and ensuring that it remains linked to the global network that is directed against the interests of the United States of America. Many security experts believe that aside from these individuals, other militant Islamic organizations share the goals of Bashir, Hambali and al-Ghozi, in particular their aspiration for a society governed through sharia by a transnational Islamic state, a movement called Darul Islam. If ever these militants prevail in the Southeast Asia states, they could provoke conflicts with the region's non-Muslim populations, produce foreign policies extremely critical of the United States and the West, and create an economic environment hostile to non-Muslims in particular, and to international order in general.

The triad of counter-terrorism

In most cases of asymmetric conflict, the success of a counter-terrorist campaign can be measured or gauged only after decades. Nevertheless, the state has numerous advantages over its asymmetrical opponents, given its control over social, fiscal, political and military resources. The main problem, however, is whether the state can apply its overwhelming resources effectively to extinguish the international terrorist without alienating its population and the international community. Like any form of asymmetrical conflicts, the option of overwhelming force is generally not practical.[35] Political backing for the massive use or sheer show of force is not usually advisable. Addressing terrorism is time-consuming and a resource-intensive, militarized response is not always successful. Rather, a counter-force can be targeted against terrorist or guerrilla bands more precisely, and that force can be viable but limited.[36] The qualities necessary in the application of violence against the terrorists are secrecy, intelligence, political sagacity, quiet ruthlessness, covert operations that remain covert, and above all infinite patience.[37]

The use of force should be primarily directed at the physical destruction of the terrorist.[38] Many states have formed and trained elite Special Forces to deal with terrorist groups rather than rely on the usual military or police forces. The formation of these elite units is aimed at enabling a state to contain a low-intensity conflict from escalating into a full-blown and more

intense militarized conflict. The underlying assumption in using this elite formation is to demonstrate the state's ability to disrupt the operational capabilities of terrorists, and if necessary, physically eliminate them. This will involve incapacitating them by disrupting, isolating, capturing and killing as many cadres as possible. Low-intensity violence can be effective in deterring and even suppressing terrorist groups. The primary purpose is to reduce the scale and frequency of violence by neutralizing the terrorists and forcing them to go on the run. These tactical actions must be directed at destroying terrorist capabilities more than they create.[39] Strikes and raids should be aimed at discrete targets, and only decisively to destroy meaningful enemy (terrorist) capability. Force should be used at a minimal level so as not to disturb the normal course of civilian life. Some targets of opportunity may be bypassed if they endanger the grand strategy of containing the conflict at its low-intensity state or if the target's elimination can generate more damage than it can neutralize.[40]

However, the application of low-intensity violence does not guarantee a lasting solution to international terrorism. The creation of these elite units can change the political context within which terrorist groups can operate since it provides the state with an effective coercive instrument in dealing with violent dissident groups. However, the use of low-intensity coercion serves only as a mechanism in addressing the symptoms of terrorism (hostage-taking, insurgency, hijacking, murders and bombings) rather than an instrument for eliminating the socio-political causes of this security challenge. The creation of such forces is a tacit admission that terrorist incidents cannot always be prevented and that there could be situations where there is a need for such capabilities.[41] Furthermore, terrorist organizations can also employ counter-strategies to neutralize a state's resort to low-intensity warfare. Terrorists can simply rely on a strategy of 'denial plus unrest'.[42] This simply involves denying the state its preferred path to victory by avoiding situations that can enable it to wage its low-intensity warfare against terrorists. Terrorists can simply rely on the tactic of continued survival, lying low for sometime, and then use occasional but spectacular acts of terrorism that can hopefully undermine the state's application of low-intensity coercion by eroding domestic support for such a policy.[43] Despite its limitations, however, the use of low-intensity coercion is still important as it provides the necessary deterrence, security and stability in order for other components of the counter-terrorist campaign (for example economic and social measures) to take their full effect in the international community.

Waging a global anti-terrorist campaign calls for cooperation among states through security alliances. It demands a sense of common purpose among like-minded states to strengthen their ties against any form of

extremism and to identify countries and societies that harbour terrorist groups. The most immediate task for these states is to develop policy coordination, including military or combined counter-terrorist cooperation on a particular regional security issue or on a series of security-related or counter-terrorist measures. International cooperation can also take the form of supporting – officially, diplomatically or financially – another state's counter-terrorism efforts, intelligence-sharing, law-enforcement cooperation or security assistance, initiating poverty-alleviation measures, and institutionalizing international economic reforms. Combating terrorism requires patience, and the formulation and execution of a global strategy with components that reduce substantially the propensity of disgruntled groups to resort to violence. International cooperation against terrorism, however, is easier said than done.

The interactions of states do not occur in a political vacuum. In the real world of international politics, states view each other through conceptual lenses of zero-sum game, balance-of-power politics, and security dilemmas.[44] Thus, their relations are often mired in a quagmire of deep historical animosities, fundamental foreign policy differences, intense competing economic claims, and chronic arms races and diplomatic crises. States interact with one another based on the assumption that the world is still anarchic and dangerous. This causes distrust, the struggle for power, national interest taking precedence over norms and collective interests, and the use of force to settle disputes among states. Against this sordid backdrop, states will have to discover their shared security interests against transnational threats like terrorism, and work together in addressing these threats. States must first be convinced that they will gain more from cooperation on counter-terrorism than continuing to conduct their business-as-usual power-politics foreign policy practices. They must share expectations of peaceful change and lessen their propensity to use force against each other.

States should also cooperate in formulating and implementing social and economic development polices that hopefully be used as a 'carrot' in discouraging the resort to terrorism. Counter-terrorism on a global scale requires alleviating poverty, social ills and other problems associated with globalization around the world that provide a fertile ground for political discontent, which may be harnessed to terrorist recruitment and violence. Efforts for international socio-economic reforms, however, are very expensive. Poor and underdeveloped states harbouring terrorist groups usually have limited resources available for an effective and sustained counter-terrorism campaign. They usually need a significant amount of official development assistance from the West. Developed countries can extend economic assistance to these underdeveloped and poor countries so that

they can enact and implement sustainable social and economic development polices that can inhibit resurgence or contain the spread of terrorism within their territories. Western funded and supported social and economic development projects can contribute to the expansion of a new and educated middle class in communities that have traditionally provided support to terrorist groups. They can also limit the pools of potential recruits to terrorist organizations by reducing perceived grievances and providing members of the communities with viable alternatives to a life dedicated to terrorism. Socio-economic development, however, can only be an effective tool of counter-terrorism if it is incorporated in a multi-pronged approach that includes wider political, military and community-relations dimensions.[45]

The final step in dealing with this non-traditional security challenge is to educate the public, through the schools and the media, against the 'terrorist psychosis', and to ensure that they are psychologically prepared to face this form of low-intensity warfare.[46] The public must be made aware of the fact that has terrorism has existed throughout history, and that contemporary international terrorism reflects a deeper and wider structural change in human society. The state and society, as well, must have the political will to prevail against terrorism. The key component in the fight against terrorism is to gain political advantage over the terrorists in terms of time, space, legitimacy and political support.[47] The management, if not eradication, of terrorism requires a considerable investment in time, effort and resources. States must be able to sustain their support for counter-terrorist measures. The will to win is extremely crucial in the light that the underlying causes of terrorism often resurface, and a different form of a terrorist group – harder to contain – emerges. The difficulty of waging a successful counter-terrorism campaign is observed by a British academic who notes:

> The depressing truth is that there is no easy answer for dealing with non-state political violence. Traditional military responses by the state can achieve some success, but only where the foe is closely linked with a government and a clear target can be aimed at . . . Wars between states usually reach a definitive conclusion but wars against non-state actors rarely do. Non-state actors are unlikely to surrender since they can run away rather than face the music of post-war settlement. It is this limitation in the application of state power which prompted Paul Wilkinson famously to liken war against non-state forces to 'fighting the hydra,' the mythical beast that could respond to having its head cut off by growing another one. Non-state foes can be subdued for periods of time, but if the same grievances persist, others are likely to take up arms again for the cause.[48]

In the end, counter-terrorism is not about defeating terrorism. It involves creating the environment that will make it difficult for terrorists to function at every possible level, such as conducting operations, procuring and transferring false documents, ferrying fugitives from one place to another,

financing and training programmes, laundering and transferring funds.[49] But the ultimate means in addressing terrorism is defusing the terrorists' most powerful weapon – the political message. The international community must mitigate or address widely held grievances that foster recruitment and support for the terrorist organization.[50] However, contemporary transnational terrorism stems from contemporary macro-trends such as globalization and modernization.

Prior to the 1990s, terrorism was waged by small and identifiable political groups in articulating their grievances against purely national issues and trends. Now, given the information revolution, the existence of global news networks, and the emergence of various technological developments that facilitate the creation of explosive devices and biological weapons, there are thousands of minute sects and individuals who can carry out a sustained terrorist campaign at the global level. Many are bound by the common cause of anti-globalism. This means opposition to international capitalism, neo-liberal economic policies, and the global spread of transnational corporations. Many of these groups regard globalization as synonymous for Westernization and Americanization of the world and believe that it perpetuates social injustice and alienation. Globalization and modernization in this new century will continue, and generate problems and tensions in human societies. There will be winners and losers because of these trends. The losers will always have grievances and this will trigger acts of terrorism. Thus, sooner or later the world has to accept and confront the stark reality that international terrorism, as an old Gershwin song puts it, 'is here to stay'.

Notes

1. Van Creveld, Martin (1991), *The Transformation of War*, New York: Free Press, p. 198.
2. See Creveld, Martin Van (1997), 'What is wrong with Clausewitz', in de Nooy, Gert (ed.), *The Clausewitzian Dictum and the Future of Western Military Strategy*, The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1997, pp. 7–23.
3. Creveld, Martin Van (1991), *The Transformation of War*, p. 200.
4. Creveld, Martin Van (1997), 'What is wrong with Clausewitz', p. 11.
5. Kiras, James D. (2002), 'Terrorism and irregular warfare', in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen and Colin S. Gray (eds), *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 211.
6. Kiras, James D. (2002), 'Terrorism and irregular warfare', p. 221.
7. Schmid, Alex P. (Summer 2004), 'Frameworks for conceptualizing terrorism', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, **16** (2), p. 200.
8. Kiras, James D. (2002), 'Terrorism and irregular warfare', p. 211.
9. Schmid, Alex P. (2004), 'Frameworks for conceptualizing terrorism', p. 207.
10. Nacos, Brigitte L. (2003), 'The terrorist calculus behind 9-11: a model for future terrorism?', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, **26**, p. 3.
11. Nacos, Brigitte L. (2003), 'The terrorism calculus behind 9-11: a model for future terrorism?', p. 4.
12. Laqueur, Walter (2003), *No End to War: Terrorism in the 21st Century*, London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group Inc., p. 14.
13. Laqueur, Walter (2003), *No End to War: Terrorism in the 21st Century*, p. 233.

14. Nacos, Brigitte L. (2003), 'The terrorism calculus behind 9-11: a model for future terrorism?', p. 5.
15. Nacos, Brigitte L. (2003), 'The terrorism calculus behind 9-11: a model for future terrorism?', p. 3.
16. Marber, Paul (Winter 2004/2005), 'Globalization and its contents', *World Policy Journal*, **21** (4), p. 34.
17. See Ellingsen, Tanja (2005), 'Toward a revival of religion and religious clashes', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, **17**, p. 307.
18. Ayoob, Mohammed (2004), 'Political Islam: image and reality', *World Policy Journal*, **21** (3), p. 11.
19. Ellingsen, Tanja (2005), 'Toward a revival of religion and religious clashes', p. 308.
20. Levitt, Matthew (2004), 'Untangling the terror web: identifying and counteracting the terror web: identifying and counteracting the phenomenon of crossover between terrorist groups', *SAIS Review*, **24** (1), p. 34.
21. Schmid, Alex P. (2004), 'Frameworks for conceptualizing terrorism', pp. 200–201.
22. Burke, Jason (May/June 2004), 'Al Qaeda', *Foreign Policy*, **142**, p. 18.
23. Burke, Jason (2004), 'Al Qaeda', p. 34.
24. Burke, Jason (2004), 'Al Qaeda', p. 34.
25. See Abuza, Zachary (2004), 'Learning by doing: Al Qaeda's allies in Southeast Asia', *Current History*, (April), p. 171.
26. See Tan, Andrew, 'The threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia: threat and responses', Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats, www.cald.org/website/10th%20Anniversary/presentations/tanonterrorism.htm, p. 2.
27. Martin, Gus (2003), *Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, p. 237.
28. Abusza, Zachary (2004), p. 173.
29. Zelikow, Philip (2003), 'The transformation of national security: five definitions', *National Interest*, (Spring), p. 20.
30. Cerny, Philip G. (September 2005), 'Terrorism and the new security dilemma', *Naval War College Review*, **45**, p. 12.
31. Schmid, Alex P.(2004), 'Frameworks for conceptualizing terrorism', p. 204.
32. Cerny, Philip G. (2005), 'Terrorism and the new security dilemma', p. 13.
33. Zelikow, Philip (2003), 'The transformation of national security', p. 20.
34. Treverton, Gregory F. (2001), *Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 43–5.
35. Honig, Jan Willem (1997), 'Strategy in a post-Clausewitzian setting', in de Nooy, Gert (ed.), *The Clausewitzian Dictum and the Future of Western Military Strategy*, The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, p. 118.
36. Honig, Jan Willem (1997), 'Strategy in a post-Clausewitzian setting', p. 119.
37. See Howard, Michael (2002), 'What's in a name? How to fight terrorism', *Foreign Affairs*, **81** (1), p. 9.
38. Kiras, James D. (2002), 'Terrorism and irregular warfare', p. 224.
39. Worley, D. Robert (2003), *Waging Ancient War: Limits on Preemptive Force*, Carlisle, PA: Army War College, p. x.
40. Worley, D. Robert (2003), *Waging Ancient War: Limits on Preemptive Force*, p. x.
41. Lutz, James M. and Brenda J. Lutz (2004), *Global Terrorism*, New York and London: Routledge, p. 234.
42. Byman, Daniel and Mathew Waxman (2002), *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 194–5.
43. Byman, Daniel and Mathew Waxman (2002), *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*, p. 195.
44. For an interesting article on the challenge of fostering international cooperation against terrorism, international crime, and other forms of transnational security issues see Blair, Dennis C. and John T. Hanley, Jr. (2001), 'From wheels to webs: reconstructing Asia-Pacific security challenges', *Washington Quarterly*, **24** (1), pp. 7–17.

45. See Cragin, Kim and Peter Chalk (2003), *Terrorism and Development: Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
46. Chaliland, Gerard (1987), *Terrorism: From Popular Struggle to Media Spectacle*, Paris: Saqi Books, p. 104.
47. Kiras, James D. (2002), 'Terrorism and irregular warfare', p. 212.
48. Hough, Peter (2004), *Understanding Global Security*, London and New York: Routledge, p. 80.
49. Levitt, Matthew (2004), 'Untangling the terror web', p. 36.
50. Kiras, James D. (2002), 'Terrorism and irregular warfare', p. 223.

Index

9/11
  Aceh rebellion and 54–5
  counter-terrorism after 39, 40
  JI's descent into terrorism and 97, 99
  mass casualty terrorism and 34, 36
  MILF and 53
  new terrorism and 3, 4, 7
  publicity and 453
  radical Muslim terrorism and 195
  significance of 6, 16, 26–7, 42
  suicide terrorism after 109
  threat and response after 437
  see also USA
Abadan cinema attack 26
ABB (Alex Boncayao Brigade) 12, 50, 420
  see also CPP; NPA
Abbas, Nasir 80, 90, 99, 111
Abbas Bakir *see* Ibnu Abbas
Abd-al Wahhab, Muhammad ibn 195
Abdul Hakim Ali Hasmid Murad 207
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi 185–6
Abdullah ibn al-Abbas 174
Abdurrahman, Sheikh Omar 72
ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces) 177
ABSDF (All Burma Students Democratic Front) 46, 311, 314
Abu Nidal 119
Abu Sayyaf (later AHAI)
  Abu Sofia links 216, 217
  al-Qaeda links 206
  counter-terrorism and 15
  JI links 207, 208
  new terrorism emergence and 33, 34
  Philippines separatism and 230, 237, 238
  'radical Muslim terrorism' and 194, 196, 202, 205–12, 217
  RSM links 213, 214, 215–16
  separatism and 34
  separatist insurgency, Philippines and 232–5
  suicide terrorism and 113
  terrorism and insurgency complexities and 13
  terrorism threat and response and 438, 441
  see also Janjalani, Abdurajak; Janjalani, Khaddafy
Abu Sofia 194, 196, 216–17
Aceh
  armed separatism and 20–21
  conflict 248–9, 263–4
    first phase 249–50
    second phase 250–54
    third phase 254–5
    2004 tsunami, Helsinki peace process and 255–9
  old terrorism and rebellion in 54–5
  peace hopes 248–9, 263–4
    civil society roles 259–62
  see also Indonesia
Aditjondro, George 146
Afghanistan
  counter-terrorism and 458–9
  DI and 71
  KMM and 170
  Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand and 272
  new terrorism emergence and 31–2
  post 9/11 threat and response and 437, 438, 441, 448
AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines)
  Abu Sayyaf and 234, 237
  Jabidah massacre and 229
  MILF and 232, 238, 239, 241
  Philippines communist insurgency and 406, 415, 416, 418, 426, 430
  Philippines separatism and 243
  'radical Muslim terrorism' and 199, 201, 202, 203, 205, 212, 213
  see also ISAFP
AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League) 299, 303, 328
Agence France Press 364

agreements
Bates (USA/Sulu) 197, 227
Cessation of Hostilities (CoHA) 55, 252–3, 254, 262
Comprehensive, on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) 428, 429
Davao peace 52
Helsinki (GoI/GAM) 248, 256–7, 258, 262, 263, 264
Joint, on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) 428
Linggarjati Agreement (Indonesia/Netherlands) 249
Malino 132–3, 134
Malino II 154, 160
Military Bases (Philippines/USA) 406
Military Logistics Support (MLSA) (USA/Philippines) 237
New York (Netherlands/Indonesia) 281, 282, 286, 287, 288
Paris peace 48
Peace (Philippines) 201, 202
reconciliation (Maluku) 157–8
Round Table Conference (UN) 249
Tripartite Peace 23
Tripoli 201, 229
Visiting Forces (Philippines/USA) 427
see also legislation; treaties
Aguinaldo, Rodolfo 428
AHAI (al-Harakatul al-Islamiya) (formerly Abu Sayyaf) 206
Ahmad Sarkawi Sulong 169
Ahmed, Muhammad GharibIbrahimi Sayed 108
Ahtisaari, Maarti 256
aid, economic *see* economic aid
AID (All Inclusive Dialogue) 253, 262
AIO (Arakan Independence Organization) 308
al-Dawa 104, 114
al-Ma'unah
KMM and 167–8
answers, searching for 180–81
bands of brothers, buying into ideals and 181–2
connections and 179–80
cult receptivity, duped into believing and 182–3
follow the leader 176–9
future 186–7
Islam, not in name of 171–4
'Islamic state' revolution 168–9
militant group, making of 175–6
mujahideen and martyrs, aspiring 169–71
wrongs, righting 183–6
militant group, as 13, 20
see also Amin Mohamed Razali, Mohamed
al-Qaeda
Abu Sayyaf links 206
al-Ma'unah and KMM and 168
Arakan state terrorism and 325
counter-terrorism and 15, 16
GAM and 55
JI and 63–4, 82–3, 97, 99
KMM links 168, 179
Laskar Jihad and 63
Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand and 271, 272
MILF and 52–3, 203–4
Muslim separatism in Thailand and 55, 57, 58
new and old terrorisms and 4, 6–7, 37, 38, 39
new terrorism emergence and 29, 31–2, 33, 37, 38, 39
Philippines separatism and 226, 233, 235–41
post 9/11 threat and response and 437, 439
radical Muslim terrorism and 194, 195
RSM links 213
suicide terrorism and 105, 108–10, 114, 115, 438
suicide terrorism emergence and 19
Sulawesi conflict and 124, 136–7
terrorism and insurgency complexities and 12, 13
terrorism as 'war of the third kind' and 454, 455
terrorist threat and 437–9
see also Osama bin Laden
Alagappa, Muthiah 8
Alatas, Ali 392

Albania 33
Albright, Madeleine 361
Algeria 119
Alonto, Abul Khayr 199
ALP (Arakan Liberation Party) 341
Alves, Domingos Sarmento 388, 391–2
Amaptuan, Zamzamin 215
Amaral, Francisco Xavier do 388
Amin Mohamed Razali, Mohamed
  biographical details 169
  cult conditioning and 182–3
  end of 180, 181
  hirabah and 174
  Islamic state, plan for 167, 169–70
  leader, as 176–9
  making of militant group and 175–6
  see also al-Ma'unah
Amin Rais 152
AMM (Aceh Monitoring Mission) 257, 258
Amnesty International
  Aceh conflict and 251
  Arakan state terrorism and 330, 331, 332, 337, 338, 343
  Hmong rebellion and 356
  Sulawesi conflict and 139
AMNM (Amar Makruf Nahi Mungkar) 155
Anand Panyarachun 271
Andang, Galib 209
Annan, Kofi 352
Anom, Permenas Ferry 286
Ansar Allah attack 119
Anwar El Islam 199
Anwar Ibrahim 187
APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation) 41
Apodeti (Associacão Popular Democrática Timorense) 376, 380
Aquino, Benigno 'Ninoy' 231, 412, 417
Aquino, Corazon 50–51, 231, 405, 417, 418, 420, 426
Aragon, Lorraine 123, 129, 132
Arakan
  state terrorism in 22, 325–6, 342–3
    dynamics of 339–41
    effects of 341–2
    reasons for 326–9
    tactics of, denial of citizenship to Rohingyas 329–39
  see also Myanmar; Rohingyas; state terrorism
Arakan Communist Party 341
Arakan People's Liberation Party 302
ARIF (Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front) 339–40
Arifuddin 136
ARMM (Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao) 201, 231, 232
Arnasan *see* Iqbal 1
ARNO (Arakan Rohingya Nationalist Organization) 313, 340, 438
Aronggear, Terianus 284, 286
Arroyo, Gloria Macapagal-
  Abu Sayyaf and 237
  assassination plot against 214
  Communist insurgency and 405, 426, 427, 428, 429
  Fourteen Point Plan to combat terrorism 54
  MILF and 238, 239, 243
  Misuari's end and 232
  Presidency, assumption of 236
  Presidency, renewal of 241
  see also Philippines
Arsyad, Ustaz 162
Arulas, Jibin 229
ASDT (Associacão Social Democrática Timorense) (later Fretilin) 376, 377
ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations)
  9/11 condemnation 40–41
  East Timor and 393
  Hmong rebellion and 49
  major armed rebellions in states of 10
  Maluku jihad and 162
  Myanmar separatism and 312
  Papua separatism and 284
  post 9/11 threat and response and 443
ASG *see* Abu Sayyaf
ASNLF (Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front) 251
ATTF (Anti-Terrorism Task Force) 210, 217
Aum Supreme Truth 28, 34, 35, 37
Aung San 45, 296, 297, 299, 328
Aung San Suu Kyi 46, 311, 313, 314

Australia
East Timor and 374, 377–8, 382, 387, 389, 393, 394
High Commission (Jakarta) bombing 38, 97, 111, 112
Hmong rebellion and 371
JI in 438
Papua separatism and 280, 287
post 9/11 threat and response and 438
aviation security
suicide terrorism and 118–19
see also security
Azahari bin Husin
al-Ma'unah and LMM and 179–80, 181, 183, 186
JI according to PUPJI and 77, 78
suicide terrorism and 110–11, 112, 120
see also JI
Azar, Edward E. 8
Azzam, Abdullah 72, 85

Badawi, Abdullah Ahmad *see* Abdullah Ahmad Badawi
BAKIN (Indonesian State Intelligence Agency) 383
Bali bombings
counter-terrorism after 41
decision to stage 77
described 104, 110, 111
DI and 70
females and 116
globalization and 72
individual bombers 112
Indonesian terrorist trials after 74
JI and 72, 97
Muslim separatism in Thailand and 57
new versus old terrorism and 38
post 9/11 threat and response and 438, 439
PUPJI and 81
suicide terrorism cost-effectiveness and 106
suicide terrorism emergence and 19
Sulawesi conflict and 133
see also suicide terrorism; Thailand
Balweg, Conrado 422
Bandura, Albert 170
Bangladesh 307–8, 312, 327, 338, 339, 340, 341
Bangsa Moro Army 52
see also MNLF
Banlaoi, Rommel 20
Banna, Hasan al- 149
Barayeva, Khava 114
Basayev, Shamil 116–17
Bashir, Abu Bakar
al-Ma'unah and KMM and 180
JI according to PUPJI and 77–8, 81
JI and 71, 72
militant group general characteristics and 65
MMI and 73
Muslim separatism in Thailand and 57
Philippines separatism and 236
'radical Muslim terrorism' and 207
Sulawesi conflict and 123, 136
terrorism and insurgency complexities and 13
transnational Islamic terrorist network emergence and 458, 459
see also JI
Bates, John C. 227
Baylosis, Rafael 417
BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) 364, 369
Belo, Bishop 393
Benedict XVI, Pope 138
Bersatu (Barisan Kemerdekaan Pattani) 57, 273
Beureueh, Daud 69
BIA (Burma Independence Army) 296, 299
BIAF (Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces) 203
BIC (Benevolence International Corporation) 204
BIMM (Badan Imarat Muslim Maluku) 155
Binago, Alo 217
Binago, Bebis 217
biological terrorism *see* NBC (nuclear, biological or chemical) terrorism
births
registration of, Arakan state terrorism tactics and 337–8

Bisalembah, Roy Runtu 125
BMLO (Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization) 200
BNPP (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani) 56, 273
Bo Mya 47, 310
Bodaw Phaya 327
Bounchanh, General 367
Brang Seng 314
British East India Company 327
BRN (Barisan Revolusi Nasional) 56, 273, 274
Brown, David 298
BSPP (Burma Socialist Programme Party) 304, 307, 308, 310, 311, 316
Burma
  Communist insurgency in 23
  political opposition groups 12
  radical Islamist groups 13
  separatism in 11, 18, 21–2, 33, 293–9
    1948–62, parliamentary era 299–304
    1962–88, 'Burmese Way to Socialism', Ne Win and 304–10
  terrorism definition and 17
  see also Myanmar
Burnham, Gracia 212
Burnham, Martin 212
Buscayno, Bernabe 'Dante' 409, 415, 417
Bush, George W. 233, 237, 272
Buzan, Barry 299

Caetano, Marcelo 375
Callahan, Mary 302–3
Campbell, James 31
Canada 47, 371
Carey, Peter 5, 22
Carter, Jimmy 387
causes
  grievance alleviation as political weapon in counter-terrorism 24
  Hmong rebellion 354–5
  insurgency 14
  Malay-Muslim insurgency, Thailand 269–73
  new terrorism 29–34
  rebellion 5, 14, 18
  separatist insurgency, Papua 280–83
  separatist insurgency, Philippines 226–8
  state terrorism, Arakan 326–9
  suicide terrorism 105–8, 113–15
  Sulawesi conflict 19, 122–4
  terrorism 3–4, 14
  see also economics; legitimacy of state; politics; separatism
Center for Public Policy Analysis 362
Chao Fa resistance movement 357–8, 359, 360, 361, 363, 367, 369
characteristics
  al-Ma'unah and KMM 169–71, 179–82
  militant groups 28, 31, 64–7
  new terrorism 6, 34–7
  rebellion 14
  suicide terrorism 115–18
Chauvel, Richard 148
Chavalit, Yongchaiyudh 312
Chechnya 33, 105, 114, 116, 117
chemical terrorism *see* NBC (nuclear, biological or chemical) terrorism
Chile 107
Chin National Vanguard Party 302
China
  Burma separatism and 300–301, 303, 306
  Communist insurgency and 23
  complexities and 12
  Hmong rebellion and 49, 354, 357
  legitimacy and rebellion 9–11
  Myanmar separatism and 312
  support base for Hmong rebellion, as 363
Christmas Eve bombings 81, 97, 122, 125, 127
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 48, 316, 353, 354, 359, 361
citizenship *see* Rohingyas, citizenship denied to
Clandestine Radio Watch 118 362
class *see* separatism
Clinton, Bill 392–3
CMI (Crisis Management Initiative) 256
CNF (Chin National Front) 313, 314
CNI (Commission on National Integration) 198

'CNN effect'
new terrorism emergence and 30
see also publicity
CNRM (National Council of Maubere Resistance) (later CNRT) 391
Colombia 107
Commander Robot *see* Andang, Galib
Communism
armed insurgency and 22–3
insurgency and *see* Communist insurgency
legitimacy and rebellion and 9–11
Malaysia 7
separatism and 18
Thailand 7–8
s*ee also* politics
Communist insurgency
Malaysia 23
Philippines 3–4, 8, 22, 23, 405–7, 429–31
1980s–1990s, debates and fallout in 420–26
PKP and National Democratic Revolution 407–9
PKP–NPA growth and decline 415–20
National Democratic Front 411–14
New People's Army 409–11
old terrorism and 49–51
political negotiations 426–9
Thailand 22
see also insurgency; politics
Communist Party of Thailand 7, 307
Community Development Centre 268
complexities
insurgency 5–6, 11–14
radical Islamist groups 12–13, 14
rebellion 18
separatism 11–12, 13
terrorism 11–14
Conboy, Ken 97
Conferences
Non-Aligned Movement Countries (1976) 387
Reorganization of the Country (East Timor) (1981) 390
Conventions
Geneva 456
ILO, Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour 333
International, on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 343
International, on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 343
Reduction of Statelessness 343
Status of Stateless Persons 343
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 343
UN, on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 336
UN, on the Rights of the Child 329, 335, 336
see also legislation
Cooley, F.L. 147
Corregidor massacre *see* Jabidah massacre
Coser, Lewis 162
cost-effectiveness
suicide terrorism advantage 106
counter-terrorism
grievance alleviation as political weapon in 24
implications 15–17
new terrorism and 39–42
old and new terrorism and 23–4
Singapore 36–7
twenty-first century 451, 459–63
terrorism as 'war of the third kind' 451–7
transnational terrorist networks 457–9
USA 36
see also security; terrorism
CPA (Communist Party of Arakan) 305, 308
CPB (Communist Party of Burma)
Arakan state terrorism and 328
Chinese backing for 306
contemporary landscape and 314, 315
KMT and 301, 302
Ne Win and 305, 306, 307, 308, 309
political power sought through armed revolution 23, 299

SLORC/SPDC and 310, 311
Tatmadaw and 303
CPLA (Cordillera People's Liberation Army) 422
CPM (Communist Party of Malaya) 11, 23, 57
CPM-43 (Civilian-Police-Military Task Force 43) 269
CPP (Communist Party of the Philippines) (formerly PKP)
Communist rebellion in Philippines and 49, 50, 51, 405
growth and decline 415–20
National Democratic Revolution and 407–9
political power sought through armed revolution by 23
radical Muslim terrorism and 199, 204
separatist insurgency in Philippines and 238
terrorism and insurgency complexities and 12
see also ABB; NPA; Sison, Jose Maria
Cruz, Avelino 242–3
CTM (Communist Terrorist Movement) 204, 205
cults
militant groups compared 182–3

DAB (Democratic Alliance of Burma) 46, 311
Daitula, David Alex 379
Dale, Sephen Frederic 108
Damanik, Rinaldy 133–6
Daof, Saeed A. 241, 243
Dawood, Dayan 261
De Castro, Renato Cruz 24
deaths
registration of, Arakan state terrorism tactics and 337–8
definitions
hirabah 172–3
insurgency 4
Islamist 64
jihad 171–2
ma'unah 171
militant 64
premanism 146
radical Muslim terrorism 20, 194–6
state terrorism 325–6
suicide terror attack 104
terrorism 4–6, 17–18, 27
Degauque, Muriel 117
degradation
socio-economic, state terrorism effect, Arakan 342
Deklarasi Menahan Diri (Restrain Oneself Declaration) 158
Delfin, Roberto 237
Dellosa, Redento Cain 215
Democratic Chao Fa Party of Laos (formerly Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos) 358, 363
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army 313
Democratic Nationalities United Front 302
Demotekay, Aser 284
DI (Darul Islam)
Aceh conflict and 249–50
Java-based militant group, as 67–71
JI establishment and 4, 76, 79, 98
militant Java-based Islamist movements and 63, 64
MMI links 73
new terrorism emergence and 39
new versus old terrorism and 39
Sulawesi conflict and 122, 125, 126, 127, 136
transnational terrorist network emergence and 458, 459
Dolnik, Adam 19
DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer) 251, 252, 255, 289
Dommen, A. 370
Duim, Feiji 290
Dujana, Abu 71, 77, 78
Dureza, Jesus 53
Dwikarna, Agus 136, 137
Dzulqarnain, Ustaz 155

East, Roger 382
East Timor
historical background 374–5
Indonesian occupation 394–5
1975 invasion and its aftermath 381–5

1976–77, military stalemate and Fretilin's resistance strategy 385–6
1977–79, Operation Annihilation Circle 386–8
1979–88, famine, resettlement and rebirth of Timorese resistance 388–91
1989–99, Timorese 'perestroika' and international community 391–4
new nation 374
political awakening and civil war (1974–75) 375–81
state terrorism in 22
see also Indonesia
economic aid
government response to Hmong rebellion 367–8
economics
causes of terrorism and 14
counter-terrorism and 15, 16, 17, 461
legitimacy and rebellion and 9
Papua separatism and 283
state terrorism effects and, Arakan 342
see also causes
education
counter-terrorism and 462
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 85, 86
Eluay, Ondolofo Dortheys Hiyo 289
environment
causes of terrorism and 14
terrorism response and 446–7
Ermita, Eduardo 240
Estrada, Joseph 51, 53, 236, 405, 423, 428, 429
see also Philippines
Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos (later Democratic Chao Fa Party of Laos) 49, 357
Ethnic Nationalities Council 315
ethnicity *see* separatism
EU (European Union) 405, 429
Evans, Grant 370
extortion
Arakan state terrorism tactics and 336–7
Falintil (Forças Armadas de Libertaçãde Timor-Leste) (later F-FDTL) 379, 385, 388, 389, 390, 391
Faraj, Abdelsalam 72
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) 107
Farouq, Omar al- 109, 137, 439
Faydang Lobliayao 48
Fealy, Greg 19
Federal Movement 304
females *see* women
Fernandez, Joe 168
Ferrer, Miriam Coronel 23
FFCL (Fact Finding Commission on Laos)
government responses to Hmong rebellion and 367
Hmong resistance groups and 357, 370
members arrested 352
videos 356, 358, 363
Vietnam as Hmong support base and 364
Fianza, Florencio D. 216
FIDH (International Federation of Human Rights League) 339
Firduas, Salik M. 112
FKAWJ (Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah) 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 155
FKM (Front Kedaulatan Maluku) 153, 156
Ford, Gerald 381, 416
FPI (Front Pembela Islam) 64
FPIM (Front Pembela Islam Maluku) 155
France 48, 49, 119, 354, 358, 371, 369–70
Freire, Paulo 377
Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independent) (formerly ASDT)
end of 391
Indonesian invasion and its aftermath and 382, 383
legitimacy and rebellions and 8
Operation Annihilation Circle and 386, 387, 388, 389

political awakening and civil war and 377, 378, 379, 380, 381
resistance strategy 385–6, 390

Gaddafi, Mu'ammer al- 31, 229
GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka)
al-Qaeda and 55
civil society roles peacemaking roles and 260, 261, 262
counter-terrorism and 15
founding of 54, 250–51
Helsinki peace process and 256, 257
MoU between GoI and 21, 248, 263
new terrorism emergence and 34
peace failure and 254, 255
resurrection of, second phase of conflict and 252
separatism and 34
terrorist threat and response and 439
see also Hasan di Tiro
Garcia, Rodolfo 240–41
General Education Centre 268
Ghozi, Fathur Rohman al- 32, 109, 207–8, 236, 239, 458, 459
GIA (Armed Islamic Group) 119
GKST (Crisis Centre of the Protestant Church of Central Sulawesi) 130, 133, 134, 135
globalization
counter-terrorism and 40, 463
JI and 71–2
Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand and 271–3
new terrorism and 28, 29–30
suicide terrorism and 117
terrorism as 'war of the third kind' and 453–4, 455–6
transnational terrorist networks and 4, 457–9
see also international community
GMIP (Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani) 13, 57, 273, 274
God's Army 47
GoI (Government of Indonesia) 248, 260, 262, 263, 288–91
see also Indonesia
Gon Jerng 307
GPNG (Gerakan Persayuan Nieuw Guinea) 280
Great Britain *see* UK
GRP (Government of the Republic of the Philippines) 201
see also Philippines
GST (Gerakan Permuda Sulawesi Tengah) 127
Gumilang, Panji 69
Gunaratna, Rohan 23–4, 39
Gusmão, José Alexandre 379
Gusmão, Xanana 388, 390–91

Habibie, Bachruddin Jusuf 150, 151, 252
Haji Sulong 268
Hamas 105, 115, 117
Hambali
al-Ma'unah and KMM and 168, 180
JI according to PUPJI and 77, 78, 97
Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand and 272
Muslim separatism in Thailand and 57
Philippines separatism and 236
'radical Muslim terrorism' and 207, 208
suicide terrorism and 110–11
terrorism threat and response and 438, 439
transnational terrorist network emergence and 458, 459
see also JI
Hapilon, Isnilon 217
Hasan di Tiro 54, 250
see also GAM
Hashim Selamat
Moro rebellion and 52, 53
Philippines separatism and 230, 231, 232, 235, 236, 239, 241
'radical Muslim terrorism' and 200, 202–3, 204
see also MILF
Hatta, Mohammad 125, 126
Havel, Vaclav 316
HDC (Henri Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue) 252, 253, 254, 262
Hendari 140
Hezbollah 104–5, 114
Hidayat, Aip 112
Hidayat, Mismo 112

Hindom, Saul 288
Hmong International Human Rights Watch 362–3, 364–5, 367
Hmong Lao Radio 362, 369
Hmong rebellion
  background 352–3
  current situation 370–71
  government responses 366–70
  Hmong people described 353–4
  old terrorism and 48–9
  principal players 356–9
  reasons for 354–5
  support bases 359–66
  suppression of, human rights abuses or 355–6
Hoffman, Bruce 23, 28, 30
Horta, José Ramos 384–5, 393
Hough, Peter 462
Howard, John 393, 394
Hso Ten 313, 316
Huber, Konrad 254
Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (People's Army Against the Japanese) 406, 407
human rights
  Child, of the, UN Declaration of 335
  Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for, and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) 428, 429
  UN Commission on 336, 393, 364, 367
  Universal Declaration of 332, 333, 335, 338
  violations
    Arakan state terrorism and 339
    Hmong rebellion suppression and 355–6
    Indonesian invasion of East Timor and 383
  see also Rohingyas

I Nyoman Somanada 135
Ibnu Abbas 177
Ibrahim Libya 169, 182
ICG (International Crisis Group) 204, 266
ideals
  al-Ma'unah and KMM and 181–2
identity crisis
  state terrorism effect, Arakan 341–2
ideology
  terrorist threat and 438–9
Idris, Safwan 261
IIC (International Information Center) 214
IIRO (International Islamic Relief Organization) 203, 204, 439
Ikle, Fred Charles 171
ILO (International Labour Organization) 333
India 37, 107, 307, 312
Indochina 108
Indonesia
  counter-terrorism and 40
  jihad movement in, rise of 148–53
  legitimacy and rebellion and 8, 9, 11
  new terrorism and radical Islam and 18
  new versus old terrorism and 39
  radical Islamist groups 13, 15
  separatism in 11, 12, 34
  suicide terrorism and 19, 116, 117, 120
  terrorism definition and 17
  see also Aceh; East Timor; GoI; Java; Maluku; Megawati Sukarnoputri; Papua; Suharto, President; Sukarno, President; Sulawesi; Sulu; Sumatra; Wahid, Abdurrahman
Indonesian Council of Churches 283, 289
insurgency
  armed 20–22
  book themes and structure 17–24
  Communist *see* Communist insurgency
  defined 4
  separatist *see* separatist insurgency
  see also causes; complexities; Malay-Muslim insurgency, Thailand; rebellion; separatism
InterFET (International Force in East Timor) 374, 393
  see also UNSC
international community
  East Timor and 383–5, 391–4

Papua separatism and 286–8
see also globalization
international crime
consequence of terrorism, as 4
International Criminal Court 272
internationalization *see* globalization
Internet
new terrorism and 29–30
see also IT
IPD (Immigration and Population Department) 331, 332
Iqbal 1 (Arnasan) 110
IRA (Irish Republican Army) 27, 33, 107
Iraq 105
Ireland 288
IRIC (International Relations and Information Center) 204
ISAFP (Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines) 205
see also AFP
Islam
al-Ma'unah and KMM and 171–4
see also radical Islam
Islamic state
revolution, al-Ma'unah and KMM and 168–9
Ismail, Razali 314
Israel 16, 33, 37, 105, 119
IT (information technology)
new terrorism and 29
see also Internet
IWW (Islamic Wisdom Worldwide) 204

Jaafar, Khalim 180
Jabidah massacre 51, 198–9, 225, 228–9
Jackson, Sherman 172
Jafar Kamal 328
Jakarta Post 134, 139
Jalandoni, Luis 413
jama'ah (group)
JI as, according to PUPJI 83–4
Jamaluddin Darus 181, 183
Jamalul Kiram II, Sultan of Sulu 227
Jane's Intelligence Review 31
Janjalani, Abdurajak 205–6, 209, 230, 232, 233
see also Abu Sayyaf
Janjalani, Khaddafy
Philippines separatism and 233, 234, 241
'radical Muslim terrorism' and 209, 210, 213, 215, 216, 217
see also Abu Sayyaf
Japan 37, 118, 197, 206, 303
Java 63–4, 67–74
see also Indonesia
Jayash al Madhi 441–2
Jemari 183
JI (Jemaah Islamiah)
Abu Sayyaf links 207, 208, 211
al-Ma'unah and KMM and 168
counter-terrorism and 15, 40
globalization and 71–2
Java-based militant group, as 71–3
KMM links 168, 179, 180
Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand and 271, 272, 273
militant group characteristics and 66
MILF and 53, 203, 204
MMI links 73
Muslim separatism in Thailand and 57
new and old terrorisms and 6, 37
new terrorism emergence and 32–3, 38, 39, 40
Philippines separatism and 230, 234, 235–41, 243
post 9/11 threat and response and 438, 440, 441, 442, 444
PUPJI, according to 76–8, 82–3, 96–9
operational dimensions 88–96
organizational patterns 83–8
RSM links 213
Salafism and 63–4
suicide terrorism and 109, 112, 118, 120
Sulawesi conflict and 122, 123, 124, 136
terrorism and insurgency complexities and 13
see also Azahari bin Husin; Bashir, Abu Bakir; Hambali; Noordin Mohammed Top
Jibril, Abu 180
jihad movement

Indonesia, in, rise of 148–53
see also Maluku
John Paul II, Pope 206, 207, 392
Jouwe, Nicolas 285
JQAF 185
JS (Jemaah Salafiah) 438
JSC (Joint Security Committee) 253, 254, 255

Kabalu, Eid 204
Kahar, Muzakkar 125, 126
Kaimudin, Sugianto 137
Kaisiepo, Markus 285
Kalbuadi, Dading 382
Kalla, Jusuf 133, 154, 159–60, 255
Kamarulzaman Askandar 20–21
Karen rebellion
old terrorism and 45–8
see also Myanmar
Kartosoewirjo, S.M. 68, 71, 126–7, 250
Kashmir *see* India
Kastari, Ma Salam-at 109, 438
Keen, David 299, 313
Kessler, Richard 50
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 109, 119, 439
Khalifa, Mohammad Jamal 52, 203, 204, 232–3, 236, 439
Khallad bin Attash 109
Khin Nyunt 48, 311, 314
Khun Sa 307, 309, 311–12
Khun Tun Oo 316
Kintanar, Romulo 426
KIO (Kachin Independence Organization) 304, 305, 309, 311, 314, 315
KISDI (Komite Solidaritas Islam) 13
Kissinger, Henry 381
KKY (Ka Kwe Ye) 308–9, 311
KM (Kabataang Makabayan) 199
KMM (Kampulan Mujahideen Malaysia) 4, 13, 20, 57, 438
see also al-Ma'unah, KMM and
KMT (Kuomintang) 300, 301, 302, 307, 309
KNL (Karen National League) 47
KNPP (Karenni National Progressive Party)
contemporary landscape and 314, 316
Ne Win and 305, 307, 309
parliamentary era and 301, 302
SLORC/SPDC and 312
KNU (Karen National Union)
contemporary landscape and 314, 316
Karen rebellion and 46, 47
Ne Win and 305, 307, 309
parliamentary era and 300, 301, 302, 303
pre-independence 297–8
SLORC/SPDC and 311, 312, 313
terrorism and insurgency complexities and 12
KNUP (Karen National United Party) 301, 302, 305
Koalisi NGO HAM (NGO Coalition for Human Rights) 261
Kopassus/Kopassandha (Army Special Forces) 286, 383
Kostrad (Strategic Army Reserve) 381
KPPSI (Komite Persipan Pelaksanaan Syari at Islam) (later KPSI) 122, 127, 137
see also Laskar Jundullah
KTA (Khalid Trinidad Army) 213
Kurdistan 38

Laard, Tim 364
labour
forced unpaid, Arakan state terrorism tactics and 333–4
Lagman, Filemon 426
land
confiscation and eviction from, Arakan state terrorism tactics and 335–6
see also model villages
Lao Democracy Institute 362
Lao Human Rights Council 362
Laos
separatism in 11, 33
state terrorism in 22
terrorism definition and 17
see also Hmong rebellion; RLG
Laqueur, Walter 27, 453
Laskar Khalid bin Walid 137
Laskar Kristus 156
Laskar Jihad
9/11, after, future challenges and 161
Aceh rebellion and 55

Christian response to 156
jihad movement emergence in Indonesia and 150, 151–2
jihad movement emergence in Maluku and 19–20
local Muslim response to 154, 155
militant group characteristics and 65, 66
national security forces response to 153
premanism and 146–7
Salafism and 63
Sulawesi conflict and 122, 130, 131, 137
terrorism and insurgency complexities and 13
Laskar Jundullah 13, 122, 127, 130, 136, 137, 438
see also KPPSI
Laskar Mujahideen 73–4, 161–2
see also MMI
Laskar Mujahidin Kompak 136
Lateka, Advent L. 130, 136
Latuconsina, Saleh 159
Lava, Jesus 406
Lava, Jose 406
Lavilla, Sheik Omar 212
Le Kha Phieu 364
Le Van Dzung 365
leadership
al-Ma'unah and KMM and 176–9
Lebanon 104–5, 114
Lee, Gary Yia 22
Lee Kuan Yew 287
legislation
Burma Citizenship Law 329, 330, 331, 339
Citizenship Act 1948 (Burma) 329
Constitutional Law 7/75 (Indonesia) 378
Hague Regulations 456
Inpres (Presidential Instruction) No. 1 (Papua) 290
Internal Security Act (ISA) (Malaysia) 181
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 343
Otsus (Special Autonomy bill) (Papua) 289–90, 292
Penal Code (Malaysia) 173, 180
PEPERA ('Act of Free Choice') (Papua) 282, 284, 285, 286, 287, 291
Strategic Goods (Control) Bill (Singapore) 36
UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights) 332, 333, 335, 338
see also agreements; treaties
legitimacy of state
cause of rebellion, as 5
cause of terrorism, as 3, 14
radical Islamist groups and 18
rebellion and 7–11
separatism and 18
see also state
Lengsavad, Somsavat 368
Lestaluhu, Maryam R.L. 147
Li Wen-huan 307
Libya 54, 55
Lindsey, Tim 146
LMHR (Lao Movement for Human Rights) 370–71
Lo Lu Yang 367–8
Lo Hsing-han 309
Lobato, Nicolau 379, 388
Lopes, Martinho da Costa 386
LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) 38, 105, 113–14, 115

Mabilangan, Leopoldo 426
Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria *see* Arroyo, Gloria Macapagal-
MacArthur, Douglas 197
Mahathir Mohamed 169, 170, 238
Maki, Ragab al- 108
Malay-Muslim insurgency
Thailand 266
domestic sources of unrest 269–71
history, burden of 267–9
regional and international dimensions 271–3
research avenues and constraints 275–6
violence, prospects of 273–5
see also insurgency

Malaya
legitimacy and rebellion and 11
Malaysia
Aceh rebellion and 54–5
al-Ma'unah and KMM in *see* al-Ma'unah, KMM and
Communism in 7
Communist insurgency in 23
counter-terrorism and 40, 41
legitimacy and rebellion and 7
new terrorism and radical Islam and 18
radical Islam and 20
radical Islamist groups 13, 15
separatism and 34
Malik, Adam 380
Maluku
future challenges and 161–2
Islamic forces after new order 146–7
Muslim–Christian conflict, early beginnings of 147–8
central government response 159–61
Christian response 156–7
local Muslim response 154–6
national security forces response 153–4
NGOs and local government response 157–9
radical Islam and 19–20
see also Indonesia
Manuputty, Alex 156
Mao Zedong 300, 407, 408
Marcos, Ferdinand E.
communist insurgency and 405, 407, 413, 416, 417
CPP and 49–50
legitimacy and rebellion and 8, 9
martial law declared by 228, 229
see also Philippines
marriage
restriction on, Arakan state terrorism tactics and 338–9
Marriott Hotel bombing (Jakarta)
described 110–11
globalization and 72
individual bombers 112
JI's descent into terrorism and 97
Muslim separatism in Thailand and 57
new versus old terrorism and 38
post 9/11 threat and response and 438
PUPJI and 81
martyrs
aspiring mujahideen and, al-Ma'unah and KMM and 169–71
see also suicide terrorism
Masduki, Ajengan 98
Masour, Jabarah Mohammed 32
mass casualty terrorism
9/11 significance and 26
characteristic of new terrorism, as 34–7
new terrorism and 29, 30
post 9/11 threat and response and 438, 439
see also terrorism; WMDs
Matalam, Udtog 199, 229
Matin, Dul 442
Matthew, Trooper 170, 182
Maududi, Abu al-Ala 149
MBG (Misuari Breakaway Group) 196, 201–2, 217
see also Misuari, Nur
MCFF (Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters) 206
Megawati Sukarnoputri
Aceh conflict and 252, 253–4, 255, 257
assassination plot against 78
central government response to Maluku jihad and 159
martial law declared by 55
NGO and local government response to Maluku jihad and 158
Papua separatism and 287, 289, 290
unacceptability as Presidential candidate 150, 152
see also Indonesia
Memali incident 168–9
Mendoza, Rodolfo 212–13, 215
Mercy International 204
migrant reliance
new terrorism and 30
MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front)
Abu Sayyaf links 210, 211

Abu Sofia links 216, 217
al-Qaeda links 203
Communist rebellion and 51
counter-terrorism and 15
founding 225–6
JI links 204
Moro rebellion and 52–3
new and old terrorisms and 6
new terrorism emergence and 33, 34
Philippines separatism and 229–32, 235–41, 243
'radical Muslim terrorism' and 194, 196, 202–5, 217–18
separatism and 34
suicide terrorism and 112
terrorism and insurgency complexities and 13
terrorism threat and response and 438, 439, 441
see also Hashim Selamat
militant groups
complexities and 12–13, 14
counter-terrorism and 15
cults compared 182–3
general characteristics of 64–7
Java-based 19, 63–74
legitimacy of state and 18
making of, al-Ma'unah and KMM and 175–6
Messianic freedom fighters as, Hmong rebellion principal players and 357–8
new terrorism and 28, 31
prospects for 74
PUPJI 19
suicide terrorism and 19
Sulawesi, al-Qaeda factor and 136–7
see also individually-named groups; radical Islam
military suppression *see* suppression, military
Miller, Captain 114
MIM (Mindanao Independence Movement) 51–2, 199
Mimbantas, Alim Abdulaziz 240
Mindanao 108
see also Philippines
MIPT (National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism) 201
Misuari, Nur
counter-terrorism and 40
Moro rebellion and 52
MNLF armed struggle defined by 200
MNLF founding and 199, 229
Philippines separatism and 230, 231, 232
'radical Muslim terrorism' and 201, 202, 210
see also MBG; MNLF
MMI (Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia) 13, 64, 73–4, 77
MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front)
founding 225
Moro rebellion and 52
new terrorism emergence and 34
Philippines communist insurgency and 415
Philippines separatism and 229–32
radical Muslim terrorism and 194, 196, 199–202, 210, 217–18
separatism and 34
see also Bangsa Moro Army; Misuari, Nur
Mo, Timothy 395
mobility
restriction on, Arakan state terrorism tactics and 332
model villages
non-Rohingyas, for, Arakan state terrorism tactics and 334–5
see also land
Moertopo, Ali 378
Mohamed Amin Mohamed Razali *see* Amin Mohamed Razali, Mohamed
Mohammad Atef 55
Mohammad Iqbal Abdurrahman *see* Jibril, Abu
Mohammed Sadiq Odeh 207
Molina, Mailed 422
Mon People's Front 302
Moon, Chung-in 8
Morales, Horacio Jr. 412
Moro rebellion
old terrorism and 51–4
see also Philippines

Moscow bombing campaign *see* Russia
Moua Toua Ter 358
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick 171, 384
MRP (Majelis Rakyat Papua) 290, 291
MTA (Mong Tai Army) 309, 312
mujahideen
  aspiring martyrs and, al-Ma'unah and KMM and 169–71
Mukhlas 66–7
Munir Ibrahim 207
Murad Ebrahim, Al Haj 53, 204, 239–40, 242
Murtopo, Ali 68
Muslim converts
  suicide terrorism and 117
Mustopa in Semerang 80, 91
Myanmar
  legitimacy and rebellion and 8, 9
  radical Islamist groups 13
  separatism in 11, 293–9
    contemporary landscape 313–17
    post-1988, SLORC/SPDC 310–13
  see also Arakan; Burma; Karen rebellion

Nai Shwe Kyin 313
Namibia 288
Narameikhla (Solaiman Shah) 327
NaSaKa
  births and deaths registration tactics 337
  citizenship denial tactics 331
  extortion and arbitrary taxation tactics 336, 340
  forced unpaid labour tactics 333, 334
  land confiscation and eviction tactics 335
  marriage restriction tactics 338
  mobility restriction tactics 332
NaTaLa (Ministry for Development of Border Areas and National Races) 334
National Democratic Revolution 407–9
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency 239
Nationalities Liberation Alliance 302
Naw Seng 306
NBC (nuclear, biological or chemical) terrorism
  counter-terrorism and 41–2
  mass casualty terrorism and 34–5
  suicide terrorism and 119–20
  see also terrorism
NCGUB (National Coalition Government Union of Burma) 311, 314, 316
NCUB (National Council Union of Burma) 311, 314
Ndawu, Bernard 139
NDF (National Democratic Front) (Burma) 309, 310, 311, 312, 315, 411–14
NDFP (National Democratic Front of the Philippines) 405
NDPHR (National Democratic Party for Human Rights) 331
NDUF (National Democratic United Front) 302, 305
Ne Win
  Arakan state terrorism and 328
  Burma separatism and 299, 304, 308, 309, 310
  Myanmar separatism and 315
  Tatmadaw under 302, 303
  see also Tatmadaw
negotiations
  peace, limiting terrorism and 241–3
  political, Communist insurrection in Philippines and 426–9
Netherlands
  Aceh and 249
  Maluku and 148
  Papua separatism and 280–81, 282–3, 287
  Philippine communist insurgency and 413–14, 429
  Sulawesi and 125, 126
  West Timor and 374, 375
new terrorism
  causes 14, 29–34
  characteristics 6
  counter-terrorism implications 15
  countering 39–42
  described 4, 27–9
  emergence of 26–7
  legitimacy of state and 18

mass casualty terrorism threat, as characteristic of 34–7
old terrorism compared 6–7, 23–4, 37–9
radical Islam and 18
separatism and 6, 7
suicide terrorism and 18
see also terrorism
New Zealand 288
Ngayaan, Daniel 426
Nhia Long Moua 358, 363
Nicaragua 421
Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz 167, 170–71, 179, 180, 181
Nik Aziz Nik Mat 168, 170
NLD (National League for Democracy) 46, 310, 312, 313, 314, 316
NMSP (New Mon State Party) 301, 302, 305, 307, 311, 314, 315
Noom Suik Harn (Young Warriors) 303, 305
Noor, Elina 20
Noordin Mohammed Top
al-Ma'unah and KMM and 180, 183, 186
JI according to PUPJI and 77, 78
Militant Java-based Islamist movements and 73, 74
suicide terrorism and 111, 112
see also JI
Norian Mai 170
Norway 429
NPA (New People's Army)
Communist insurrection in Philippines and 49, 50, 51, 405, 409–11
complexities and 12
growth and decline 415–20
'radical Muslim terrorism' and 204, 205
see also ABB; CPP
NRC (National Reconciliation Council) 271
nuclear terrorism *see* NBC (nuclear, biological or chemical) terrorism
NULF (National United Liberated Front) 307
NUPA (National Unity Party of Arakan) 313, 340
OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) 201, 229, 231
Oklahoma City bombing 26, 28, 37
old terrorism
causes and 14
counter-terrorism implications 16
described 4
legitimacy of state and 18
new terrorism compared 6–7, 23–4, 37–9
separatism and 6–7, 18
survey of 45, 58–9
Aceh rebellion in Indonesia 54–5
Communist rebellion in Philippines 49–51
Hmong rebellion in Laos 48–9
Karen rebellion in Myanmar (Burma) 45–8
Moro rebellion in Philippines 51–4
Muslim separatism in Thailand 55–8
see also terrorism
OMA (Office of Muslim Affairs) 214, 215
Omar, Abu 203, 207
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) 387
OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka) 284, 285–6, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291
OPMRC (Independent Papuan Organization Revolutionary Council) 284, 285, 288
Osama bin Laden
Abu Sayyaf links 206
counter-terrorism and 15
JI according to PUPJI and 97
MILF and 52
new terrorism emergence and 29–30, 31
new versus old terrorism and 37–8
radical Muslim terrorism and 195, 203, 204
Solid Base and 85
terrorist threat and response and 438, 440
transnational terrorist network emergence and 459

WMDs and 31
see also al-Qaeda
Othman Mohamed 179

Pa Kao Her 357, 358, 361, 363
Palestine 106, 114–15
PAMDAE, Inc. (Philippine Association of Muslimah Darul Eeman, Inc.) 214
PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional) 152
Panama 119
Pao National (Liberation) Organization 302
Papua (West Papua) 18, 21
see also Indonesia; separatist insurgency, Papua
Papua New Guinea 280, 287–8, 289
Papua Youth Group 290–91
Paribatra, Sukhumbhand 9
Pariela, Tony 160
Parimo, Herman 127
parliament *see* politics
PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia) 167, 169, 182, 186
Patek, Omar 213, 442
Pathet Lao
background to Hmong rebellion and 48, 352, 353
human rights abuses and Hmong rebellion suppression and 355
principal players in Hmong rebellion and 356, 357
USA as support base for Hmong rebellion and 361
Vietnam as support base for Hmong rebellion and 363, 364
Pavlova, Elena 19
PCN (Protestant Church in the Netherlands) 290
PDI-P (Parti Demokratik Indonesia-Perjuangan) 78, 257
PDP (Papuan Presidium Council) 289, 290
PDP (Parliamentary Democracy Party) 307, 314
peace
limiting terrorism through negotiations 241–3
Perrin, Andrew 357
Peru 38–9
PGMA *see* Arroyo, Gloria Macapagal-
Phibunsongkram, P. 267, 268, 270
Philippines
Communist insurgency in *see* Communist insurgency, Philippines
counter-terrorism and 15, 16, 40
legitimacy and rebellion and 8, 9
political opposition groups 12
post 9/11 threat and response and 441–2
radical Islam and 18, 20
radical Islamist groups 13, 15
radical Muslim terrorism in *see* radical Muslim terrorism, Philippines
separatism in 12, 16, 18, 20, 34
separatist insurgency in *see* separatist insurgency, Philippines
suicide terrorism and 19, 115, 120
see also Arroyo, Gloria Macapagal-; Estrada, Joseph; GRP; Marcos, Ferdinand E.; Moro rebellion
Pinheiro, Paolo 316
Pires, Mário Lemos 380, 384
PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) 126, 377
PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) 38, 115
PKP (Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas) (later CPP) 49, 406–7
PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) 27, 33
PNP (Philippine National Police) 206, 214, 217, 237, 239
PNP-IG (Philippine National Police Intelligence Group) 208
Pobzeb, Vang 362
Pode, Prama'artha 139
Poe, Fernando Jr. 241, 429
politicians
exiled, Hmong rebellion principal players and 358–9
politics
causes of rebellion and 5
causes of terrorism and 3, 14
counter-terrorism and 15, 16, 17, 461
East Timor civil war and 380–81

grievance alleviation as weapon in counter-terrorism 24
negotiations, Communist insurrection in Philippines and 426–9
opposition groups 12
Papua separatism and 282, 283
parliamentary (1948–62), Burma 299–304
see also causes; Communism; legitimacy of state; radical Islam
Pongsudhirak, Thitinan 21
Ponulele, Aminuddin 134
Portugal
East Timor and 374, 375–6, 378, 379, 383, 386, 391
Maluku and 147
Poso Muslim Forum 137
postmodern terrorism *see* new terrorism
poverty *see* economics
Prados, J. 354
Prem Tinsulanond 268
premanism
Maluku conflict and 146–7
problem denial
government response to Hmong rebellion 368–70
PRS (Pusat Rujuk Social) 157
publicity
'CNN effect' 30
suicide terrorism and 106–7
terrorism as 'war of the third kind' and 452–3
PULO (Pattani United Liberation Organization) 56, 57, 273
PUPJI (Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah) 19, 32, 76–7, 78–82
see also JI
PVO (People's Volunteer Organization) 299

Qiy'adah Rosyidah (Core Group of Those who Follow the Righteous Path)
JI as, according to PUPJI 84
Qoi'dah Aminah (Secure Base)
JI as, according to PUPJI 86–8
Qoi'dah Sholabah (Solid Base)
JI as, according to PUPJI 84–5

Rabitat-ul-Mujahideen (Legion of the Fighters of God) 438–9
Rabiyya, Hamza al- 443
radical Islam
groups *see* militant groups
new terrorism and 18, 31–3
see also Islam
radical Muslim terrorism
Philippines 194, 217–18
Abu Sayyaf 205–12
Abu Sofia 216–17
defined 194–6
historical background 196–9
MILF 202–5
MNLF 199–202
RSM 212–16
see also terrorism
Radio Free Asia 362, 369
Radio Pathet Lao 370
Rahman, Tunku Abdul 229
Rajagukguk, Adolf Sahala 383
Rama I, King of Siam 267
Ramos, Fidel 50, 51, 231, 236, 405, 426, 428
RAND 16
Rashid, Ahmed 31
Razak, Mohamad Najib Tun Abdul 238
RCC (Revolutionary Command Council) 328
reasons *see* causes
rebellion
al-Ma'unah and KMM and 173–4
causes of 5, 18
characteristics of 14
complexities 18
legitimacy of state and 7–11
see also Hmong rebellion; insurgency; terrorism
religion *see* radical Islam; separatism
Renetil (Resistência Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor-Leste) 391
resettlement
government response to Hmong rebellion 367–8
Reyes, Angelo 429
Rice, Condoleezza 314–15

Riduan Isamuddin *see* Hambali
Ridwan, Amad 125
RLG (Royal Lao Government) 354, 358, 359, 361, 367, 368
  see also Laos
RNA (Rohingya National Alliance) 340
Robson, Alan 50–51
Rodell, Paul 20
Rohingyas
  citizenship denied to, Arakan state terrorism tactics and 329–32
    births and deaths, registration of 337–8
    extortion and arbitrary taxation 336–7
    human rights, other violations of 339
    labour, forced unpaid 333–4
    land confiscation and eviction 335–6
    marriage, restriction on 338–9
    mobility, restriction on 332
    non-Rohingyas, model villages for 334–5
  elimination of, state terrorism effect, Arakan 342
  see also human rights
Rohmat *see* Zaki
Roihan, Achmad 77, 80
Roosevelt, Theodore 227
RPF (Rohingya Patriotic Front) 308, 313
RSM (Rajah Solaiman Movement) 117, 194, 196, 212–16, 217, 234, 235
  see also RSRM
RSO (Rohingya Solidarity Organization) 13, 313, 339, 340, 438
RSRM (Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement) 441
  see also RSM
Rusdan, Abu 77, 78
Russia 30–31, 33, 119

Sabaya, Abu 233, 234
Sagadevan, Detective Corporal 170, 182
Said, Zaini Mohd 180
Salafism
  JI and 63–4
  Maluku conflict and 148–9
  militant group characteristics and 67
  radical Muslim terrorism and 195
  Thalib and 149–50
Salamat, Hashim *see* Hashim Salamat
Salas, Rodolfo 417
Salazar, António 375
Salem Ali 207
Salim Shah II 327
Samudavanija, Chai-Anan 9
Samudra, Imam 66, 80, 98, 438
Sanchez, Romeo 426
Sandinistas (Nicaragua) 421
Sangaji, Arianto Santo 139
Santana, Nino Konis 379
Santos, Ahmad 212, 214, 216
Santos, Daud 216
Santos, Jallaludin 199
Santos, Pedro Abad 406
Sao Hkam Hpa 316
Sao Shwe Thaike 304, 316
Sarit Thanarat 268, 270
Sarmiento, Rene 243
Saw Ba Thin 47
Saw Ba U Gyi 302
Saw Hunter Tha Hmwe 305
SBPAC (Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre) 268, 271
SEC (Securities Exchange Commission) 203
Second Great Rectification Movement 419–20
security
  aviation, suicide terrorism and 118–19
  counter-terrorism implications 17
  non-traditional issues 3–4
  terrorism challenges 456–7
  see also counter-terrorism
Sein Win 311
Senegal 288
Senga, Generoso 240
Senghor, President 288
Senglathone, Khenekham 366
separatism
  Aceh rebellion 54–5
  cause of terrorism, as 3–4

complexities of 11–12, 13
counter-terrorism implications 16–17
Hmong rebellion 48–9
Karen rebellion 45–8
legitimacy and rebellion and 8, 11
legitimacy of state and 18
Moro rebellion 51–4
Muslim, in Thailand, old terrorism and 55–8
new terrorism and 6, 7, 33–4
old terrorism and 6–7, 18
see also Burma; Myanmar
separatist insurgency
Papua 279–80, 291
grievances, fundamental 282–3
historical roots of 280–82
independence struggle 283–6
Indonesian government response 288–91
international communities' response 286–8
Philippines 225–6
Abu Sayyaf Group, odyssey of 232–5
historical roots 226–8
Jabidah Massacre 228–9
MILF and al-Qaeda + Jemaah Islamiah, coupling and decoupling 235–41
peace negotiating, limiting terrorism and 241–3
separatism to Islamic consciousness, MNLF to MILF 229–32
see also insurgency
Shamsul Bahari Hussein 181
Shan State Communist Party 302
Shan State Independence Army 298
Shanti Bahini movement 308
Sheik Mohammad *see* Salem Ali
Shim, Steve L.K. 173, 174
Shining Path 38–9
Sholeh, Badrus 19
Shukri Mustafa 184
Silverstein, Josef 311
Singapore 32, 36–7, 42, 109, 119, 168
Singer, Margaret 182
Sison, Jose Maria
biographical details 407
capture 50
CPP chair and 417
declared terrorist by USA and EU 405, 429
exile 50, 413–14
Plaza Miranda bombing and 411
publications 408–9, 410
see also CPP
Siti Norma 174
Sivongsa, Myka 367
SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) (later SPDC) 310
Sluka, Jeffrey A, 325–6
Smith, Martin 21–2
Smith Dun 303
SNLD (Shan Nationalities League for Democracy) 314, 315
Soares, Mário 376, 391
Sonthi Boonyaratkalin 276
Soulivong Savang, Prince 49
Souphanouvong, Prince 48
South Africa 288
Souvannavong, Outhong 358
Spain 51, 196, 225, 226–7, 405
SPCPD (Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development) 201, 232
SPDC (State Peace and Development Council) (formerly SLORC)
Arakan state terrorism and 328, 330, 333
Burma separatism and 293, 299, 302, 308
Myanmar separatism and 310–13, 315, 316, 317
Sri Lanka 38, 105, 113–14
SSA (Shan State Army) 307, 309, 312, 314, 315, 316
SSNA (Shan State National Army) 312, 316
SSNLO (Shan State National Liberation Organization) 309
state
Islamic, revolution, al-Ma'unah and KMM and 168–9
legitimacy of *see* legitimacy of state
state terrorism
new terrorism and 28–9

see also Arakan, state terrorism in; terrorism
SUA (Shan United Army) 307
Suharto, President
Aceh conflict and 252
East Timor and 377, 381, 393, 394
JI according to PUPJI and 77
legitimacy and rebellion and 9
Papua separatism and 288–9
terrorism and insurgency complexities and 13
see also Indonesia
suicide terrorism
9/11 significance and 27
air-based 118–19
al-Qaeda and 438
new terrorism and 18
radical Islamist groups and 19
Southeast Asia 104–5, 108–13, 120
emerging trends 115–17
future outlook 118–20
reasons for 105–8
tactical trends 117–18
triggers of adoption of 113–15
see also Bali bombing; terrorism
Sukarno, President 125, 126, 281, 282
see also Indonesia
Sulaiman, Abu 215, 216, 234
Sulawesi
armed struggles and local history 125–7
crisis 125, 133–6
Fabianus Tibo, curious case of 138–9
militia groups, al-Qaeda factor and 136–7
phase 1 (December 1998) 127–8
phase 2 (April–May 2000) 128–9
phase 3 (May–August 2000) 129–30
phase 4 (July–December 2001) 130–33
phase 5 (2002) 133
radical Islam and 19
reasons for conflict 122–5
recent events 139–40
see also Indonesia
Sulu
suicide terrorism and 108
see also Indonesia
Sumatra
suicide terrorism and 108
see also Indonesia
Sungkar, Abdullah 71, 72, 83, 98, 236
suppression
Hmong rebellion, human rights abuses and 355–6
military, government response to Hmong rebellion 366–7
SURA (Shan United Revolutionary Army) (Burma) 307, 309
Syafiah, Abdullah 55
Syaikh Abdulaziz bin Baz 148–9
Syed Serajul Islam 5, 22
synchronization
suicide terrorism and 117–18

tactics
state terrorism, Arakan 329–39
suicide terrorism 106, 117–18
terrorist threat and 438–9
Tahir Alonto 239
Tandzim Sirri (Secret Organization)
JI as, according to PUPJI 85–6
Tanggahma, Ben 288
Tarbara, Arturo 426
Tatmadaw
Burma separatism and 302, 303, 305, 309
Myanmar separatism and 312, 313, 315
see also Ne Win
Taufik Rifki 120, 239, 240
Taylor, John 382
taxation
arbitrary, Arakan state terrorism tactics and 336–7
terrorism
book themes and structure 17–24
consequences of 4
defined 4–6, 17–18, 27
future 447–8
limiting, peace negotiating and 241–3
maritime, Abu Sayyaf and 211–12
'radical Muslim', defined 20, 194–6
response 437, 448–9
crafting 442–7
threat 437, 448–9

al-Qaeda and 437–9
emerging 439–42
'war of the third kind', as, counter-terrorism and 451–7
see also causes; complexities; consequences; counter-terrorism; mass casualty terrorism; NBC (nuclear, biological or chemical) terrorism; radical Muslim terrorism; new terrorism; old terrorism; state terrorism; suicide terrorism
terrorist networks
transnational 4, 457–9
Thai–Lao Border Commission 360
Thailand
Burma separatism and 300, 306–7
Communism in 7–8
Communist insurgency in 22
Hmong rebellion and 48, 49, 355, 358, 359, 366, 369
legitimacy and rebellion and 7
Malay-Muslim insurgency in *see* Malay-Muslim insurgency, Thailand
Muslim separatism in, old terrorism and 55–8
Myanmar separatism and 312
new versus old terrorism and 39
political opposition groups 12
radical Islamist groups 13
separatism in 11–12, 18, 21, 33–4
suicide terrorism and 19, 114, 115, 120
support base for Hmong rebellion, as 359–60
see also Bali bombing
Thaksin Shinawatra
Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand and 21, 268–9, 270, 271, 272, 274–5, 276
Myanmar separatism and 312
Thalib, Ja'far Umar 65, 137, 148–50, 151, 155
Than Shwe 313, 314, 315, 316
Thompson, W. Scott 50
Tiamzon, Benito 417
Tibo, Cornelius Fabianus 129, 130, 133, 135, 136, 137, 138–9
Tilao, Aldam *see* Sabaya, Abu
Time Asia Magazine 369
TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) 252, 283, 289, 291
Tokyo subway attack 28, 34, 37
Tomagola, Tamrin Amal 146, 160
Tong, Ricardo 211
Tong Yer Thao 368
Torquiddin 71
torture
Indonesian invasion of East Timor and 383
see also human rights
Touby Lyfoung 354
TPN (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional) *see* OPM
treaties
Anglo-Siamese 55, 267
London (Anglo-Dutch) 249
Friendship and Cooperation 1977 (Laos/Vietnam) 364
Treaty of Paris (1898) 405
see also agreements; legislation
trends *see* characteristics
Trinidad, Khalid 213
Tuan Shi-wen 307, 308
Tutu, Desmond 288, 316

U Bee Tu Re 300
U Nu 299, 302, 303, 304, 307, 314, 328
U Seinda 297, 302
UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights) 332, 333, 335, 338
UDT (União Democrática Timorense) 376, 378, 379, 380
UIFO (Union of Islamic Forces and Organization) 199
UK (United Kingdom)
Aceh and 249
Arakan state terrorism and 327
Burma separatism and 293, 296, 297, 303
Karen rebellion and 45, 46
Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand and 267
Muslim separatism in Thailand and 55
RAND study and 16
Ullah, Ruland 202, 211

ULNLF (United Lao National Liberation Front) 358–9, 361
UN (United Nations)
  Aceh conflict and 249
  Arakan state terrorism and 329, 330, 342
  Burma separatism and 301, 310
  Commission on Human Rights 336, 364, 367, 393
  Declaration of the Rights of the Child 335
  East Timor and 374, 380, 392, 393
  Hmong rebellion and 352, 363, 366
  International Forum on Indigenous People 363
  Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand and 267–8, 272
  Maluku jihad and 153
  Myanmar separatism and 310, 314, 316, 317
  Papua separatism and 281, 282, 286, 290, 291
  see also Conventions; UNSC; UNTEA
UN-HABITAT 335
UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) 274, 313, 331, 339, 340, 341, 360
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) 407
Union Solidarity and Development Association 316
United Lao Movement for Democracy 362, 370
United Liberation Front of Assam 307
UNSC (United Nations Security Council) 40, 316, 383–4, 385
  see also InterFET
UNTEA (United Nations Temporary Executive Authority) 283
US Department of Defense 27
USA (United States of America)
  Burma separatism and 300, 310
  counter-terrorism and 36, 41, 42
  East Timor and 384, 387, 392–3
  'global war on terrorism' and 3, 4, 5, 6, 15, 17
  Hmong rebellion and 352, 354, 358, 359, 363, 366, 371
  Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand and 271, 272
  Moro rebellion and 51, 53
  Myanmar separatism and 316
  new terrorism and 27, 30
  new versus old terrorism 37
  Osama bin Laden and 37–8
  Papua separatism and 281, 282
  Philippines Communist insurgency and 405, 407, 417, 420, 426, 427, 428–9
  Philippines separatism and 225, 227–8
  Philippines takeover from Spain by 406
  post 9/11 threat and response and 438, 439, 448
  PUPJI and 81
  radical Muslim terrorism and 196–7, 212
  suicide terrorism and 109, 118–19
  support base for Hmong rebellion, as 360–63
  terrorism definition 27
  see also 9/11
Uto, Datu 227
UWSA (United Wa State Army) 311, 315, 316
Uzbekistan 114

Valentine's Day bombings 208, 442
Van Dijk, Cees 98
Vang Pao
  China as support base for Hmong rebellion and 363
  exiled politician, as 359
  Lao government responses to Hmong rebellion and 366
  Messianic freedom fighter, as 358
  Pathet Lao takeover and 355
  RLG army and 354
  Thailand as support base for Hmong rebellion and 360
  United Lao Movement for Democracy and 370
  USA as support base for Hmong rebellion and 361, 362
Veitch, Jim 19
Vermonte, Philips 21
Vietnam

Hmong rebellion and 48, 49, 357, 367, 369, 370
legitimacy and rebellion and 9
separatism and 33
suicide terrorism and 108
support base for Hmong rebellion, as 363–6
Vietnam News Agency 365
VPDC (Village Peace and Development Council) 337
Vue Mai 369

Wahabism
radical Muslim terrorism and 195
Wahid, Abdurrahman
Aceh conflict and 252, 253
Maluku jihad and 150–51, 152–3, 153–4, 158, 159
Papua separatism and 287, 289
Sulawesi conflict and 138
see also Indonesia
Waldheim, Kurt 384, 385
Wali Khan Amin Shah 206–7
Wan Min Wan Mat 181, 183, 184
Wattimena, Agus 156
Werror, Moses 284
West Papua *see* Papua
West Papuan Independent Committee 285
West Papuan National Front 285
Westerling, Captain 125
Whitlam, Gough 377, 394
WMDs (weapons of mass destruction)
9/11 significance and 26–7
counter-terrorism and 41, 42
mass casualty terrorism and 34, 35–6
new terrorism and 28, 30–31
see also mass casualty terrorism
women
Indonesian invasion of East Timor and 382–3
suicide terrorism and 115–17
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against (CEDAW) 336
World Development Report 407
wrongs
righting, al-Ma'unah and KMM and 183–6

Xai Shua Yang 357

Yabo, Jameela 203
Yang, Siatou 368
Yangyongyia, Sivongya 366
Yano, Alexander 240
Yazid Sufat 179
Yong Chanthalansy 356, 370
Yong Yua Her 357, 358
Yosfiah, Yunus 381
Yousef, Ramzi Ahmed 206, 233, 439
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang 132, 133, 253, 255, 290, 291
Yugoslavia 33
Yunos, Muklis 441
Yunos, Saifullah 112–13, 236

Zabidi Mohamed 170
Zahid 183
Zahit Muslim 169, 178, 181, 183
Zaki 208
Zau Mai 313
Zubayadah, Abu 236
Zulkifli bin Hir 237–8
Zwahiri, Ayman al- 55, 97, 85, 440